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Preface
The objective of this dissertation is to explore the usefulness
of accounting infonnatian to trade unions. Evidence fran this and
previous research supports the view that, at best, trade unions
believe financial infonnatian to be of little use and, at worst, as
largely irrelevant. By contrast, financial analysts use the sane
infonnation in conjunctien with other published ecananic and
industrial statistics, to assist investors to nonitor and, in effect,
control the econaT!Y. This suggests there is an incentive for the
unions to acquire the necessary skills to analyse financial
infonnation, so that they too can IOOnitormanagementpolicy, and thus
be in a better posi tian to further the interests of their members.
And yet they do not, and showfew signs of wanting to.
To understand this apparent paradox, this thesis argues that the
trade unions use of accounting infonnatian has to be understood in
the context of their methods, objectives and role in capitalist
society.
This thesis concludes that for the trade unions to realise the
potential of accounting infonnatian, they would need to organise en
the basis of "strategic unionism". The arguments presented are
illustrated and developed through a detailed analysis of closures at
Dunlopdurin3 the late 1970s and early 1980s. '!he case-study shows
(a) that the trade unions could have foreseen Dunlop's closure
programneby utilisin3 the infonnatian potentially available to then,
and (b) that they failed -to do so because of the constraints Imposed
upon their strategic uses by organisational and institutional
weaknesses.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
In theory accounting information should be useful to trade unions.
In practice, it appears not to be. Investors use financial and other
data to value assets, and to monitor the performance of compani es,
industri es and the economy. Why do trade unions not use the same
information and techniques to analyse and understand management's plans?
The purpose of this thesis is to explore this question.
A key source of financial information potentially available to the
trade unions are the published accounts of companies. However, as these
were not specifically designed for use by trade unions they appear to
believe that they are inappropriate for their puposes. This led Cooper
and Essex (1977) to conclude that:
II ••••• the camp 1exity of accounts, the belief that they are
susceptible to manipulation by management, their aggregated
nature and their concentration on financial data which are
only a part of likely information needs, results in the
attitude that accounts are inadequate and hence,
infrequently used" (p.210).
One senior trade unionist, Clive Jenkins, has gone further by
expressing an apparently widely held view that "published accounts are
utterly and absolutely useless" (quoted from Halmesand Sugden, 1982,
p.ii;). Some union researchers have voiced similar opinions. For
example, Gold et al (1979) suggested that trade unions are unable to use
company information effectively in collective bargaining, because "what
is publicly available is not of real relevance, reliability, suitability
or usefulness" (p.20). Whilst Moore (1978) declared that:
2"The most basic weaknesses of company accounts and reports is
that they are hi storic documents which are out of date and
lacking any serious forward-looking or "prospective"
dimension" (p.l).
However, it is clear that these statements are based on a
misunderstanding of the accounting model. Financial analysts, for
example, routinely use company accounts to estimate the "earning power"
of an enterpri se, a measure of the abi 1i ty of a company "to generate
cash inflows in excess of outlays in the long run" (May, 1977, p.94), or
the cash generated in excess of the investment in assets requi red to
maintain the company in "steady state".
The importance of company accounts is that they form one part of
the total financial information used by analysts to build economic and
financial models of companies, industries and national economies. It is
collected and produced in the interests of investors, and it is used to
protect and further their objectives. However, the information which
enables investors to control and monitor the economy, could
theoretically also be used by the unions for the same purpose. As Bryer
et al (1984a) have pointed out, in Britain and the United States there
is
IIan effi ci ent and effective system for the fi nanci a1 control
of industry based largely on publicly available information.
Ironically, the effective control of private industry is
made possible only by making the system that achieves it
Ipubliclll (p.2l).
The main reason is that the public availability of economic and·
financial information (rom company reports, government publications,
academic institutions and other research bodies, substantially reduces
3the cost of collection, validation and analysis. If investors had to
assemble this information individually the cost would be prohibitive.
To quote one student of business policy:
II In the end, the most re1iab1e inte11igence sources for
competing organisations are open; the best data, seldom
secret, are the actions of the other party" (Wilensky, 1967,
p. 72) •
The trade unions, therefore, theoretically have the opportunity to
formulate policies and strategies for individual companies, industries
and for the economy as a whole, using the same publicly-available
information. However, the unions invariably disregard accounting and
financial analysis, even though in dOing so it has been argued that they
are placed at an unnecessary disadvantage. This is because
"accounting and finance are the most important planning tools
of capitalism; decisions are made and performance is
measured in financial terms, and if investors' plans are to
be understood and challenged financial analysis is
indispensable" (Bryer et a1, 1984b, p.227).
But, as Reeves and McGovern (1982) have pOinted out:
liThe inst inctive reaction that many trade unionists feel
about becomi ng too close ly invo 1ved with manageri a1
decision-making is a powerful inhibitor •••••for (making)
more extensive uses of company information" (p.27).
A key problem appears to be that many trade unionists believe that
financi ali nformat ion is the property of management, who are seen as
controlling the enterprise through their possession of this "valuable
neutral cOllll1odity"(Gold et al, 1979, p.98). Similarly, Owen and Broad.
(1983) in thei r interviews with 14 blue co11ar and 11 white collar
stewards (a small sample), found that just over half of the former group
believed that the information provided by management was "unbi ased and
4factual"; a view, however, which was not supported by a single white
coll ar steward. Overall,. Owen and Broad found that the white coll ar
stewards were highly scept ica1 of informat ion dise1osed by management,
whereas all of the manual stewards said they found it slightly useful,
with six stating that it was moderately or. very useful. These
researchers also found a "low ambitiousness of demands" on the part of
the manual stewards, with nearly half claiming that they had enough say
in decisions made at work, whilst only one white collar steward
supported this view. Further, when specific decisions were considered:
the introduction of new products; investm~nt plans; and the drawing up
of financi a1 budgets, white collar stewards 1ikewise disp1ayed a low
level of ambition, with just over half in each case claiming that it was
a "management matter". Yet deci sions taken ina 11 three areas have a
strong bearing on job prospects, which we shall see, has been claimed to
be of paramount importance to the concept of trade unionism. However,,
not planning strategically in the context, of an understanding of
management's plans, merely responding to management's decisions, is
inconsistent with the claims that an objective of trade unions is to defend
employment.
The question therefore arises: why do the trade unions not develop
policies to make effective use of financial information, and what
implications does this failure have for our understanding of the nature
of trade unionism?
Clearly, trade union uses of information must be understood in the
context of their goals and objectives. Two dimensions on which these
may be explored are their economic and political forms. In principle,
5trade unions could pursue either "sectional" economic objectives or
"strategic" economic objectives, and they could do so either with
"pluralist" or "radical" political objectives. These ideal-typical
unions, and their demands for information which are implied, are shown in
Figure 1.1 and discussed below:
Figure 1.1 - Ideal-Typical Economic and Political Objectives for Trade
Umons
SECTIONAL OPTION 1 OPTION 2
* HIGHER WAGES * SOCIAL WELFARE
* INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
ECONOMIC
OBJECTIVES
OPTION 3 OPTION 4
* NATIONALISATION * CHALLENGEINVESTORS' STRATEGIES
* REDISTRIBUTION OF
INCOME AND WEALTH
STRATEGIC
PLURALISt RADICAL
POLITICAL
OBJECTIVES
Option 1
Here, trade union policy is primarily concerned with pursuing the
economic and sectional interests of its members, usually in the form of
higher wages. They look to the state for no positive support. Although
the unions may refer to the company's ability to pay, they will mainly
refer to "external standards", such as the cost of 1iving index. Such
trade unions would need only local financial information and broad-
economic indicators.
6Option 2
Trade unions may extend their objectives from being solely
concerned with wage issues, to an interest in the context in which
wages and the conditions of life are set. The unions are now concerned
with politics, but are heavily constrained by the sectional economic
interests of individual unions. At the political level the unions will
pursue socia1 welfare policies. This politica1 outlook may spi11over
into the industrial sector, encouraging the unions to make a wider range
of issues subject to joint determination, culminating in a demand for
greater industrial democracy. These demands pose no threat to
management control, and again the trade unions need only local financial
information, and broad economic and social indicators.
Option 3
Here, trade union policy encompasses wider economic objectives.
The unions take a more strategic overview of the economy. Sectional
economic interests are replaced by a limited consensus. The unions seek
a degree of redistribution of income and wealth, and call for the public
ownership of key companies and industries. Although such unions may
attempt to change the economic system, their aim is not to challenge
capitalism. !he trade unions still adhere to a pluralistic perspective,
which implies that they refrain from directly challenging management
prerogatives and control. The trade unions explicitly limit their
aspirations, and conflict is institutionalised through the mechanism of
collective bargaining. Again, only local financial information and.
general economic and social indicators are required by trade unions.
7Option 4
Here, the unions recognise a need to make more political use of
informat ion. A strategi c approach replaces their previous IIad hoc II
demand for information. Under this policy the unions monitor
investors' strategies. They accept that their interests and those of
investors are diametrically opposed. The unions adopt a radical
political perspective. Here they need all the information demanded by
investors. This ideal I call IIstrategic unionismll•
The Case Study
These ideal types are used to explore a detailed case-study of the
trade unions' information strategies which arose from the major changes
t ak i nq place in the UK motor industry and the British tyre
sector, with specific emphasis on Dunlop Holdings PLC, one of the
principal component suppliers.
During the 1970s, but particularly after 1979, capital investment
in British manufacturing industry declined sharply. As a consequence,
between 1969 and 1981, employment in manufacturing fell by one-thtrd,
with half the job losses occurring after 1979 (Bryer et a1, 1984, p.18).
By 1981, output had similarly fallen by 22% from its a11~time peak in
1973, with two-thirds of the decline resulting after 1979 (Ibid).
Among the major industries affected was vehicle production and its.
component supply industries. British Leyland, for example, shed 75,000
jobs between 1978~9 and 1981~2, whilst Dunlop lost 19,000 jobs over the
same period (Ibid, p.39). Dunlop's problems arose, initially, from its
failure to invest in modern manufacturing facilities when the tyre
8industry had under-gone a major technological change. Unfortunately for
Dunlop, the first oil shock happened to coincide with the spread of the
steel radial tyre (which has a ltf'e-span more than double that of a
crossp1y tyre) which, in combination, led to a stagnation in output and
demand in the British and European tyre markets. Dunlop responded by
closing down technologically obsolete production facilities.
We shall see that the strategiesadopted by the tyre c:arq;an:i.esn response
to the changes taking place in the motor and rubber industries, raised
many information policy issues for the trade unions in the tyre sector
which, if they had been tackled, could have influenced policy-making
within the unions concerned.
Research Methods and Sources
The fie1dwork research for the case-study was divided into two
phases:
(1) An identification of the policy issues affecting the British tyre
sector;
(2) An identification and appraisal of the information policy responses
of the trade unions.
During the first phase, statistics and industrial information were
collected on the tyre se~tor, Dunlop Holdings PLC, and the British motor
industry. The purpose was to identify the major problems and issues
facing the tyre sector, and to look specifically at the strategy adopted
9by Dunlop to respond to these changes. This was supported by a detailed
financial appraisal of Dunlop's trading position (see Chapter 4 and
Appendices 3 and 4). The main sources of data were obtained from
industry and government statist ics; market research reports; annua1
company reports and accounts; reports and minutes of the Tyre Industry
Sector Working Party; stockbrokers' reports and circulars; trade
journals; trade union reports; newspaper articles; and academic
publications. The information collected and analysed was largely
publicly available, and is assumed to be identical to that used by
financial analysts monitoring the tyre sector. All this information was
potentially available to the trade unions.
The second phase of the research was concerned with investigating
how far the unions had used this information to develop their policy
responses. The purpose was to analyse the strengths and weaknesses in
trade union strategy and organisation for acquiring and using business
information. To identify the trade union policy and strategy, access
was acquired to files and documents of the GMBATU, the major union
concerned. Interviews were also carried out with nine union officials,
shop stewards and research staff who played an important role in
formul at;ng and deve1opt ng union policy. The GMBATU is the second
1argest union in the rubber industry behind the TGWU, though it is the
union with the largest membership in Dunlop. Union records show
membershi p was highest amongst process and ancf llary workers. There
were also about 2,000 MATSA union members in the industry, with about
50% employed in Dunlop •.
10
In 1976, the GMBATU established regular, annual, regional and
national conferences for the rubber industry. The proceedings of these
conferences were analysed. At regional level delegates were elected to
attend the national conference, which decided union policy for the
rubber industry. The conference gave shop stewards the opportunity to
meet with the National Industrial Officer for the industry, and to r a i s e
wit h him issues of major concern. These were supplemented by a
conference held each year specifically to discuss policy towards Dunlop,
attended by shop stewards from the company. Overa11 union industri a1
policy was, however, decided by Congress, which was attended by
delegates from all companies and industries.
The thesis is organised in the following manner:
Chapter 2 examines the literature on the industrial and political
objectives of trade unions and describes the main methods they use to
achieve their goals. It shows that trade unions in Britain tend to be
solidly located in cells 1,2 and 3 of Figure 1.1, where sectional
interests predomi nate, and where the unions I main preoccupat ion is to
enhance their respective members I wages and conditions through
collective bargaining. Here accounting information is less useful to
trade unions precisely because of their limited economic and political
objectives. Thus, even if the unions had full access to all of the
information available to management, it would have only a negligible
influence on trade union strategies. This is because traditional trad&
unionism is "reactive" hot "proactive", and both the employers and the
state have a vested interest in using their power to control and to
"domesticate" the objectives of the unions.
11
Chapter 3 reviews previous research on information disclosure to
trade unions. It shows that this research has mainly adopted a
pluralist perspective, where disclosure is seen as redressing any
imbalance that may exist between what are essentially "equal" partners.
It is argued that this view ignores the fact that information disclosure
is essentially political. For example, the Government has made the
disclosure provisions in the Employment Protection Act (1975) highly
restrictive, so that employers are not obliged to disclose information
which may disadvantage them in their negotiations with the trade unions.
In Chapter 4 the first part of the case study is presented. It
describes the closure of the Dunlop tyre plant at Speke, in Liverpool,
and detai 1s the efforts made by the workforce at the factory to resist
the company's closure plan. These included political campaigning,
demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins and alternative plans. We shall see
that the trade unions were ob1ivious of management' s plans until they
were announced. Further, the unions failed to learn from this
experience, and were once more caught unaware by Dunlop's planned sale
of its European tyre operations to Sumitomo of Japan.
Chapter 5 reviews the ~trategic policies pursued by Dunlop during
the 1970s and early 1980s. It shows how the company responded to the
spread of the steel radia1 tyre, the dec1ine in car production in
Britain and the two oi1 crises. The chapter out1ines the type of
information which was available to an investment analyst, and which wa~
thus theoretically available to the trade unions, to analyse and monitor
the tyre sector. Far from being surprised by the closure of Dunlop's
tyre plant's and the rationali sation of its operations, analysts were
12
fully aware that this strategy was being planned and implemented.
Chapter 6 explores why the unions were unable to use the
information available to keep themselves informed about management
policies, or to develop their own strategy for the industry. It is
based on an analysis of the trade unions involvement in the Tyre
Industry Sector Working Party, and explores the institutional constraint
which this implied on the trade unions' information demands and concern
for industrial strategy.
Chapter 7 summarises the case~study and draws general conclusions.
13
CHAPTER 2 - THE ROLE OF TRADE UNIONS IN CAPITALISM
There appears to be a clear consensus in the industrial relations
literature, among both Marxists and pluralists, that trade unions are
incorporated into capita1isrn and that this serves to influence thei r
aims and objectives. In other words, trade unions are incapable of
transforming themselves into revolutionary bodies, or of pursuing
objectives that are unacceptable to management or the state. Thus to
understand the usefulness of accounting information to trade unions in
pursuing their goals, its potential role must be examined in the context
of their subordinate position in society.
Not surprisingly, therefore, many Marxists (e.g. Anderson, 1967)
are sceptical of the ability of the trade unions to advance the
interests of the working class. At the same time, some plurali st,
writers have concluded that the unions have become 1argely redundant,
and that they have 1itt1e or no role to play in modern industri a1
society. John Kenneth Galbraith (1967), for example, argued that "(t)he
union belongs to a particular stage in the development of industrial
system" (p.274), which is characterised by conflict between employer and
employee. However, he believes that once this stage has been surpassed
and power shifts to the technostructure, conflict lessens, and the need
for unions similarly recedes.
14
Defensiveness
Although some scholars of the Labour M ovement may questi on these
viewpoints, it is nevertheless clear that both Marxists and non~Marxists
recognise that there are severe constraints on the ability of unions to
achieve their goals in capitalist society. Why, therefore, do workers
join unions? Is it because they wish to engage ina revo 1utionary
struggle against capitalism? Or is it because they believe that through
collective organisation they will obtain higher wages and better working
conditions? Undoubtedly, since most workers have not so- far developed a
revolutionary consciousness, they are seeking greater material rewards.
Indeed, it has often been asserted that the main foundation of trade
unionism in Great Briain is job consciousness rather than class
consciousness (Milne~Bailey, 1934). All an Flanders (l968a) has
similarly argued that workers do not join trade unions because they
•
share a common social or political philosophy; they do so primarily to
gain immediate improvements in their work situation which they expect to
follow from collective organisation and collective action. However,
this is not the only reason. The operation of the labour market ensures
that the employer is able to negotiate with the workforce from a
position of strength. He is able to select employees, replace them with
machines or dispense with their services when no longer required. The
simple act of combination can therefore be interpreted as a defensive
measure against the employer.
The Trad~Union Congress in its evidence to the Royal Commission on
Trade Unions and Employers' Associations (Donovan Commission) set down
the defensive nature of trade unionism:
15
IIAri sing out of their status as employed persons, dependent
on earnings, dependent on securing and retaining employment,
workpeop1e know that to exercise their rights they must find
a means to redress the balance of unequal strength vis~a~vis
their employers. Whilst the position of the individual
employee, both in law and in practice, is one of
subordination, individual employees together recognise that
it is through combination that they can develop a means, the
essent ia1 means whieh they possess, to harness thei r own
potent ia1 strength. It is in the nature of the employment
situation that working people readily identify themselves
with their fellows in groups. This feeling of collective
identity enhances the economic freedon of the individual, a
freedom which rests on the knowledge that unity is strength.
Just as the bargaining strength of the individual is
enhanced when he combines with his fellow workers in a group
at a place of employment, so on a wider plane, trade unions
grow in size and extent to become whatever may be the most
effective combination of workpeop1e to advance and protect
those interests, arising from thei r employment, wh ich they
have in cOlIIDonII(1966, pp.30~ 1)•
The predominance of defensiveness has played a very important part
in shaping the objectives of trade unions. If one looks at the position
of weakness and insecurity faced by most working people, it is
understandab 1e why this strategy has been adopted. Many workers find
themselves in the situation, particularly in a period of recession and
high unemployment, where improvements in pay and conditions are of
secondary importance. Their prime concern is to prevent their existing
position from being made worse. Workers may therefore respond by
resisting changes in working practices, the introduction of new
machinery or the reduction in manning levels. This can be attributed to
the
IIgreater priority.of the goal of maintaining existing gains
over that of pursuing new ones" (Crouch, 1982, p.124).
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When workers do decide to push for a particular demand, they have
to weigh up the cost of any action against the likely gain. This
involves taking into consideration the likely response of the employer.
To this extent, workers are forced to press claims that management will
find broadly acceptable, rather than radical claims that will be
rejected outright; in the words of Perlman (1949):
"(Manua1 workers) have had their economic attitudes basically
determi ned by a consci ousness of scarcity of opportuni ty"
(p.6) •
Workers are also aware that taking industrial action in pursuit of,
say, a wage demand, may ultimately lead to a reduction in employment.
The employer may respond by sacking striking workers or, if the wage
increases are such that they lead to a steep rise in the cost of labour
to that of capital, the employer may decide that it is more economic to
replace labour by machinery.
Arising out of this defensive posture, trade union action has two
fundamental characteristics which are mutually reinforcing. Firstly, it
is reactive rather than instigative and, secondly, it is orientated
towards the sect iona1 interests of its members. As Hyman (l975) has
explained:
"Trade unionism is primarily reactive because of the right
accorded to management in capitalism to direct production
and to command the 1abour force. Unions can win some
~mprovements in workers' conditions, protest successfully at
tndtvtdual decisions, and impose certain general limits on
managerial prerogative. But as long as they maintain a
primary commitment to collective bargaining, they cannot
openly attack the predominant right of the employer to
exercise control and initiate change. 'Management would
never agree to that ': what unt ons demand in collect ive
barg~ining is necessarily constrained by what is considered
reallstic, and what is realistic is defined in terms of what
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the employer can be persuaded to concede ina negot iated
settlement. This clearly does not extend to any radical
alteration in the balance of power in industry" (pp.97-8).
According to Clements (1978) the key factor preventing the
development of an objective working class identity "in and for itself",
has been the fragmentation of the class, especially along industrial
lines. This legacy is due, in no small part, to the development of the
early craft unions. Propelled by the doctrine of "vested interests",
they sought to recruit membership from a distinct trade or occupation.
Only those workers who went through an apprenticeship and qualified as
a tradesman were eligible for membership. The union allowed entry into
its rank to those who possessed this particular skill, regardless of the
industry or service where they may be employed. By cantrall ing the
entry of apprentices into the trade, and by regulating the length and
nature of apprenticeship, the union could control the supply and price
of labour; a tradition inherited from the early craft societies (Clegg
et a1, 1964, p.S).
However, the organisational development of trade unions along
sectional lines also helped to dissipate the unions' radical socialist
perspective, and to blur the common interests of workers, thereby
hindering the development of class consciousness. This is because
collective bargaining, by its very structure, encourages sectional
interests as well as providing an institutional means of regulating and
controlling industrial militancy. Trade unions are therefore unable to
bring about a revo1utiopary change in society because
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"(t lhe normal activities of unions which necessitate
estalished bargaining relationships with employers,
conciliation and compromise, and the division of the working
class along the lines of sectional interests, clearly serve
to strengthen, rather than weaken, capitalist relations of
production (Clarke, 1978, p.18).
Thus:
"Unions are naturally oriented towards furtheri ng the
interests of their own members within the framework of
capitalism rather than the interests of the whole class
through the abolition of capitalism" (Hinton and Hyman,
1975, p.59).
Management are also likely to encourage sectionalism because it is
divisive and helps prevent workers from realising their COlll1lon
interests. Moreover, sectional claims can be more readily contained
than radical demands based on class interests.
Trade Union Objectives
Traditionally the rule book of every trade union sets down the aims
and objectives of the organisation. These differ between unions, though
a cOlll1lonthread runni ng through all is a commi tment to improvi ng the
terms and conditions of employment of their respective members. Other
objectives adopted by trade unions may more closely represent the
political and social aspirations of members rather than their everyday
pursuits:
"Unions that came into existence at periods of unrest and
socia1 upheava 1 tended to phrase their objects in
socialistic language, while those that were formed in times
of peace and prosperity were more likely to adopt the sober
language of 'business unionism'" (Milne~Bailey, 1929, p.45).
It is perhaps for these reasons that the Webbs, when writing on the
"History of Trade Unionism", did not explicitly describe trade union
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objectives, but stated that a union was:
"a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of
maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment"
(5 and B Webb, 1894, p.1).
The Webbs instead chose to concentrate their ana1ysis on trade
union methods, where they sought to infer what a trade union was from
what it actually did.
When the Webbs re-edt ted their book in 1920 for the Workers'
Education~l Association, they replaced the word "employment" by the
broader term "working lives". This was to placate those critics who
felt that the earlier definition presumed the continuation of the
capitalist system - an inference denied by the Webbs (Coates and Topham,
1985, p.1).
In the following years a number of other scholars of the Labour
M ovement have tried to elaborate on the Webbs' definition of the trade
unions' central purpose, to take into account: salary earners' and the
professions (Milne-Bailey, 1934; Paynter, 1970); to emphasise that the
unions' aim is to secure "control of the job" (Perlman, 1949); to
demonstrate that the purpose of trade unions is not purely economic, but
that through collective bargaining they seek to establish industrial
rights for workers (Flanders, 1968a); and to emphasise that trade
unionism seeks to establish a "countervailing structure of control" to
restrict and to some extent neutralise the dominant position of the
employer. According to.Hyman (1975):
20
"A trade union is, first and foremost, an agency and a medium
of power. Its central purpose is to permit workers to
exert, collectively, the control over their conditions of
employment which they cannot hope to possess as individuals;
and to do so largely by compelling the employer to take
account, in policy and decision-making, of interests and
priorities contrary to his own" (p.64).
The Trad~Union Congress in its evidence to the Royal Commission on
Trade Unions and Employers' Associations also set out what it believed
to be the main objectives of trade unions. These were as follows (though
not necessarily in rank order of importance):
(i) improved terms of employment
(ii) improved physical environment at work
(iii) full employment and national prosperity
(iv) security of employment and income
(v) improved social security
(vi) fair shares in national income and wealth
(vii) industrial democracy
(viii) a voice in government
(ix) improved public and social services
(x) public control and planning of industry.
(TradesUnion Congress, 1966, p.33)
From this list it would appear that what the TUC believes can be
achieved through collective bargaining in a capitalist society ;s
marginal. Indeed the TUC stated in its written evidence to the Donovan
Commhsion that:
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"The objectives which may be pursued are wider than those
which can be met by bargaining with employers. There can be
no theoretical limit to the scope of advancing and
protecting the interests of employed people, and trade union
objectives will extend into any field which is of common
concern to their members" (p.32).
To a 1arge extent many of the above objecti ves fall withi n the
realms of traditional socialism, and therefore the unions will have to
pursue these goals through other methods, including statutory regulation
and political action. Amongst these objectiv~s was the "public control
and planning of industry" which the TUC saw as being concerned with:
lithe performance of industries rather than with the details
of management of particular firms ••••• (and) •••••with
ensuring that the great industries of the country are making
the best use of their resources and that their policies with
regard to prices, investment, and exports •••••reflect the
needs of the community as a wholell (p.39).
The TUC advocated public control of industry, firstly, as a means
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of IIredressing the balance of private powerll and,secondly, on the basis
of restructuring and improving the economic performance of an industry.
In other industries the TUC believed that public control and planning
could be achieved through the workings of the newly created Economic
Development Committees.
Union policy therefore appeared to be more concerned with economic
performance than with the question of ownership and control. Clearly,
the TUC was not prepared to challenge capitalist control of the economy
beyond the nationalisation of the major utilities, and other key
industries such as coal, steel and the railways which had been starved
of investment. Far from advocating IIworkers' controlll of industry, the
unions were prepared to accept limited nationalisation, which did not
pose a threat to the overall power of investors. Thus:
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"Contemporary trade union action involves comi ng to terms
with the power of capital rather than attempting to
overthrow that power: collective bargaining is a process of
defensive accomodation to the existing external power
structure, and involves the relief or suppression of
immedi ate grievances rather than any attempt to tackle the
underlying cause of workers' problems. Therefore the
conventional role of trade unionism may be accepted as
merely a protective function exercised within the
constraints of capitalist domination of the employment
contract: collective negotiation may secure better terms for
the sale of labour power - but it does not begin to question
the acceptability of wage'slavery" (Clarke, 1978, p.16).
To achieve a socialist transformation of capitalist society, the
unions would need to overcome sectional divisions and to unite behind a
common political programme. For this to happen the unions would also
have to recognise the political dimensions of their industrial
objectives.
Trade Union Methods
The Webbs distinguished three main methods by which trade unions
seek to achieve their objectives: Mutual Insurance, Legal Enactment and
Collective Bargaining. Other methods used by trade unions include:
organisation; education and training; joint consultation; autonomous job
regulation and international activities. There is, however, no rigid
dividing line between these various methods, and no absolute distinction
between methods .and objectives (TUC, 1966, p.33). A trade union will
adopt that method which it considers most appropriate for the purpose in
hand.
Today the two pr+nctpat methods used by British trade unions are
collective bargaining and political action, with the former considered
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to be the most important. The Webbs, on the other hand, believed that
the method of legal enactment would largely replace collective
bargaining. This, however, has not happened largely because of the
traditional hostility of the unions towards relying on assistance or
intervention by the state, emanating primarily from anti-union
legislation and hostile judicial decisions. Thus,
" •••••• the state of the law, and how it is moulded by
political legislators as well as interpreted by the courts,
establishes a framework within which unions shape their
objectives and fashion their methods" (Fox, 1985, p.163).
This led to the development of a tradition that has become known as
"vo1untari sm"; where workers bel i eve that they are capable of achi evi ng
thei r objecti ves through thei r uni ons. Fl anders (1969) has i denti fi ed
three different principles associated with this tradition:
"The first expresses a preference for collective bargaining
over state regu 1at i on as a1ternat i ve methods of sett 1i ng
wages and working conditions. The second favours keeping
i ndustri a1 di sputes out of the courts by preservi ng our
non-legalistic type of collective bargaining. The third
principle is an insistence by the bargaining parties on
thei r complete autonomy (the notion of I free I co11ect ive
bargaining) which leads them to resent any outside
intervention in their affairs" (p.289).
Voluntarism has also encouraged the belief that:
"politica1 action should be treated as subordinate to
industrial action and statutory regulation as inferior to
regulation by collective agreement II (p.292).
So long as the system produced industrial peace and fostered good
industrial relations, government was prepared to allow it to flourish.
The public were not troubled, and the contents of collective agreements
were considered to be of no concern to anyone but the parties to the
bargain and those they represented.
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"consequent1y the government's role was largely confined to
that of peacemaker, which naturally included the fosteri ng
of voluntary arrangements. That it should also act as a
pacemaker was categorically rejected on all sides. Its job
was to hold the ring, to see the rules of the contest were
respected, but otherwise to leave the contestants to fight,
or rather to argue, it out" (Flanders, 1965, p.101).
Hyman (1975) detected an alternative reason for keeping the state out of
industrial relations:
"In Britain, 'vo1untarism' in industrial relations sharedwith 1aissez~faire ideology in general an essentially
practical basis: the confidence of employers in their own
ability to exercise control without outside assistance.
This meant in turn that trade unions should lack either the
power or the wi11 to interfere excess ively with manageri a1
objectives" (p.135).
The non-t ntervent ion by the state in the specifics of co11ective
bargaining simply allowed the more powerful employers to dictate the
structure of their relationship with the trade unions. Further,
successive governments have established a number of institutions whose
prime functions are to assist capital. These include, for example, the
Emp1oyment Service to help firms to recrui t 1abour, and independent
bodies such as ACAS, to arbitrate and mediate during industrial
disputes in order to encourage industrial peace and to restore
production. Where all else fails, the state can intervene directly by
legislating to restrict the right to strike or to picket. As a last
resort, the police can be used to break-up picket lines, or the ar~ may
be drafted in, under the Emergency Powers Act (1920), to maintain vital
services.
The postwar years have witnessed a more pronounced intervention by
the state in industrial relations matters, as the Br1tish econo~ became
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beset by economic decline. Full employment policies strengthened the
bargaining position of the trade unions, while firms began to experience
declining profitability. The state reacted by using incomes policies to
place restraint on the freedom of bargainers, to hold down wage
settlements. From the late sixties onwards, this was coupled with
policies aimed at assisting management to regain control over the labour
process. In essence, therefore, voluntarism has always been "more
apparent than real" (Hyman, 1975, p.137),
Industrial and Political Issues
A key feature of industrial relations in Britain has been the clear
separation between "industrial" and "political" issues. Each of these
has been seen to require distinctive organisations and strategies, and
have been pursued in different arenas. In practice, however, it is
often difficult to distinguish which is the more appropriate category.
Industri al and political matters are deeply entwined. The difference
for the trade unions, therefore, lies primarily in the methods used to
arrive at a solution to a problem.
Where an issue is considered to be an "industrial" matter, the
trade unions will seek to bring their power and influence to bear on the
employer. If no agreement is reached industrial action may follow,
which could range from an overtime ban or a work-to-rule to a strike or
lockout. A dispute of this nature will remain firmly in the industrial
arena, except where essent t al services are involved or where there is
widespread disruption which threatens the "national interest". In these
circumstances it may become the subject of a parliamentary debate, but
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direct government intervention would normally only be considered as a
last resort. On the other hand, when trade unions engage in "political"
methods they bring their power and influence to bear on political
parties or government.
As we noted earlier, these categories are not mutually exclusive.
It may happen that an issue is consi dered at first to be an industri a1
matter, but later it may enter the realm of politics. On occasions, an
issue may be both an industrial as well as a political matter. We can
take as an example the case of redundancy. The terms and the
accompanying financial compensation were regarded, initially, as a
matter to be decided by management and unions. Later government passed
the Redundancy Payments Act (1965), which provided workers with a legal
right to financial compensation when dismissed for economic reasons.
Alternatively, a situation may arise where the workforce refuses to
negotiate with management, and instead decides to resist the planned job
losses by occupying their factory. A relatively obscure local issue may
then attract national news coverage and develop into a major political
issue, as in the case of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (McGill, 1973).
We must also take into consideration that over time prevailing
views change, so that issues once considered political may later be
class ified as industri a1 and vice-versa. Over the postwar years the
distinction between the two categories has become increasingly blurred,
as successive governments have taken a more interventionist role to
steer the direction of, the economy. The actions of government in
pursuing these policies - to control inflation and to maintain
profitable economic growth ':'have a direct bearing on the industrial
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context within which management and the unions have to operate. If the
government embarks on a tight fisca1 and monetary policy to control
inflation, this may result in a reduction in output and hence lead to an
increase in unemployment. Conversely, government may try to use
instruments of regional policy to influence the location of industry,
which will also have a direct impact on employment and wage rates in
local labour markets. Thus, the trade unions feel the need to have an
input into the process of political decision-making to affect these
issues at the industrial level.
After the Second World War, there seemed to be an unwritten
agreement between the trade unions, the employers and the politica1
parties, that industrial issues should be handled by industrial methods.
Consequently,
1I ••••• when they have a choice, trade unions invariably prefer
to rely on industrial rather than political methods to
achieve their aims ••••.they are prepared to use political
methods to support and to supplement their industrial
methods, but never to supplant them •••••trade unions derive
their membership sanctions, in other words satisfy this
institutional need, primarily through their industrial
activities •
•••••as a minimum, trade unions must be involved in politics
in order to establish and maintain the legal and economic
condit ions in which they can flourish. That is the lower
limit imposed on their political aims by their institutional
needs •••••there is also a maximum, an upper limit to the
aims they can follow in politics, which is also'set by their
institutional needs. They cannot, for example, adopt
political aims which would seriously threaten their
industrial unity ••••.When political divisions within a trade
union become too acute and occupy too much attention, the
result is paralysis and possibly disruption" (Flanders,1961a, pp.26-31).
Mann (1973) is critical of this division between industrial and
political action, which he attributes to the dominant ideology of
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capitalism. As part of this "conditioning", trade unions have come to
accept that they should not use industrial weapons, for example,
strikes, to pursue political ends which should remain the exclusive
domain of parliament. Trade union 1eaders may have reasoned that to
break with this convention might provoke government to reta1iate by
enacting legislation or by using coercion to restrict trade union
rights.
The Labour Party has likewise been keen to maintain this separation
in the belief that it would be politically damaging to its image as a
national party if it were seen to be siding with the trade unions in
the event of an industrial dispute.
However, by this limitation on the use of their industrial methods,
trade unions have effectively restricted their ability to achieve their
political objectives. Moreoever, not only has political action been
separated from industrial action, but the latter has also been
sub-divided into two subordinate and distinct spheres: the economic and
job control spheres. The former is concerned with the pursuit of
financial improvements within the existing structure of industry.
Whilst through job regulation the union seeks to establish rules jointly
with management to enable the worker to exert control over an agreed
area of work.
A trade union has been described as "a political agency operating
in an economic environment" (Ross, 1948, p.306). Unions find it easier
to obtain higher wages for their members, as part of their share of the
total income generated by the firm, than to win concessions from
29
management on issues of job control. This is because there is only a
fixed amount of work available for distribution, and one party can only
increase its area of control at the expense of the other. Management
are therefore more likely to compromise on economic issues than on the
prerogative of control. Hence, union action is rarely oriented towards
increasing job control. On the contrary, because unions are organised
towards achieving economic bargaining gains, they have often been
prepared to relinquish shopfloor controls, established informally or
surreptitiously, in return for higher economic rewards.
Mann (1973) has argued, on the other hand, that if workers
possessed full class consciousness, they would seek amongst their goals
worker control of industry and society. This wou1din theory enable
them to attain both "material and moral fulfilment, economic sufficiency
and freedom of self expression II (p, 295) • However, unions have not
pursued this goal with any conviction. Mann contends that their failure
to do so has been counter-product.tve to the interests on the working
class:
"Hence, to the extent that trade unions pursue economic and
Job-centro 1 issues separately and the 1atter defensively,
and to the extent that they do not pursue wider issues of
work control, they operate to weaken workers' classconsciousness" (p.298).
In other words, the sectional economistic pursuits of trade unions
reduces the class nature of the confl iet, and inhibits unions from
translating their industrial objectives into general political demands.
Similarly, collective bargaining, by its very structure, encourages
sectional interests and operates as an institution to channel and
control industrial conflict.
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Radical Objectives
The Webbs (1920), by contrast, believed that the growth and
development of trade unionism would ultimately lead to the overthrow of
capitalism:
lithe object and purpose of the workers, organised
vocationally in Trade Unions •••••is no mere increase of
wages or reduction of hours. It comprises nothing less than
a reconstruction of society, by the elimination, from the
nation's industries and services, of the Capitalist Profit
maker" (p.71]).
The radical aspirations concerning the issues of power, control,
and social accountability are embodied in the rule books of most trade
unions. A key commitment in the TGWU's rule book is the need:
lito endeavour by all means in thei r power to control the
industries in which all their members are engaged II (quoted
from Milne-Bailey, 1929, p.61).
The first aim of the AUEW is:
lithe control of industry in the interests of the cOlllllunity"
(Ibid, p.S8).
Whilst the Durham Miners' Association has as one of its objects:
liToseek the abolition of capitalism and the substitution of
cOlllllOnownershi p and control of the means of live1ihood II(Ibid, p.64).
These objectives clearly lie beyond the narrow confines of
collective bargaining, being achievable only by the overthrow of the
capitalist system. A number of the early socialist theorists, however,
held that the trade
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unions through their activities can contribute to a revolutionary change
in the nature of society:
"Strikes •••.•are the military school of the working-men in
which they prepare themselves for the great struggle that
cannot be avoided; they are the pronunci amentors of single
branches of industry that these too have joined the labour
movement ••••••And as schools of war, the unions are
unexcelled" (Engels, 1978, p.40).
lenin (1973), on the other hand, stated that:
"Trade-unionist politics of the working class is precisely
bourgeois politics of the working c1ass ••••••" (p.83).
He argued that the central tenets of trade union consciousness were
sectionalism and economism. By economism, lenin included not only the
pursuit of improvements in wages and conditions, but also union activity
at the political level aimed at winning concessions for labour. To
lenin, trade union politics was simply an attempt to reduce the rate of
exploitation of the working class, but not to abolish its subjugation to
capital. By concentrating on economic issues, together with their
narrow economic base, lenin held that the unions were incapable of
developing a revolutionary class consciousness, and were therefore
incapable of being more than reformist institutions.
To go beyond this stage and develop class consciousness, lenin
stressed that the working class would necessarily depend upon the
bourgeois intelligentsia to instruct them in socialist theory. Only the
revolutionary party could act as the vanguard of the working class to
lead them in the overthr~w of capitalism, because trade unions are able
to achieve their economic objectives under capitalism and therefore
become integrated into the system.
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Anderson (1967) also notes that trade unions are an essential
part of capitalist society, because they reflect the division between
capital and labour.
"(a)s institutions, trade unions do not challenge the
existence of society based on a division of classes, they
merely express it. Thus trade unions can never be viable
vehicles of advance towards socialism in themselves; by
their nature they are tied to capitalism. They can bargain
within the society, but not transform it" (pp.264-5).
Only a revolutionary party, Anderson asserts, can overthrow capitalism:
"Trade unions represent only the working class. A
revolutionary movement - a party - requires more than this:
it must include intellectuals and petit bourgeois who alone
can provide the essential theory of socia1ism ••••••Cu1ture
in capitalist society is in this sense a prerogative of a
privileged strata: only if some members of these strata go
over to the cause of the working class can a revolutionary
movement be born. For without a revolutionary theory, there
can be no revolutionary movement. Trade unions represent
too limited a sociological base for a socialist movement.
By themselves they inevitably produce a corporate
consciousness" (pp.266-7).
Whi1e it is undeni ab1y true that trade unions cannot perform the
same function and purpose as a political party, be it revolutionary or
democratic socialist, it is equally true that the unions do not regard
themselves as revolutionary bodies, much to the chagrin of a number of
socialist intellectuals. As Perlman (1949) put it:
"Trade unionism, which is essentially pragmatic, struggles
constantly, not only against the employers for an enlarged
opportunity measured in income, security, and liberty in the
shop and industry, but struggles also, whether consciously
or unconsciously, actively or merely passively, against the
intellectual who would frame its programs and shape itspo11cies" (p.5 )•
Flanders (1969) similarly described trade unions as:
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"••••••singularly pragmatic bodies, deeply distrusting
theories and ideologies" (p.280).
The reasons why the Labour Movement has pursued reform in preference to
structual change is not difficult to understand. As we noted earlier,
workers join unions to improve their standard of living, which they are
able to achieve under capitalism. Few workers take up union membership
because they see trade unions "as an agency for transforming the social
structure" (Galdthorpe et a1, 1968, p.28) • Thisis not to deny that
some trade union activhts are Marxists, or that on occasions Marxism
forms part of the Labour Movement's rhetoric. Nevertheless, as long as
unions are able to win economi c gains for their members, workers are
more 1ikely to choose reform. To mobilise industrial strength to
directly confront capitalism raises too many uncertainties. The
likelihood of success and the possible gains have to be weighed against
the potential ~osses arising from defeat, and so far "no general strike
has ever been successful" (Anderson, 1967, p.266).
Insecurity and uncertainty about the future strongly influences the
outlook of workers. It is for these reasons that trade unions are
unwilling to negotiate on the basis of long-term benefits, but prefer to
achieve immediate material rewards. From this it is easy to understand
why workers are fearful of change. New developments introduce unknown
elements which, based on this rationale, are likely to make them
worse-off. Consequently, Crouch (1982) observed that:
"••••••workers· actions will usually be incremental,
concerned with short-time advantage within known parameters,
it ;s not surprising that they rarely follow a revolutionarypath" (p.13l).
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He goes on to explain why this is so:
"As soon as workers acquire some power, capital makes
concessions to them; and given workers' incremental
approach, they take the concessions, with the result that
their pattern of demands and gains follows the contours of
the concessions which capital is able and willing to make -
not that of the points which might overthrow capitalism.
And given the tendency for unions to resolve their problems
of uncertain information about the labour market by clinging
to actions familiar. to them, they gradually become wedded to
that pattern as their own. In this way the labour movements
of the advanced capitalist societies have moulded themselves
around their various capita1s and have reached
accommodations with them. Revolutionary strategies are
likely to predominate only where capital makes no
concessions and presents a front of total resistance - a
characteri stic un1ike1y to be disp1ayed by capital ism and
more frequently found in autocratic pre-capitalist regimes"(Ibid). .
A number of other explanations have been advanced to explain the
lack of revolutionary zeal among organised workers. A common theme is
to blame the union leadership for imposing a restraining influence on
their membership in order to control their militant aspirations
(Clarke, 1978). Clements (1978) also suggests that union leadership has
been more exp1 icit1y reformi st than the rank-and-fl1 e. Ideo1ogical
constrai nts and integrat;ye pressures on the union bureaucracy have
ensured that at this level the unions have not. become "radical
politically conscious organizations" (p.325). Instead the union
leadership has been prepared to accept a politically subordinate role to
the Labour Party, which has not been prepared to attempt to
fundamentally alter capitalist SOCiety. By definition, without a
radical politica1 frame of reference, the aspirations of the
working-class will continue to be restricted to seeking marginal
improvements. In this respect, industrially and politically,
"macro-level trade union consciousness reflects the limited sectionalism
of the micro-level" (p.324).
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Paradoxically, however, whilst sectionalism limits workers'
perceptions, shopfloor militancy may,in certain circumstance~ lead to
an expansion of workers' consciousness. Mann (1973) contends that in
times of intense industrial conflict (e.g. the industrial unrest in
France in May-June 1968 or the Miners • strike in Britain in 1972) ,
workers have rejected their subordinate position as wage labour. This
may result in the transformation of their consciousness, or their
rejection of individual calculation in favour of collectivism. However,
this has not led to revolution, because workers have rarely been able to
extend their consciousness beyond collective solidarity to conceive of
an alternative socialist society. Mann describes this division between
the two acts as ..a cruci a1 watershed in contemporary class
consciousness" (p.301). Clearly, what has been missing is a coherent
ideology to enable workers to link economic and political issues. But,
"(w)hether trade unions as institutions can provide the
ideology to ensure successful transition is, in the light of
historical experience, highly unlikely" (Clements, 1978,
p.329) •
Trade unions are therefore left to effect only marginal
improvements in the well-being of their members. As we saw ear11er,
disputes tend to centre on wages and conditions, union recognition, and
similar matters. At times, shop floor militancy has been sufficiently
disruptive to encourage companies to introduce new managerial techniques
including productivity bargaining, job evaluation and measured day work.
Government has also intervened to assist management by implementing
incomes policies and industrial relations leglislation. But on the'
whole, trade union action has not posed a direct threat to the basic
fundamental s of the capita1ist system, such as the private ownershi p of
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property, the extreme division of labour, the hierarchial structure of
society and business organisations, the large differences in financial
r~wards, and so on. The unions have likewise made little effort to seek
joint determination of key management decisions covering investment,
expansion, and market opportunities.
Why do the trade unions not challenge management on all of these
issues which clearly have a direct bearing on the interests and
prospects of the workforce? A key reason is because, so long as the
unions are prepared to operate within the existing economic and
political framework, they are able to muster sufficient economic power,
and enjoy the support of the state and other sections of society, to
legitimately challenge management on this limited range of issues.
However, to successfully step outside this framework, and to confront
management on issues that lay at the heart of their authority, privilege
\
and values, would entail a large mobilisation of labour power. Faced
with a direct challenge of this kind, the employers would probably
mobilise the support of friendly organisations and sympathetic sections
of society and,ultimately, the power of the state. The trade unions
have, therefore, to consider the likely response of management and other
vested interests when they formulate their objectives:
"For the more ambitious and extensive a union's objectives,
the more likely are the politically and socially powerful to
express their hostility through acts of repression.
Conversely, if it curbs those objectives which seriously
threaten the status quo it may be able to win the
acquiescence and even goodwill of employers and the state.
Historically, unions which have become firmly established
have been drawn inexorably towards policies which are
relatively accepta6le to these significant others. Thus it
is rare indeed for trade union commitment to major social
change to be an operational one, in the sense of influencing
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day-to-day industrial tactics or serious long~term
strategies: the socialist attachments of British unions are
in general confined to the rhetoric of rule-book preambles
and conference speeches. Similar pressures normally affect
i ndustri a1 pol i ci es in such manner that interference with
managerial control does not go 'too far', while economic
demands are characterised by 'moderation'. Evidently, then,
the central role of collective bargaining in union policy
should be interpreted as an acconmodation to external power"
(Hyman, 1975, pp.BB-9).
Capita 1i sm does not, however, have to rely solely on the threat of
coercion to ensure that trade unions confine their aspirations to what
is "accepteb le", If it were to rely entirely on the threat of force,
then ultimately it could promote a similar reaction from among the
working class. A more potent and effective means of controlling the
objectives of the unions is the process of socialisation. As Allen
(1966) has explained:
lilt is not possible for unions which arose in opposition to
the dominant effects of capi ta 1i sm to operate withi n the
system as permanent bodies without taking on some of the
characteristics of the system itselfll (p.24).
This acts in the case of collective bargaining,
" •••••• by containing negotiations within limits which are set
more by employers' expectations than ethical considerations
concerning the distribution of income or estimates of what
the market can bear. The demands which unions make are
based on a concept of fairness which is conditioned by what
employers, by and large, are prepared to concede. In so far
as unions aim beyond this it is usually as a bargaining
tactic rather than a wholesome desire for something out of
the ordinary. In short, the aspirations of employees are
closely linked to what is immediately realizable" (p.29).
Ideological and social conditioning affect all aspects of workers'
lives. From childhood working people are brought up to respect and obey
rules and to accept directions from other people. Similarly in the
factory, workers learn to distinguish between those issues where they
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can legitimately challenge management authority, and those where they
are expected to conform and obey. If a worker steps outsi de this
consensus he will be told in no uncertain terms, by both shop stewards
and management, that his actions are unacceptable. In this way the
trade unions, along with other institutions, condition workers to accept
a subordinate role in society (Fox, 1985, p.54).
The ideological legitimation of capitalism is conducted through a
multitude of agencies, embracing the media, educational institutions and
religious organisations (Miliband, 1969). Through these agencies
capi ta1ism is able to set the tone of what is acceptable and what is
unacceptable. For example, trade unions are frequently portrayed as
being "irresponsible"; similarly nationalisation is presented as being
"bad" for the country. Whilst private acqUisitiveness is often used as
a measure of happiness and success. These ideological pressures
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inevitably influence how workers view their position and role in
society and, of course, their aspirations. Workers, therefore, find
themselves in the position where they are constrained and encouraged to
put forward only what is socially acceptable. In these circumstances,
it is impossible for employees to demand workers' control of industry,
without it sounding "silly". As Hyman (1975) observed:
"The, 'vocabul ary of moti ves' avail ab1e to employees ":'the
soclally acceptable justifications which can mobilise their
own ,actions, a~d influence the responses of others - imposes
serlOUS 11mltations. on their goals and strategies"(pp.146-7).
Allan Fox (1974) describe~ how this operates in practice:
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"Power and social conditioning cause the employee interests
to accept management Is shaping of the main structure long
before they reach the negotiating table. Thus the
discussion may be about marginal adjustments in hierarchical
rewards, but not the principle of hierarchical rew~r~s;
about certain practical issues connected with the prevalllng
extreme subdivision of labour, but not the principle of
extreme subdivision of labour; about financial (extrinsic)
rewards for greater efficiency, but not about the
possibility of other types of (intrinsic) rewards with some
sacrifice of efficiency; about measures which may achieve
company expansion and growth but not about the principle of
company expansion and growth; about how the participant
interests can protect and advance themselves within the
stucture operated by management to pursue its basic
object ives, but not about the nature of basic objectives II
(p.286).
Trade union officials are particularly vulnerable to these external
pressure which serve to domesticate the goals of trade unionism. For,
on the one hand, he is concerned to enhance the security and stability
of the trade union as an organisation, while on the other, he is engaged
in regular negot iations and deal ings with senior management. One of
consequences of this is that the union official will be keen to preserve
a good bargaining relationship with the employer. He is unlikely to
welcome any militant action which may damage this relationship. Thus,
Hyman (1975) described the main function of the union official as:
"•••••the negotiation and renegotiation of order within
constrai nts set by a capita1ist economy and a capita1ist
state" (p.9l).
Hence, if
11 •• , •• the union official sees orderly industrial relations as
essential for stable bargaining relationships with employers
and ultimately for union security, his viewpoint in many
respects parallels.that of management ••••Job control, as it
primarily concerns the lunion-as-an~organisationl ••••is
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therefore concerned more with stabilising the detail of the
relationship between labour and capital than with conducting
a struggle against the domination of capital. Such control
may thus involve the suppression of irregular and disruptive
activities by the rank and file which challenge managerial
control. In this way, union control and workers' control
may face in opposite directions •••••" (Ibid).
Collective Bargaining
Pluralists and radicals would probably agree that collective
bargaining is the most important of trade union methods. However,
whilst some pluralists have equated collective bargaining with
industrial democracy (Clegg, 1960), radicals see it as a process that
delivers only marginal improvements to workers without directly
challenging the system that perpetuates their subordination.
Allan Flanders is recognised as a leading pluralist academic. In
his view, collective bargaining is the raison d'etre of trade unions:
"All the other activities which the trade unions have
undertaken and all the other purposes they have acquired
must be regarded as a by~product and auxiliary to this their
major activity and purpose since success in it has been the
condition for their survival and the basis of their growth"
(l968b, p.75 )•
Flanders (1968a) argued that through collective bargaining the
trade unions fulfil their underlying social purpose, that of
"participation in job regulation" (p.42). Both the Webbs and Flanders
saw collective bargaining as a rule-making process. The Webbs (1902)
wrote that the objectives of the trade unions
"can be reduced to two economic devices: restriction of
numbers and the coman rule" (p.73).
"', ~
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The common rule encompassed collectively agreed norms covering the
terms and conditions of employment of a group of workers. The Webbs saw
the extension of common rules across each trade and industry as a
means of restricting competition in labour markets; thereby preventing
wages being undercut when the supply of labour exceeded demand.
Similarly, when the reverse was the case, employers would no longer have
to bid against each other for scarce labour.
For Flanders, collective bargaining served two great social
purposes: firstly, providing protection for the employee andisecond1y,
allowing him to participate in how these rules are made -thus enabling
him to gain more control over his working life. These rules may be
unilaterally imposed, jointly agreed between management and unions or
•
result from tripartite discussions involving government. The rules
estab 1ished are of two kinds: procedura 1 or substantive. Procedura 1
I
ru1es defi ne the status and re1ationsh ip between any of the part ies
participating in job regulation, for example, disputes procedures, union
recognition agreements. Substantive rules settle the status and rewards
of jobs, including wage rates, hours of work, and other conditions of
employment. In other words, the procedural rules of collective
bargaining regulate the making, interpretation and enforcement of its
substantive rules, while the latter regulates jobs.
Within this agreed set of rules the trade unions pursue a range of
objectives. These may include higher wages, a shorter working week,
increases in manning levels, improvements in working conditions, less
supervisory control and so on. Clearly, not all of these goals can be
achieved simultaneously. Union negotiators may, for example, have to
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make a choice between pursuing increases in wage rates or pressing for a
reduction in the working week. A similar choice may have to be made
between increasing staffing levels or expanding overtime working
practices. On occasions the union may have to decide whether to use
industrial action to achieve a desired objective. This introduces a
great deal of uncertainty into the negotiations because the workforce
is not always able to accurately predict management's resolution. Past
experience of management behaviour will, however, provide guidance. The
shop stewards wi11 .normally be fully aware of the 1ike1ihood of success
in pursuing a particular course of action, and they will be reluctant to
waste time pressing for a particular objective that they know management
will be unwilling to concede. The unions may find it preferable to bide
their time until circumstances are more favourable. In this way a
particular bargaining pattern may be established, where management and
unions become acquainted with what is acceptable and unacceptable to the
other side.
As well as pursuing substantive objectives, workers also seek
procedural goals. That is, workers seek the right to control, to
jOintly determine, or to bargain over issues that arise at work. These
procedural objectives may range from seeking control over the speed of
machines to the joint determination of investment decisions. A
procedural objective is, therefore,
"••••a goal concerned with control over work rather thanreturns from work" (Crouch, 1982., p.150).
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Thus, workers seek these goals, not because they are proposing to
overthrow capitalism, but because it will put them in a far stronger
position to secure their substantive objectives. It is a means of
guaranteei ng securi ty and assurance along with materi a1 gai ns. For
example, if workers are able to control the speed of their machines,
they can determine the level of output and, from this, the amount of
overtime working that will be required to meet existing orders. The
shop stewards may also try and ensure that it is they and not
management that decides on the allocation of any overtime working. At
one time the craft unions enjoyed the right of unilateral control, free
from any manageri ali nterference in job regu1 at ion. Today, thi s has
largely been eroded, with only the "professions", and to a lesser extent
the printing unions, still enjoying this control. Some semi-skilled
workers in the engineering industry are also able to exert a degree of
control, so that management in unable to make unilateral decisions on
manning 1eve1s, work-speeds, and so on, without fi rst enteri ng into
detailed negotiations with the unions.
A trade union may find itself in the position of having to choose
betwen a substantive objective and a procedural one. This could arise,
for example, during negotiations over productivity bargaining, where
workers may be persuaded to surrender some of their job controls,
including restrictive and other work practices, in return for increases
in wage rates. Management may see this as a preferable way of winning
back control of the job process, as opposed to engaging in direct
confrontation with the labour-force. The dilemma for workers is whether
management will use its new found strength to erode the real value of
these wage increases at some time in the future. If they believe that
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thisis indeed management' s intention, then they may decide to resist
all proposed changes. But even this strategy is not without its
pitfalls. Workers may come to realise that to maintain existing work
practices will contribute to an erosion of competitiveness, which will
eventually result in the loss of jobs. Similarly, increases in
productivity and efficiency, particularly in stagnant markets, may also
lead to job displacement.
The choice facing trade unionists are clearly never easy ones.
Fear of the unknown and the unexpected help to condition the defensive
position often adopted by the trade unions. Even when the unions try to
take a more assertive approach to policy goals, their stance has been
described by Crouch (1982) as:
"••••••cautious, unadventurous, occasionally taking an
aggressive plunge forward where it seems something can
safely be achieved. And it is an approach which suits the
logic of workers' situation: many of the factors
determining their environment are unknown to them; much has
to be taken on trust; their position is, always, one of
subordination to capital and fear of bumping against a
rigorous demand curve for labour" (p.138).
To sum up, the rules and procedures, arrived at by mutual
agreement, perform a dual purpose, in that they help to legitimate
management authority while at the same time restricting the potential
goals of trade unions. Trade union strategy within this context is
limited to pursuing objectives that are broadly "acceptable" to
management. To do otherwise would ultimately involve a direct political
challenge to capitalism. Collective bargaining may therefore be more
aptly described by a radical as
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1I •••••• a process by which the rank,,:,and-file,inferior in
power, status, and treatment, are allowed to press for
margi na1 improvements in thei r lot on condition that they
1eave uncha 11enged those structural features of the system
which perpetuates their inferiorityll (Fox, 1974, p.143).
Internal and External Job Regulation
Flanders also drew a distinct ion between what he termed interna 1
and external job regulation. The former are rules developed within the
company by shop stewards, either separately or jointly with management.
These may include a factory wage structure, or internal procedures for
joint consultation or for dealing with grievances. The 1atter
encompasses those rules which impinge upon internal rule- making, such
as protective labour legislation, and the rules of trade unions or
employers' associations.
The driving force behind the development of external job regulation
were the trade unions, who sought to impose constraints on the actions
of employers, so as to protect the workforce from the worst exigencies
of capitalism. These rules were introduced to fix minimum rates of pay,
to control working hours, and to improve working conditions. Hence, the
Webbs (1902) saw the "fundament al object II of trade unionism as:
lithedeliberate regulation of the conditions of employment in
such a way as to ward off from the manual-working producers
the evil effects of industrial competitioni• (p.807).
In addition to collective bargaining there are five other methods
of external job regulation: uni 1atera 1 regul ation by unions or by
employers' essoctat.tons , tripartite regulation, for example, Wages
Councils, involving independent or public representati.ves as well as
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trade unions and employers; state regulation by statute or common law;
and social regulation by custom and convention.
The driving force behind the development of systems of internal job
regulation, in contrast, has come from management seeking greater
control over the work of their employees. This can be associated with
the growth in size of business organisations, and the wider application
of the techniques of scientific management.
Criticisms of Job Regulation
Hyman (1975) is critical of this emphasis by pluralists on the
institutions of job regulation, though he admits that much of what
Flanders (and also Dunlop) has written is unassailable. This is because
"(rlules of various kinds clearly do pervade the world of
work and employment, and the institutions which devise and
implement this network of rules are of central importance
for the study of industrial relations" (p.ll).
Hyman's main objections to the definition of union purpose and the
subject matter of industrial relations in terms of job regulation are
stated below:
"The implication is that what industrial relations is all
about is the maintenance of stability and regularity in
industry. The focus is on how any conflict is contained and
controlled, rather than on the processes through which
disagreements and disputes are generated. From this
perspective, the question whether the existing structure of
ownership and control in industry is an inevitable source of
conflict is dismissed as external to the study of industrial
relations ~ whi~h must be concerned solely with how
emp1oyers, trade unions and other institutions cope with
such conflict. Thus to accept the definition of industrial
relations as job regulation is to share the traditional
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concern of conservative sociologists with the 'problem of
order': the interest is in how existing patterns of social
relations are stabilised, rather than the significance in
their own right of challenges to the prevailing social
structure.
This conservative tendency is reinforced when the notion of
an industrial relations system is used to suggest that
processes are naturally at work to maintain stability and
equi 1i bri um; that the vari ous i nsti tuti ons and procedures
are compatib1e and well integrated; and that confl i ct is
therefore largely self~correcting" (Ibid).
Hymaninstead seeks to broaden the emphasis on job regulation to
take into account the "process of control over work relations" (p.12).
In his view, if trade union purpose was restricted to job regulation,
then union objectives would be extremely narrow and uncontroversial, and
their role would be reduced to no more than protecting members from the
worst excesses of capitalism. Hymanhas summarised the implications of
this view of trade unionism:
"If unions have to accept the capitalist arrangements of
industry . the structure of ownership, of economic
priorities and of managerial authority - then they can
expect to provide no more than a 1imited range of
improvements in the worker's situation. The reasonable
member, in turn, wi11 vi ew hi s uni on as no more than a
fairly narrow service agency; so long as it delivers the
goods he has no cause to worry about its internal
government. It would be as pointless to tell his full-time
official how he should go about his job as it would be to
tell his greengrocer II (p.8S).
Hyman rejects this limited view of trade union objectives, and
insists that trade union purposes
"must be defined in terms of the members' own aspirations"
(p.84) •
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Flanders did in fact recognise that trade unions do have wider social
and political purposes, but they could not be easily incorporated within
his framework of job regulation. Flanders (1961b) asserted that trade
unions have always had two faces: "sword of justice and vested interest"
(p, 15) . He argued that if the unions were to operate more or 1ess as
"business" unions, there was a danger that they would end up losing the
loyalty and se1f~sacrifice of their members, which are the foundations
of the movement's "strength and vitality". This would render the trade
unions very vulnerable to any concerted attack from a hostile government
or from the employers. More so, if, because of their actions, the
unions were unable to appeal to the wider communi ty for support.
Flanders, therefore, suggested that the unions need to achieve a balance
between pursuing the narrow economic interests of their respective
members, and kind1ing the spirit of ideal ism in their quest to change
society in the interests of working people.
Trade Unions and Income Distribution
If trade unions are committed to collective bargaining because they
see it as the main method of improving the wages and conditions of
employment of their members, then it is essential to see how successful
they have been in achieving this goal. However, Flanders (1968c)
has further. argued that trade unions are not solely bargaining agents.
If people join unions simply for economic rewards, then they are
"unusually prone to se1f~deception". Instead he suggested that:
"the value of a union to its members lies less in its
economic achievements than in its capacity to protect theirdignity" (p.239).
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Fox (1975), however, though he accepts much of what Flanders says, has
pointed out that:
"••••••it is as a bargaining agent that the union finds its
major justification in the eyes of its members and that
issues relating to financial reward are still, whether for
material or symbolic reasons or both, among its major
bargaining preoccupations" (p.17l).
The living standards of trade union members can be improved in two
ways. Firstly, they could benefit along with everyone else from
technological advances which increase the growth in the size of national
income as a whole. In this instance the relative share of national
income will remain unchanged. A second way is for the trade unions to
effect a redistribution of income away from capital. This can be
achieved by a sustained increase in real wages through collective
bargaining.
In a capitalist economy workers forgo potential income to provide
the profits and interest required to induce the owners of property to
part with their capital. The ability of the trade unions to increase
labour's share of national income depends therefore upon whether they
can reduce capitalist consumption without endangering job creating
investment. However, in 1939 Keynes wrote that:
lithe stabi1ity of the proportion of the nationa1 dividend
accruing to 1abour is one of the most surpri sing yet best
established facts in the whole range of economic statistics"
(quoted in Burkitt and Bowers, 1979, pp.60-1).
This assertion has been qualified by a number of studies which have
suggested that, througn wage increases, the unions have been able
intermittently, to increase labour's share of national income (Phelps
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Brown, 1957; Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972; Robinson and Eatwell, 1973).
These studies show that short-run changes in factor shares may have been
due to union activity, however, long~run changes are attributed to
structural and secular trends.
Table 2.1 shows the long-run trend in the distribution of income
between labour (wages and salaries) and property, with the income of the
se1f~emp1oyed imputed 75% to 25% between 1abour and property. Up to
1910
Table 2.1 The Distribution of Inca.e between Labour and Property in the
UK. 1910-76 (annual averages)
% of gross
national produt
Year Labour
1910-14
1921-24
1925-29
1930-34
1935-38
1946-49
1950-541955';'59
1960-631964';'68
1969':'73
1974
1975
1976
55.3
67.4
66.4
68.1
67.1
73.0
72.1
73.4
73.6
73.6
75.6
78.1
80.2
78.3
Property
44.7
32.6
33.6
31.9
32.9
27.0
27.9
26.6
26.4
26.4
24.4
21.9
19.8
21.7
% of gross
domestic product
Labour
60.2
70.6
70.5
71.1
70.0
74.3
73.7
74.4
74.5
74.4
76.6
79.4
81.0
78.3·
Source: Burkitt and Bowers, 1979, p.62, table 5.2
Property
39.8
29.4
29.5
28.9
30.0
25.7
26.3
25.6
25.5
25.6
23.4
20.6
19.0
21.7
no major changes took place in the distribution of income between labour
and property. Between 1910 and 1976, however, labour's share increased
from 55.3% to 78.3%, with this shift concentrated in three periods:
1910-14 to 1921-24; 1935-38 to 1946~49; and from 1968 to 1975.
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According to Burkitt and Bowers (1979):
II••••••the weight of evidence refutes the hypothesi s of a
long-run constancy in relative shares when the overall
1abour share rather than that of wages is the variab1e
studiedll (pp.65~6).
Owen~Smith (1975) has put forward five reasons to account for the
increase in labour's share since the turn of the century. Firstly, the
supply of capital, and hence the capital/labour ratio, has increased and
"the effect of this capital substitution has been to lower capital
productivity and, therefore, its share of national income. Secondly,
self-:-employment in agriculture and small business has declined,
resulting in an increase in wage earners. This would allow the share of
labour relative to capital to increase, even though income per employee
remained constant. Thirdly, technological change has stimulated a
greater demand for labour. Fourthly, the skill level of labour has
increased more rapidly than the quality of capital. Fifthly, and IImore
controversialll, the rise of trade unions.
It is possible that the first four factors may have had some impact
upon income distribution. As to the fifth suggestion, Phelps Brown
(1957) has expressed doubts as to whether trade union power is a
sufficient explanation of changes in factor share. To explain relative
changes in factor shares, he examined the interaction between trade
union power and the market environment. When any increases in costs can
be passed on to the consumer in higher prices, the market is "soft";
when the converse is the case because of competitive forces, the market
is "hard", In the former. case, a rise in wages will leave distributive
shares unaltered because wages and prices increase in tandem, resulting
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in an inflationary spiral. In the latter case, if trade unions are able
to rai se the 1eve1 of wages, it wi11 be at the expense of property,
because the abi 1i ty to pass on increased costs to the consumer in the
form of higher prices will be restricted. The implications of this
analysis are that factor shares will remain unchanged in soft markets
with strong unions, or in hard markets with weak unions. On the other
hand, there will be a redistribution towards labour when there is a
combination of a hard market environment and strong unions, and a shift
towards property when markets are soft and unions are weak.
WhenBurkitt and Bowers (1979) applied this analysis to the three
periods in question, they found that other factors besides trade union
power and a hard market environment were responsible for the increase in
labour's share. In .the first period, they found that the increase in
unionisation and, therefore strength, was extremely important but alone
not a sufficient means ~ union membership increased to twice the pre-war
number. After the First World War, the unions sought to resist wage
cuts during the deflationary period that followed. Here they met with
some success which enabled them lito delay these reductions and often to
dimini sh them" (pp.68-9). Prices, therefore, fell more rapidly than
money wages, causing profits' share to be squeezed by the deflationary
market conditions and trade union endeavours to maintain wage levels.
Other factors also played their part. The proportion of income
generated by agri cu1ture, where labour's share was low, dec11ned;
whereas that generated by the public services, where labour's share was
high, rose. Meanwhile, se1f-emp10yement fell while skilled employment
expanded. The share of rent also fell due to war-time inflation and
legislative controls on rent. They therefore concluded that:
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"•••••••the rise in 1abour I s share duri ng and immedi ate1y
after the First World War occurred in response to a number
of factors, of which the growth in union strength would
appear to have been a necessary but not a sufficient
condition" (p.69).
Ouring the second period, the impact of war 1ed to a very high
demand for 1abour and the e1imination of unemployment. Rationing,
accompanied by price and rent controls, led to wages rising faster than
incomes from property. Between 1938 and 1947, average wages rose by
18%, while the average income from property fell by 15%. Over this
period, unionisation increased from 29.8% to 44.4%. Although the war
produced an inflationary climate, stringent price controls limited the
cost increases that could be passed on to the public, which ensured that
prices only increased by 6% between 1942 and 1945. At the same time,
the steep increase in total money income led to a drop in the real value
of rents, which were stringently controlled.
"Again, the growth of union strength in this period appears
to have been at least a permissive influence enabling the
rise in labour's share to occur" (p.70).
The profit squeeze in the third period can be partly attributed to
union strength, as membership started to increase in the late 1960s.
Property incomes were squeezed between intense international competition
and trade union pressure on wage costs.
liThecause lay in further deterioration in competitiveness.
Cont inued slow product ivity growth re1ative to conipetitors
abroad compelled capitalists to hold the rate at which
prices rose below that of costs (primarily wages) in an
attempt to retai n markets. Profi ts suffered as aconsequence.
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But pari ng down profi t margins was not enough to prevent a
seri ous loss of markets. The UK's share of world exports
fell and import penetration rose. The loss of markets in a
context of continued steady accumulation provoked accelerated
scrapping. Unemployment followed" (G1yn and Harrison, 1980,
p.53).
Once agai n the evi dence wauld suggest that the growth of uni on
power, bFoughtabout by the postwar period of full employment, is not the
sole explanation of the increase in labour's share. A major
contributory factor was the fierce increase in international
competit ion. The dec1i ne in 1abour 's share from the 1ate 1970s was
probably precipitated by government policies aimed at protecting profit
margins, essent i ally by ho1di ng down real wages. This was achi eved
through a variety of policies, including controls on wages, switching
the burden of taxation from capi ta 1 to labour and by all owing the
exchange rate to float downwards; thereby reducing real wages by raising
import prices and hence the price of consumer goods.
Thus, when attempts were made to raise profi t 's share through a
fall in real wages, the presence of strong trade unions could have been
vital to protecting labour's share. Yet all the available evidence
revea 1s that the uni ons had only a 1imited success, and that uni on
res i stance was usually manifested in an outbreak of wages di sputes,
leading swiftly afterwards to price increases.
In short, although the trade unions may believe that they have
successfully raised labour's share at the expense of property, research
shows that the increase was concentrated into three periods and that
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union activity was not clearly the decisive influence. This led Mulvey
(1978) to conclude that:
"unions probably have no appreciable influence on the
long-run distribution of factor incomes, although because of
imperfect adjustment, they may influence income distribution
in the short~term" (p.140).
Considerable doubt must therefore be expressed about the ability of
the unions to permanently raise labour's share whilst the ownership of
property lies in private hands. Declining property incomes may lead to
a reduction in capital accumulation and employment. Therefore, labour's
share can only be permanently protected through the abolition of the
private ownership of capital. As Burkitt and Bowers (1979) put it:
liTheessential prerequisite for trade unions to achieve their
aim of raising labour's share to the maximum consistent with
the maintenance of the long-run wage level is the
socialisation of investment funds and the corresponding
public ownership of the means of production" (p.66).
If these changes were brought about, the state would be left in the
position of having to decide, after consultation with the trade unions
and other interest groups, what proportion of national income would be
set aside for consumption and for capital expenditure. This would
enable labour's share to achieve its potential maximum, consistent with
the long~run maintenance and growth of national income, because property
incomes or profit would no longer be necessary to satisfy capitalist
consumption. These funds would then be available to finance capital
expenditure and to raise wage levels.
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Wemust remember, however, that workers do not join trade unions in
the belief that the share of labour in national income will be
increased. They do so because they bel i eve that thei r own personal
circumstances will be improved through collective action. One way of
testing to see if these aspirations are justified is to measure the
extent to which uni ons have been able to rai se the 1eve1 of thei r
members' wages above that which would have prevailed in the absence of
unionisation. Since it is virtually impossible to say with any accuracy
what this would have been, researchers have typically compared the level
and movement of wages of uni ani sed workers with comparable groups of
un~org~nised workers.
Phelps Brown (1962) suggested two particular situations where trade
unions are able to increase the relative wages of their members. The
first is when trade unions are formed and they are able to obtain a
once-far-all advantage over non-unionised labour; lithe impact effect".
The newly unionised workers though are unlikely to sustain this
advantaged conferred upon them as other groups of workers become
progressively organised. The second situation arises when unionised
workers are able to resist wage cuts more effectively than un-organised
labour; this is known as the "ratchet effect". The net result is that
. over the span of the trade cycle, money wage levels are probably no
higher than they would have been in the absence of trade unions.
Nevertheless, according to Phelps Brown, organised workers have
benefited when compared to nen-untontsee workers, not on the basis of
1arger pay increases or small er reductions in wage rates, but because'
the former had been obtained earlier and wage cuts, if any, would come
later. This has allowed unionised workers to enjoy the high wage rate
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over a comparatively longer period of time.
Lewis (1963) in his study on the impact of trade unions on relative
wages (based on an examination of earlier studies of individual
industries and occupations) of unionised and non~union workers, for the
United States over the period 1920-58, estimated that the unions had
increased the wages of their members relative to un~organised workers by
10-15%. The unton-non union wage differential will vary according to
conditions prevailing in the labour market. When the labour market is
tight the differential will be relatively small, and when it is slack
the converse wi11 be the case. In these circumstances, the 1arger the
differential the less employment there will be in unionised relative to
non-unionised industries. Lewis found that a 5% increase in the
differential would reduce employment in unionised industries by 3.8% and
increase non-union employment by 1.3%.
From this evidence, Burkitt and Bowers (1979) argued that unions in
the United States had an "impact effect" or a "once-for-all" increase on
members I wages, by counteri ng the monopsony power of the employer.
Thereafter, they were unable to produce a continuous widening of
differentials. Thus, they concluded that:
"The weight of evidence from US research suggests that some
association exists between wage differentials and union
strength but a casual connection is difficult to prove"(p.29).
Mulvey (1978) has interpreted the data differently and rejects the
arguments put forward tJ) support the "impact" hypothesis of American
unions. This is because union membership fell from 15% in 1920 to 9% in
1929, whi 1st the different iali ncreased over this period from 17% in
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1920-24 to 26% in 1925-29. From 1930 to 1939, unianisation increased
from 10% to 19%, whilst although the differential rose to 46% between
1930~34, it fell sharply to 22% between 1935-39, which was the period
when union membershi p increased most rapi dly. From 1940 to 1958,
membership grew from 20% to 30%, whilst the differential fell from 6% in
1940-44 to 2% during 1945~49, rising to 12% between 1950~54 and to 16%
from 1955-58. This led Mulvey to speculate about the:
"apparent relation between the differential and the state of
the economy" (p.llO).
The first study of the union/non-union differential in Britain was
carried out by Pencavel (1974). He estimated a union differential over
29 industries of 0-10% in 1964, which would indicate that British unions
affected relative wages to a lesser degree than American unions.
However, this study was centred on a boom year using unionisation and
not wage coverage data. Later studies focusing on 1973, a slump year,
revealed a higher differential of 16~26% (Mulvey, 1976; Nickell, 1977).
Mulvey (1978) also noted that male manual workers in manufacturing,
who were only covered by national agreements ~ about 25% of the manual
workforce ~ had no wage premium over non-union workers. Whereas those
covered by national agreements plus supplementary, company or local
agreements, enjoyed a differential of 20-46%. The fomer may be
attributed to the "spillover effect", whereby non~union workers are paid
the nationally agreed rate, due either to convent10n or else to keep out
the un10ns. Therefore, it would appear that plant level agreements are.
essential for organised workers to retain the differential over
non-union workers, wh1ch Mulvey est1mated was in the region of 0-40%
(p.117).
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Johnson and Mieszkowski (1970) undertook a review of previous
research in the fi e1d and they simi 1ar 1y reached the conc 1us i on that
the trade unions had managed to increase the wages of their members
relative to those of non-unionised workers. They concluded, however,
that:
"although our empirical estimates are subject to a number of
qualifications and limitations they strongly suggest that
most, if not all, of the gains of labour are made at the
expense of non-uni oni sed workers and not at the expense of
the earnings of capital" (p.560).
This stems from their observation that raising the level of
unemp1oyment in the uni on sector wi11 depress wages in the non-unt on
sector. On the other hand, if the entire workforce became unionised,
then the distribution of income will depend upon the bargaining power of
individual unions and their ability to procure any monopoly rents or
profits which may exist. However, if
" •••••• there are no monopsonist i c rents and uni ons are not
able to "tax away" a share of monopoly profits, the
distribution of income will be essentially the same as the
distribution in an economy in which unions do not exist"
(Ibid, p.561).
To sum up. The consensus appears to be that trade unions have achieved
few economic gains for Labour through collective bargaining. Thus to
achieve their wider social and industrial objectives the British unions
have found it necessary to engage in political action.
Political Methods
There are a 1arge number of peop1e who are opposed to we1fare
unionism (Banks, 1974) and, hence, to any involvement by the unions in
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politics. Nevertheless, even in the United States where "business
unionism" flourishes, this has not precluded the unions from becoming
involved in the political process to pursue social objectives.
Similarly, the attachment of the British unions to the principle of
voluntarism has not discouraged the unions from exerting political
pressure on govemnent to enact social legislation - though typically only
in narrowly defined areas.
May (1975) identified three main concerns which have been primarily
responsible for the unions involvement in politics. The first is the
legislative framework which determines the parameters of trade union
action. Here, the unions may put pressure on government to enact
legislation to improve the terms and conditions of a specific group of
workers, or to strengthen the bargaining position of the unions against
the employers. In other circumstances, the unions may try and persuade,
government to repeal 1egislation whieh they find curbs and restri cts
their activities. Secondly, the unions pursue wider political and
social objectives, for example, health and safety standards, which are
best enforced through appropriate legislation. The third concern is an
extension of the second. This is to influence the economic and social
po1;cies of government on pub1ic spend ing , emp 1oyment po1icy, we1fare
and so on, which directly affect their members' lives.
In pursuing their political aims the trade unions have embraced
three distinct methods: direct action; parliamentary pressure; and
direct influence on gover~ment and Whitehall. For much of the twentieth
century direct action, covering strikes, boycotts, sit~ins and defiance
of the law in pursuit of political objectives, played a relatively
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insignificant part in trade union political activities. The unions were
more likely to resort to demonstrations, lobbying, delegations and
campaigns to get their message directly across. After 1969, however,
direct action became more pronounced. The trade unions took to the
streets to defeat two attempts by government, one a Labour
Administration, the other a Conservative, to introduce restrictive
industrial relations legislation, in 1969 and from 1970 to 1973.
".•••.. (A)lthough the campaigns were quite explicitly
political, directed at preventing or obstructing changes in
the law by elected governments, they can be seen as
se1f~contained episodes, not as having established
precedents for the use of direct action on other matters"(May, 1975, p.128).
Indeed, the unions have avoided taking the next logical step of
furthering their political objectives through industrial action. As we
have seen, this can be partly explained by the ideological pressures
that are exerted on the unions to conform to' "accepted" practices and
methods, and partly to a recognition by the unions that the state has
historically been prepared to use legal measures or coercion to ensure
that they comply with its will.
Legislation
The trade unions' fundamental concern with the legislative
framework stems from repeated attempts by politicians and the Courts to
restrict their objectives. This ultimately led to the involvement of
the unions in party politics. Up to the end of the nineteenth century,_
the trade unions were pr~pared to use both the Liberal and Conservative
parties as vehicles to achieve their objectives. This bi-partisan
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approach 1ed to the passing of the Trade Union Act (1871) and the
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (1875) by governments of
different political persuasions. The former Act gave unions protection
from the "restraint of trade II doctrine, while the latter gave immunity
to strikers against any action for criminal conspiracy, so long as the
union was acting "in comtemp1ation or furtherance of a trade dispute".
These protections, however, proved to be thin. Thwarted in their
use of criminal conspiracy against the unions, the Judiciary turned to
the use of civil conspiracy to curtail the actions of the unions. This
resulted in unfavourable judicial decisions, in particular Lyons v
Wilkins (l896), Quinn v Leatham (1901) and Taff Vale (190l), all of
which restri cted the abi1ity of the trade unions to engage in strike
activity. Only parliamentary action could reverse these decisions.
In 1900, the Labour Representative Committee was formed, whereupon
it became a distinct Labour group in Par11ament, with a policy to
promote legislation to further the interests of working people. The
unions in return agreed to pay a levy from members' subscriptions to
support the new grouping. Six years later they returned 29 MPs to
Parliament, and accordingly changed their name to the Labour Party. In
the same year, working closely with the unions, they persuaded the
Liberal Government to pass the Trade Disputes Act (1906), which provided
the necessary legal framework to enable the unions to continue with
their activities. The Act gave the unions complete immunity from legal
action against strikers in tort, as well as comprehensive immunity fromo
judge-made law. This more or less encouraged the growth of collective
bargaining, free from legal intervention, for the next half century.
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However, within three years of the passage of the Trade Disputes Act, in
the Osborne Judgement (1909), the Law Lords ruled that it was illega 1
for the unions to use their funds for political purposes, thus depriving
the fledgeling Labour Party of its main source of income. This decision
was later reversed by the Trade Union Act (1913), which permitted unions
to set up a political fund, separate from their general funds, to spend
for political purposes. To comply with the Act, each union was
compe 11ed to ballot its members to estab 1ish whether they shou1d have
political objectives and a political fund. Where this was supported,
individual members were allowed to "contract out II of paying the
political levy.
In the wake of the General Strike, the Conservative Government once
again tried to curtail the activities of the unions, by passing the
Trade Dispute and Trade Union Act (1927). This Act outlawed the closed
shop in the pub1;c sector, made strikes to "coerce the government II
illegal, restricted picketing rights, and replaced "contracting,,:,out"by
"contracting,,:,in"of the political levy. It was not until the postwar
labour GOvernment of 1946 that this Act was eventually repealed.
The 1960s set in train new developments in labour law initiated, as
in the past, by another adverse judicial decision in an industrial
dispute. In 1964, the Law Lords discovered, in Rookes v Barnard, an
obscure tort of intimidation, to restrict and punish the activities of
the trade unions. The judges decreed that a threat to break a contract
of employment to enforce a closed shop, constituted intimidation, and
was therefore not protected by the 1906 Act. Although these immunities
were temporarily restored by the labour Government's Trade Disputes Act
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(1965), the stage was now set for successi ve governments to take a
closer look at how the law could be used to influence behaviour in the
workplace.
The first attempt to systematically impose legal sanctions on trade
union activities and statutory limitations on pay to contain union
militancy was pioneered by the Labour Governments of 1964-70.
Following the submission of the report from the Royal CODlllission,the
Labour Government produced its White Paper, "In Place of Strife", which
went beyond Donovan's recoDlllendations. The White Paper proposed giving
the Secretary of State for Employment discretionary power to order a
28-day conciliation pause in unconstitutional strikes, with financial
penalties for those who breached the pause. It further proposed to
empower him to order a secret ballot before any major official strike.
In return the unions were to be given extended new rights covering areas
of recognition by employers.
These proposals signalled an attack on the voluntary tradition of
British industrial relations, as well as on the right to strike. The
Labour Movement was outraged, and sustained pressure was put on the
Government by the TUC and by trade union sponsored MPs, to withdraw
these proposals. Faced with this pressure, the Government decided to
concede, in return for a "solemn and binding" undertaking by the TUC, to
do its utmost to prevent unconstitutional and unofficial strikes.
The failure of these policies, in the face of union opposition, did
not deter the in-coming Conservative Government from attempting to
impose its own measures for the IIreform II of industrial relations. These
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proposals were first set down in the party document IIFair Deal at Workll,
produced in 1968. The Industrial Relations Act (1971), that followed,
proposed to abolish the foundation of trade union and abstentionist
1abour 1aw enshri ned in the statutes from 1871 to 1906, and thus in
effect sought to reintroduce the principle of Taff Vale, leaving the
unions liable to injunctions and damages. The Act proposed to replace
collective laissez-faire in labour law by a comprehensive and highly
interventionist legal framework, based upon North American experience.
The authors of the 1971 Act took the view that:
lithe traditional abstention of the law had allowed the unions
to acquire too much power. This concentration of power
could, in their view, be broken down, first by surrounding
the strike weapon with a new range of civil 1hbi1ities
which, it was confidently assumed, most employers would
eagerly exploit to restore order to their strike-torn
workplaces. The second limb of the strategy was to confer
new ri ghts on the i ndustri a1 worker and groups of workers
which would in total strengthen their position against the
union to which they belonged. Faced with this two-pronged
assault on their power, one led by employers and the other
by their own members, it was anticipated that the trade
unions would become a much more cautious and co-operative
influence in British industryll (Hawkins, 1981, p.54).
Under the Act, trade unions were required to register with the
Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, to bring
themse 1ves withi n the 1aw. An unregi stered uni on had no 1ega1 ri ghts
and was vulnerable to legal redress, as exemplified by' the House of
Lords judgement in Heaton's Transport v TGWU(1972). All trade unions,
registered or otherwise, were held legally responsible for the actions
of thei r offi cers and shop stewards and 1i ab1e for damages. The
intent i on of the 1egi slat i on was to force uni on offi cers to control'
their shop stewards, and to ensure that they abided by agreed
procedures.
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In the event, the Act proved to be a failure. The employers were
unwilling to use the provisions, provided for in the Act, to take action
against the unions; while the TUC instructed its affiliates not to
regi ster under the Act, thereby preventing the State from using the
unions to discipline their shop stewards and members. The AUEW refused
to appear before the NIRC even when it was fined for contempt of Court
and its funds were sequestrated. Far from restricting industrial
confl ict, the Act led to the most serious confrontation between the
government and organi sed 1abour since the General Strike. The unions
orchestrated a political campaign and engaged in industrial action to
demonstrate their opposition to this legislation - these strikes were
classified by the Department of Employment as political rather than
industrial stoppages. This led one American academic to conclude that:
"••••••the underlying objective of trade union political
action in the post-war years was simply the achievement,
maintenance or restoration of 'free collective bargaining'.
Whenever there is a threat to the legal status of unionism
or to free collective bargaining, trade unionism moves
towards genuine political action to counter the threat"
(Richter, 1973, p.21S).
The explosion in industri a1 mi 1itancy cu1minated in the miners '
strike of 1974 and the downfall of the Heath Government. The new Labour
Administration rejected the use of legal compulsion, firstly, because it
had proven unsuccessful and, secondly, because it was both superfluous
and inadequate to tackle rising inflation and growing unemployment.
Instead, the Government chose to pursue a policy of collaboration with
the unions, rather than one of coercion and repression. By this means,
the Government was able ,to use the "social contract" to secure their
voluntary compliance to policies that they had previously resisted when
imposed by statute by the previous administration.
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In return for their co-operat ion, the Labour Government repealed
the Industrial Relations Act (1971), and replaced it with legislation to
enhance the power of organised labour. The first of these measures was
the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act (1974) (amended in 1976), which
repealed the 1971 Act, but retained and strengthened the unfair
dismissal provisions in the statute. These Acts essentially restored
the iRlDunities of 1875 and 1906, and encouraged the spread of the
post-entry closed shop throughout industry. Trade union objectives for
labour legislation now passed from the "defensive to the aggressive"
(Lewis, 1976, p.14), 1eading to the passage of a number of Acts to
strengthen the organisation and bargaining position of the unions.
These included the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) and the
Employment Protection Act (1975).
The former Act established the Health and Safety Conmission, an
executive body with strong trade union representation, whose powers
enab 1e it to act upon any recoRlDedations it may make, as opposed to
simply carrying out a monitoring role; thereby giving the unions an
opportunity to ensure that the employers comply with the law. The Act
also provided for the appointment of union safety representatives at the
workplace, as well as placing an obligation on the employers to disclose
information on health and safety matters to these representatives. The
inspectorate was similarly responsible for passing on to the safety
representative any information it may receive from the employer. This
legislation therefore offered a number of promising opportuniti"es to the
unions of extending workers' rights through collective bargaining.
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The latter Act provided for a wide-ranging extension of individual
and collective trade union rights: the right to a written statement of
conditions of employment and periods of notice; the right to maternity
leave and pay; the right to trade union membership and activity; laying
down a procedure for obtaining trade union recognition from an employer;
providing for disclosure of information by an employer to a trade union;
providing the unions with the right to advance warning of, and
consultation about, planned redundancies; establishing ACAS as an
independent statutory body with functions of medi ation, conci 1iation,
and voluntary arbitration. The fact that information disclosure came as
an integral part of this "package" is examined in the next chapter.
The election of a Conservative Government in 1979, signalled the
ending of corporatistpolicies, and the re-introduction of anti-union
legislation. This time union opposition proved to be less effective for
I
a number of reasons. Firstly, the Government was elected on a wave of
anti-union sentiment, following the "winter of discontent", when the
public sector unions were in the fore-front of opposition to the Labour
Government •s policy on wage restrai nt. Secondly, the Government had
learnt the lessons from 1971, and did not immediately introduce a
comprehensive legal framework. Instead, it introduced legislation
piecemeal, to gradually reduce the unions' legal scope and immunities.
Thus preventing the unions focusing attention upon, and rallying
opposition against, any major legislative proposals. Finally, the high
1eve1 of unemp 1oyment brought about by government economi c po1icies
severe 1y weakened the trade unions I wi 11ingness to directly
confront government~
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The Thatcher Administration, through its trade union legislation,
embodied in the Employment Acts (1980) and (1982), and the Trade Union
Act (1984), reduced the role and effectiveness of the unions. The TUC
has been excluded from the corridors of power, and union membership of
nationa1 1eve 1 pub1ic bodies has been severely reduced. In addition,
restrictions have been placed on picketing and secondary action, the
closed shop has been curtailed, and trade unions are subject to legal
redress if industrial action is not considered to be in furtherance of a
"trade dispute". The trade unions can also be sued for damages by the
injured party, where an official strike is declared without first having
conducted a secret ballot, in which the majority have voted in favour of
taking action. The trade unions must also hold secret ballots to elect
their executive committees, and ballots every ten years to decide
whether they should maintain a political fund.
A number of trade unions have fallen foul of this legislation. For
example, British Telecom engineers in 1983, refused to co-operate with
legislative measures introduced to encourage competition from the
private sector, because they feared that it endangered their jobs. This
action, however, no longer enjoyed the protection from damages conferred
under the 1906 Act, due to the fact that the 1980 and 1982 Acts have
narrowed the definition of what constitutes a "trade dispute". The
latter Act states that, it should be "wholly or mainly" in connection
with industrial matters, so as to exclude from protection "political"
disputes directed at government.
More recently, the NUM and the NGA have both defied the Courts,
which led to the sequestration of their assets. In the former case, the
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miners had no doubt that their battle was ultimately with the
government, whom they believed were determined to cut production
capaci ty in order to reduce Britain's dependency on coal for power
generation. Many believed that a hidden, though closely connected
reason, was the Conservative Party's desire to emasculate the strength
of the miners' union, so that never again would the Labour Movement,
with the NUM at the helm, be in a position to challenge and bring down a
Conservative Government.
Organised labour, therefore, now finds itself in a position where
it is still able to pursue limited industrial objectives, but not to
pursue political goals. Nevertheless, this has not completely deterred
the unions from seeking political goals which, in many instances, have
been aimed at thwarting the policies of government, or have been
concerned with maintaining the unions' existing position. However,
rarely has union action been directed towards extending the legal rights
of trade unionists.
"Thus the politica1 struggle, 1ike the industri a1 strugg 1e,
has so far been conducted 1arge ly at the margi ns of the
system, and the reason for this has been the power of those
individuals and groups whose interests, objectives or values
are served by confining contention to the margins and
preventing any more basic challenge" (Fox, 1985, p.152).
Incorporation
Despite recent trends, the state faces two choices in the way that'
it can control the act'ivities of trade unions: it can rely upon
repression or it may seek to incorporate the unions into the body
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politic. If government relies upon the first strategy and is
unsuccessful (as it probably would be, since only fascist states have
managed to achieve this) then the unions are likely to become militant
and may eventually challenge the authority of the state. If, on the
other hand, the unions are assigned legitimacy through legal protection,
knighthoods and other honours for union leaders, and representation on
government committees, the state may be able to cultivate and ensure a
"responsible" labour movement that serves to integrate the working class
into capitalist society.
The role of unions as integrative organisations has been recognised
by Marxists and non~Marxists alike. To the former this process serves
to domesticate union goals, so that they pursue objectives that are
acceptable to the ruling class. The latter group, by contrast, welcomes
the fact that the trade unions can be used to integrate workers into the
capitalist system, as opposed to being the vanguard of revolutionary
change.
"When the conf1i ct of interest groups is 1egitimate, these
Iconfl ict I organi zations contri bute to the integrat ion and
stability of the society. Trade unions should not be viewed
primarily in their economic~c1eavage function. They also
serve to integrate their members in the larger body politic
and give them a basis of loyalty to the system" (Ltpset ,
1959, p.113).
Accordi ng to Lipset controlled conf1i ct he1ps to create cohes ion
and reduces tens ion. It is when the state tries to suppress workers I
organisations that it becomes more vulnerable to subversion from
revolutionary movements:
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"It is precisely in those countries where workers have been
able to form strong unions and obtain representation in
politics that disintegrative forms of political cleavage are
least likely to be found. Communist movements have
deve loped in countri es which were most inc1ined to deny
1egitimacy to unions and other democratic express ions of
working~c1ass aspirations" (Ibid).
With this in mind, it is quite easy to understand why governments
and management have deliberately tried to build up accommodative
relations with the trade union movement. Crouch (1982) argues that
social democracy has developed as a political force which has come to
terms with capitalism, so that the class interests of labour and capital
are harnessed to work in the long-term national interest. Government is
able to win their co-operation through a series of compromises, whereby
labour is placated by a welfare state and progressive taxation, and in
return labour's organisations assist capital in the subordination of the
workforce •. This of course presupposes that the union leadership is in a
position to control the action of its members. Where it is able to do
so, an overall consensus will be reached between the unions and
employers within the corporatist framework. Though this wi11 still
leave room for a high degree of pluralism and conflicts of interests, as
both sides pursue their own policies (Crouch, 1977).
In the Scandinavian countries, Austria and the Netherlands, wage
bargaining is carried out by the national confederations, whereas in
Britain the TUC is not involved in bargaining. In the former countries,
wage issues, which are of key interest to ordinary workers, are
therefore on the economic. agenda at the highest level. This is not the
case in Britain. But, 1ike the other confederations, the TUC is
concerned with pursuing long~term goals, such as full employment and
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other policy issues which may be considered of indirect interest by the
shopfloor. Neverthe 1ess, governments prefer to operate and to reach
agreement at the national level for reasons of expediency, because this
puts the onus for policing any agreement on the national confederation.
This is a cruc iale 1ement in the process of incorporat ion. The TUC or
confederation is left to obtain compliance from among its members, but
this can only be achieved if the confederation is in a strong enough
position to secure agreement to these policies which, by necessity,
requires some degree of integration of the shopfloor organisation into
the formal union structures.
80th Labour and Conservative Governments have responded to the
demands of economic management by pursuing integrationist and
corporatist policies. The 1970-74 Conservative Administration imposed
legal requirements on union leaders to control their members. The,
Labour Government that followed took a different course. After the 1971
Labour Party Conference, Labour and trade union 1eaders set up the
TUC~Labour Party Liaison Committee, a unique institution which brought
together parliamentary, party and union leaders in one policy body. The
Liaison Committee was established in January 1972, and comprised six
leading MPs and Shadow Cabinet members as representatives of the
Parliamentary Party, six members of Labour's Executive and six TUC
1eaders. The trade union 1eaders were insistent that the Committee
should include members of the Shadow Cabinet, as well as the National
Executive, so as to ensure that future Labour Ministers were included
and that they were party ~o any agreement or policy reached and, hence,
Committed to its implementation. 8y adopting this policy stance,
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"(t lhe TUCtherefore, for the first time in its history, had
a direct line into Labour Party policy making and thus into
general election manifestoes" (Elliott, 1978, p.31).
When Labour returned to power in February 1974, the Committee
remained in existence, attended by senior Cabinet Ministers, including
the Pri me Mini ster and the Chance11or of the Exchequer, so that it
became "virtually an arm of government II (Ibid), dealing with policy
issues, including draft employment laws. The unions were thus able to
turn the social contract into a
"vehicle of partnership with the new Government, so
increasing their influence on economic affairs" (p.34).
In return union leaders appeared prepared to accept public
expenditure cuts despite the rising level of unemployment. Furthermore,
the TUCGeneral Counci1 wi11i ng1y suppressed the seamanI s stri ke in
September 1976, which was to signal the beginning of the shopfloor
backlash against the social contact, as workers increasingly held it
responsible for the erosion of their standard of living. The Labour
Party can thus be regarded as an integrative political party that, on
the one hand, represents working class interests, but on the other acts
lias one of the chief mechanisms for inculcating the organised
working class with national values and symbols and of
restraining and re-interpreting working class demands in
this light" (Panitch, 1976, p.23S).
The involvement of the trade union confederation in corporatist
structures is not, however, without its problems. At this level the
issues on the agenda are concerned primarily with national economic'
policies. In these forums the unions are also likely to seek 10ng~term
economic goals including, for example, policies to restrain 1nflat10n so
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as to allow improvements in real incomes, or the adoption of socia1
welfare policies that will lead to an increase in the social wage.
Trade union members on the shop floor may not, however, share these
goals, especially if they appear to be intangible and are viewed as a
one-sided trade-off in return for controls on wages. This has been a
real dilemma for the trade union movement. On the one hand, the TUC
may pursue "participation" objectives because it believes that this is
the best means to satisfy wider trade union goals, whilst, on the other,
these may only be conceded at the expense of wage increases.
The likely outcome, therefore, of the involvement of the TUC or
national union confederation in politics is conflict between the
national unions and the rank-and-fi1e, as represented by the shop
stewards' organisations. This is because in practice the "central aim
of tripartite control is wage restraint" (Crouch, 1982, p.212). (The
involvement of the Dunlop unions with tripartism is analysed in Chapter
6). In return for a say in policy-making, the national unions have had
to demonstrate that they can. influence the wage demands of their. ~ \ .~:
members. Theytried to do this by shifting the emphasis fran local
or plant-level bargaining to national negotiations, so that the burden
of restraint fell directly on the shopfloor organisations. However,
through time the stewards' organisations rejected these "corporatist -
structured II inoanes policies, whichwere designed to curb their pursuit
of higher pay for the membership. Ultimately, their ability to resist
these policies dependeduponhowsuccessful these national forumswere
at winning benefits for the shopfloor. For, in Britain power also
resides at plant-level, where autonomousaction by the rank-and-file
can underminethose policies being pursued by the leadership.
This is whycorporatist
76
structures tend to be unstable. In the 1950s and 1960s, attempts to
impose wage restraint were defeated through opposition from the
shopfloor. The same occurred in the late seventies, culminating in the
"winter of discontent" at the beginning of 1979.
Once the position is reached where national understandings cease to
have any validity, then government will be less willing to reach
agreement with the national leadership. Government may instead, as the
three Thatcher Administrations appear to have done, to increasingly rely
upon high unemployment to restrain wages. This underlines the paradox
faced by the trade unions if they are not radical. To co-operate with
government and be drawn into corporatist structures may ultimately
•
weaken the plant-Jevel union organisation. To do nothing, and resist
involvement, will result in government adopting other measures to
control the unions; one of which may be to weaken the union movement by
pursuing policies that actively result in unemployment.
Management
Management has 1ikewise tried to control the acthi ties of the
trade unions by attempting to incorporate them into the institutional
structure of the firm. In this respect, management po.l1cy has played a
major part in the development of collective bargaining. This is because
"(t Ir-ade unions can influence the scope for workplace
bargaining only by agreement with the managers with whom
they negotiate and only within the limits imposed by the
structure of managerial organisation" (Boraston et a1, 1975,
p.188)
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It is management that deci des what issues are to be subject to
negotiations, and at what level, whether it be plant, divisional or
company wide. For example, industry-wide bargaining was specifically
initiated by management strategy:
lithe initiative came in nearly every instance from a recently
formed employers' federation, more often than not after a
national 10ckout" (Clegg, 1970, p.201).
Management was, therefore, able to negotiate with the unions
through an employers' association, which laid down the terms and
conditions of employment for all employees throughout the industry.
liThe main advantage of these arrangements for management was
that they more or less excluded trade union officials from
the workplace or, at the very least, heavily circumscribed
their role thus leaving individual managers a relatively
free hand in the running of their departments. In brief,
the effect was to protect or neutral i se the workp1ace from
trade union activity" (Purcell and Sisson, 1983, p.100).
Employers are also in a position to determine the form and type of
uni oni sm that operates in thei r companies. They can achieve this
through selective recognition; by recognising a union that is "moderate"
by reputati on, as opposed to one that is "mi11tant", and thi s can be
successfully implemented by the company before any union has had an
Opportunity to organise the workforce. Management is thus able to
influence the scope of collective bargaining by refusing to negotiate
with a uni on committed to cha11engi ng manageri a1 prerogatives at the
point of production. The employer, may also choose to concede
recognition to one union for the entire labour force, in order to avoid
mu1ti~unionism and any associated problems, including inter~union
rivalries. The local union may similarly find its actions constrained
by the need to maintain a good bargaining relationship with the
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employer, which will effectively preclude it from raising issues that
will be strongly resisted by management.
By these means therefore, management is able to exert its influence
over the behaviour of the trade unions. In these circumstances, the
sophisticated employer will have little to fear from the unionisation of
his workforce, but may instead come to regard it as beneficial to his
objectives.
nBy making explicit the many discontents which work in
capitalist industry generates, unions help to make workers'
behaviour more predictable and manageablen (Hyman, 1975),
p.89) •
Throughout the postwar years the increase in trade union membership
presented a new challenge to managerial authority at plant level. This
led to a rise in the number of shop stewards from 90,000 in 1961 (Clegg
et al, 1961, p.153) to 175,000 in 1968 (McCarthy and Parker, 1968,
p.15), increasing to 250,000 in 1978 (Clegg, 1979, p.51). Management
faced the choice of either directly confronting the growing power of the
trade unions, or else, trying to adapt and control it to suit its own
interests. Management chose the latter course of action, and disclosure
of information was acknowledged as a component part of the strategy to
exert control over the labour process (Ogden and Bougen, 1985).
Terry (1983) slml1ar1y argues that the strategy adopted by many
company managements during the 1950s and 1960s towards the growl ng
strength of the shopfloor was one of "helpful accomodationU (p.75).
Management was prepared· to make concessions to the emerging shop
stewards' organisations, though essentially on its own terms. In the
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motor industry, for instance, piecework bargaining was encouraged which
gave workers a certain amount of discretion for determining their own
earnings. The stewards, for their part, regu1ated this element of
IIcontro111 in order to stabilise the earnings of the workforce.
Procedural agreements were drawn up which extended the role of the
steward by involving him in some managerial functions including
grievance handling and welfare arrangements (Turner et a1, 1967). These
measures also benefited management because the involvement of the
stewards effectively sanctioned these policies, and by so dOing
contributed towards the maintenance of orderly industrial relations on
the shopfloor.
These concessions by management, paradoxically, had the secondary
effect of strengtheni ng the shopfloor cha11enge to manageri a1 control
over the labour process. Towards the end of the 1960s, the employers
and the state both became increasingly concerned about the impact of the
growing shopfloor power. The "challenge from below" (F1anders, 1963,
p.103), or what has also been termed the "challenge from within"
(McCarthy and Ellis, 1973, p.92), was held responsible for wage drift,
inf1ation, and the high incidence of unoffi cia1 and unconst itutiona1
strikes. Furthermore, the increase in wage costs together with the
intensification of foreign competition, contributed to the profits
squeeze which beset British industry. Increasingly, restrictive
practices, overmanning and low productivity were blamed for the decline
of the manufacturing base (Kilpatrick and Lawson, 1980). Management had
few options. The choice was one of confrontation or coming to terms
with the rh a1 authority on the shopfloor. Hence, F1anders (1967)
asserted that management
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"•••.•• can only regain control by sharing it" (p.172).
However, Flanders did not question "whether those with whomcontrol
(wa)s to be shared and those over whomcontrol (wa)s to be reimposed
(wer)e in fact the same people" (Goldthorpe, 1974, p.203). Given that
they were, there was 1itt 1e reason for management to re 1i nqui sh any
power; all it had to do was to appear to be formally sharing control
through employee participation schemes or by extending joint regulation.
Thus:
" •••••• the Donovan Comission placed primary emphasis on the
extension of the process of incorporation: particularly at
shop-floor level, where the source of 'anarchy and disorder'
(i .e. control by workers) was identified. Shop stewards
were to be integrated into the 'responsible' patterns of
national union-employer relations by a more formalised
relationship with senior management and a clearly defined
role within official trade unionism" (Hyman, 1975, p.143).
This process was seen as a vital element in the strategy by
management to restore control over those areas of the 1abour process
where workers had established uni latera 1 controL The strategy they
adopted was to "mould" the steward organisations in a way that was
beneficial to management, rather than attempt to destroy them (Terry,
1983, p.8S) Workplace bargaining, which had generally become "largely
informal, largely fragmented and largely autonomous" (Flanders, 1967,
p.169), was to be replaced by the
"development of formal, company,,:,level trade union organisa-
tion, usually around shop steward recognition" (Terry, 1983~
p.86) •
Management attempted to achieve this, firstly, by recognising shop
stewards and joint shop stewards' committees; secondly, by granting
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full-time status to some stewards, and by providing them with, in many
instances, office and telecommunications equipment and; thirdly, through
the negot iation of closed shop and check-off agreements. To reassert
their authority and to legitimise their decisions, management viewed the
containment of trade union activity as a necessary first step.
"This involved, firstly, introducing a variety of procedures
to institutionalise industrial conflict: and, secondly,
restricting the scope of collective bargaining and avoiding
it altogether, if possible, at the potnt of production. In
some cases it also involved avoiding collective bargaining
at corporate divisional level. In this way key decision-
making activities at the level of production and at the
heart of the enterprise became protected from direct
involvement in collective bargaining" (Purcell and Sisson,
198~ , p, 103) •
Terry (1983) has suggested that management in both the private and
public sectors introduced work study and job evaluation to regulate work
and pay, and to remove negotiations from the workplace. The
introduction of job measurement techniques to replace piecework removed
the responsibility for wage negotiations from individual stewards on the
shop-floor, and transferred it to a negot iating cOlllllittee composed of a
sma11er group of stewards at plant or company 1eve 1• The effect of
-these measures was to encourage the centralisation of the shop stewards'
organisation, and the development of joint stewards' cOlllllittees. This
process wa~ also greatly assisted by the wave of mergers, takeovers and
restructuring, as firms sought to improve their competitiveness through
economi es of scale. The stewards were likewi se compe 11ed to develop
'their organisations to enable them to bargain within the new company and
management structures. Thus:
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IIBy encouragi ng the development of independent steward
organisations capable of operating without full-time
officials, and by developing company-based measurement and
payment systems, managements assisted in a process of
increasing shop steward authority within a developing
situation that could be seen as the first moves towards a
form of 'company unionism'lI (Terry, 1983, p.81).
The benefits of these developments were not lost on management, who
recognised that the application of job evaluation techniques, together
with the centralisation of the stewards' organisations, would directly
contribute to the incorporation of the shop stewards into the process of
control. As Purcell and Sisson put it:
1I •••••• job evaluation creates a structured set of
differentials ••••(which makes it) ••••extremely hard for shop
stewards or supervisors to influence pay levels themselves.
Claims must be handled through the appropriate appeal
machi nery staffed by senior stewards and senior management
and the basis of the claim is, in theory, restricted to the
'rationa l ' criteri on of changes in job content. As the
trade unions are often involved in the implementation and
maintenance of job evaluation they are encouraged or forced
to consider the impact of one sectional claim on the
operation of the scheme as a whole. Thus unions can take on
a quasi-managerial function of blocking or filtering claims
which challenge the logic of the agreed pay differentials.
The process of implementation, if undertaken by joint teams
of management and unions, is a powerful means of encouraging
joint problem solving techniques and a depolarisation of
industrial relations. The domestic union leadership
becomes, along with industrial relations management, the
custodians of the scheme. Even if implemented unilaterally
by management, job evaluation and the 'rational' ordering of
differentials makes plant industrial relations more
controllable. Taken with changes in the basis of bonus
calculation the incidence of bargaining is reduced, the
location of bargaining changed, and the bureaucratisation of
union 1eadersht p encouraged ", (1983, p.1 05).
How successful were management and the state in their strategy of
incorporation? According to Terry (1983) these strategies achieved only
a part ia1 degree of success, owing to the resistance of workers, who
became increasingly concerned about the effect that these policies were
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having on earnings and employment. Further, these incorporationist
strategies also contained their own contradictions. At the level of the
state and the company, policies to incorporate the trade unions involved
conceding to them power and authority that they previously did not
enjoy. The unions were thus able to turn their new found power against
both the employers and the state when they decided to rescind their
agreements. More importantly, Terry (l983) concluded that the
incorporationist strategy failed to have any impact on those targets it
was aimed at addressing. Over the period 1973-78, private sector
profitability declined, productivity increased at a much lower rate than
among our major competitors, and there was 1itt1e evidence ~f it having
any impact on the incidence of strikes.
Conclusions
The overwhelming consensus in the Industrial Relations literature
is that trade unions are incorporated into capitalism. The employers
and the state have a vested interest in using their power to control and
to "domesticate" the goals of trade unions. To this end, union policies
and organi sation have been strongly inf1uenced by the structure and
dynamics of capital ism, and by the strategi es of the employers. These
help to reinforce and sustain the mainly reactive nature of trade
unionism. Ideological pressures are also exerted on union officials and
members to narrowly define trade union objectives, as well as to create
an artificial divide between industrial and political objectives. The
consensus in the industrial relations literature is that it is the
failure of the unions to overcome this barrier, to use industrial action
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to achieve their political goals that limits the achievements of trade
unionism.
The main method used by the unions to pursue their aims is
collective bargaining. There is, however, little evidence that they
have managed to increase 1abour's share of national income. Instead,
unionised workers have gained at the expense of the unorganised.
The evidence suggests that collect he bargai ning helps to
institutionalise industrial conflict to produce order in industrial
relations. It also allows management and unions to reach agreement on
issues that are important to both of them, but which are nevertheless
located at the margins, and hence are not seen as a direct threat to the
system of control.
It is against this background that we now turn to examine in detail
the legislative provisions and codes of practice which have governed the
disclosure of financial information to trade unions. The major question
to be addressed is: were these rules designed to encourage and allow
unions to take a managerial interest in finance and accounting?, or were
they designed to limit their interests and involvement to the
traditional areas of collective bargaining?
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CHAPTER3 - INFORMATIONDISCLOSURETOTRADEUNIONS
The paradox of i nformat ion di sc 1osure to trade uni ons is that,
given their reformist objectives, they have little use for published
fi nanci a1 accounti ng i nformati on. Nevertheless, the assumpti on
under lyi ng the di sc 1osure provi si ons in the Employment Protection Act
(1975) was that the ability of the unions to negotiate with management
was impaired because of their unequal access to information. This would
seem to imply that once the unions were in possession of the relevant
financial information, they would be able to use it to extract
significant gains or concessions from management. However, information
disclosure is a highly political subject ~ a characteristic, as we shall
see, which has been ignored by much of the research conducted into it.
It is for this reason that many companies have been reluctant to
di sc lose i nformat i on to trade uni ons. On one 1eve1, employers were
aware that disclosure could prove particularly v~luab1e in influencing
or "moderating" union behaviour. Whilst on the other, they feared that
it coul d undermine "managementI s ri ght to manage", or 1ead to "greater
militancy and more inflationary trade union wage demands" (CIR, 1972,
p. 14).
The potential use of information to restrain union action was fully
comprehended by some accountants, certainly as far back as the 1920s.
During the early part of this period disputes broke out in mining,
railways, the docks, cotton, and the shipping and engineering
industries. This was followed by the General Strike in 1926. An
accountant writing in the mid~1920s argued that the failure by
management to furnish workers with financial information contributed to
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the industrial disorder. He wrote that:
"The damage and loss inflicted on the country by the
continually recurring disputes in industry between capital
and labour call for the most earnest consideration in order
to explore methods by whieh what is; n effect "war in
industry" may be replaced by the processes of better
understanding between employers and workers.
Among the causes which lead to disputes must be placed in
the forefront the lack of knowledge of the true facts as to
the financial position in our staple industries ••••in far
too many industries jealous concealment of any facts
relating to earnings and expenses is still the rule rather
than the exception.
There can be no reasonable doubt that if the principle of
furnishing the workers with sufficient detailed information
of the cost of the product or service and the profit
resulting therefrom were accepted generally, as it is
already being accepted in a few cases, while claims for a
greater share in the produce would not be avoided, at any
rate they would be pressed with a due regard to the facts in
relation to the industry or service, and without the
exaggerated claims and ideas which are so frequent 1y in
evidence on both sides" (Lowes-Dickinson, 1924, p.469).
In view of the turbulent industrial and political climate
prevailing during the 1920s, it is unlikely that financial information
would have been presented in a manner that undermined the interests of
the employers ~ and it was not. Nevertheless, Lowes~Dickinson's views
were later to gain some support.
During the war, information on production was made available to
employees through the Joint Production Consultative and Advisory
Committees (Marsh and Rosewell, 1976, p.4), apparently to increase
output to help lithewar effort ". Here, employers and the labour~force
shared a common interest. With the ending of the conflict these bodies.
were no longer cons tdered necessary by management or government, and
were phased out. However, the 19505 saw a renewed interest in
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disclosure as the unions became more closely involved in policy
discussions about the development of the nationalised industries. In
1952, disclosure became ,official TUC policy, whilst the main political
parties gave it tacit support as a means of improving "colJlllunications"
in industry (Marsh and Rosewell, 1976, p.5). A few years later, the
British Institute of Management (1957) produced a study recommending the
provision of information from annual company reports to employees.
It was not until 1960, however, that the disclosure of company
information became a specific "issue" for the trade unions, when the TUC
submitted evidence to the Company Law Committee, chaired by Lord Jenkins
(Jackson-Cox, 1984,· p.253). The terms of reference of the Committee
were restricted to the "rights of shareholders and the duties of
directors"; nevertheless, the TUC argued that the rights of employees to
obtain access to company information should be encompassed by Company
law. This initial attempt by the trade unions to put disclosure on the
political agenda came to nothing, but in 1967 the Labour Party Working
Party Report on Industrial Democracy endorsed the need for disclosure
1aws. Two years 1ater, it became one of the reconnendat ions of the
Donovan Commission report (1969, para 184). It was viewed by the
Commission as a necessary step to help "to promote the orderly and
effective regulation of industrial relations within companies and
factories" (para 182). From here on disclosure was seen
"no longer in the field of company law reform, but this time
in the fie1d of industri a1 relations 1aw reform"
(Jackson-Cox, 1984, p.253).
In 1969, the Labour Government produced its consultative document
"In Place of Strife", where disclosure was seen as a means of enabling
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the trade unions
"•.••••to participate with management on equal terms in the
extension of collective bargaining and consultation at
company or plant level (1969, para 47).
The document also mooted the idea that a provision was needed to
detail the type of information that the unions would require for
negotiation purposes. This was incorporated into the Industrial
Relations Bill (1970) the following year. It did not, however, reach
the statute book, and it was left to the incoming Conservative
Government to enact these provisions on disclosure as part of the
Industri a1 Re1ations Act (1971)• This was supplemented by a Code of
Industrial Relations Practice, and a report on disclosure from the
Commission for Industrial Relations (CIR, 1972).
The Commission decided that a "shopping 1ist" approach was
inappropriate, and instead suggested "guidelines" covering six areas,
where without this information the "unions will be materially impeded in
negotiations" (para 101). The report recommended that it would be ugood
industrial relations practice" to disclose information on: l.
organisations and activities of the employing unit; 2. manpower; 3. pay;
4. conditions of service; 5. financial information, and 6. prospects and
plans for the future. In the spirit of the British tradition of
voluntarism, the report recomended that disclosure with regards to
timing, presentation and content should be the subject of joint
agreement and regulation between management and unions. Critics of the
report suggested that:
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"Far from being a clear guide to decision and action, it is
mere ly a collection of very general recommendat ions whi ch
wi 11 create 1itt 1e controversy because they are so
unexceptiona111 (Foley and Maunders, 1973, p.4).
The Conservative Government's original intention was to prepare a
detailed Code on disclosure after the CIR had reported, but in the event
no code materi ali sed. I t was not unt i1 1977 , under the new Labour
Government, that the first Code of Practice on disclosure (Advisory,
Conciliation and Arbitration Service, 1977) was produced in connection
with the Employment Protection Act (1975). The disclosure provisions of
the 1975 Act were broadly similar to those of the 1971 Act.
Motives
It may appear somewhat unusual that the two main political parties, the
emp1oyers, and the trade uni ons have all to some degree supported the
need for disclosure of information. The reasons for this are: firstly,
one of interpretation, the employers seeing disclosure more in terms of
"communicationll and; secondly, more to do wi th the di fferent
expectat ions of the benefi ts each side bel i eved wou1d flow from more
open access to information. As Smith and Manley (1973) pOinted out:
liThe similarity of the disclosure provisions in legislation
proposed by both Labour and Conservative Governments is a
comment not so much on a bi part i san approach to sol vi ng
industrial relations prob1ems •••••• but on the way widely
di fferi ng groups all see di sc 1osure as a techni que whi eh
will further their differing objectivesll (p.29).
These differences become more apparent when the views of these
various groups are subject to close examination. In general, the
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employers and trade unions both favour disclosure because they each
believe that it will produce "an improvement in industrial relations",
that will be to their mutual advantage. However, consider the
motivations of the employers:
"Company spokesmen tend to believe that disclosure and
improved communications will produce rational and objective
bargaining, prevent rumours, encourage approaches favourable
to productivity improvements and job evaluation, enable
workers to understand the affairs of the company and improve
morale, workmanship and cost consciousness as well as
creating a greater sense of involvement and identification
with the firm. They argue that it will influence the
behaviour of trade unions by stimulating professionalism and
moderating some of their demands and attitudes" (Marsh and
Rosewell, 1976, p.8).
In her survey of 48 private sector companies, Dickens (1979) found
that thirty-three advantages were listed by the 29 unionised firms who
responded to the question on disclosure of information to trade unions.
These are summarised in table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1 Advantages of Diclosure to Trade Unions Listed by
Unionised CO!panies
Advantage
Leads to more informed, intelligent
collective bargainingLeads to more responsible, realistic
collective bargaining
Leads to 'better'collective bargaining
Encourages trust
Provides common ground, fosters common
interest
Gives unions better understanding of
the business/management problems
No % ofAdvantages
6 18
10 30
16 -, 48
6 18
3 9
8 24'
33 100
(Thirty-three advantage~ were listed by twenty-nine of the thirty-four
unionised employers, three employers saw no advantage, and two did notanswer this question).
Source: Dickens, 1979, p.II, table 1
j
.''" ....
91
Although it was only a comparatively small survey, it is
interest ing to note that 1ess than 50% of the percei ved advantages
related to collective bargaining, the single largest category.
Evidently, many employers were not totally convinced that disclosure
would influence union bargaining strategies. On the other hand, nearly
52% of the perceived advantages can be classified as corporatist. That
is, management recogni sed that informat ion dise1osure had an important
role to play in shaping union attitudes and strategies, which may
produce better industrial relations, higher productivity, and fewer
disputes and strikes. If successful, the incorporati on of the trade
unions could eventually lead to IIbetterllcollective bargaining.
Within this corporatist framework can be included the views of
those writers who have identified lIethicallland lIaltruisticllmotivations
behind company disclosure policies, where managers believe that
employees have a IIrightllto know what is happening in their workplace
(Dair and Reeves, 1979). This open and more participative management
style is seen as a product of IIhigher educati ana1 standards and changhlg
social values" (p.26). The authors, however, qualify this assertion by
referring to management's ultimate motive as being one of raising
productivity through improving industrial relations. Reeves (1980)
later classified communication goals according to whether they satisfy
"coepany or-tentated" or lIemployee orientated" aims (p.16) - though, in
reality, this distinction seems artificial as the latter is usually
accepted as an incidental bi-product of the former.
As recipients of information from management, some trade unionists
often see disclosure as one means of shifting the balance of power in
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their favour:
"They and their supporters believe that it wi11 redress an
imbalance in collective bargaining and enable them to
negotiate as equals and bargain in good faith, arm them with
valuable information about when an employer can least afford
a strike, provide ideological and agitationa1 re-enforcement
for claims, compel companies to justify their decisions and,
hence, be less autocratic and generally aid the process of
improving the status of work-people in industry" (Marsh and
Rosewell, 1976, p.8).
A number of socialists including the Institute of Workers' Control
(Barratt Brown, 1968; Coates and Topham, 1974) see access to information
as a stepping stone to workers' control. They openly reject
consultation and other forms of worker participation, which they see as
a means of disarming the workers and incorporating them into management.
Thei r demand is for complete access to all conmerci a1 secrets, though
they are prepared to accept "partial" access because they bel ieve that
through time it will encourage the unions to demand increasingly more
information. Other socialist academics disagree and assert that the
primary goal is not litoopen the books" but to "transcend" them (Hyman,
1974, pp.245-6). The reason being that simply opening the books could
prove counter-producthe, by engendering elitism, where only those who
can understand what is in the books can properly determine union policy.
These socialist intellectuals also fear that it could lead toa
reduction in worker militancy, particularly if workers took the view
that existing profit levels precluded any increases in wages.
Gospel (1978) also offered this as an explanation of why the trade
unions have not been pushing for greater disclosure. He labelled this
union strategy the "ostrich approach". It is characterised by a lack of
interest in company information, or cynicism about its value or even
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strong hostility towards securing and discussing information. Gospel
suggested that this attitude stemmed from a number of causes: inability
to relate or connect company policies to the general welfare of the
membership; preoccupation with wage bargaining; and "overtly
ideological" reasons where:
"••.•..the pursuit of company information would mean that the
unions would, in effect, be accepting managerial
rationa1ity ••.••.disc10sure will demonstrate the constraints
under whi ch the firm operates and •.••in the long term wi 11
weaken militant aspirations" (p.21).
These arguments have recently been refined by Ogden and Bougen
(1985). They focus on disclosure as a managerial strategy where the
latent function of accounting information is seen as:
"an ideological mechanism for propagating and reinforcing
managerial values and purposes" (p.220).
Odgen and Bougen argue that accounting informat ion is not "value
free" or"ideo10gically neutral" because it is a management tool, and by
definition is concerned with financial viability and profitability.
Once imparted into the industrial relations area, where conflict is
inherent in collective bargaining, it could become an effective means of
"exercising control over labour"; thus undermining the fundamental
purpose that trade unions have in collective bargaining, namely that of
"contesting managerial control" (p.218).
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Accounting information, they believe, could remove conflict from
collective bargaining, so that management and unions based their
agreements on criteria relating to "efficiency, technology and the
market" (p.221). Used in this manner, disclosure would enable
management to reinforce its authority, and allow it to educate the trade
unions into management's "way of thinking". The terms of all
negotiations would be firmly on management's terrain, where it possesses
all the technical expertise and where managerial priorities would be
seen as legitimate. In this way,
"••••••account ing informat ion may be used as a means of
socialising trade unions into endorsing the primacy of
market criteria for management decision~making. Disclosure,
therefore, could serve the dual purpose of both
simultaneously informing and manipulating trade unions"
(p.22l).
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Thus, Bougen and Ogden argue that disclosure may provide the basis
for "ideological recruitment", from which could evolve "a new legitimacy
for the exerci se of manageri a1 authority". Further, it coul d allow
management "to channel union arguments into a discourse which is
singularly concerned with managerial priorities" (Ibid).
It is evidently true that disclosure can be a two-edged sword, and
that the trade unions wou1 d have to avoid the pitfa 11s of argui ng on
management I S terms. By the same token, however, many employers are
sceptical of the "potential benefits" offered by disclosure, possibly
because they fear that it will only serve to strengthen the bargaining
position of the trade unions. Contrary to this view, Dickens (1979,
p.15, table 2) found that only one employer thought that dise1osure
would actually weaken their bargaining position. Instead,59% of the
problems cited were concerned with the mis-interpretation or "misuse" of,
information, or the inability of unions to understand it, but only 16%
mentioned the possibility of a breach of confidentiality.
Many managers appear concerned that accounting information is more
subjective than Ogden and Bougen would lead us to believe, and that far
from becoming the victims of "latent ideological conditioning" (p.222),
perhaps they are fearful that the unions may reach radically different
interpretations and conclusions. In these circumstances, disclosure of
informat ion cou1 d undermi ne. management I s right to manage - if trade
unionists were capable of providing critiques and alternative
interpretations. Odgen and Bougen do not, however, completely dismiss
the benefits that accounting information could offer to trade unions.
Indeed, they suggest that to enable them to use accounting information
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to pursue their own objectives and purposes,
" •••••. unions would need to generate and develop alternative
criteri a to those used by management for assessi ng
organizational performance" (Ibid).
The authors do not unfortunately elaborate on what these
"alternative criteria" may be, leaving one to speculate that it probably
i nvo1ves soci a1 accounting concepts re 1at i ng to employment, investment
and the environment.
By inference, Odgen and Bougen still appear to be dismissive of the
role that accounting can play in enabling the trade unions to achieve
their goals. Yet there are examples of where trade unions could have
used accounting information to critically appraise management plans: at
Lucas (Confederation Trade Union Committee, 1979); the run-down of
British Steel (Bryer et a1, 1982); and the closure of pits in the coal
industry (G1yn, 1985; Berry et a1, 1985). Although the trade unions
were unable to prevent management implementing their strategy, the fault
may not lie with accounting but with the weakness of the union movement.
As we saw in chapter 2, trade unions have traditionally adopted a
reactive stance which, we shall see in the case of Dunlop at least,
1eaves them respondi ng to management pol i ci es long after they have
passed through the planning stage, and normally just before they are
about to be introduced. One sol ut i on advocated to ameli orate thi s
situation is for the unions to engage in "paralle1 managementII (Lane,
1981) or "shadow planning" (Bryer et a1, 1984b), so that the unions
would at least be in a position to understand, to question, and to·
campaign against adverse management policies. This is considered in
detail later. Another solution is legislation.
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Disclosure Provisions
If disclosure could produce the desired outcomes for management as
Ogden and Bougen (1985) suggest, then it would clearly be in
management's interest to introduce a policy of systematic and
non-selective disclosure of accounting information. So far few
compani es have appeared wi11ing to adopt a policy of this nature. On
the contrary, an inspection of the disclosure provisions of the
Employment Protection Act (1975) and the experiences of trade unions
seeking to obtain information from reluctant employers, shows how far
management is prepared to go to protect it secrets.
The main provisions of the 1975 Act covering disclosure are
Sections 17-21. Under section 17(1) the employer has a duty to disclose
information to the representatives of independent recognised trade
unions which relates to the employer's undertaking, and is in his
possession or that of an associated employer, and is information (a)
"without which the trade union representative would be to a material
extent impeded" in carrying on collective bargaining, and (b) "which it
would be in accordance with good industrial relations practice that he
should disclose to them for the purpose of collective bargaining". The
information requested must also cover matters for which the trade union
is "recognised" for collective bargaining purposes. In addition to
these limitations, employers are specifically exempted under section
18(1) from supplying certain types of information: (a) if it would be
against the interests of national security; (b) which it would be·
illegal to disclose; (c)'which had been communicated to the employer in
confidence; (d) which related specifically to an individual, unless he
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has consented to it being disclosed; (e) which would cause "substantial
injury to the employer's undertaking for reasons other than its effect
of collective bargaining"; (f) which related to legal proceedings.
There are two further restrictions on trade union rights under section
18(2) where an employer shall not be required (a) to produce, or allow
inspection of, any documents other than those specifically prepared for
the purpose of conveying the infopmation, or (b) disclose information
where the compilation would involve an amount of work or expenditure out
of reasonable proportion to its value in collective bargaining.
These provisions are clearly intended to be restrictive - the union
has no means of checking whether the information disclosed is inaccurate
or misleading, if it is unable to check the original documents. By way
of contrast, consider the position of the auditor who acts on behalf of
shareho 1ders who is able to exami ne origina1 documents to ensure that
fraudulent or misleading, or even "unfair" information is not being
presented.
The provisions of the 1975 Act do not specify what information
should be disclosed. Where an employer refuses to disclose information,
a trade union may register a complaint with the Central Arbitration
Committee (CAC) under sections 19-21. If the complaint is upheld
("wholly well founded" or "partly well founded"), the Committee will
specify the information to be disclosed and the time period involved.
Where an employer refuses to comply with a decision, the Committee can
make an award of the terms and conditions specified in the claim or any
others which it may consider appropriate.
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To provide guidance to the CAC, a Code of Practice was drawn up by
ACAS on what constitutes "good industrial relations practice" in
disclosure. The Code has been described as:
"•.••an eminently political document, attempting to steer a
midd1e course between thwe T.U.C. shoppi ng 1ist and C.B.I.
counter list" (Gospel, 1976, p.229).
The code provides examples of information which "could be relevant
in certain collective bargaining situations", under five main headings:
(1) Pay and benefits; (2) Conditions of service; (3) Manpower; (4)
Performance, and (5) Financial. Each of these headings also includes
details of the type of information that may be disclosed. For example,
financial information covers: cost structures; gross and net profits;
sources of earnings; assets, liabilities; allocation of profits; details
of government financial assistance; transfer prices; loans to parent or
subsidiary companies and interest charged. Much of this information is
available in company financial statements, though because of their
sectional organisation, trade unions may be expected to prefer this to
be disaggregated down to plant level, particularly with regard to cost
structures, profits and transfer pricing.
The Code goes on to state, however, that "these examples are not
intended to represent a check~list of information that should be
provided for all negotiations. Nor are they meant to be an exhaustive
list of types of information as other items may be relevant in
particular negotiations" (para 12). The Code then qualifies this list
with another list, "which if dic10sed in particular circumstances might'
cause substantial injury". This includes cost information on individual
products; detailed analysis of proposed investments, marketing or
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pricing policies; and price quotas or the make-up of tender prices. The
Code states that "substantial injury" may occur if, for example, certain
customers wou 1d be lost to compet itors, or supp1iers wou 1d refuse to
supply necessary materials, or the ability to raise funds to finance the
company would be seriously impaired. In this case, the burden of
establishing that the disclosure of certain information would cause
"substantial injury" rests with the employer, which at least is an
improvement on the CIR Code, where the union had to show "material
impediment" and "be able to demonstrate reasonableness having regard to
all the facts and circumstances of the case" (para 110). Nevertheless,
"••••••the relationship between the Code's lists and the
Act's provisions is vague and contradictory. The Code
appears to promise access to certain types of information,
whereas the Act merely lays down specific tests to be
applied". (Gospel and Willman, 1981, p.21).
In addition, by not placing the onus on the employer to disclose
information unless he could prove that it was detrimental to the
interests of the firm, the unions have found themselves cast in the role
of plaintiffs. How successful have the trade unions been at obtaining
information under the Act?
Complaints
From the effective operation of the disclosure provisions in August
1977 up to August 1980, 129 section 19 comp 1aints were recei vedand 35
declarations made by the CAC. After 1978, there was a decline in the
use of section 19. The majority of these cases were either settled or
withdrawn before they reached a full hearing of the CAe. This may be
because the employer was prepared to adhere to the union's request, or
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because the trade union recognised that it was pointless to pursue the
case. An analysis of the declarations by the CAC reveals that:
"a majority of users are white collar unions and that a
majority of the successful cases are unambitious attempts to
gain information on the groups' own terms and conditions:
often they are seeking the sort of information which many
other trade unionists find readily available" (Gospel and
Willman, 1981, pp.21-2).
The preponderance of white collar unions among the plaintiffs can
be attributed to a number of factors: greater awareness of the
importance of information for bargaining; employers tend to be more
secretive when it comes to terms and conditions for white collar staff;
and, more importantly, because of their relatively weak bargaining
position.
Most of the comp 1aints referred to the CAC concerned terms and
conditions, mainly covering job evaluation schemes, gradings, pay
sca1es, and wage systems. This was fol.loeed by requests for infornation on nunbers
employed and wage bills, labour costs and training budgets and costs.
Here the union success rate in obtaining this information was relatively
high. By contrast, when requests were made for particularly sensitive
information on profits, performance, non-labour costs and closure and
redundancy, the success ratewas negligible. This is presumably because
workers' interests in obtai ning informat ion was in confl ict with those
of investors. As noted earlier, employers need not disclose information
if its ability to raise funds would be seriously impaired. Taken
1itera lly, this means that the unions have no right to informat ion to
enable them to challenge the role of profit. Not surprisingly,
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"••••.•over 90 per cent of the 'not well-founded'
declarations concerned requests for the kind of financial
information that would be essential to a shop steward's
committee fighting for jobs" (Hastings, 1984, p.181).
Perhaps one of the reasons why the number of complaints to the CAC
on non-di se1osure has fallen in recent years is because, during the
recession after 1979, companies were only too willing to show how badly
they were performing in the hope that this would help to moderate union
wage demands. Another important reason is the singular lack of success
of the unions ' requests for informati on in previous years. The most
widely used objection by employers to disclosing information is section
17(1)(a) that collective bargaining would not be materially impeded by
non-di se1osure. However, even where the condi tions insect ion 17 had
been met, trade unions were likely to fall foul of a number of
objections under section 18: in particular 18(1)(c) relating to
confidential communication, 18(1)(e) based on substantial injury to the
firm, and 18(2) relating to the production of original documents and
disproportionate work. Therefore, the more ambitious the claims by the
unions the less likely it is to be successful, which explains why the
unions were unable to use the Act to extend collective bargaining.
In conclusion, it would seem that the 1975 Act has had very little
direct impact on disclosure practice (Dair and Reeves, 1979; Dickens,
1979), though it may have had an effect on the more reluctant disclosers
by offeri ng a statutory remedy. In her survey, Dickens (1979, p.29)
found that 22 of the 34 unionised companies (65%) said that the
legislation had had no effect; 12 said that it had had some effect in
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making management think about disclosure, of these 8 said that it had
led to more information being given to the trade unions; while only 6
reported that it had encouraged the unions to ask for more information.
One possible explanation for the trade unions' limited use of the
disclosure provisions is that they already receive sufficient
information from management. The evidence available, however, would
tend not to support this conclusion, and that on the contrary much of
the information provided by management may not be regarded by the unions
as directly relevant or useful. Indeed, Cooper and Essex (1977) have
stated that:
........shop stewards are 1ike1y to find disaggregated data
about the future performance of the plant more useful than
aggregated data ••••(and).•••informat ion re1ating to future
events more useful that information relating to past events"
(p.21S).
Another survey of the disclosure practices of 390 firms by the
British Institute of Management (Smith, 1975), conducted prior to the
implementation of the legislation, found that the only information
regularly provided to employees or trade unions by most firms were
details of pay scales and make-up of pay, but even here nearly 25% of
respondents did not disclose it on a regular routine basis. When it
came to General performance indicators and Future Plans, only about 25%
disclosed any of this information on a regular basis. About half of all
companies said that they never gave information on unit costs, rate of
return on capital, value of the company, mergers and takeovers, while,
around 40% said that they never disclosed information on sales revenue
and pre and post-tax profits.
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Surprisingly, about a quarter of all respondents claimed that they
gave manual workers more information than shareholders (for listed
compani es, a breach of Stock Exchange rules), whil st a third provided
them with less. Cooper and Essex (1977) found, on the other hand, in
their survey of disclosure practice in the engineering industry in
Manchester, that "information from plant management was rarely provided"
(p.2l3).
It is clear, therefore, that where management is providing
information, the timing, content and quality of the information is
crucial. In the light of the previous discussion, it is highly
unlikely, except in exceptional circumstances, that the unions would
have privileged access to price sensitive information about listed
companies before the Stock Exchange. Shop stewards may receive
disaggregated informat ion on sales, costs and profits, through
consultative committees or briefings with management, which would
probab ly not be disc1osed to investment analysts, but this probably
means that in itself it is of little value in understanding management's
strategy.
Shareho 1ders, by contrast, have access to the research services
provided by stockbrokers and other financial institutions to help them
to formulate their investment decisions. Surprisingly, many trade
unions (at national level) are also clients of these institutions and
receive the same information. To date, however, it appears that the
unions have not devoted sufficient resources to collate and analyse the
"disjunct" information (Turner, 1978) available from these different
sources.
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Thi slack of interest by the trade uni ons in pushi ng for more
i nformat i on was confi rmed by Dickens (1979). She found that all fi rms
were either disclosing or were prepared to disclose information on
manpower, no fi rm sai d that it was not wi11i ng to do so. The most
"C 1osed II area was found to be Future p1anni ng, with only 50% of fi rms
disclosing or prepared to disclose information; the respective figures
for Profit/value were 58%; Performance/Efficiency indicators 69%; Costs
62%; and Pay and conditions 64%. However, if we look at these
statistics more closely, we can see that only just over 25% of
respondents were gi vi ng these types of i nformat i on as a matter of
course, and only 38% were willing to disclose this information if the
unions requested it. So we are presented with a picture that is one of
"potenti al" rather than "actual " openness (p.34). Only three of the
companies sampled reported that no information was given to the unions
as a matter of course, while only five companies reported that they had
•
refused a request for information from the unions. In all but one case
the information concerned salaries or job descriptions of individual
staff. This led Dickens (1979) to conclude that:
" ••.••. although the information actually being provided to
unions in many cases appeares rather limited, there seems to
be little pressure from the unions themselves for greater
disclosure. This lack of union pressure arguably helps
explain the limited impact of the 1egis1ation" (p.35)
Why are the trade unions not pressing for more information?
Following the introduction. of the disclosure provisions of the EPA
(1975) in August 1977, Dair and Reeves (1979) examined the policies on
disclosure of twelve major trade unions, "who might be expected to take
a lead if the use of disclosure rights were being actively encouraged"
(p.25). By the late summer of 1978, only five of the twelve unions,
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three white collar and two manual unions, had issued anygui dance of
their own on the use of the new disclosure legislation. Though, with
the except ion of the TGWU and GMWU, the advice issued to negot iators
went no further than the Code of Practice.
Dair and Reeves (1979) also found that knowledge of disclosure
rights amongst shop stewards was infrequent and haphazard. Their survey
of East Anglian firms, conducted between October 1977 and March 1978,
revealed that few firms were under pressure from their trade unions to
provide information, neither was there any evidence amongst those firms
taking an iniative to supply information that their policy had been
influenced by the legislation. Where there was an awareness of the
disclosure provisions, Dair and Reeves found that there was a reluctance
amongst shop stewards to use them. The most common exp 1anat ion given
was satisfaction with existing communication arrangements. The authors,
did not take this to indicate that management were providing a
comprehensive range of information, but rather that the stewards "lacked
the sophistication to ask probing questions" (p.2S). This may indeed be
true, and also that a level of training is needed to remedy this
situation, though equally it may indicate that the stewards had not been
confronted by a situation, say, a factory closure, where they needed to
muster strategic information. Stewards further indicated that they did
not trust information provided by management:
"Any information they supplied would have little credibility
and even if true would be presumed by the stewards to have
been carefu 11y selected to support management Is viewpoi nt"
(Ibid).
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Other stewards were purported to be just concerned with wage
issues, so that little regard was paid as to whether disclosure could
enhance their bargaining position. Finally, Dair and Reeves contended
that as the EPA provisions came into force at a time of incomes policy,
negotiators would have had little incentive to use information to
formulate wage claims based on liability to pay". Although there is some
logic in this argument, it is equally true that trade unions prefer to
base their wage claims on changes in the cost of living, or to utilise
"orbits of coercive comparison" with other groups (Ross, 1948), rather
than on a company's liability to pay". It is, therefore, doubtful
whether incomes policy was a serious impediment to the trade unions
making greater use of the disclosure provisions.
To sum up, so far, the 1975 Act would appear to have had only a
very marginal impact on disclosure practice. Many trade unionists found
that they were recei ving voluntarily from management more information
than was prescribed under the Act. As Dickens (1979) pointed out:
"A great deal of the information currently disclosed to trade
unions by employers would be protected under the exemptions
of the legislation or fail to pass the tests described"
(p.2]) •
This exemplifies the limitations of the present provisions and
demonstrates the constraints on any increase in disclosure. Many trade
unionists may fear to make use of the statute to seek more information
in case the employer should retaliate by only disclosing the bare
minimum in line with the legislation. Even those unions that are
"far-sighted" and proactive in their approach to the use of information
will see voluntary disclosure practices as more important than statutory
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provisions, and will only resort to the latter when voluntary methods
fail (Gospel and Willman, 1981, p.22).
The main drawback with the present legal procedures for obtaining
information is that, they are IItoo protracted, requiring too much
effort, and with an uncertain outcome" (Reeves and McGovern, 1981,
p.S?). In the medium term, Hastings (l984) suggests that the legal
provisions could be improved by:
11- placing the obligation on employers to give information
rather than expecting union representatives to ask for
it;
- stipulating that information about future company plans
and proposals be disclosed;
- specifying that representatives have sufficient time to
digest the information;
- reduci ng 1oopho1es for not provi di ng i nformat i on to an
absolute minimumll (p.191).
Hastings concedes however, that even this would not overcome all of
the obstacles because IIthere would be no guarantee that union
representatives would be able to utilise the information or contribute
to the deci_sion making" (p.191). Fundamentally, the unions would need
to press for a change in the 1aw based on a much wider defi ni t i on of
collective bargaining, as well as continually striving to extend the
bargaining arena. In the longer term, Hasting suggests an extension of
the HASAWA(Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974) framework concept,
where there would be a regular flow of information together with a
system of employee consultants. This latter idea comes from Sweden,
where the consultants .may be remunerated by the company, but are
employed by the union to assist stewards to interpret and use financial
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information.
If the trade unions were able to engage the services of specialist
consultants, this would undoubtedly improve their understanding of both
information and decision-making. To be effective, however, the unions
would need to develop the relevant policies, priorities and strategies
to make use of this information. A further consideration should also be
given to the role of third parties in British industrial relations
which, from the point of view of the trade unions, is generally
unwelcomed. There is little reason why outside consultants should not
be similarly regarded. Foley and Maunders (1977) have suggested a role
for independent auditors to vet and to report on information of
potential use in collective bargaining. However, it would be difficult
for them to be conceived as anything other than IItools of management IIby
the trade unions, particularly as they typically work for investors.
Additionally, they are frequently trained in business or management
schools, and they associate with management on a professional and social
basis as an inevitable result of their work. In principle, therefore,
trade unions would have little option but to lIauditllfor themselves, if
they wished to use accounting information to help them protect the
interests of their members.
Research on Disclosure
If we consider the academic study of industrial relations, it is'
.
apparent that much of the literature is concerned with the trade union
movement, whereas the study of management has until comparatively
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recently been neglected (Friedman, 1977; Thurley and Wood, 1977 and
1983). Conversely, little academic research has been carried out by
accounting or industrial relations specialists on trade union strategy,
or the ability of trade unions to influence corporate policy decisions .
. One of the few areas where there has been a degree of cross-
fertilisation between accounting and industrial relations is disclosure
of accounting information and collective bargaining.
Much of the early research on disclosure was, in the main,
concerned to explain the legislative provisions (Jones, 1975; Gospel,
1976), or concentrated purely on the concept of communications to
employees. During this period there was a growing interest among
accountants in presenting financial information to employees in a way
that it could be readily understood (Corporate Report, 1975). This
encouraged a number of compani es to prepare specia1 "emp1oyee reports II
(typically simplified versions of their published accounts) to explain
to the workforce the trading and financial position of their companies
(Marsh and Hussey, 1979; Hussey, 1979). However, these reports tended
to be highly partisan in the way that they emphasised the financial
benefits accruing to employees and minimised the contributions paid to
shareholders (for example, by ignoring the likely benefits from retained
earnings). This undermined their potential usefulness to trade unions
because
1I •••••• as long as the nature of the information supplied is
determined by management and the methods of collections and
measurement of the various indices are poorly specified,
then it is 1ike1y that the documents wi11 be regarded as
managerial propaganda II (Cooper and Essex, 1977, p.210).
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A number of studies on the role of accounting in collective
bagaining have focused mainly on wage bargaining (Foley and Maunders,
1977; Palmer, 1977; Craft, 1981; Pope and Peel, 1981). Within these
bargaining models disclosure is seen as playing an important role in
influencing the outcome of negotiations between management and unions.
One of the failings of these models, however, is that they consider
di se 1osure from a manageri a1 perspective, whi1st the needs of trade
unions and how they might use this information are virtually ignored.
In their study, Foley and Maunders (1977) adopted a pluralist
perspective of the enterprise, which sees the firm as "a coalition of
interest groups presided over by a top managementII (Fox, 1985, p.26).
To pluralists, trade unions are accepted as "legitimate expressions of
legitimate challenges to managerial rule" (Fox, 1973, p.194). In this
model, equal access to information is seen as a means of making the
outcome of negotiations more rational. This may lead to a positive
managerial pay-off by encouraging the union to revise downwards its
assessment of the firm's ability to pay. It may also work the other way
by producing in the short-term a loss of tactical advantage to
management in "di stri buti ve bargai ni ng". However, were management to
adopt a liberal disclosure policy, where information is given to the
unions on a systematic basis in order to build trust and credibility,
rather than used in a tactical sense, this will in the long~term produce
positive benefits arising from "integrative bargaining" and "additudinal
structuring"*,
* "Integrative bargaining" operates to find comon or complementary
interests and to solve problems confronting management and unions.
"Attitudinal structuring" functions to influence the overall
relationship between the two parties.
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A number of writers have, however, questioned how far management is
P1ura 1i st in its vi ews, when for all intents and purposes thei r natural
inc1 ination is to the unitary position, especially since "unitary
values have been strongly inculcated in their own training and
deve l opment" (Purcell and Sisson, 1983, p.113). Those who take a
uni tary perspective of the enterpri se see management and workforce as
having shared interests. This is because
" ..•• '•• the Iorgani zat i ona1 109i c I of the enterpri se is seen
as poi nt i ng towards a uni fi ed authori ty and 1oya lty
structure, with managerial prerogative being legitimized by
a11 members of the organi zat ion. Thi s accords with the
emphasis that is placed on assert i ng the comnon objectives
and common values which unite and bind together all
pert lctpentsvIfox, 1973, p.186).
The policies and goals pursued by management are perceived as being
,
rational and, therefore, the behaviour of the workforce "should" be
congruent with these aims. Managers who subscribe to a unitary ideology
support the notion of a single authority and leadership in the
organisation, namely their own, which commands the loyalty of all
employees. Trade unions are seen as having no legitimate function to
challenge management decision-making or to present itself to employees
as a ri va1 focus of 1eadershi p. They are regarded as ali en to the
organi sat i on and a threat to its well-bei ng. The trade uni ons are
vi ewed as a "hi stori ca 1 carry-over", or as an outcome of secti ana 1
greed, or even as vehicles for subverting the existing social order.
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Craft (19Sl) adopts a unitary perspective of the enterprise, where
the union-management relationship is seen as basically "adversary",
mainly because of "different goals and values" (p.9S). Craft argues
that, for management, the tactical reasons for disclosing information
"must necessarily be a contingency decision" (p.103), dependent upon a
number of organisational factors, as well as the management-union
relationship, their relative bargaining strength, and the political
disposition of the union. Thus, he asserts that:
".•••.•the most important factor affecting manageri a1
interest and wi11ingness to diselose financi ali nformat ion
is the nature of the collective bargaining relationship with
the union. This influences management's perception of
whether information will be used for the mutual benefit of
the parties and to what extent it will be used responsibly
in the negotiation" (p.99).
Where the relationship is characterised by extensive conflict,
management will as a matter of course limit the amount of information
dise1osed to the bare 1ega1 requi rements, and restri ct the union's
influence in the enterprise. On the other hand, Craft advocates that
management should adopt a "non-selective" disclosure policy, where lithe
union accepts management problems as its own concerns II (p, 99) , and
contributes to the goals and objectives of the enterprise.
The weakness of these two p1ura 1ist and unitary models is, to
repeat, that they are concerned solely with wage bargaining. They
assume that management controls access to information in the enterprise
and that the release of this information, whether for tactical or
non-selective reasons, will influence the outcome of negotiations. The·
.
models fail, however, to consider the role. that information has to play
in formulating union strategies, and its relevance to union purposes.
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For example, research carried out suggests that trade unions do not
base thei r wage claims on IIabil ity to pay II• In recent years it appears
that many managements have tried to influence negotiations by disclosing
information about the company or market in order to lower union
expect ations. However, on the whole "this has, with rare except ions
either been ignored or rejected by the unionsll (Jackson-Cox et a1, 1981,
p.266). As I have suggested before, part of the reason for this may be
the unions' distrust of management's motives. Another reason is the lack
of tradition in Britain for conducting collective bargaining on the
basis of detailed financial, production and manpower information (Marsh
and Hussey, 1970). For example, Reeves and McGovern (1981, case 3) cite
a case of a settlement reached on liability to pay", which provoked "a
very hostile reaction from the workforce II (p.14) because it was below
the IIgoing rate". The following year the union also accepted an offer
based on what management assessed the company caul d afford, but this,
time it was in line with going rates. Although the unions did not make
an independent assessment of the company's ability to pay, they did use
other yardsticks against which to measure management's interpretation of
the financi a1 pasition. These inc1uded: the reduct ion in deli veri es,
tangible evidence of a deteriorating trading position; increased
investment by the new owners after years of 1ack of investment by the
previ ous management; the fear that the company might dispose of its
holding if it proved unprofitable; and open discussion with senior
management on a contract to protect jobs.
From the above we may conclude that the trade unions will normally
base their pay claims on "external" standards: changes in the retail
prices index; local labour market rates; and key wage settlements.
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These are then supplemented and adjusted to take account of "interna 1
labour market pressures", leading to the restoration or consolidation of
differentials. It would seem that the trade unions are usually only
prepared to consider "ability to pay" when a company is facing
financial and trading difficulties, and the normal "external" criteria
are unattainable. Where a company is makig high profits, the unions may
use this as one of their arguments duri ng negot iations, but they have
rarely based their claim solely on profitability, perhaps because in the
following years the profits may fall.
Owen and Broad (1983) similarly found that rises in the cost of
living were the most important consideration in formulating a wage
claim. Nevertheless, they did find that "ability to pay" was an
important factor amongst white collar negotiators, who were keen "to
retai n credi bi1ity with the membershi p by taki ng account of what the
company can afford" (p.29). Because of their members' greater exposure
to financial information through their jobs, they asserted that:
".•••••white call ar stewards have more potentia 1 for
mobilising support behind ability to pay arguments than
their blue collar counterparts" (p.29).
Although Owen and Broad believe that financial information does
have a potentially important role to play in bargaining, they found that
it was not being realised because union negotiators were receiving very
little management accounting information covering, for example: costing
methods used on the site; product cost structures; assumptions
underlying budgets; budgeted cash flow information for the company as a
whole, or budgeted cash flow information for the site. Similarly, blue
collar workers were not receiving information on: output per worker;
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planned standard worker performance levels, or subsequent comparison of
actual output with standard performance levels.
In spite of the optimism of Owen and Broad, it is difficult to make
generalisations from a study of bargaining in just two companies. No
analysis was made of why management was not making this information
available; perhaps the unions had never requested it, or perhaps
management were treating it as confidential because it was an important
part of their control system. Even if the stewards did have access to
this information, it is by no means certain how they would have used it.
As in the earlier case, it is possible that workers will only support
bargaining based on financial information so long as the pay deal is in
line with the going rate. If pay settlements fell consistently below,
there is little reason to believe that the membership would continue to
support liability to pay II negotiations. As Owen and Broad readily
admitted the only steward totally against this form of bargaining was a
white collar representative, who saw his job to obtain the maximum
possible settlement. If circumstances changed there is very little
reason to believe that he would remain a lone voice.
The SSRC Studies
In 1978, the Social Science Research Council provided a major
stimulus to· disclosure research by taking a decision to fund four
research projects*. This was part of an "Accounti ng Initiative"
presided over by the Accountancy Steering Group, which was a
sub-committee of the Management and Industrial Relations Committee. The
Group's aim was to encourage more research in the field of accountancy.
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As part of this programme the Group also commissioned research on
Inflation Accounting.
The disclosure initiative was viewed as a "relatively novel
multi-disciplinary research" (SSRC, minutes of a seminar held at the
University of Bradford Management Centre on 5 September 1979). Building
on previous research, the SSRC studies
lI.sought to ground their observations in a generally richer
institutional context than was the case with earlier
studies •••••• (Moreover,) they have not perpetuated the error
of identifying collective bargaining solely with wage
bargainingll (Owen and Lloyd, 1985, p.33l).
Neverthe 1ess, as we shall see, accounting seems to have played a
relatively minor role in the SSRC research studies. This can be
attributed partly to the research proposals submitted by the four teams,
and partly to the methodologies they adopted. For example, the
researchers from the University of Kent set out to develop an approach
* The respective research teams were:
J. Jackson-Cox, J.E.M. Thirkell and J. McQueeney (University of Kent)
M. Gold, H. Levie and R.E. Moore (Ruskin College, Oxford).
T.K. Reeves and T. McGovern (Anglian Regional Management Centre).
F. Mitchell, H.J. Sam and P.J. White in conjunction with D. Tweedie
(University of Edinburgh) (The research project was essentially
concerned with the dynamics of information disclosure to employees as
opposed to trade unions).
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to disclosure of company information to trade unions and employees that
would investigate:
" •..... the conditions under which information disclosure
takes place and wou1d consi der the consequences and
implications that the disclosure and use of company
information would have on such things as the pattern and
outcome of collective bargaining" (Progress Report submitted
to SSRCseminar, 5 September 1978).
To develop their conceptual approach the Kent researchers drew on
concepts from "mainstream industrial relations, management organisation
and business theoryfand political anthropology" (Ibid, p.6).
The researchers from Ruskin College, Oxford, on the other hand,
were concerned with identifying "constraints upon the acquisition and
use of company information by trade unions". Their methodology was to
adopt an "tndustr+al relations/educational framework II rather than a
"narr-ower economic/ accountancy one" (Progress Report, p. 2) • They were
concerned that the latter might simply have demonstrated the lack of
uni on expertise in copi ng with i nformat ion. Thi s may be so, but it
fails to explain why an industrial relations/accounting framework could
not have been used, which could have set the case studies within a wider
business context, as opposed to a much narrower industrial relations
perspective. By studying industrial relations and lIaccounting in
act ton", it would then have been possible to view disclosure as an
integral part of management policy within each industrial sector. The
following criticisms can also be levelled at these studies:
1. They failed to explicitly consider the potential usefulness of
accounting to trade unions;
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2. They failed to relate union objectives to uses of information;
3. They failed to address the politica1 nature of, and hence the
political constraints on, disclosure.
In general, we shall see that the weaknesses of their conc 1usions
stemmed from the fact that the case studies were not set in a business
or industrial context, i.e. they were not based on a clear financial
analysis of the companies or the industries in which the firms were
based. Thus, they had no basis for understanding management's
strategies, or those available to the trade unions.
Jackson-Cox, Thirkell and McQueeney (1984)
This project looked at disclosure practices in 17 companies. The
I
aim was to investigate the role that disclosure played in the
deve 1opment of trade union and management industri a1 re1ations
strategies. They indentified two distinct management disclosure
policies: the "integrated" and the "ad hoc" approaches.
In the former case, information was provided on a regular basis in
order to encourage "employee ident ificat ion" with company policy and
objectives, and to thus allow management to exert greater control over
the internal labour market. To assist this policy, management
encouraged the development of a shop stewards' conunittee "to exclude the
influence of the external union officials" (p.257). Management's
principal objective was "to prevent the segmentation of the labour force
through internal and external labour market pressures, and to encourage
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the development of a common set of union objectives" (p.259).
Management also established a bilateral management-union forum; initially
to negotiate the introduction of a value-added productivity scheme, and
later as a body where it could provide information to the trade unions.
In their view, management was intent on encouraging loyalty to the
company, whilst at the same time minimising the influence of full-time
union officers, the external union organi sation and nationa1 industry
agreements. This was presented as part of management I s strategy to
control the internal labour market, consisting of a multi-skilled
flexible workforce, and to avoid the "traditional" demarcations
prevalent in the industry.
Management recognised that the domestic union was helping to
regulate the internal labour market, by "shaping the process of
intra-organisational bargaining" (p.262). Convenors were therefore able
to win concessions from management on issues not strongly supported by
the membership, and thus they were able to extend the range of
bargai ning issues. However, we are given no further detai 1s of these
matters, nor the reasons why they were not supported by the membership.
By the same token, we were also informed that management readily
disclosed information on staff salaries and "marketing" to senior
stewards and convenors on a restri ctive basis, but the researchers
provided no details of the quantity or quality of information disclosed
(e.g. what exactly were "regular monthly sales figures"?).
Additionally, the Kent researchers failed to indicate whether management
was disclosing information on company strategy and long~term prospects.
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The research team did, however, inform us that the convenor and
shop stewards were unable to make "effective use" of the information
disclosed for two reasons. Firstly, they did not fully understand the
company organisation. Secondly, the domestic union was isolated from
the external union organisation, which constrained their "capacity to
integrate information within a wider perceptual field", and thus "its
value as "intelligence" for the identification of issues was limited"
(p , 262). From thi s evi dence it would appear that management had very
effectively neutered the domestic trade union organisation, and that the
provision of some information and the withholding of other data, had
played an important part in constraining the trade unions.
In the ad hoc case, information was disclosed "piecemeal and
intermittently, in reaction to specific issues and events" (p.2S7).
Faced with rationalisation of the product lines and organisational
changes, the "highly segmented domestic trade union organisation",
estab 1i shed an "open i nter-uni on forum" , compri sing process, craft,
technial and administrative workers. The unions also created an
"Information Steward", to gather details about the company structure and
information on the operation of the parent and other subsidiary
companies. Unlike in the previous example, the trade unions controlled
the internal labour market, which they used to initiate collective
i ndustri a1 acti on on minor issues, in order to gai n access to seni or
management. This prompted the plant management into action, who defined
the deteriorating industrial relations situation as a "col1lllunications
problem". Management elected to resolve this problem by disclosing
information to the unions through a "single bilateral management,:,union
forum", rather than on a sectional basis. According to the authors,
this disclosure strategy was ill-defined because management did not link
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this policy to any "substantive, or other issue" (p.259),· neither did
they "define the level of the organisation at which disclosure should be
related and fixed". As a result, management failed to tackle the issue
of most concern to the unions, namely, "their relationship to the wider
company and enterpri se structure II • For these reasons "management's
reactive and ad hoc disclosure strategy failed in its objectives"
(Ibid).
The authors did not consider, however, whether this was a
deliberate management strategy aimed at keeping the unions uninformed.
Moreover, there appears little reason in this case why the unions could
not have found much of the relevant information from published data as
the entities were public companies.
This notwithstanding, perhaps the major weakness of this research
and, as we shall see, that of other research projects, was that they
failed to study the market environment in which the firms were
operating. Consequently, no analysis was made of any of the firm's
business strategi es or that of their compet itors. This is a major
omission from this research, particularly as the researchers boldly
asserted that:
"In general the management provision of information to trade
union representatives was initiated in response to pressures
arising out of constraints imposed by the environment in
which firms operated, rather than in response to trade union
pressures or requests II (p.260).
A detailed analysis of these market constraints would perhaps have
given us an insight into the evolution of the various management
strategies, and how this influenced their disclosure policies in
123
different market environments. Further, it would also have allowed us
to see what part this information played in influencing, if at all,
trade union strategies, so that we could determine whether particular
market environments were more conducive than others in stimulating trade
union uses of accounting information.
Jackson~Cox et a1, concluded that in most cases there was a
considerable amount of company information available to shop stewards,
but that it was either ignored, or else it was used in a very limited
way. They attributed this to the inability of the stewards to recognise
its relevance or to link it to a specific issue, mainly because they
lacked the expertise to understand the information or were mistrustful
of it. As a result they concluded that:
1I •••••• the major role of information for trade unions must be
that of "tnte lltqence", leading to the identification or
development of issues, criteria and standards II (p.269).
In this respect, information can play an important role in
developing shop stewards' "perceptual fieldsll, though little evidence of
this was actually found. Most stewards were seemingly quite content to
adopt a "react tve" rather than a "proact tve" approach to trade union
strategy. Here, union strategy may be constrained or facilitated by the
domestic union organisation. Where it was highly segmented or sectional
at plant level, it became necessary to create "integrative" or jOint
shop stewards' committees to overcome these constraints. The researchers
produced an example of .where a similar initiative by a white collar
steward was rejected by the two manual unions because they were in open
competition for members. Hence, the opportunity of marrying the
expertise of the white collar union in gaining access and understanding
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information with the strength of the manual unions was lost.
The main recommendations of the research was that the ACAS Code
should be revised so that categories of issues are provided with
specific information, linked to a bilateral information policy. These
issues may include business strategy, company structure, job security,
and new technology. The drawback of these recommendations, however, is
the assumption that management will readily agree a joint policy to
provide information that will help the unions to extend collective
bargaining and joint control. It is difficult to see why management
should voluntarily choose to do this, especially when it will not serve
their interests to open up areas of corporate decision~making to joint
control.
Reeves and McGovern (1981 and 1982)
The research was concerned to show "how shop stewards make use of
company informat ion in their day-to~day role". It was also seen as
"relevant to understanding how employee participation might be more
effectively developed" (p.3). The ten case studies were presented in a
sequence to ref1ect the researchers' assessment of the re1ative degree
of "openness" by management, and hence the progressively favourable
environment for the use of information by trade unionists.
This research has been criticised along with other studies of trade
unions' use of information in collective bargaining, for being
"essentially short term and static in nature" (Owen and Lloyd, 1985,
p.333). The researchers are also said to "overstate the degree of
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management Iopenness lin terms of informat ion" (I bid, p.335) . In a
number of the case studies relatively important and crucial information
was withheld from shop stewards, because management undoubtedly believed
that to disclose it would weaken their bargaining position.
Reeves and McGovern identified six potential trade union uses of
company information. These are:
1. To build up a background picture over time of their employing
company, and generally to take an informed interest in it -
particularly with regards to future job prospects.
2. To understand the rationale underlying a specific management
proposal or decision.
3. Having understood the stated rationale, to assess whether
management's explanation for an event or decision was credible and
valid, especially checking that there were no inconsistencies
between various sets of information in their possession.
4. To obtain advance warning of the possible need to negotiate over a
management decision.
5. To help decide whether they should be taking into account financial
or other company consi derat ions in determi ning thei r stance on a
particular issue.
6. To propose the adoption of alternative policies or decisions.
(1981, p.55 and 1982, p.14).
In most instances shop stewards were concerned with collecting
information principally to protect members' jobs, and this was normally
geared towards issues as and when they arose. When stewards were using
information on familiar negotiating issues, such as overtime working or
manning levels, they were more likely to be able to use it effectively
and to also receive the support of the membership. This finding has
been confirmed by other research studies, where the stewards
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"..•..•were more concerned that they and their members be
involved in decisions relating to job content and context,
such as working methods, the method of payment and health
and safety at work matters, than in strategic decision
making" (Owen and Broad, 1983, p.30).
The researchers also identified a number of constraints which
inhibited the use of information by trade unions. These included: lack
of information about plant level performance; key financial data
withhe 1d by management; inadequate expertise; mistrust of management
informat ion; trade union structure; and 1ack of membershi p support.
Referring to case 5, the researchers reported that white collar stewards
found it impossible to use information topersuade members of the
importance of certain issues, in this instance, the non-replacement of
employees lost through natural wastage. At that particular time
unemployment was relatively low locally, and members were therefore not
highly motivated by the possible loss of job prospects. The unions were
also diffident about pushing this issue too far lest the company
retaliated by preventing early retirements. These stewards were well
aware that information could be used to extend collective bargaining
into wider corporate issues. Once again the lack of membership support
was seen as a major stumbling block because
"••••••bargaining over budgets, however theoretically
desirable, was believed to be something that management
would not accede to lightly, while their members would not
be prepared to support them in what it believed they would
see as a remote and irrelevant exercise. Competition
between unions was also seen as a vital factor here, causing
them to concentrate on bread and butter issues rather than
corporate issues with doubtful pay-offs" (1981, p.24).
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On this part icul ar point the researchers were accused of fail ing
"to investigate strategic decision-making and areas of trade-union
management conflict" (Morgan, 1985, p.248). As in the previous research
project, no investigation was made of the "envtronment " in which the
firms were operating, essentially because the research focused on
"routine" as opposed to IInon-routine" issues confronting shop stewards,
although job losses later became "rout ine", In common with the
previous researchers, the research team similarly failed to evaluate
disclosure and use of information by trade unions within a dynamic
context of the firms' business and market strategies. Hence, industrial
relations policies and practices were abstracted from the overall
corporate policies of the enterprises, instead of being considered as an
integral component.
The trade unions are guilty of making' similar mistakes, which
prevents them from being proactive in their dealings with management and
from deve 1oping IIadequate" pol icies. As a consequence, there are few
trade unionists at the present time who are prepared to abandon thei r
traditional reactive stance in favour of using information to extend
collective bargaining into corporate policy decisions, and thereby
challenge managerial prerogatives. As a result, shop stewards are left
in a virtually untenable position when faced by, say, a plant closure.
This is because they only become involved after the decision has been
made, with little likelihood that management can b!:!"persuaded" to
change its mind. Nevertheless, to move from a traditional reactive role
to a more proactive role is equally fraught with danger. These were
cogently expressed in a letter from a senior shop steward in case 8, in
response to his initial reading of the case studies:
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II •••••• Your case studi es appear to me to be underpi nned with
the be1i ef that there is some radi ca 1 a1ternat i ve to the
'traditional approach' to the role of the shop steward in
British industry.
I tend to have some sympathy with thi s vi ewpoint, but I
believe that this is a political problem, rather than a
question of tampering about with the institutions and
mechanisms of industrial relations today. There is one
conclusion which your findings would lead the disinterested
observer to and that is that you would support moves towards
the corporate state and a complete integration of workers'
organizations into the network of capitalist ownership and
administration of industry.
Thi s surely, is one of the main reasons for the complete
rejection by the entire political spectrum of the trade
union movement•••• of the Bullock proposals on industrial
democracy ••••
Information disclosure and our legal right to it is a gain
that has been won for us •••• I see it, and I bel i eve that
most other trade uni on representatives do as well, as a
right that will aid us in the pursuance of our traditional
goa1 of improvi ng the 1i vi ng standards and working
conditions of our members.
To argue, as you seem to, that the information gained should
be used by the union reps as part of a campaign to enforce a
greater amount of co-determi nat i on of management deci si ons
is not on1y a threat to the independence of the trade
unions, it will alternately politically disarm the rank and
file leadership of the trade union movement in the pursuit
of their primary aims ••••• 11 (1982, p.2?).
In many respects this letter typifies union attitudes to
information disclosure. Trade unionists tend to see disclosure as a
means of enhancing collective bargaining over the traditional areas of
wages and conditions. They rarely see it as part of a coherent strategy
to monitor management pol icy or to extend collective bargai ni ng into
strategic decison~making. This is not to deny that disclosure as stated
above (or as Ogden and Bougen, 1985 argued) cou 1d become part of ~
management strategy to i·ncorporate or di sarm the uni ons. However, if
management can use i nformat i on withi n a strategi c context, there is
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1itt1e reason in princip1e why the unions cannot do the same. As Gold
et a1 stated:
1I •••••• there are three elements of forward thinking: the
selection of objectives or ends, the ordering of priorities,
and the choosi ng of strategi es or means to achieve them"
(1979, p.85).
By adopting carefully defined objectives the unions could
theoret ically avoid being incorporated into management functions. It
would also allow the unions to assess their own organisation to see how
far it was conducive to achieving these goals. And, most importantly,
by pursuing a specific strategy the trade unions would be able to select
from the vast range of information available, that which was relevant to
achieve these aims.
Gold, Moore and Levie (1979); Moore and Levie (1981)
These researchers, from Ruskin College, Oxford. sought to identify
the "constratnts" which limited the effective use of information by
trade unions. They were critical of the idea of disclosure as an end in
itself, instead of as a means to achieve trade union objectives. Gold
et al (1979) therefore advocated a lIuser" approach or what has also been
termed a IIdecision:orientedll approach (Cooper and Essex, 1977), as
opposed to a "shopping listll approach. They stated that:
1I •••••• information is a means to an end; •••••• it makes sense
only within its context; •••••it must be used within a
strategy; and that a IIwedgellof the union or unions has to
c070perate together to ensure its effectivenessll (p.34).
In their original research, Gold et a1 identified two main
categori es of constrai nts: company constraints, covering managerial
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attitudes, industrial relations, company structure; and union
constraints, involving union servicing, union policy, and union
structure, including shop steward organisation. They 1ater extended
their model by adding an additional constraint category: the nature of
industry, coveri ng the size and spread of employers, the nature of
employment, employment traditions and relations between unions (Moore
and Levie, 1981). The initia1 research covered four case studi es,
whilst the second stage covered three, including one in the public
sector.
The original four studies concerned a major industrial change: an
anti-merger campaign at Odhams; the introduction of a participation
scheme at British Leyland; the closure of the Ebbw Vale steelworks in
South Wales; and union reorganisation for effective bargaining at Lucas.
Although the case studies do provide useful guidance to trade unionists,
trying to improve their use of information, they do nevertheless, leave
a number of questions unanswered. Like all the SSRC studies, none of
the cases were placed in a business setting or industrial context, and
they were conspicuous by the absence of any accounting information. No
data was produced on the developments taking place in the market which
stimulated these changes, and how far in advance the unions were aware
of what was taking place.
For example, at Odhams, we are told that the workforce opposed the
merger because they believed it would solve nothing because the real
problem was "lack of mar~et adaptation and under~investment" (p.43). No
details were given as to how the unions arrived at this conclusion.
Finally, after resisting the closure plan, a joint Forum was established
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which came under the domination of management, "who fix the agenda and
do not discuss future plans" (p.46). Why did the trade unions allow
this to happen? Why were the unions unable to develop a broad ranging
strategy? Perhaps the answer is that, "it is easier to develop a
strategy to counter a one-off crisis, 1ike a merger" (p.86) • Simi1ar
problems seemed to have occurred at British Leyland, where
"participation would appear to stop when management wants it to" (p.52).
The closure of steel-making at Ebbw Vale could be interpreted as a
devastating indictment of union disorganisation and incompetence. In
this case the trade unions certainly did have access to a great deal of
information, both from the company and from publicly available
resources, at branch and divisional level. Crucially, however, the ISTC
received no information from the planning department at British Steel's
head office, nor from the worker directors, who were committed to
confi dent ia1ity. Faced with the prospect of closure, the workers at
Ebbw Vale, assisted by two former BSC managers and a sociologist,
prepared their own plan for an integrated steelworks which was presented
to the Secretary of State for Industry. We are told that the BSC Strip
Mills Division "issued a devastating reply to it" (p.58), though we are
not informed about its nature and content.
The plan to shut the Mill arose out of the ten year strategy for
the Corporation. The steel industry unions, organised jointly through
the TUC Steel Industry Consultative Committee, did not oppose the
strategy, nor did it develop a plan of its own. Instead, individual
plant committees presented their own case against BSC's proposals ':'
which were, arguably, ill-conceived from the workers' stand pOint,
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because the integrated product ion methods of the Corporation ensured
that one plant cauld only be saved at the expense of another. "The
effect was that this national issue was left for local committees to
fight " (p.60 )• We were informed, however, that the ISTC research
department did evaluate the plans for Ebbw Vale, and found the ten-year
strategy wanting as far as the production of electric steels were
concerned. Yet the branches were completely unaware of this. The
researchers suggested in this case that:
"••••(the) ways to increase the use of informat ion on the
closure might have included moni tori ng BSC's progress in
achieving its plans, more effective servicing of officials
with timely information about developments, an information
agreement with the BSC and a strengthening of the
participative structure to allow involvement of branch
officials in issues beyond plant level" (p.62).
But more pertinently, why was this not happening in the first
place? Further, are the assurances from the researchers that progress
has been made in this direction by the unions correct? If not, why not?
Their Lucas case study presents details of the type of information
problems faced by the APEX stewards. The researchers thought that APEX
head office "takes too long to collate material to be of much assistance
despite the extra attention it gives Lucas on account of the company's
prosperity and innovatory industrial relations" (p.64). The stewards
were, therefore, dependent upon information received from management,
which was also problematic because:
"•••.•the information lacks sufficient detail or consistency
to allow satisfactory questions to be raised, documents are
not circulated beforehand, so there is little written
material and there is virtually no prospective information
on finance or production" (p.64).
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On the other hand, APEX appeared be have formu1 ated policy and
strategy on a number of issues, including the reduction of excessive
overtime in favour of extra employment, which was regularly monitored by
the stewards. The union used its own channel to acquire information to
push for quick replacements when staff resigned. APEX also had a policy
on discipline and dismissals, but no strategy on maternity and paternity
provisions, temporary labour or, more crucially, on computerization.
The installation of Visual Display Units could have been expected
to have had a serious effect on the employment of clerical workers, yet
no strategy to tackle this issue had been worked out. The senior
steward had written to head office two years previously on this matter,
but "they never recei ved an answer" (p, 66). Perhaps, more
appropriately, the focus of the case study should have been here: how
can a union develop a strategy towards new technology, and what are the,
constraints it will need to overcome?
In their second study, Moore and Levie (1981) looked at a further
three case studies to explore the use of information by trade unions.
This included a case study on the problems UCATT (Union of Construction
Allied Trades and Technicians) encountered when trying to gather
information about members' earnings, as part of its strategy to
consolidate the wages structure in the industry. Disclosure and use of
information by the APEX union trustees of the Lucas Staff Pension Fund,
and the acquisition and use of information in the public sector by the
National Union of Teachers. Arising from these studies, the researchers'
added a new constraints category to their model: the "nature of
industry". Within the list of constraints, however, the competitive
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nature of the industry and the corporate policies of the firms were
apparent ly overlooked. Moore and Levi e were critica 1 of thei rear 1ier
constraints model which they now believed to be static, and only useful
in helping to identify the constraints on disclosure practice in a
particular industrial and company setting at a particular pOint in time,
whereas disclosure and use of information are "dynamic". These dynamic
factors were identified as: management style and strategy; the state of
the economy (firms more readily disclose information when things are
going badly); and, most importantly, the ambitiousness of union demands.
Accordi ng to Moore and Levie, as the union demands become more
ambitious in extending collective bargaining, they move along an
information scale as shown in Figure 3.1. Ultimately, the union will
reach the point where it wi 11 develop its own informat ion system. The
evidence from all the SSRC studies suggests, however, that trade unions,
are un1ikely to get past the second rung in the 1adder. A
critical weakness in the model is that Moore and Levie do not demonstrate
how the unions wi 11 gain access to the management informat ion system,
and what they will gain by doing so. According to Moore (1980):
"Management informat ion systems, un1ike annual reports and
accounts, represent operational data which is more likely to
be related to company decision-making processes and to
industrial relations machinery. By becoming acquainted with
these, trade union representatives will be enabled to
percei ve the real ity of the company Is structure and
organisation through the information system which underpins
it. The emphasis is thus placed on the function and use of
information, so that requests for more information by unions
can be better founded" (p.38).
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Figure 3.1 Union A.bition and Information Use
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1
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THE INFORMATION SCALE
Source: Moore and Levie, 1981, p.9
In addition he contended that:
1I ••••• since attention is focused on information already
collected, there is no question of extra costs and resources
bei ng devoted by management to the spec ia1 provi sion of
information for trade unions. Further, for the same reason,
the re1iabi 1ity and credi bi 1ity of the informat ion (due in
part to its regularity and consistency) would be enhanced in
trade union representatives' eyesll (Ibid).
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But, for the unions to access and interpret informati on from the
MIS would require the agreement of management, plus appropriate
training, and the development and implementation of a strategy for its
use. A key difficulty, however, is whether management would be willing
to consent to this, particularly as Moore and Levie (1981) concluded
that "a discussion on disclosure of information is in the end a
discussion about access to power" (p.16). Logically, therefore,
management has every incentive not to accede to this demand. One may
also question whether penetrating the MIS is appropriate. Morgan (1985)
suggests that the unions should be focusing on the financial planning
system as opposed to the MIS. This could explain some of the confusion
on their part about the role and operat ions of the MIS.
paints out:
As Morgan
"••••••management information systems at this level are
designed to provide control rather than strategi c p1anning
information and in consequence is unlikely to provide trade
unionists any strategic awareness as to how company policy
is developed" (p.252).
So how did Moore and Levie (1981) suggest that the trade unions
would be able to improve their use of information? In their view:
"••••••the level of democracy in a union is a yardstick of
its ab;1ity to improve its use of company informat ion. The
more democratic a union is, the more chance that the
constrai nts on use of informat ion experi enced by a shop
stewards committee or a district official are identified and
tackled" (p.19).
Here, they distinguished between "formal" democracy which they
asserted exists in all unions and "active" democracy which exists in·
many unions. The latter entails a high level of membership involvement,
bargaining structures at every level of a company, and a high level of
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co-operation between and within unions. To accomplish this, the
researchers state that an active education and research programme would
be required that is responsive to changes in collective bargaining,
together with a flexible and adaptive trade union organisation. Thus
Moore and Levie envisaged that this "active democracy" would act as the
catalyst which would assist ,the trade unions to overcome union
constraints on the use of information.
It cannot be denied that better union servicing and co-operation
would help to improve the use of accounting information by all levels of
the trade unions. The question arises therefore, whether developments
in collective bargaining will promote organisational change and elicit
better servicing, or whether improvements in education, organisation,
and forward thinking will help to extend collective bargaining. Perhaps
it is interactive? Another question is the impact of management
strategy on union organisation and the levels of collective bargaining.
As we saw in chapter 2, management strategy can have a major impact
here. This is imperative because Moore and Levie suggest that
information agreements are one way of incorporating information rights
in collective bargaining, though not in the form of a "shopping list"
approach. The preferred method is:
"••••••a procedural agreement specifying the conditions of
information to be disclosed (timing, level of detail,
re1iabi1ity, format, etc), for whom it wi 11 be disc1osed,
how often and who is responsible for disclosure. Specifying
the substance of the information to be disclosed should be a
function of collective bargaining itself" (p.ll).
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At first sight, there is merit in this approach, and it is an
improvement on the practice of appending requests for information on to
a pay claim. However, as we outlined earlier, both parties recognise
that disclosure is ultimately political. Therefore, there is no
guarantee that management will be prepared to sign a procedural
agreement of this kind or, if coerced to do so, that they will respect
the agreement. Moreover, this sti11 1eaves the unions dependent upon
management for information, and takes no account of the wider strategic
objectives of the trade unions. Hence, information from management
should only form part of the total information collected and used by
trade unions in pursuit of their objectives. As Morgan (1985) puts it:
"••••..the authors have not realistically assessed the
process whereby trade unions can acquire informat ion
independently of management. Nor has sufficient
consideration been given to the problems involved in
reconciling the need for expertise, especially regarding the
interpretation of the necessary abstract accounting and
other information, whilst respecting the democratic
principles which underlie trade unionism" (p.253).
Conclusions
Information disclosure to trade unions is clearly a highly
political topic, yet this aspect has been virtually ignored by
researchers. Instead, academic research has concentrated on examining
the constraints that unions face when trying to acquire and use
information. The assumption made is that this will lead to more
"rational" bargaining, or that it may assist the unions to strengthen
their negotiating posi~ions with management. However, research has
largely failed to link uses of information with the pursuit of trade
union objectives. This leaves open whether the unions' weak negotiating
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position is attributable, not to lack of information, but to their
position as IIsecondaryllorganisations in capitalist society.
The research reviewed in this chapter reveals that there is a large
amount of information potentially available to trade unions, though they
appear not to be making use of it. Published information, by contrast,
is used by investors to assist them to monitor and control their
investments. It would appear, therefore, that the unions lack the
IIwillllor IImotivationll,as well as the expertise, to use information to
help them to achieve their objectives.
The employers, meanwhile, have tried to "seni t ise'' or to restrict
the amount and IIqualityll of information disclosed to employees -
because, presumably,they recognise its political significance - in order
to IImoderatell and shape union attitudes and behaviour. Here, the
employers have been assisted by the state, which has implemented and
enforced very restrictive disclosure provisions in its enabling
legislation.
In sUlll1lary,the trade unions appear to have failed to comprehend
the possibilities that access to information has placed within their
grasp. This can be partly attributed to their distrust of management's
motives, and partly to their inability to understand much of the
published information. More crucially, however, the traditional
IIreactivellnature of trade unionism may have constrained the unions from
seeking and using information about their industries and companies.
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Ultimately, the explanation of the unwillingness of trade unions to
actively seek and use information must be sought in detailed empirical
investigations of the experiences of trade unions understood in their
economic and political contexts. This is the purpose of the case-study
which follows in the next three chapters.
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CHAPTER 4 - PLANT CLOSURES AT DUNLOP
In thi s chapter we show that the trade uni ons were in the main
surprised by Dunlop's announced closure of its tyre plant at Speke. The
uni ons were aware that the tyre sector was sufferi ng from
"overcapacity", and that Dunlop was producing tyres at Speke and
Inchinnan on "old equipment". Neverthe 1ess, they presumed that the
company would reduce the workforce at Speke rather than close the
factory. Thus, faced with the prospect of a loss of 2,400 jobs, the
unions decided to fight the closure plan.
We shall show, however, that the trade unions had left it far too
1ate to cha 11enge or resi st management strategy. In spite of the
support the workforce recei ved from the conununity, other workers, and
local politicians, it proved insufficient to make the company alter its
•
plans. The unions evidently did all that was in their power to do:
they engaged in industrial action; they drew up alternative plans for
the factory; they also exerted pressure on the Labour Government, both
through thei r 1oca 1 MPs and by theateni ng a boycott of the Edge Hi11
by-election. Yet they failed.
Forewarned that more job losses were expected, the unions set up a
number of multi-union bodies to strengthen their bargaining position.
But this only served to .ex~ose the inherent weaknesses of union
organi sati on, because management refused to di scuss strategic issues
with them - and the unions were unable to compel them to do so. Shortly
.
afterwards, Dunlop announced the sale of its European tyre operations to
Sumitomo of Japan, and once again the unions were completely unaware
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that management had been contemplating this strategy.
The Closure of Speke
On 19 January 1979, Dunlop announced the planned closure of the
tyre plant at Speke, Liverpool, with a loss of 2,400 jobs. The company
also revealed that a further 550 jobs were to be shed at Fort Dunlop,
Birmingham, and 250 were to go at Inchinnan, Scotland (in December 1980,
this tyre plant was also closed). Whilst some trade unionists were
genuinely surprised by this announcement, others had been expecting this
"type" of news for some time. In their Report, representatives of the
white collar union, ASTMS, stated that:
IIAlmost without exception senior shop stewards on the site
were expecting the company to announce severe cutbacks in
the 1abour force but the concept of total closure of the
tyre division was never serlously consldered by them untll
mld September 19/8) (ASTMS Execub ve Group, undated,
Preface; myemphasls).
In his statement to shop stewards, Mr Griffiths, the Production
Director for the UK Tyre Division, set out to justify why, in the
opinion of management, the tyre plant at Speke had to close:
IIt remains the 1east product ive of all the Dunlop tyre
factories in Europe. It has the highest costs, the lowest
productivity, the highest level of waste and a poor
industrial relations record. It has been subsidised for
many years by the more efficient factories in the Division
and we now estimate that our losses at Speke during 1977
and 1978 will amount to nearly £8m" (Statement to Employee
Representatives and Management at Speke, undated).
The trade unions responded by registering their intent to resist'
the closure plan. They lobbied their local MPs, wrote to Ministers,
organised demonstrations and sit-ins, as well as devising their own
143
plans to preserve employment at Speke. The unions also formed a Joint
Trade Union Action Committee, to press their case, prepare propaganda,
and to forge links with the local community.
Loca 1 people demonstrated thei r support by formi ng a communi ty
picket of non-Dunlop employees, from 7am to 5pm, to prevent Dunlop
removi ng £15 mi 11ion worth of tyres from its warehouse. This was
organised to circumvent company rules, which allowed an employee to get
paid if he was unable to work through no fault of his own, thereby
relieving the workforce of the need to take strike action (Guardian, 22
March 1979). Church Leaders in Merseys ide also 1ent thei r support by
leading a march of some 5,000 people through Liverpool on 10 March 1979,
to protest about the closure plans. Yet it was barely mentioned in the
national press or media, where attention was instead focused upon the
closure of steel-making at Corby, and the rioting by steel workers in
\
France, protesting about the loss of their jobs.
While some trade unionists were building support among the
community, others, with the help of the local Labour politicians, were
tryi ng to galvani se support from a "sympathetic" Labour Government. If
the Speke workers were elated by the support that they received from the
local community, they were to be bitterly disappointed by the response
from government. On 29 January 1979, Jun ior Dutton, the Secretary of
the Engi neeri ng shop stewards at Speke, wrote to the Prime M;nister,
James Callaghan. The intention was to bring political pressure to bear
on Dunlop, to reset nd the' ninety days' not ice and to neqot late with the
trade unions about the best way of making the Speke factory competitive
with the company's other European plants. In his letter, Junior Dutton
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first acquainted the Prime Minister with the facts:-
"You are no doubt aware that all the Tyre Division
employees have been given ninety days' notice of
termination of employment. The reasons given for this are
reduced demand for our products and low productivity.
Whilst both of these reasons may be true, it is also a fact
that the Speke Factory has had no major investment in new
plant and equipment for over ten years. It is therefore
unfair to compare our productivity record with other Dunlop
Tyre Division plants in Europe.
We were informed in July/August 1978, that the Tyre
Division was in trouble and that we could expect cut-backs
in our production programme, and therefore our manning
levels, but at no time was it said that we would close"
(Speke Joint Shop Stewards Committee, August 1979, Appendix
9) •
This clearly reveals the failure by the trade unions to carry out
a detailed analysis of Dunlop's corporate strategy and future
intentions. If they had done so, they would not have naively accepted
management's word that factories would not close. On the contrary, they
would have realised that Speke would almost certainly be closed. We
shall see that it was only a question of when. Notwithstanding, Junior
Dutton informed the Prime Minister that:
"The Dunlop Company, whi 1st it has invested money in the UK
(but not Speke), has certainly invested large amounts of
money abroad to the obvious detriment of the workers here
and now I understand is seek ing a loan of £50,000 from
Government sources to invest in the Tyre Division. If this
is true, then they must see a future in the Tyre Industry
and I am therefore seeking your help in an attempt to save
jobs at Speke and get the Dunlop Company to rescind the
ninety days' notice to the workers at the Speke Factory.
Surely, if it is going to cost £10,000,000 to close the
factory it wou1 d be better to invest this money in new
plant and keep the 1abour force at work and not on the
dole. You do not need me to explain the position regarding
unemployment in the Merseyside are or to spell out the
effect that this closure will have on the communityll (Speke
Joint Shop Stewards Committee, August 1979, Appendix 9).
Since no mention was made of the possible profits that would be
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earned from this capital expenditure, the unions obviously assumed that
the investment would justify itself. They did not appear to consider
the possibility that the closure of Speke was part of Dunlop's strategy
to reduce its dependency on tyre manufacturi ng, and that the company
planned to direct future capital expenditure into other product areas.
Moreover, the unions wrongly appeared to assume that the Government
would do its utmost to persuade Dunlop to retain production at Speke.
This illusion was soon dispelled.
Mr Alan Willians, the Minister of State, at the Department of
Industry, replied on behalf of the Prime Minister on 14 March. He
explained that the Government was fully aware and concerned about the
high 1eve1s of unemployment on Merseys ide, to the extent of providing
£200 million worth of assistance during 1978. He also confirmed that
the Government was discussing with Dunlop the possibility of providing
finance to help with their investment plans, and that
II•••• an important considerat ion wi11 be the company' s
ability to maximise employment in its UK operationsll
(Ibid).
But he offered little comfort to the tyre workers:
III know that the company is giving careful consideration to
what production lines might be continued at Speke. We are
obviously kept informed of difficult commercial decisions
to close factories or parts of factories, but the
particular decision whether to reduce its Speke activities
is ultimately one for Dunlop to make, and to explain to its
workforce II (Ibid).
This reply hardly satisfied the workforce. On 19 March 1979, Junior
Dutton wrote back to the Minister, clearly disappointed at his letter:
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"The information in your letter that Dunlop's were at least
considering what products could be continued at Speke, was
good news. I thought that the Government had persuaded the
company to think along different 1ines but my hopes were
dented when I read your 1ast remarks about the ultimate
decision being one for Dunlop's to make .
••••.• 1 know it is difficult to interfere with a private
company, but I do assure you that those people closely
affected by decisions to close their factory and be thrown
on the dole do expect a Labour Government to give a
positive reponse to help protect those jobs" (Ibid).
A letter in a similar vein was also sent to Eric Varley, the
Secretary of State for Industry, on 20 March 1979. The following day
the Dunlop Joint Trade Union Action Committee sent a strongly-worded
letter to the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet:
"We are unimpressed by the aid directed to Merseyside by the
Government. In the 12 months ended this March at 1east
14,000 redundancies have been announced and on one day last
week (March 16th) 700 redundancies were announcea7
We are particul arly unimpressed by the penultimate
paragraph of Mr Williams letter of March 14th and the final
sentence we find totally uncomprehensible coming as it does
from a Labour Government •.•..•
It is our view that a Labour Government has it in its power
to curtail and effect the operations of market forces. We
on this Action Committee are all Labour voters and
activists of many years standing.
We are saying to you that unless we have a positive
response to our demand for urgent action to stop the
closure of The Dunlop Speke Factory, we intend to mount a
massive DON'T VOTE campaign in The Edge Hill bye-election
on Wednesday and Thursday 28th and 29th March 1979. We
give you until midnight, Tuesday 27th to give positive and
concrete assurances" (Ibid).
This prompted the Government into action, and a meeting was
hurriedly arranged for the evening of the 27 March, to allow the
Secretaries of State for Employment and Industry to meet with
representatives of the Speke Action Committee, together with MP Eddie
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Layden and National Trade Union Officials. At the meeting they
discussed proposals for maintaining employment in the Speke Factory and
saving jobs on Merseyside. Clearly, the Ministers were placed in a
difficult position. Successive administrations have used financial and
other incentives to influence the location of industry, but no
government has been prepared to intervene to obstruct investors'
strategies. The dilemma facing the Labour Government was therefore how
to appease the Dunlop workers. The Ministers made no promi ses to the
unions, but reaffirmed in their statement to the Press Association on 27
March 1979, their willingness
lito look at any proposals which were put forward for the
maintenance of employment in Dunlop's tyre operations and
to explore any means which offered prospects of saving
jobs, particularly on Merseyside" (Ibid).
The shop stewards had clearly learned a lesson from their dealings
with government. They realised that the Ministers' willingness to "hold
ta1ks II with management and unions to further these ends was no more
than an empty gesture. The harsh reality was that there was very little
that the Government, sympathetic or otherwise, would do at this stage.
The industry was suffering from overcapacity, and Dunlop was
determined to implement its plan of closing down outmoded surplus
capacity. The Government was likewise unwilling to obstruct the
company's closure policy. The gambit of using the Edge Hill
bye-e 1ect ion to draw the Labour Admi nistrat ion into the arena, to put
pressure on Dunlop to reverse its closure policy, proved to no avail •.
The battle for manufacturi ng industry had already been lost, and the
politicians were (presumably) now more concerned with remaining in
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office and protecting their political positions, than getting embroiled
in the affairs of a company which was pursuing a policy which, on the
face of it, appeared "rational".
This left the workers effectively on their own. Meanwhile, the
trade unions in the plant turned to collecting accounting information to
assist them to draw up their own plans for maintaining tyre production
at Speke.
(1) Midd1e-Management's Plan
Managers belonging to ASTMS Executive Group produced a detai 1ed
production and manpower plan, in an attempt to persuade senior
management to reconsider their decision. Their aim was not to produce a
wide-ranging plan in order to challenge company policy, or to counteract
company propaganda; instead they hoped to produce a plan that was
acceptable to Dunlop. In their document they stated:
"It is not suggested that all of the conclusions drawn from
the report are original. In fact we would indeed hope that
in the recent past Senior Management have either discussed
most of the suggestions and either implemented them or
endeavoured to do so. It may be that because of their very
nature, some of the suggesti ons were not openly discussed
with the Trade Unions because it was feared there would be
total rejection ••••••The purpose of this report is to
outline a series of major changes that affect both
management and employees aimed at retaining tyre production
at Speke. Whi 1st the short. term cost of unemployment is
high and radical new working practices would be required,
this plan does provide some hope" (Part II, section 3).
If senior management had indeed carried out a similar exercise of '
measuring whether the factory could operate profitably on lower output
vo1umes and a smaller workforce, and there is informat ion from the
company I shead office that they did, then the midd1e managers shou 1d
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have realised that this in itself was evidence that the closure was
planned and implemented as part of Dunlop's corporate strategy.
The plan proposed a reduction in total manpower of 40%, producing
a saving of over £4 million a year in wages and salaries. This would
leave the remaining 60% of the workforce to produce 60% of the existing
tractor programme, 65% of the radial, 67% of the crossply truck and 100%
of the existing motorcycle programmes. The managers were confident that
if their plan was adopted, and production targets were met, this would
enable the Speke Factory to capture a greater share of the market for
the four main product groups, in particular motorcycle tyres. Despite
their belief that there was an immediate lucrative market for the four
main product groups, thei r long-term aim was to attract investment to
enable new products to be manufactured at the plant, including the rear
radial tractor tyre, the self-diagnostic tyre, incorporating a
microprocessor which registers tread wear and tyre pressure
automatically, and the high speed motorcycle tyre.
To improve the competitive position in the short-term, the report
called for action on dumping. In addition, it recommended that imports
should be curbed through the implementation of the West German policy of
homolgation, whereby a car cannot be registered unless it possesses
components of a certain standard, which are normally only available from
domestic manufacturers. In the medi um-term, the report suggested that
government assi stance might be requi red to encourage new investment in
plant and machi nery, bui1dings, and research and development. However;
given the overcapacity fn the industry and stagnating demand, this was
not a policy that was acceptable to either Dunlop or the Government.
Neither party had any intention of investing in modern capacity at Speke.
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The Manpower Plan:
The main emphasis in the plan was increased efficiency; to be
achieved through a radical reduction in the workforce accompanied by
higher productivity, improvements in quality, and greater flexibility of
1abour. The report also called for a number of changes in working
practices, including the elimination of certain customs and practices,
such as early finishes; unnecessary overtime; overmanning; and low
interim outputs. It also recommended that hours spent on trade union
activities should be brought to a minimum, and that shop stewards, when
not attending to union business, should work at their appointed jobs.
The report further proposed that the Industri a1 Engi neeri ng department
should determine accurate manning-levels for staff, engineers and
rubberworkers, as to date only the latter group had been subject to work
measurement. The report recommended that job evaluation should be,
introduced to determi ne a new gradi ng structure for all groups of
workers, and that piece-rates for rubber workers should be re-evaluated.
The plan analysed in detail every department in the factory,
looking at what needed to be implemented to achieve the proposed
targets, taking into account manning-levels, management, supervision,
organisation, production methods, quality, over-manning, shift systems,
and plant and machinery.
The plan called for a reduction in the workforce from 2,320 to
1,389; a loss of 931 jobs. It was proposed that staff and management
~d suffer a 29.7% cut in jobs, engineers a 70.7%, and rubberworkers a
33.4% reduction. Not surprisingly, the manual unions refused to support
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it, as the plan called for their members to bear the brunt of the job
losses. They responded by drawing-up their own plan to save the Speke
Factory (see following section).
Table 4.1 summarises the costs expected to be incurred in meeting
the proposed target for 1979, compared to those costs that would be
incurred for the same programme, if the total labour force and overheads
were not reduced as outlined. To meet this objective, the plan envisaged
that productivity would increase to a minimum of 10.06 Kgs/man hour,
compared to 7.17 Kgs/man hour in 1978 (Ibid, Part II, Section 9). This
would lead to a substantial reduction in unit costs, allowing "marginal"
costs to fall from £22 million to just under £19.3 million. Further,
under the former, total factory costs were estimated to fall to just over
£22.75 million, exclusive of base stores cost, as compared with £26.7
million in the latter case; producing a saving of £4 million. This would
result in material costs, still the largest item of expenditure, rising
from 40.4% to 47.5% of total factory costs, whereas direct labour costs
would fall from 14.7% to 12.3% of total factory costs,
The managers accepted that what they were proposing was a
"ruth 1ess II plan based upon their own knowledge and experi ence of the
industry and plant. This they duly acknowledged:
1I •••••• the whole of this report serves as a guide as to the
way the factory needs to be re-organi sed. It forms the
basis for urgent and in-depth discussion on all aspects of
productionll (Part II, Section 4).
The managers believed that their plan, accompanied by a strong"
.
cORlTlitmentfrom all the workforce to the changes put forward, could
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persuade Dunlop not to close Speke. However, as we shall show,
investors are not interested in altruism, but are concerned to support
plans that produce acceptable profits. Based on this criterion, it is
not clear whether the managers' plan would have produced "satisfactory"
profits, though it is doubtful because no profit forecasts were
produced. Instead, the plan was drawn-up on the basis of the "proposed
programme 1eve1s for the four main product groups" , which were
"conservative estimates of 1979 requirements" (Part II, Section 3).
These output projections were, nevertheless, calculated before the
western economies suffered the onset of the second oil crisis, when the
world was plunged into recession for the second time in less than a
decade. The depressed economic outlook would have required the output
volumes to be revised downwards still further, and with it a greater
reduction in manpower requirements. As a result, larger savings than
the projected £4 million in labour costs and factory overheads would
have been necessary. Even allowing for the greater cost savings, in the
absence of detailed output and profit forecasts, it is not possible to
state whether the plan was sufficiently profitable, though it is
unlikely.
Thus, the plan was little more than a cost-saving exercise. The
proposed changes on their own would probably not have made tyre
production at Speke sufficiently profitable, regardless of the changed
economic outlook. Although the managers believed that there was a large
market for the products that they produced, they did not support this
assertion with any sales forecasts, neither did they clarify why, if
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this 1arge potential market existed, it was necessary to operate on a
smaller production programme? The managers certainly had their doubts
whether the plant could survive long-term on the existing product range,
since they called for investment in modern equipment and for the
introduction of new products. However, they failed to specify the level
of capital expenditure that would be required to make the factory
profitable. Without it, we may speculate that the Speke plant could not
have produced satisfactory profits on an obsolete product range, for
which there was a declining demand.
The plan also proved "unacceptable" to the manual unions, because
it required them to disclose their hand in advance by accepting the loss
of 813 jobs. Moreover, acceptance of the plan may well have seriously
impaired the abil ity of the unions to negoti ate the best redundancy
terms for those about to lose their jobs, and the best terms and
conditions for those employees retained by the company.
The plan also highlighted the traditional sectional interests of
the white collar and manual unions, as the latter were not prepared to
support a plan which they had played no part in drawing up, particularly
when it resembled the kind of exercise any management team might wish to
pursue, in order to cut jobs and reduce unit costs. In response the
manual unions decided to draw up their own plan for the plant.
(2) The Manual Workers' Plan
The plan was drawn up on behalf of the Dunlop Trade Union Action
Committee, by Tony Lane, a lecturer in Sociology at Liverpool
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University. The report he produced fulfilled a dual
purpose. Firstly, it presented the trade unions' case for keeping the
plant open and, secondly, it attempted to rebut the criticism from
management that the blame for Speke's poor performance and low
productivity and, ultimately closure, lay with the workforce (Liverpool
Daily Post, 5 April 1979). The report set about "demolishing" the case
for closure by challenging the premise that poor productivity, caused
by an unco-operative and recalcitrant workforce, was the root cause of
the problem. Instead, the report put the blame firmly on 1ack of
investment and the run-down of the factory over many years:
"..•.•.the tyre plant has been used as a 'bits and pieces '
factory, the place to fit in bits of programme that cannot
be produced elsewhere. Since the plant has always been a
'residual category' it has been consistently starved of
investment" (Dunlop Spekes, 6 April 1979, p.ii).
Tony Lane was able to amass a great deal of evidence from internal
l
reports and pub 1ished informat ion to support the unions ' case. From
table 4.2, it is evident that employment at Speke had been progressively
cut-back from a peak of just over 7,000 in 1952 to under 2,500 by 1978.
This was a direct result of the failure of Dunlop to invest in new plant
and machinery, and to introduce new products on Merseyside. On the
contrary, the company had been gradually running-down the factory. Over
this period, twenty-three products were transferred from Speke to other
sites. The only new products to be produced in the factory were radial
truck tyres and motor cycle tyres, in 1965 and 1972 respectively.
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Table 4.2 E.p1oyment at the S~eke Factory. Rubberworkers and
Ensineers (not inc1udins staff), 1952-78.
Year Workforce
1952 7,023
1954 5,988
1956 6,384
1958 5,142
1960 4,290
1962 3,688
1964 3,110
1966 3,508
1968 3,376
1970 2,958
1972 2,550
1974 2,719
1976 2,458
1978 2,457
Source: Dunlop Spekes, 6 April 1979, p.10.
Table 4.3, compiled from internal information, reveals that only
in three years between 1968 and 1978, dt d capi ta1 expendi ture exceed
depreciation, measured on a historic cost basis. The lack of investment
was so severe that the book value of buildings, and plant and equipment,
without allowing for the replacement cost, were almost written off. In
other words, the workforce were producing tyres with very old plant and
equipment.
The shop stewards requested from management a detailed list of the
age and value of the equipment in use. This was to be used to support
their case against Dunlop, that the factory had been "starved" of
investment, and that this was the prime cause of the low productivity in
the plant. Management were not wi 11ing to accede to this request,
possibly fearing the propaganda value of the information. Not to be'
deterred, the stewards compiled a list of their own based on their
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knowledge of the machinery, which is reproduced in table 4.4. All of
the Banbury Mixing units dated back to just after the Second World War,
as did seven of the eight mills. The planned life of this equipment was
until 1960-62, and it had been fully written-off. Most of the remaining
equipment listed was installed between 1955 and 1965, and it similarly
was only valued for scrap.
The trade unions claimed that Dunlop never completed the "ten-year
modernisation p1an" drawn up for the factory in March 1973 (just before
the first oil crisis). Under this plan, the company proposed to invest
£8.5 million in new plant; £5.7 million or 65% of total capital
Table 4.3 Capital Expenditure at the Speke Factory, 1968-78
Year De~reciation (£) Investment (£)
1968 465,000 744,000
1969 489,000 671,000
1970 552,000 226,000
1971 440,000 304,000
1972 546,000 443,000
1973 495,000 649,000
1974 528,000 279,000
1975 516,000 209,000
1976 500,000 487,000
1977 508,000 460,000
1978 483,000 388,000
TOTAL 5,522,000 4,860,000
Original cost of Factory Building:
Original cost of Plant and Equipment:
Book value of Building, 3-78:
Book value of Plant and Equipment, 3-78:
£1,534,000
£9,569,000
£ 760,000
£2,501,000
Source: Dunlop Spekes, 6 April 1979, p.11.
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Table 4.4 A Breakdown of some of the Plant and Machinery O~rated at
Speke by Age and Value
Installed Life till: Book Value
88" curing units 1946 1961 nil
66" " " modified 1961 nil55" Bag-O-matics 1965 1980 £3,669
63i" " 1965 1980 £3,23975" " 1960 1978 nil
85" " on leasing agreementAuto-forms 1961 1976 nil
40" Bag-O-matics 1955 1970 nil
lOA Casemakers 1926 1935 nil
13A " 1957 1967 nil
Crown Overlaps 1961 1971 nil
Banbury Mixins Units
No. 1 1945 1960 nil
2 1945 1960 nil
3 1946 1961 nil
4 1946 1961 nil
5 1945 1961 nil
7 1947 1962 nil
Mills
A 1945 1961 nil
B 1945 1961 nil
C 1946 1961 nil
0 1946 1961 nil
E 1946 1961 nil
G 1946 1961 nil
J 1947 1962 nil
K 1962 1976 nilCalendar No. 9 1947 1962 nil
" 11 1946 1961 nil
" RB 6 36" 1965 1980 £1,700Veneer mill 1945 1950 nil
Qualitl: Control
X-ray units RB6
11 items 1972-74 1979-82 £8,134
Source: Dunlop Spekes, 6 April 1979, p. 12.
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expenditure, was to replace machinery dating from around 1945. By far
the largest amount, £3 million, was to replace the Banbury Mixers
installed in 1945. A further £0.3 million was scheduled for roof
repairs.
In the event only £2.5 million, or 28% of the original planned
expenditure, was invested in new plant and equipment between 1973 and
1978 (p.13). The onset of the oil crisis towards the end of 1973 caused
the programme to be shelved. As we shall see 1ater, investors in
general were no longer concerned with modernising British manufacturing
industry.
The trade unions contended that this effectively signalled the end
of management's intentions to upgrade and modernise the factory. Of the
£7 million allocated for investment in the Tyre Division in 1977, only
I
£415,000 was scheduled for the Speke Factory (p.14). The capital
expenditure plan produced in April 1978, setting out plans to spend
£10.1 million at Speke during the period 1979-81, was similarly heavily
criticised by the unions. Tony Lane insisted that this "plan" was
simply a list of projects submitted by the Plant Engineer, that were
"••••••••• seen as necessary to keep the plant operat iona 1•
None of it was sanctioned. The vast majorlty of the
projects listed are copcerned Wlth meetln2 statutory safety
reaulabons and malntaln1ng eXlsbng efflclency only. Nomo ernlsation of any kind was envisaged" (p.13). -- -
Thus, on the strength of the available evidence, the trade unions
asserted that under-i nvestment, the 1ack of products with long
product ion runs and buoyant markets, poor working condit ions, and low
morale, had all contributed towards the low productivity at Speke.
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Table 4.5 A Comparison of Productivity in Dun10p's British and
European Tyre Plants, 1975-77 (measured by Kg. per man hour)
UK Plants 1975 1976 1977
Fort Dunlop 9.0 9.33 B.94
Speke B.2 B.44 7.31
Inchinnan 10.54 10.4 9.6
Washington 10.14 lB.75 17.2
EEC Plants
Wittich 17.B lB.19 20.12
Hannau 15.9 15.7 16.9
Amiens 14.11
Montlucon 15.0
Source: Dunlop Spekes, 6 April 1979, p.B.
Table 4.5 reveals that Dunlop's British tyre plants, with the
exception of Washington, were considerably less productive than the
European factories. Of the former, Speke was the least efficient.
However, these productivity comparisons take no account of age and
quality of machinery, product mix, and length of production runs. It is
clearly a combination of all of these factors which accounts for the
higher unit costs in the British tyre plant.
The trade unions therefore justly accused Dunlop of running-down
its UK operations, by investing instead in France and West Germany. The
unions stated that the only modern tyre plant in Britain was Washington,
which explained why it had productivity levels on a par with the
European plants. Paradoxically, owing to its lower wage costs,
Washington was stated to be Dunlop's only profitable tyre plant in-
Europe.
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In summary, the trade unions probably reached the right
conclusions about the closure of Speke but, as we shall see, they were
too late. Their failure to monitor management policy ensured that the
unions were always reacting to fait accomplis. Management, by contrast,
were able to propagate effective propaganda by constantly repeating that
poor output and high wastage rates had made Speke the 1east efficient
plant in Europe, which ultimately led to its closure. Because they did
not monitor management's plans, the unions were constantly forced on to
the defensive to rebut the criticism that it was their actions and
practices that were largely to blame.
Union Proposals to Retain Tyre Production at Speke
The trade unions were determined to prevent the Speke Factory from
being closed down, with the consequent loss of 2,500 jobs. They
therefore tried to "open talks II with Dunlop on the measures needed to
save the plant, using the recomendations and machinery of "efficiency
dialogues" as the basis for negotiations. Management had estimated that
the losses incurred during 1977 and 1978 at Speke amounted to nearly £8
million. The trade unions made no attempt to transcend these figures by
basing their case on value-added analysis (see Morley, 1978 and Sizer,
1981), to argue that the over-riding concern should be the total wealth
produced for the nation, rather than the profits accruing to investors.
This wotild have at least allowed the unions to demonstrate whether the
Speke factory was "financially viable" from the point of view of the
wider community, by showing that the factory was capable of generating'
sufficient wealth to cover 1abour costs and pay for investment. The
unions, instead, found themselves arguing on management's terms, where
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they accepted the need to improve efficiency and to stem the losses
suffered at Speke, and to meet these ends the shop stewards were
prepared to give a clear commitment to:
III • Renegotiate working practices with a view to increasing
efficiency.
2. Ensure overtime working is based on actualrequirements.
3. Negotiate procedures for minimising lateness and
absenteeism.
4. Ensure disputes between management and workers are
pursued through the jointy agreed procedures.
5. Negotiate flexibility of labour with a view to
improving efficiency.
6. Negotiate allocation of tasks for craftsmen to ensure
skills are fully utilised.
7. Negotiate flexibility of craft labour such that simpler
maintenance functions are left to process workers.
8. Negotiate conditions whereby all personnel agree to be
trained in tasks not required of their particular job
function.
9. Negotiate appropriate levels of manning associated with
changes in work practices" (p.23).
In short, the unions were now prepared to concede on key issues
where management had been seeking concessions over a number of years.
The stewards proposed that the negotiations should include the
profitable Sports, Rubber Belting and Motor Cycle departments, as well
as the loss-making departments, identified as Radial Truck,
Crossply Truck, Rear Tractor, Storage Control Inspection, Engineering,
Administration and Technical and the Mill.
The report recognised that the obsolete machinery made it
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impossible to reap profits immediately in these loss-making departments,
regardless of any new agreements negotiated, and so the unions
reconmended that "massive investment in new automated machi nery" waul d
be required. However, the shop stewards were aware that, given the
1eve1 of overcapaci ty in the tyre sector, any new investment at Speke
may not have proved "economically viable", if similar investment was
planned for Fort Dunlop. In short, Speke was not a "special case".
Most of the other Dunlop tyre plants in Britain and Europe had also been
"starved" of investment, as the company was trying to reduce its general
dependency on tyres. Similarly, the factories operated by the majority
of rubber companies in the UK, with the possible exception of Michelin,
were also suffering from under-investment as we shall see was evidenced
by the fact that many were still producing crossply tyres. Michelin was
one of the few companies to have installed fully automated radial
production facilities in all of its plants.
To avoid the argument that Speke should remain open at the expense
of jobs in other factories, and the consequence that any investment in
automated plant at Speke would reduce labour requirements in the factory
by 50%, or 1,000 jobs, an attempt was made to guarantee the long-term
future of Speke, Fort Dunlop and Inchinnan, by calling for investment in
new machinery plus the introduction of new products in all three
factories. Additionally, the unions reconmended that some of those
products currently manufactured abroad, which had growth potential,
should be transferred to the British factories. The unions cited as a
precedent the agreement negotiated between Dunlop-Pirelli and the·
Ita1ian unions to transfer products from the North to the South of
Italy.
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However, whilst investment in modern plant and the introduction of
new products were clearly necessary to ensure the viability of the
factories, on their own they were not sufficient. As we shall see in
the following chapter, investors' strategies were at this time
orchestrati ng a di vestment away from Briti sh manufacturi ng industry.
Against this background, and the concomitant recession, it is doubtful
whether the measures advocated by the unions would have been sufficient
to generate the "acceptable" profits necessary to guarantee the future
viability of the factory. The initiatives from the trade unions had
come far too late.
All the social arguments marshalled by the unions concernins the
"desperate unemployment" on Merseyside were not enough to make Dunlop
reverse its strategy. The report estimated that lost revenues plus
soci a1 security and other costs would produce a loss to the State of £8•
mi11i on a year (p, 26) ; whereas, if Speke were to remain open, the
Government would only have to make available about £2 million, assuming
higher productivity and greater efficiency resulting from changed
working practices, to stem Dunlop's losses (Ibid). However, in the
context of the recess i on caused by the second oi 1 shock in 1979, a
considerably larger injection of cash from government would have been
required to offset the resulting higher losses.
In summary, the unions' strategy for Dunlop was based on the
following points:
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"l. The immedi ate withdrawal of all enforced redundancy and
factory closure notices. This is to allow discussions
to take place in a reasonable atmosphere between
management and unions about the current overcapacity of
the tyre market.
2. The introduction of import controls on all tyres to be
applied irrespective of EEC regulations. One way of
overcoming such regulations would be to adopt the West
German and Japanese policy of homo1gation, i.e. to
introduce technical restrictions in the country which
discriminates in favour of British tyres.
3. Massive investment in Dunlop's plants to replace the
current outdated equipment.
4. A P1anning agreement to be negotiated to allow the
trade unions, Government and company to plan a secure
future for Dunlop employees. The agreement will enable
the planning of new rubber based products to be
introduced in those plants facing rundown in employment
arising from the introduction of automated machinery"
(p, 25) •
The Response by Dunlop
On 17 April 1979, Mr Geoffrey Wheater, Managing Director of Dunlop
Ltd, with responsibility for the European tyre operations, wrote to Mr
John Miller of the TGWU outlining the company's response to the plan put
forward by the Dunlop Joint Trade Union Action Conmittee. A copy was
also sent to Mr Stan Pemberton, the Chairman of the TGWU, and a senior
shop steward at Speke. The company stated that there were many points
in the document that they felt were inaccurate or misinterpreted.
However, Dunlop declined to elaborate on this matter, instead it
concentrated its response on the main principle of the plan. Management
stated that:
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II •••••• the proposal to operate the factory on much reduced
volumes and staffing has already been considered by us and
rejected. The overri ding factor was that lower volumes
could not support the overheads and fixed costs of a
factory as 1arge as Speke. The poor del;very performance
of the factory over the past years has 1ed to a loss of
customers at home and overseas which has added to the
problems of a stagnant market, and the point has been
reached where the plant is simply no longer viable (i.e.
profitab 1e) II (Speke Joint Shop Stewards Committee, August
1979, Appendix 9; my insert).
Dunlop also stressed that disruptive action by the workforce and
the commun ity had further undermi ned the compet itive position of the
factory, because important customers had turned to competitor companies
for their supplies. Management feared that this action could undermine
customer confidence in Dunlop tyres generally, thereby contributing to
job losses at other Dunlop factori es. The company, however, confi rmed
that the Belting operations would continue at Speke, as would the
production of sports goods, provided in the latter case that government
assistance was forthcoming and that productivity improved.
The unions now appeared to realise that there was little prospect
of retaining tyre production at Speke. Whether or not the factory could
make profits on reduced volumes and lower staffing levels was now purely
IIacademi c". Dunlop was determi ned to reduce its dependency on tyres;
investing much needed capital in Speke was not a question the company
was prepared to cons ider. The manual trade unions at the plant
therefore decided that a new approach was needed. If the company was
not prepared to invest in new tyre manufacturing equipment, perhaps it
might be willing to introduce new products to Speke.
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Alternative Products
The tyre plant was scheduled to close on 19 April 1979, after a
90-day battle to save it. The Joint Action Committee of Shop Stewards
had done everything they could to maintain tyre production at Speke.
Dockers at Liverpool and Southampton demonstrated their support by
refusing to handle goods and raw materials bound for the plant. Ford
workers at Halewood had similarly "blacked" Dunlop tyres. Trade union
leaders, meanwhile, declared a "Day of Action" on 11 April for all
Dunlop workers, as a show of solidarity, while the wives' of striking
workers demonstrated outsi de Transport House, Tory Central Offi ce and
the Employment Department.
Faced with this mounting pressure, the company agreed to form a
joint management-union working party to investigate possible
alternative products to produce at Speke. Its terms of reference were:
"To examine the possibility of introducing new products to
Merseyside in the light of the closure of the tyre factory
at Speke, and to report back within 3 months to the company
and the Nat i ona 1 Offi cers of the Trade Unions concerned II
(Speke Joint Shop Stewards Committee, August 1979, p.i).
To assi st them to draw up thei r product proposals, the shop
stewards contacted a number of sympathetic academics and trade
uni oni sts. The bul k of thi sassi stance was provi ded by Tony Lane and
some of his colleagues at Liverpool University, together with the staff
at the Centre for Alternative Industrial and Technological Systems
(C.A.I.T.S.), a unit which had been set up and jointly run by the Lucas·
Aerospace Shop Stewards Combine. Once the information had been
collected, Dunlop allowed two shop stewards, Junior Dutton, the
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Secretary of the Engineering Shop Stewards Committee, and Arthur Todd,
the Engineering workers convenor and the Chairman of the Dunlop
Engineering Workers National Combine Committee, one week off to
a11ow them to prepare their report. Thi s can hardly be cons idered a
sufficient amount of time to prepare an in-depth detailed analysis,
especially if it was seriously intended to form the basis for creating
new jobs at Speke.
The document, entitled "Dunlop; Jobs for Merseyside", was produced
in August 1979, based on an analysis of the company's operations and a
preliminary investigation of possible products to be manufactured on
Merseyside. Although the time available severely limited the depth and
range of issues covered in the report, it did confirm, albeit too late,
the findings of Tony Lane's earlier report that the market prospects for
tyres was very gloomy and~ furthermore, that jobs in other Dunlop
I
factories were also in jeopardy from the falling demand for tyres, and
the company's strategy of reducing its dependency on the product.
Product Proposals
The mai n emphasis of the report was to put forward a number of
product proposals that Dunlop might consider producing on Merseyside.
The trade unions had previously suggested a number of possible products,
including: sticking mats for hospitals and computer rooms; glass-
reinforced plastic boats; sportsfield covers; roadside furniture;
mechanical handling equipment; specialist tyres; and a host of general
rubber goods. Dunlop had rejected all of these suggestions because they
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were not profitable (see Reeves and McGovern, 1981, Appendix E, pp.
99-100).
In this document, the trade unions identified several products for
immediate production on Merseyside. The most novel of these ideas was a
design for a Bike/Trike, invented and designed by staff f ron the
Open University. Its originality lay in the way that the bike
could be converted into a trike for carrying shopping, luggage or other
load-bearing tasks. It was also designed to avoid special purpose-built
machinery, so that the tooling-up costs would be minimal. In the
short-term, the report proposed that Dunlop should produce the frame and
buy-in the necessary components, leaving the factory to do all the
assembly work. In the medium-term, it was planned to design and build a
new type of wheel in-house, using TP polyester. The project was costed
on the basis of assemb 1ing 7,500 bikes and 1,500 trike convers ions a
I
year. Taking into account the limited financial information produced,
estimates show that if the sales price of the bike was £80 and the trike
£120 (comparable to standard machines on the market at the time),
profits in the region of £66,000 could be expected, excluding start-up
costs. However, in the absence of a feasibility study and detailed
market research, it is difficult to estimate what level of sales could
reasonably be expected.
A second novel product advocated by the Working Party was an
inflatable jack. This was a rubber bag that could be inflated from the
vehicle exhaust, allowing it to be used safely on all surfaces. By
comparison the standard jack is generally unsuitable on roads covered
with snow, ice, mud, gravel, sand and uneven surfaces.
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In the longer-term, to increase employment on Merseyside, the
Working Party recommended that Dunlop should carry out feasibility
studies on a wide range of products. These proposals were listed under
four main headings: Engineering products; Container fabrication;
Medical products; and 'Xetal' based processes. Included among these
products were an oi1 centri fuge, buoyancy tanks and bags, dracones,
micropore adhesive tape, machinery guards, and so on.
The main aim of the report was to put forward products that
matched the skills, expertise and experience of the Speke workforce.
Initially, it was proposed that those workers producing the Bike/Trike
and inflatab 1e jack, should be 1arge ly semi-ski 11ed. In the
longer-term, ski11ed craft, techni ca1, design and engineeri ng workers
would be required to advance these products, as well as to work on the
latter group of products, incorporating both engineering and rubber
processes.
The Working Party was particularly concerned to protect and
enhance job prospects at other sites, most notably Fort Dunlop and
Inchinnan. Therefore, a number of product proposals were raised for the
company to consi der produci ng in these plants. Rubber based petrol
tanks was one ingenious suggestion which, hopefully, would be safer in
the event of an accident. Another was the use of dun1opi 110, in
combination with a suitable film, that could be used in the treatment of
patients suffering burns, or other long-stay patients, to prevent them
getting bedsores which, it was estimated, costs the NHS £60 million a
year. And lastly, the shop stewards were concerned to make greater use
of the many millions of tyres that are discarded each year. Speke
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already possessed one of the only two rubber recycling plants located in
the UK. It was proposed that Dunlop should investigate the possibility
of using rubber crumb for cement production, and as a basis for
rubberised asphalt surfaces. Research carried out in the United States
had shown that the use of rubber in road surfaces cou 1d prolong its
life, and cut down on necessary maintenance.
The report contained no detailed market research or business
plans, so it is not possible to assess whether any of these product
proposa 1s cou 1d have been produced profitab lyon Merseyside or any of
the other Dunlop factories. The shop stewards did not have the
expertise or the time to carry out any feasibility studies. They saw it
as a management function to report back on the potential and financial
viabi1ity of their product proposals. Thisis the nub of the matter.
How far can trade unionists realistically come up with product
suggestions that have been overlooked by management? It is true that
the experience and ingenuity of shop~loor workers can lead them to
suggest ways of improvi ng the product ion process; hence the emphas is
placed by Japanese companies on quality circles? It is true that during
a "brainstorming" session an unorthodox approach may lead to new uses
being found for old products. Nevertheless, it is management who
decides how much will be invested in developing new products, and this
is determined purely by the profits expected to be earned; a prerogative
of management which lies outside of the control and influence of the
trade unions.
It is evident that Dunlop saw the Worki ng Party as a means of
placating the unions, and diverting unfavourable criticism away from the
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company following the closure of the Speke tyre factory. Management may
have believed that if the unions were preoccupied with other pursuits,
they would have less time available to direct and sustain the industrial
and political pressure on Dunlop. In this respect they were relatively
successful because it appears that Dunlop had no intention of investing
in new products. On the contrary, we shall see that management I s plan
was to rationalise its product range and close down factories.
Summary
These three reports produced by the trade unions, with thei r
diversity of approach and analysis, demonstrates both the extraordinary
lengths to which trade unionists will go to protect their jobs, and the
limitations of trade union action. The three documents produced are by
definition defensive in nature, though not negative in purpose. The
shop stewards attempted to use the reports to mobilise support against
closure, both inside and outside of Dunlop, and in addition they were
prepared to use them as a basis for negotiations, for want of anything
better. Their involvement in producing these reports also served as a
useful education and conscious-raising exercise for the stewards. For
example, discussions with workers in other Dunlop plants about possible
new products, elicited roughly 40 proposals, that were finally whittled
down to a handful. This encouraged ordinary workers to talk and think
about these products, and to question narrow conceptions of trade
unionism.
Later the Dunlop stewards met with trade unionists from Lucas
Aerospace, where they were exposed to the latter's ideas of developing·
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workers I plans. The stewards, however, realised that they neither had
the time nor were they in a position to draw up an alternative
corporate plan, as the Lucas stewards had managed to do. Their sights
were set much lower. Through their meetings with sympathetic academics,
the Dunlop stewards were able to collect and analyse a substantial
amount of information about Dunlop. Without the help of these
academics, two of the three reports would never have been prepared; the
exception being that drawn up by the ASTMS Executive Group. Most of the
information used came from publicly-available sources, including
stockbroker reports, trade magazi nes, speci alist journals, government
statistics, and industry statistics produced by the Employers'
Federation. Other information was collected from internal sources, such
as briefing sheets, company documents made available for communication
purposes, and individual and collective knowledge of the plant.
None of the academics assisting the trade unions were accountants
or specialists in business or corporate strategy. Hence, their analysis
of company policy was not explored in the same detail as that which is
to be presented in chapter 5. Nevertheless, the reports were able to
diagnose the effect that the declining earnings from tyres were having
on profits. The report, for example, prepared by Tony Lane on behalf of
the Joint Trade Union Action Committee, concluded that in the absence of
a very large injection of capital into the UK plants, they would become
uncompet itive vis-a-vi s the European and Ameri can producers, and that
this would ultimately lead to Dunlop withdrawing from the volume tyre
market in the UK (Dunlop Spekes, 6 April 1979, p.6).
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Tony Lane reached the right conclusions, although he appeared to
have no specific view when this divestment might take place. Moreover,
he di d not question whether investment, though necessary, would be
sufficient to make the Dunlop factories competitive. Clearly it was
not, and by now it was far too 1ate for the uni ons to prevent Dunlop
imp1ement i ng the next phase of its plan, which was to sell off its
tyre-making facilities.
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that all three reports
served a useful purpose, both as a propaganda exercise to exert
political pressure on Dunlop > the company perhaps believed that bad
publicity relating to job losses could adversely affect sales - and in
all owing the uni ons to cha 11enge management pol icy. The uni ons were
not, however, able to use their reports as a basis for negotiations;
management were not prepared to reconsider their closure decision. The,
only avenue open to the uni ons was to try and persuade Dunlop to
introduce new products to Merseyside, which the company was clearly not
prepared to do. All multinationals employ marketing and corporate
policy specialists, whose jobs are to bring new products to the market
and to find new customers for the eXisting product range. There was
little prospect, therefore, that the unions, in a comparatively short
time period, could have come up with potentially profitable products
that had been ignored or overlooked by Dunlop.
The trade unions also expected Dunlop to reject their proposals,
because they were in an ~xtreme1y weak negotiating position, with most
of the workforce havi ng accepted redundancy payments when the tyre
factory closed in April 1979. As the shop stewards were preparing their
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report on "Jobs For Merseyside", they were informed that the remainder
of the workforce, who had been fighting to get the factory re-opened,
had agreed redundancy terms. It would appear that the idea of
alternative products carried little conviction with the remaining
employees, who were convinced that closure was inevitable. In July
1980, the golf ball production facilities at Speke were closed down.
The reports did, nevertheless, make other workers employed by
Dunlop aware of the threat to their jobs. The Engineering combine, a
body representing all AUEW members throughout the company, responded by
requesting further information from management on the company's future
plans, and the impact that the introduction of new technology was
expected to have on jobs. The threat to jobs also encouraged greater
co-operation between the manual and white collar trade unions, leading
to regular meetings between representatives from all the major
factories. These responses were, however, too late to have any
possibility of influencing management policy.,
One of the prfnctpal themes to come out of this episode, certainly
as far as the shop stewards were concerned, was a realisation of the
importance of "accounting information". The stewards could see that
unless there was a systematic collection and analysis of information,
the unions would always be ina position of having to respond to events.
They also recognised that the traditional defensive role of the unions
was largely responsible for the limited use made of financial and
commercial information. In this respect they wrote that:
liThevarious regional grants, employment subsidies and so on
have guaranteed profits, but not jobs. Our experience of
fighting for the 2,400 jobs at Dunlop have brought us to
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the conclusion that the only hope of shifting the
priorities of production decisions towards meeting the
needs of working people, is for trade unionists themselves
(with the support of the communities in which they live) to
exert greater control. In one sense this is not new. From
its origins trade unionism was about resisting the power of
the employer in order to defend the interests of the
worker. But in general this resistance and control has
been limited to wages and conditions. This preliminary
report and proposals is based on the idea that trade
unianists can and should extend their bargai ning power to
investment decisions and production decisions. This report
is, in a sense too late. We should have been investigating
and bargaining for alternatives before the closure
decisions were announced. We ourselves at Speke no longer
have much bargai ning power; but with the support of the
wider trade union movement, on Merseysi de, in Dunlops and
nationally we hope our jobs can be saved and further jobs
created II (Speke Joint Shop Stewards Committee, August 1979,
p.6.2).
However, although some trade unionists appear to have learnt from
the closure of Speke, it soon became evident that the natiana 1 union
leadership had failed to do so.
The Divestment of the European Tyre Operations
The trade unions were now "deeply concerned II about the employment
prospects of workers in the tyre sector and, more specifically, those
employed by Dunlop. On 9 January 1980, the Dunlop Rubber Workers Joint
Commi ttee met to "share their concerns II and to "discuss a plan of
action". Committee representatives urged that a meeting between the
company and senior union officials was imperative. The Committee also
proposed that a joint coepany-unton body, with lay representatives,
should be established for the express purpose of discussing general.
economic, marketing, and investment policies (Bulletin on Dunlop Ltd,
January 1980, No.23, p.l). Dunlop management, however, refused to
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discuss these issues with the unions and were not prepared to
contemplate the formation of a joint forum. Obviously, management were
in a very strong position, and could see no benefit in discussing
company strategy with the trade unions.
Spurred on by the deteriorating position of the rubber industry,
delegates at the GMWU National Rubber Conference, voted to press
companies for more information and to establish "suitab1e arrangements II
for discussions on investment, market trends, production and other
corporate decisions. This policy was subsequently endorsed on 19
September 1980 by the Rubber Unions Joint COlll1littee,and on 8 October
1980 by the Dunlop Rubber Workers Joint Union committee. On 13 October
1980, Alan Lord, the Managing Director of Dunlop, accompanied by other
senior managers, finally agreed to meet with trade union officials. The
union officers "urged" on the company the need to establish a "National
Joint Body, to discuss investment and future strategies". The necessity
of such a body was spelt out:
"The purpose of our proposal is not to interfere with the
traditional collective bargaining issues which are catered
for by separate arrangements with unions, but to extend the
dialogue which is already in evidence at divisional and
plant level. Currently, discussions take place on lithe
state of the bus+ness" but much of it relates to general
strategies determined at the very senior level of Dunlop.
If such exchanges are to be worthwhile and productive it
is, in my judgement, crucial that the avenue for dlScussion
be extended to the top •. A structure which begins and ends
at Divisional level obviously earns a degree of suspicion
and even disinterest. If we are to develop sound
relationships on the varying problems which we acknowledge
exist, a facility such as a Joint Council (or any other
name!) where senior 1ay union representatives can discuss
the overall policies and intentions of Dunlop is more than
necessary" (Bulletf n on Dunlop Ltd, October 1980, No. 26,
p.2).
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Alan Lord rejected any notion of establishing a national body, but
he assured the unions that Dunlop would "dtscuss future plans" with
them. Five weeks later, in December, without consulting the unions,
Dunlop announced that several thousand more jobs were to go in the
tyre and footwear divisions. The first that the unions heard of the
announcement was in the Press (Bu11etin on Dun1op Ltd, December 1980,
No.26, p.T}, This only contributed to the already "straf ned" relations
between the two sides.
During 1981, industrial relations at Dunlop continued to
deteri orate. Overt ime bans were in operation ina number of plants,
while others had held ballots authorising industrial action in response
to the failure of management to resolve outstanding grievances relating
to pay, conditions, manning levels and the infringement of agreed
procedures. Against this background, senior management held two
meetings in London, in March 1981, with senior shop stewards to discuss
these problems. The unions agreed to these meetings, but insisted that
they were no substitute for "proper-ly const ttuted" meetings between
national union officials and the company.
The idea of a multi-:-union IINational Joint Counct l" had gained
acceptance beyond the RUJC and DRWJUC, and was now supported by all the
major unions at Dunlop. The obstacle facing the unions was that no
mechanism or structure existed to negotiate on matters lying outside
local arrangements, so that when the unions tried to raise these issues
at national level, they were normally informed that these should be'
dealt with at divisional level. However, no procedures had been
established for joint negotiation at this level (Bulletin on Dunlop Ltd,
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April 1981, No.28, p.2). Thus management had manoeuvred the unions into
a position where they were ~nab1e to influence decisions outside of the
immediate plant.
A year 1ater the unions were still in the same position. On 4
March 1982, a special meeting of the DRWJUC was called to discuss the
deterioration of industrial relations in Dunlop, and to consider steps
necessary to resolve this problem Convenors and full-time regiona1
officia 1s of both the TGWU and GMWU were also present. The unions
accused the company of "contravening existing agreements", and of trying
to force through changes in working practices without agreement
(Bulletin on Dunlop Ltd, March 1982, No.29, p.2). Consultation had been
replaced by threats and ultimatums had replaced negotiations. The
DRWJUC decided that if the company refused to meet with unions at
national level to discuss their grievances, then a nationwide strike
would be called. A letter to this effect was despatched to Allan Lord
on S March 1982. No response was forthcoming from the Managing
Director, whereupon David Warburton issued a press release on behalf of
the DRWJUC, on 11 March 1982, threatening a national strike if the
company refused to meet with the unions. David Warburton and John
Miller had previously met with Charles Levinson, Secretary General of
the International Federation of Chemical, Energy and General Workers'
Union (ICEF), to secure support from Dunlop workers abroad, so that work
normally produced in the UK would not be transferred overseas (Bulletin
on Dunlop Ltd, March 1982, No.29, p.S).
Faced with the threat of industri a1 action, Dunlop agreed that
henceforth the company would discuss matters of concern with the unions.
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That October a meeting was held between senior management and national
uni on offi ci a1s, where the uni ons were assured that the company was
planning no "new rationalisation proposals at present" (Bulletin on
Dun1op Ltd, November 1982, No.31, p. 1) . However, on 5 November 1982,
the unions learned from radio and television, that major cutbacks were
planned at Fort Dunlop and in the North East. The unions once again
were neither informed nor consulted in advance (Ibid, p.2).
On 17 June 1983, representatives of ni ne uni ons met with seni or
management to "rai se major issues of concern to the 1abour force", in
parti cu1ar "i nvestment and job security". The company was not prepared
to gi ve any "categori ca 1 assurance on jobs", but management assured the
unions that they would be consulted on any plans that were made. The
unions were also informed that the Board had made no decision on the
future of Fort Dunlop, and that no plans would be formulated for at
least four to five months (Bulletin on Dunlop Ltd, June 1983, No.32,
p.1). These statements were clearly untrue, for on 22 September 1983,
Dunlop announced that it was sell i ng its European tyre operat ions to
Sumitomo of Japan. Once again the unions had been taken completely by
surprise, and union leaders could do little more than protest and make
vague noises about possible "industrial action".
Conclusions
The trade unions were not prepared for plant closures. As we have
seen,most trade unionists believed that Dunlop was preparing to reduce
its workforce, in response to the overcapacity in the industry. This
knowledge did not lead to a union response or strategy, presumably
181
because job shedding in search of efficiency and profits was accepted as
an everyday occurrence in a capitalist society. The closure of a whole
factory, on the other hand - at that time - was a new phenomenon.
Although the unions put pressure on Dunlop to reverse its plans,
they realised that they were in an extremely weak negotiating position,
with little prospect of thwarting management's plans through industrial
action. Thus, alternative plans drawn up by the unions demonstrate, on
the one hand, the ingenuity of the stewards in responding to a crisis
situation whilst, on the other, they reveal the lack of planning and
strategy on the part of the unions, and perhaps their desperation.
It is clearly inconceivable that these plans could have persuaded
management to alter thei r strategy. The trade unions had 1eft it far
too 1ate. Dunlop was now proceedi ng to implement the fina1 stages of
the palicies, which we shall see had evolved over the course of the
1970s. Because the unions had not monitored and analysed Dunlop's
corporate strategy, they were unaware that plant closures were being
planned, and that ultimately Dunlop intended to divest itself of its
European tyre facilities. This lack of foresight essentially left the
unions powerless to predict, and hence to respond effectively to
management policy. Yet as we shall show in
the next chapter, all the necessary information was publicly available.
All that was required was a commitment from the unions to analyse it.
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CHAPTER 5 - DUNLOp·S STRATEGY: THE INFORMATION PUBLICLY AVAILABLE TO THE
TRADE UNIONS
In this chapter we shall examine the corporate strategy of Dunlop,
the major British tyre manufacturer, to see how the company responded
and adapted to the changing market conditions. All the information used
in this analysis is from published sources. On this basis, the
following analysis could theoretically have been carried out by the
trade unions. The main skills required to do this are a working
knowledge and understanding of the techniques of financial analysis.
Some Recent Economic History
Before we examine the key factors which led to the run-down of the
British tyre sector and,ultimately, to Dunlop's divestment of its tyre
I
faci 1ities, it is necessary to set it in the context of the postwar
decline of British manufacturing industry.
At the end of the Second World War, with much of manufacturi ng
industry in Europe and Japan destroyed, British industry quickly
responded to the rapid growth in worldwide demand, and establ ished
itself as the world's second largest producer behind the United States.
Meanwhile, our European competitors and Japan embarked on a
programme to rebuild their industrial base, by investing large sums in
modern plant and technology. Here, they were assisted by British
investors, who rather than invest in restructuring the domestic
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; ndustry, found ; t more prof; tab 1e to squeeze as much product; on and
profits from the, heavy war-time investment in British industry, while
dt verti ng surp1 us funds into more 1ucrati ve overseas investments (Bryer
et a1, 1984a).
The fai 1ure to' invest in moderni sing and restructuri ng Brit ish
industry eventually left the domestic manufacturers producing goods in
old, obsolete plants, while our overseas competitors operated modern
manufacturing facilities. This allowed our foreign competitors to
produce superior products, which were considered more reliable and
des i rab 1e by consumers. Thei r products proved more compet it i ve than
British goods, especially in the important area of non-price factors
(Panic, 1975; Posner and Steer, 1979), because consumers were prepared
to pay higher prices for better quality foreign goods.
Britain fell particularly behind in the more technologically
advanced industries: vehicles, engineering and chemicals, but less so in
the less technological advanced industries, metals and textiles
(Begg and Rhodes, 1982, p.20, table 2.4); leaving BritAin dependent on
low value added exports.
The net resu1 t was that British goods began to suffer a fall in
their share of world trade, whilst imports started to capture a growing
share of the home market. ' Between 1950 and 1980, the UK's share of
manufactured exports fell from 25.5% to 10.2% (Brown and Sheriff, 1979,
p.241, table 10.5 and Na~ional Institute Economic Review, No.96, May 1981).
Imports, meanwhile. increased as a proportion of home demand from 8% in
1955 to 30% in 1980 (Williams et aI, 1983, pp.118-119, table 4).
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The main source of these imports was the European Community, which
increased substantially especially after Britain joined the EEC
(Thir1wa11, 1982). This is because firms have found it more profitable
to supply the home market with exports from Europe than to maintain or
estab 1ish new factori es in Britai n (Dunning, 1979). Whereas UK firms,
on the other hand, have tended to exploit the European market by
establishing or expanding production facilities there, as opposed to-
relying upon exports (Ibid).
Thus, over the postwar years most of the investment in British
industry has been to replace worn-out plant and machinery, rather than
to expand production by invest ing in up-to-date technology (Wilson
Committee, 1980). Since British production facilities were
older compared to our major competitors, they were also less productive
and less profitable.
As far as investors were concerned, investing in foreign
manufacturing industry offered a far higher net real rate of return over
the postwar period, than could be earned from investing in British
industry (British Business, 19 August 1983, p.22). Hence, investment was
channelled overseas.
By the begi nning of the 1970s, investors recogni sed the need to
moderni se British industry, (Bryer et a1, 1984a). However, these plans
were curtailed by the oil crisis in 1973-74, which led to a doubling in
the cost of oil imports into the UK. Investors realised that with world
overcapacity in many manufacturing industries, combined with Britain's
dependence on obsolete production facilities, profits from British
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industry would decline.
Many firms responded by cutting back or by abandoning their
investment plans. This is confirmed by the valuation ratio (market
value of equity plus debt/replacement value of trading assets) which
declined from 1.09 in 1973 to 0.62 in 1974 (calculated from Wilson
Committee, 1980, p.144, table 37). The valuation ratio then recovered,
but fell back tq 0.67 in 1979, following in the wake of the second oil
crisis.
Investors now wished to speed up their plant closure plans to
limit the losses expected to arise from the recession. These plans were
greatly assisted by the election of a Conservative Government in 1979,
whose policies of high interest rates, accompanied by the abolition of
exchange controls, assisted the outflow of funds into forei gn
investments.
Thus, while investors' interests were protected by successive
governments, workers' interests were not. The outcome of these policies
was a large decline in employment in manufacturing industry, from a peak
of 9.1 million in 1966 to 5.4 million in 1982 (calculated from Thirlwall,
1982, p.25, table 1 and Department of Employment Gazette, December 1982),
with more than 40% of the job losses occurring after 1979.
Bryer et a1 (1984a) noted that 27 firms were alone directly
responsbi 1e for the loss. of 433,000 jobs. Amongst these major
"unemp1oyers" were the vehicle and components companies, including
Dunlop and British Leyland. In the following sections we shall trace
the policies and events which led Dunlop to formulate its strategy of
divestment and plant closures.
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Dunlop's Strategy Maintaining Market Dominance
From the late-1920s up to the mid-1950s, Dunlop adopted two main
strategies to maintain its dominance of the domestic tyre market:
mergers and price restrictions. Dunlop initially embarked on a series
of horizontal mergers to secure control over its raw materials and
component supp 1ies. To counteract the attempts by the Ameri can and
Continental companies to establish new outlets for their tyres, Dunlop
started to covertly acquire a controlling interest in a number of tyre
distribution companies during the late-1920s - and actively pursued this
policy for the next two decades.
Contro 11ing interests were purchased in W. Briggs & Co Ltd and
the Marsham Tyre Co Ltd, so that by the mid-1950s Dunlop had a retail
network covering the whole of Britain. These companies tended to stock
about 30-35% of Dunlop tyres (Monopolies Conunission, 1955, p.89). And
as they sold directly to the public as well as to the trade, it provided
Dunlop with guaranteed sales at both the who 1esa 1e and retai 1 1eve 1, as
well as with information about the selling methods of its competitors.
Additionally, Dunlop tried to restrict competition in the domestic
market through enforced price maintenance. The company played a
prominent role in establishing the Tyre Manufacturers Conference, which
was instrumental in restricting competition by establishing an identical
retail price for the same size and type of tyre sold in the replacement
market. Sa1es in the origina1 equi pment market were in the mai n, .
however, not subject to any price restri ctions, though sales to the
smaller vehicle manufacturers were subject to price guidelines.
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Dunlop's strategy appears to have been very successful, as by the
1950s it was supplying more than two-thirds of all car tyres sold for
original equipment and, together with its subsidiary, India Tyre and
Rubber Co, accounted for 47% of total UKtyre sales by value in 1951 and
1952 (Ibid, pp.38 and 82). But this position was not to last, as the
fo 11ow;ng two decades were to witness a gradual eros i on of Dunlop' s
market dominance.
In 1955, the Monopolies Commission Report on the tyre sector was
published. It declared that the maintenance of retail prices and
certain other ancillary practices which helped to maintain retail prices
in the replacement market were against the public interest and should
cease forthwith. The following year the passing of the Restrictive
Trade Practices Act (1956) outlawed the collective enforcement of
resale price maintenance. Thi s was 1ater strengthened by the Resale
I
Prices Act (1964), which declared resale price maintenance by an
individual company to be similarly against the public interest.
Following the publication of the Monopolies Commission Report,
Dunlop tried to protect its market position by switching the emphasis
from vertical to horizontal mergers (Walshe, 1974), but it proved to no
avail. Dunlop's competitors were now aware that the company owned some
of thei r best retai 1 customers. Thei r response was to try and reduce
Dunlop's stranglehold by buying their own distributive outlets. Worse
was to follow - as we shall see in the fall owing secti ons, Dunlop' s
market dominance was further undermi ned by the advent of the radi a1
tyre.
188
The Radial Tyre
The expans ion plans of the tyre compani es in the 1ate 1950s and
1960s, and their contribution to overcapacity in the industry were
compounded by the spread of the radial tyre, which has proved to be the
most important innovation in the tyre sector for the last two decades.
The radial tyre offers a number of advantages over the crossp1y tyre,
including longevity, safety, durability and better fuel efficiency.
The concept of the radial tyre was first devised and patented in
England by Gray and Sloper in 1913, but it was never commercially
exploited because the industry at that time lacked the know-how to bond
stee 1 and rubber together. It was not unt i1 two decades 1ater duri ng
the 1930s that the necessary technology began to be developed by
Miche 1in in France. The company started to experi ment with steel cord
in tyres, and by 1938 Miche 1in was produci ng a truck tyre of crossp 1y
construction but with a steel cable casing. This initial experience in
the truck tyre sector provi ded techni ca1 informat ion, which was to
eventually lead to the development of the first stee1- belted radial car
tyre. Throughout the rest of the thirties and during the war years the
company continued to experiment with steel, until finally in 1946,
Michelin registered its patent for the steel radial with the French
patent office. In 1949, the company went into production of what is now
the famous "X" tyre.
There are a number of differences between the crossply and the
radial tyre. The crossp1y is made of four (later two) cord plies
running at right angles to each other in a criss-cross fashion and at a
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45 degree angle to the tread. The radia1 by compari son has the p1ies
running perpendicular to the circumference of the tyre. In addition, it
has a rigid-breaker structure made of steel cord running between the
plies and the tread. It is this structure which gives the radial tyre
its longer life span. Radials are also more expensive to produce than
crossp ly tyres because of the cost of steel and the increased 1abour
input needed to align exactly the plies and the steel belt.
In 1953, the radial went on sale in England where it received a
mixed reaction. The early vers ions proved very unsatisfactory in wet
conditions, and they were also prone to occasional violent "breakaway",
particularly when cornering at speed. It was not until the design of
new cars specifically suited to steel radial tyres, that the problem was
largely overcome. The first of these models was the Citroen DS with
oleo-pneumatic suspension, which came onto the market in 1955-56.
Meanwhile, all of the other tyre companies, with the exception of
Pirelli, failed to recognise the significance of Michelin's
technological breakthrough. In the early 1950s, Pirelli introduced a
textile-reinforced radial tyre called the Cinturato; a technology later
1icenced to, and adopted by, many other compani es, inc1uding Dunlop.
However, it was to prove an intermediate technology between the crossply
and the steel radial.
Initially these companies had little choice because Michelin's
tight patent coverage ensured that any competitors going over to radial
production had to use a breaker reinforcement made from a material other
than steel. It was not until 1967 when the patent for Michelin's "X"
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tyre expi red, that other compani es were able to adopt steel radi a1
technology. By then, however, Michelin had established a considerable
technological lead over its competitors, which allowed Michelin to grow
from the seventh 1argest tyre company in 1960 (measured in terms of
sa 1es ) to the second 1argest today, just behi nd Goodyear (Appendi xl,
table 3).
During the 1960s, the demand for radials was stimulated by the
growth in sales of front-whee1-drive vehicles. Tyres fitted to such
vehicles were found to suffer very heavily from wear. The radial, on
the other hand, was able to overcome thi s problem by produci ng its
cornering power at a smaller misalignment angle, so reducing tyre wear.
The radial spread from France and became widely adopted in
Southern Europe, gaining somewhere between a quarter and one-third of
\
the replacement markets in Italy and Spain. By 1970 radial penetration
in Southern Europe and the Benelux countries had risen to 50% (Brazier,
1981, p.8), whilst in the UK and West Germany penetration was
substantially lower. Table 5.1 shows that in 1970 textile radials
accounted for nearly 36% of the UKreplacement market, which was roughly
similar to the position in West Germany.
In Britain, the adoption of radials for original equipment fitment
was relatively slow, primarily because the motor manufacturers regarded
them as too costly. At that time the radial was about 25% more
expensive than the conventional crossly tyre (Observer, 6 May 1973). It
was not unt i 1 Jaguar, Rover and Tri umph des i gned thei r new mode1s to
suit the properties of the radial that attitudes began to change. The
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first volume produced British car to use radials was the Austin 1800 in
1964 (Tompkins, 1981, p.38).
Table 5.1 Growth of Radial Tyres in the Passenger Car Market. 1970-76
OE (%) Re~lacement (%)
Fabric Steel Fabric Steel
1970 32.3 35.6
1971 37.9 42.9
1972 50.3 47.8
1973 73.9 51.9
1974 86.6 56.6
1975 52.5 38.0 40.9 25.0
1976 35.0 55.0 40.9 30.0
Source: Tyres & Accessories, November 1976, p.40.
In the UK the demand for radials initially came from the
replacement market because OE fitment was still restricted by cost
(Tyres & Accessories, November 1976, p.40). Indeed, table 5.1 reveals
that it was not until 1972-73 that fabric belted radials became the
domi nant fitment in the OE market. The British tyre manufacturers, in
the main, opted to produce the fabric or textile radial as opposed to
the steel version. A key reason was that it was comparatively cheaper
to convert production to the former than invest in expensive steel
radial technology. Additionally, the fabric radial offered the twin
advantage of a more controlled breakaway than the steel radial and, more
importantly, it could be used on cars of earlier design (Tompkins, 1981,
p.101). In other words, the motor manufacturers were not planning any
new 1arge-sca 1e investment in the British motor industry, and were
therefore anxi ous not to incur the "unnecessary" expense of redesi gni ng
the suspension and steering mechanism of their cars to suit the steel
radial. However, this policy proved short-sighted, and the reliance on
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outdated technology, eventually paved the way for the influx of crossply
and cheap fabric radials from Eastern Europe (Business Week, 6 October
1978, p.65).
Unfortunately for the tyre manufacturers, the spread of the fabric
radial in the original equipment and replacement markets, coincided with
the first oil crisis in 1973-74. The cutback in vehicle mileage
combi ned with the higher mi1eage capabi 1ity of the radia1 caused the
replacement market to dramatically shrink in size. The replacement
market was further depressed by the adoption of the steel radial in 1975
(see table 5.1) with its guarantee of even greater mileage: the
feasible life of a crossply tyre is 18,000 miles compared to 28,000
miles for a fabric radial, and 40,000 miles for a steel radial (Tyres &
Accessories, January 1980, p.24).
Thus, the over-dependence on outmoded crossply and fabric radial
technology left the UK industry not only vulnerable to cheap imports,
but also severely disadvantaged when market demand switched to steel
radials. The British tyre producers were left facing the twin dilemma
of a European industry holding surplus capacity, with themsevles holding
a consi derab 1e amount of redundant capaci ty. In fact, the UK was
holding the largest share of European crossply production ~ in the order
of 12% (SRI, 1980, p.34). Inevitably, these were among the first tyre
plants to be closed.
The tyre companies now faced the task of investing in steel radial
capacity to meet the anticipated market needs, but once again
circumstances were to intervene to upset these plans. The tyre
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producers were fairly accurate in planning the switch into steel radial
product ion, as far as the replacement market was concerned. However,
the forecasters did not allow for the continuing decline in British
produced cars and the consequent rise in imports. Accardi ng to Peter
Taylor, the Marketing Manager of Firestone:
"As little as three years ago we were forecasting 1979 UK
car production at between 1.5 and 1.55 million and imports
of about 550,000. What happened was a fall in UK car
production to £1.22 million; a rise in registration from
the forecast 1.55 million to 1.7 million; and a growth in
imports from 550,000 to 960,000" (Tyres & Accessories,
1981, p.29) •
Moreover,
"(b}ecause of the reduction in UK car manufacture, the tyre
industry had held back on plans to expand steel belted
radial production capacity •.••••The challenge most
manufacturers faced was to invest in conversion (to steel
radial) capacity rather than additional capacity at a time
when overall profitability was so low as to make thisalmost impossible" (Ibid).
Consequently, as the demand for steel radials expanded, there was
insufficient capacity in the British facilities to meet it, and so the
manufacturers responded by importing tyres from their continental
plants. It now became imperative for the tyre companies to close down
any obsolete production capacity.
Loss of Market Share
As the radial tyre began to take an increasing share of the
European market; Dunlop, for almost the first time, was forced to follow.
in somebody else I s techni ca1 footsteps, and re-equi p at enormous cost
with radial technology. Initially, textile radial manufacturing
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equipment was bought from Pire11i, with whom Dunlop had developed close
ties, and later in 1969 capacity was expanded by the purchase from Avon
of its new factory at Washington, County Durham.
"Dunlop plunged into a conversion whose huge cost was
essential for defensive reasons alone. Although its market
share has changed 1itt1e, at around 40% in the UK, that
share would have dropped catastrophically (still more in
Europe) without the radial. New investment was essential,
for the method of radial construction is quite different
from (and the cost intrinsically higher than) that of the
conventional crossp1y type" (Heller, 1969, p.64).
However, in the 10ng·run this did not prevent Dunlop from losing
market share. Between 1971 and 1982, Dunlop+s share of the car tyre
replacement market fell from 35% to 17%, whilst Michelin increased its
share from 13% to 23% (Appendix 1, table 25). Dun10p's share of
original equipment sales also fell from around two-thirds of the
passenger car tyre market in the early 1950s (Monopolies Commission,
1955, p.38) to 29% in 1979. Meanwhile, Michelin increased its share of
the OE segment to 31%. By 1982, however, Dunlop had regained its
position as the main OE supplier by acquiring a sUbstantial share of the
business lost by Firestone, through the company' s divestment from the
UK. This allowed Dunlop to increase its share of the market to 34%
compared to 31% for Michelin (Rubber Trends, No. 99, September 1983,
p.38, tab1e 13).
Clearly, one of the key factors responsible for Dun10p's loss of
market share was its late entry into radial production. According to
Newman (1982):
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"The traditional criticism has been, first, that Dunlop was
too slow in switching from conventional crossply types to
radials in the mid-1960s (in fact, the company continued to
make some crossp1y tyres in the UK until last year); and,
second, that having started to switch to radials, it made
the wrong technological choice - and plumped for textile
radials (which then had better performance in the wet),
rather than the more durable steel variety. In the early
1970s Dunlop did start converting from textile to steel; by
that time, Michelin had already carved out its market
leadership" (p.52).
Another factor responsible for Dunlop's loss of market share,
particularly in Europe, was competition from the American manufacturers.
Until the late 1960s the European tyre market was extremely fragmented,
with the European tyre companies being largely nationally based. The
more market ing orientated Ameri can compani es, on the other hand, were
quick to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the development
of the EEC, and began to expand their operations throughout Europe. By
1969, there were 29 US subsidiary plants operating in Europe
(Harkleroad, 1980b, p.6). This gave the American companies a far
greater amount of commercial and marketing flexibility. Of the European
companies, only Dunlop and Michelin with plants in France, West Germany
and Britain were able to match the internat iana 1 operations of the
Americans.
Through expansi on and by deve 1oping tradi ng and techni ca1
agreements with the smaller European compani es, together with thei r
links with Ford, General Motors and Chrysler, the American tyre
companies were able to win a combined share of the European market of
25-30% by 1970 (Financial Times, 16 July 1971). The American operations·
.in Europe were, however, equipped essentially to produce crossply tyres,
though all of them had at 1east one 1ine of radi a1s on offer by 1968
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(Harkeroad, 1980b. p.6). In spite of the fact that their radials were
considered inferior to those produced by Dunlop, Michelin and Pire11i
(Financial Times, 16 July 1971), the American tyre manufacturers proved
very adept at increasing their market share.
The Dunlop·Pirelli Union
To counter the threat posed by the Ameri can tyre compani es, a
number of European manufacturers sought defensive mergers or tried to
establish similar groups and alliances.
On 1 January 1971, the Dunlop·Pirelli Union came into being, which
made the new tyre group the strongest in Europe, with roughly 24% of
European sales compared with Miche1in's 23%, Goodyear's 12% and
Firestone's 9% share of the market (Financial Times, 16 July 1971).
This made the group the third 1argest tyre manufacturer in the worl d
behind Goodyear and Firestone. Half the annual turnover of the Union
was derived from tyres, giving the group a strong competititve position
in every major European tyre market. The complementary geographi ca1
spread of the two companies was also fortuitous; the only overlap was in
Britain and Germany. This is because Dunlop concentrated its expansion
in the United States and the Commonwealth, whi 1e Pire11i expanded in
Southern Europe and Latin America. One benefit of this was that there
was little need to shift and change the existing management.
The two companies believed that the merger was the logical'
response to the changes taking place in their industri es, and worl d
markets. It was considered the rational response to the American
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challenge which, during 1969, when discussions were taking place, was a
major concern. This was especi ally so for compani es 1ike Dunlop and
Pire11i, who were keen to compete with the Ameri cans on a world-wi de
basis. But by 1971, the American companies were no longer a serious
threat in the European market. Nevertheless, it was envisaged that the
compet itive strength of the two compani es waul d be enhanced by the
merger in several ways:
"(i) Dunlop and Pirelli each manufactures and sells
internationally and is a leader in fast-growing
product lines many of which, like tyres, are common
to both. Together, the two groups, which have a
combi ned turnover of nearly £900 mi11ion, wi 11 be
able to use their existing facilities more
effectively: they will be able to obtain the
benefi ts of 1arger scale with consequent economi es
in supply and production, and to gain from common
services.
(ii) the various major industries in which the two groups
operate are characterized by a rapid rate of
technological development. Each group spends about
£8 million annually on research and development and
has a distinguished record of technical achievement,
but their joint capacity to innovate and exploit the
results of research and development will be greatly
improved by bringing together their two programmes,
their skills and flairs.
(iii) The Groups are complementary in thei r geographi ca1
spread, so they bring to each other territorial
diversification with a consequent spread of risks,
and so a better opportunity to grow with their
global markets. Dunlop will acquire a greater stake
in Italy, Southern Europe and Latin America; Pirelli
in the United Kingdom, North America, Africa, Asia
and Australasia.
(iv) The greater product range of the combined group will
be beneficial both in spreading risks and in
mitigating the effects of cyclical fluctuations
affecting existing products of either partner.
(v) The combi ned resources and commerc ia1 "know-how" of
the two. Groups will make possible greater
penetrat ion of markets all round the world ina
greater range of products.
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(vi) Together the two Groups will be in a stronger
position to raise outside finance for expansion.
In brief, the prospective advantages make this a union for
growth and expansion" (Dunlop, December 1970, p.3).
The reasons for the Union were sound enough from management Is
viewpoint. Both Dunlop and Pirelli were formerly too dependent on their
respective home markets, which in a normal year accounted for two-fifths
of turnover and one-thi rd of profi ts in each case (Crawford, 1972,
p.22]). In turn, Dunlop and Pirelli depended too heavily on one major
customer to generate profits in their home markets: BLMC and Fiat
respectively. Sales of new cars in the UK had already been stagnating
since the 1atter part of the 19605. Then in 1970, Dunlop suffered a
long strike at Fort Dunlop which caused the UK operation to experience a
loss for the first time; in the region of £3 million. To make matters
worse British Leyland, as a result of the strike, adopted a policy of
dual sourcing so that it would not be vulnerable to similar industrial
action in the future. Previously, Dunlop had been the sole supplier of
tyres to the company.
Industrie Pirelli also suffered a major loss of business with
Fiat, its major customer, when Fiat purchased a 25% stake in Citroen in
1969. The latter was controlled by Michelin at that time, who
subsequently took a large slice of the Fiat contract away from Pirelli.
The Union was arguably, however, ill-conceived from the very
beginning. Part of the reason for Dunlop enteri ng the merger was to
gain access to Pirelli's technology and "know-how" in the production of
textile radials, which in the event proved to be an intermediate
technology as the market shifted to steel radials.
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Additionally, an analysis of the financial statements of Dunlop
and Pire11i, prepared in accordance with the common accounting
principles, plus the pro-forma Union accounts (Appendix 2) reveals that
the two companies were in a weak and deteriorating financial position.
The pro-forma Union profit and loss account shows that sales were
start ing to slow down after 1967, wh ilst operating profi ts fell from
£63.6 million in 1968 to £57.2 million in 1970. The substantial
increase in interest charges also caused attri butab 1e profi ts to drop
from £23.1 million in 1968 to £10 million in 1970.
Worse was to follow when in the first year of trading, Pire11i's
Italian subsidiary suffered an unprecedented slump, declaring losses of
£18.6 million under the common accounting principles. The weak trading
position was further undermined by the oil crisis, and the resulting
overcapacity and stagnation in the European tyre market. When Pire11i's
1
trading position started to improve towards the end of the 1970s, Dunlop
found itself suffering large losses from its European tyre operations.
Pire11i, meanwhi 1e, was unwi 11ing to finance the necessary investment
needed to modernise its partner's operations.
By 1981, the heavy losses from the tyre operations had eliminated
the share capital and reserves of Dunlop Ltd. With Pire11i unwilling to
subscribe any new capital to reconstruct the company, Dunlop was left to
bear all the losses, whilst Pire11i was entitled to share in the profits
from Dun10p's overseas operations.
The original aim of the Union was to create a single business
entity, but this was becoming increasingly difficult to realise.
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Accordingly, both companies agreed that it was in their mutual interest
to dissolve their partnership; this was duly announced to The Stock
Exchange and the press on 23 April 1~8l.
SUl1I11ary
Dunlop's strategy to protect its market dominance was to engage in
a series of vert ica1 and hori zont a1 mergers. This palicy appears
initially to have been successful, because the company was able to
retain its leading position in the British market. However, the opening
up of the domestic market to more competition following the publication
of the Monopolies Commission report, exposed Dunlop's weak competitive
position. The failure of Dunlop to invest in modern plant and machinery
left the company heavily dependent on obsolete crossply production, at a
time when the market was switching to radials.
Dunlop tried to protect its market position by forming a merger
with Pirelli, to acquire direct access to the Italian company's
technological "know-how", while also providing the Union with the
financial strength to compete with Michelin and the American companies
on a global basis. However, the inherent financial weakness of Dunlop
and Pirelli, undermined the synergy of the Union from the very
beginning, as neither company was prepared to sustain the losses of the
other in order to pursue the aims and objectives of the merger.
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With the dissolution of the partnership in 1981, Dunlop was left
with a tyre-making capacity in need of substantial investment, to stem
the losses and to make it competitive with the other major producers.
In the following sections, I shall examine in detail the market
situation that Dunlop faced, and how the company responded to it.
Overcapacity
The postwar growth in the vehicle market encouraged the tyre
manufacturers to put down enough capacity in the late 1960s to
accommodate the expected increase in demand. Table 5.2 gives a
breakdown of tyre production capacity in Western Europe by company in
1964 and 1969. Between those two dates European capaci ty increased by
81%, with Michelin increasing its capacity by 131%, followed by the
American companies: Goodyear, Firestone and Uniroyal who expanded their
capaci ty on average by 80%. Dunlop, by compari son, concentrated on
replacement investment which saw capacity increase by just 15%. In
fact, between 1958 and 1967, Dunlop invested £163 mi11ion in its tyre
operations, of which £73 million was spent in the UK. Acording to Sir
Raey Geddes, the Chairman of Dunlop at that time:
"Britain was not in a growth period, so this expenditure went
mostly on renewal and modernization" (quoted from Heller,
1979, p.60).
hwas this failure to restructure its tyre operations which was to
1eave Dunlop ho1ding a surfeit of redundant capacity, when the market
shifted to radi a1 production. The dec1ine in demand brought about by,
the fall in car production following the two oil crises, in combination
with the spread of the steel radial tyre, resulted in an excess capacity
203
in the European market of 20% by the end of the 1970s (Financial Times,
21 December 1982).
The manufacturers responded initially through a price war, but
rationalisation inevitably followed. At first a number of the smaller,
unprofitable operations were shut down, whilst the major phase of plant
closures began in the Spring of 1979. Three American companies:
Uniroyal, BF Goodrich and General Tire divested from tyre production in
Europe. Firestone ceased producing tyres in Britain; and Phoenix and
Metzeler, West Germany's second and third largest tyre companies
respectively, withdrew from the industry.
In total, European tyre capaci ty was reduced by 97,000 tyres per
day between 1977 and 1981; equivalent to 11% of total capacity (Appendix,
1, table 7). During this period Firestone reduced its productive
capacity by nearly 28,000 tyres per day, followed by Dunlop which cut
its capacity by 19,000 tyres per day. By 1983, 19 tyre plants had been
closed, accounting for 20% of European tyre productive capacity (TAB,
November/December 1983, p.25). Six of these plants were located in the
UK, with Michelin closing a seventh plant in Northern Ireland at the end
of 1983.
Britain, in fact, suffered a greater loss of tyre-making capacity
than any other country in Europe (Appendi XI, table 10). Between 1977
and 1980, tyre capacity in the UK was reduced by nearly 44,000 tyres per
day, compared with 26,000 tyres per day in West Germany and 19,500 per
day in Sweden. Over this period, plant closures in the UK accounted for
over 50% of the total reduction in European productive capacity.
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The pr t mary reason for this was because the tyre plants in the UK
were older and, hence less profitable, than those in Europe. The
British plants (with the exception of Michelin) were still producing the
now obsolete crossply tyre, which was surplus to requirements. And with
overcapacity in Europe estimated at roughly equivalent to the UK's
entire production (SRI, 1980), it was not surprising that Britain bore
the brunt of the closures.
Output
The British Rubber Manufacturers Association produces monthly
statistics on the rubber industry, detailing the production, sales and
exports of crossp1y and radials by type of tyre (car, commercial
vehicle, Earthmover), and by market segment (OE and replacement). If
the unions had been monitoring these statistics, they would have been
aware that output had been stagnating since th~ beginning of 1974, and
that crossp1y tyres were being phased out to be replaced by radial
capacity. (Appendix 1, table 11).
The reduction in output can be attributed to a number of factors:
a fall in OE demand due to a decline in car output; a reduction in the
growth of the replacement market owing to the spread of the radial tyre;
and an increase in import penetration including captive imports.
In 1960, Britain was the second largest car producer (behind West
Germany) outside North America (Appendix ~ table 32), but by 1980 the
UK was in sixth place having been overtaken by France, Italy, Japan and
Spain, mainly because of the unwillingness of the motor manufacturers to
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invest in new plant and equipment to meet the growth in demand in the
early 1970s (Appendix 1, Figure 2). In 1972, new car registrations
reached a peak of 1.7 million, whilst output similarly peaked at 1.9
mi 11ion cars. Fo 11owing the first oil shock demand and production fell
in unison, but as demand recovered, output continued to fall, so that by
1977 new regi strati ons outstri pped producti on. When demand reached a
new peak of 1.73 million in 1979, output had fallen back to levels on a
par to those prevailing in the 1950s. The car firms clearly did not
invest in additional capacity because they faced financial difficulties,
and were committed to exporting from the UK in kit form. Hence final
assembly capacity fell from 2.5 million units in 1973 to 2.3 million in
1978 (Rhys, 1980).
The pol icy of the volume car producers since 1970 had been to
reduce the output of British produced cars. Between 1972 and 1981, BL's
output of cars fell from over 900,000 to around 400,000, whilst over the
same period Ford reduced its output from around 500,000 to under 350,000
(calculated from SMMT statistics). This led to a larger share of
domestic demand being serviced by imports, which increased their share
of the home market from 5% in 1965 to 55.7% in 1981 (SMMT, 1982).
The large increase in vehicle imports was partly due to the failure
of the motor manufacturers to invest in new models, leaving the British
producers dependent on old production facilities and an ageing model
range. This allowed the forei gn manufacturers to increase thei r share
of the small er-engi ned market (engine, capaci ty of 1ess than 1200cc),·
from 19% in 1971, before the oil crisis, to over 50% by 1978 (Bhaskar,
1979) •
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An additional reason for the large increase in imports, in
particular captive imports after 1975, can be attributed to the policies
of the motor companies to integrate their European operations. In 1973,
captive imports accounted for less than 2% of home demand, but by 1981
they represented over one-third of all imports, or 19.1% of the total
market (calculated from SMMT data). In terms of "lost" tyre sales in
1981, this was equivalent to a reduction of 1.4 million units.
The increasing level of import penetration clearly had a major
impact on UK tyre production, because each car was carrying five imported
tyres. This level of imports during the 1980s represented a production
"loss" of about 4.5 million car tyres per annum. The majority of cars
exported, on the other hand,were in an unassembled form (Appendix 'I,
table 36), and tended to have tyres supplied from sources close to the
country of assembly.
The export policies of the British-based subsidiaries are
determined by the corporate strategies of the parent companies. Only BL
is able to export world-wide without any restrictions being placed on
its markets or model des ign. All of the other car producers in the UK
are essent ially used to source the home market, and are not in the
business of competing in the European market with their own overseas
subsidiaries. Consequently, BL is Britain's only major car exporter,
and usually its exports are greater than the combined total of the other
major producers. However" the 1ack of investment in suitab 1e models
adversely affected its export performance, so that between 1976 and
1981, its exports fell from 309,000 cars to 122,000 (SMMT, 1982).
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The overall effect of these strategies on employment in the motor
industry is evident. Employment fell from a peak of 485,000 in March
1978 to under 300,000 in March 1983; a reduction of nearly 40% (Marsden
et al, 1985). Additionally, BL estimated that the level of captive
imports was equivalent to just over 40,000 "lost" jobs in the UK
(Financial Times, 2 November 1982).
The Replacement Market
The rep 1acement market for tyres had been stagnat i ng since the
beginning of the 1970s. It reached a peak of 16.1 million car tyres in
1972 compared with 14.6 million ten years later (Appendix 1, table 17).
This segment of the market is satisfied by home production and by
captive and competitive imports.
After 1971, there was
I
a considerable increase in both types of
imports. I n that year captive imports accounted for 29.7% of total
imports, reaching a peak of nearly 50% in 1974, before falling back and
averagi ng 40-48% for the rest of the peri ad up to 1981 (Appendi x L ,
table 27). The large and sustained high levels of captive imports was
attri butab 1e to the i nternat i ana 1 production and sourci ng pol i ci es of
the tyre compan i es. After 1977, capt i ve imports plateaued at a much
hi gher 1eve 1, whi 1st net replacement sales in the home market by the
domestic producers continue~ to shrink; indicating that captive imports
were being used to di sp 1ace home production. Furthermore, because the
British plants were heavily dependent on obsolete crossply and text t le
radial production, the manufacturers had to rely upon imports of steel
radials from their factories in Europe to meet the burgeoning demand for
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these tyres.
Competitive imports have similarly displayed an upward trend since
1971, peaking at 4 million tyres in 1979 (Appendix 1, table 27). The
most important source of these tyres are distributor or parallel
imports, shipped-in by independent dealers taking advantage of large
discounts prevailing in Europe in concert with favourable relative
changes in the exchange rate. In 1981, they accounted for 14.4% of the
car tyre replacement market, compared with 20. 1% for captive (Appendi x
1, table 29). The next most important source of imports are the
countries of Eastern Europe. By "dumping" tyres on the British market
they managed to increase thei r share of the replacement market from a
negligible amount at the beginning of the 1970s, to reach a peak of 6.3%
in 1978. However, by 1981 this source of imports fell to 2.8%,
followi ng an undertak ing by the Eastern European producers to refrain
•
from "dumping" tyres in Europe. Though their share of the rep 1acement
market was small, the volume together with the low prices, proved
sufficient to depress prices in a market already suffering from
overcapacity.
In total, competitive imports increased their share of the
replacement market from 12.6% in 1971 to achieve a peak of 27.1% in 1979
(Ibid). Additionally, competitive imports exceeded captive imports in
every year after 1971, though in some years only just so. Overa 11,
competitive and captive imports combined have taken an increasingly
larger share of the replacement market since the beginning of the 1970s,'
and by the early 1980s were supplying almost half the domestic car tyre
replacement market.
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Dunlop's Strategy: Overseas Investment and Product Diversification
In response to the overcapacity in the European tyre sector, Dunlop
embarked on a strategy to reduce its dependency on tyres and to
concentrate on more profitable areas of business. This resulted in tyre
sales falling from 63% of turnover in 1970 to 57.2% in 1979, which was a
record year for tyre sales in money terms (Appendix 3, tables la and
1b) •
The poor performance by the Tyre Division is reflected by the
declining profit margins earned on tyres in relation to other product
groups, especially the Engineering and Industrial groups. Between 1971
and 1980, tyre margins were squeezed from 8.4% to 1.7% (Appendix 3 ,
tab 1e 3). Thereafter, margi ns recovered due to plant closures and
rationalisation policies, although they failed to reach earlier peaks.
An integral part of Dunlop's strategy was to reduce the company's
reliance on the domestic market, as it sought to extend its product and
geographical spread. Hence, Dunlop was not prepared to invest heavily
in modernising it British tyre facilities. Consequently, the UK
operating companies saw their share of total sales fall from 43.1% in
1971 to 31.4% in 1983 (Appendix 3, table 5b), whilst they also became
the least profitable companies in the Group. Between 1972 and 1977, the
British-based companies were the most profitable, with profits peaking
at £31 million in 1976, equivalent to 35.6% of total profits (Appendix
3, tables 6a and 6b). Thereafter, profits fell sharply, resulting in'
large losses totalling £38 million between 1980 and 1982. Meanwhile,
the overseas operations became the more important source of profits to
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Dunlop, as the European tyre opera~ions began to accumulate large
losses.
Dun lop's strategy of reduci ng its exposure to the home market
ensured that Britain became not only a less important manufacturing base
for the company, but also a less important market for the Group. Thus,
the UK's share of world-wide sales fell from about one-third in 1976 to
a quarter by 1983 (Appendix 3, table 8).
Dunlop's expansion into overseas markets left fewer funds available
to invest in British production facilities. The main phase of
investment for Dunlop-Pirelli was 1971-74, when capital expenditure
totalled £310 million, of which 55% was for expanding capacity. About
one-fifth of capital expenditure over this period was in the UK,
compared with near 1y 50% in Europe (Append ix 3, tab 1es 12a and 12b).
However, since the British manufacturing facilities were older than
those in Europe, the level of investment was insufficient to make them
competitive with the continental plants.
Unfortunately, Dunlop does not disaggregate capital expenditure by
product group accordi ng to regi on. Nevertheless, we do know that
company policy of both concentrating investment outside the UK, as well
as in diversified products, had a disproportionate impact on British
production facilities, especially tyre manufacturing. In fact in 1983
the level of investment in Dunlop's British operations was, after
adjusting for inflation, approximately half that invested in 1968
(calculated from Appendix 3, table l2a).
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The under-investment in the British tyre operations directly
contri buted to the dec 1ining profitabil ity and. 1ater losses, as Dunlop
became heavi ly dependent on obsolete capacity in an industry
characterised by excess capacity. Table 5.3 confirms that the sustained
losses arising from tyre manufacturing after 1978 were primarily
responsible for the large losses suffered by the British operations. In
that year, the UK tyre facilities returned a loss of £8 million.
However, by 1980, losses had risen to the point where they completely
overwhelmed the earnings from non-tyre activities, which were also
suffering from declining profitability.
With the help of table 5.3 we are able to separate the results of
Dunlop's tyre operations from that of Pire11i's. Until the end of 1979,
the results of Pirelli Ltd (Pirelli's British tyre manufacturing
company) were consolidated in the accounts of Dunlop Holdings. In 1980,
IPirelli Ltd, became an associate company, and the following year this
status was surrendered under the terms of the dissolution of the
Dun lop-Pi re11i Union. Thus we can see that sales from Dunlop's tyre
operations (excluding Pire11i Ltd) had been stagnating since 1977. Even
in 1976 and 1977, when Dunlop was making profits from tyres, these were
very low, and the corresponding profit margins were 6% and 3.5%
respectively. From 1978 onwards, Dunlop's tyre operations began to
suffer from mounting losses, which reached £22 million in 1980. Dunlop
responded to this situation by closing down the loss-making plants and
by reducing its workforce.
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Table 5.3 Dun1op's UK Operating Profits by Activity, 1976-82 (£II)
Sales 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Dunlop tyre operations 167 201 198 197 192 176
Pirelli Ltd 48 56 67 67
Total sales 215 257 265 264 192 176
Profits
Dunlop 8 4 (9) (13) (22) (16)
Pirelli 2 3 1
Tyres 10 7 (8) (13) (22) (16)
Non-tyre 21 23 26 15 7 3
Total 31 30 18 2 (15) (13)
Source: Phillips & Drew, Equity Book Service, 29 June 1982 andPhi11ips & Drew, Motor Research, 4 June 1981.
Nevertheless, some analysts questioned whether Dunlop's rational-
isation and investment policies were sufficient to guarantee the future
competitiveness and profitability of the tyre operations:
1I ••••• (A)ll Dunlop can do in the near term is to invest
fairly heavily in factory modernisation and reorganisation
and try and get unit costs down. Management recognises this
and hence a disproportionate percentage of capital
investment is going into tyre activities (last year £35m out
of a total of £54m). However, given the financial
constrai nts on the Group this means that the scope for
expansion of the non-tyre activities is necessarily limited.
Furthermore, we feel that even though a high proportion of
capital expenditure is going on the tyre activities, the
investment is substantially below the replacement cost
depreciation charge, so that there is an over-dependence on
old and inefficient plant and equipment. We fear that if
profitability declines any further this vitally important
capital expenditure will have to be deferred, with worrying
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implications for future competitiveness, efficiency and
profitabil ity" (Simon and Coates, 14 June 1978, p.6, quoted
from Dunlop; Jobs For Merseyside, Speke Joint Shop Stewards
Committee, August 1979, pp. 3.3-3.4).
By 1982, Dunlop had trimmed the losses from its British tyre
facilities to £11 million. But it was evident that the company did not
have sufficient funds to both restructure its tyre operations, as well
as to invest in expanding its non-tyre interests. Hence, Fort Dunlop
was described the following year as:
"..••.•possibly Britain's most old-fashioned tyre plant and
one needing substantial investment" (Financial Times, 20
September 1983, p.18).
It was clear, however, that this investment was unlikely to be
forthcoming in the near future, as Dunlop was facing growing financial
difficulties (see following section), and the company's stated policy
was to direct an increasing proportion of new investment into non-tyre
I
product areas. Nevertheless, although investment in tyres fell from
72.1% of total capital expenditure in 1976 to 59.1% in 1983 (Appendix ~
table 13b), it still remained Dunlop's major source of expenditure.
The on1y way of reconc i1ing company po1icy aimed at expand ing
product and geographical diversity with the drain on resources
necessitated by tyre manufacturing, was to abandon one in favour of the
other. As tyre production was the 1east profi tab1e and demanded the
1argest resources, it was. inevitab 1e from the mid-1970s that Dunlop
would divest itself of this product group if the right opportunity
arose.
In the following section we shall analyse the financial statements
of Dunlop from 1970 to 1983, to show the impact that the dec 1ining
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profits and, later losses, from tyre manufacturing had on the financial
viability of the company from the investors' point of view. If the
trade unions had been monitoring the financial performance of the tyre
sector, they would have anticipated the company's plans to run-down and
later divest itself of the loss-making tyre facilities.
Financial Statements
Between 1970 and 1983, turnover increased from £563 million
(adjusted for the Dunlop-Pirelli Union) to £1,603 million; a rise of
184.7%. However, the growth in sales revenue has not been uniform.
From 1970 to 1976 , sal es increased on average by 15% a year, but from
1977 to 1983 the correspondi ng average increase was only 3% per annum
(calculated from table 5.4).
The slow-down in sales in this later period is indicative of the
prob 1ems that began to beset Dunlop. The turnover fi gures were also
affected by divestments and the change in status of a number of
subsidiary companies. For instance, sales fell from £1,569 million in
1979 to £1,386 million in 1980, primarily because of the exlcusion of
sales of Dunlop S.A. (France) and Pirelli Ltd, whose status was changed
from that of subsidiaries to associated companies.
In the former case, Dunl op- s holding in the French company was
reduced from 53% to 49%, as part of a fi nanci a 1 re-structuri ng to
provi de fi nance for investments in new ventures in France. whilst in
the 1atter case, Dun1op t s equi ty ho 1di ng was reduced from 51% to 44%
(Annua 1 Report, 1979, p. 15) • The resu 1ts of these two compani es were
consolidated in the 'Group profit and loss account in 1979, but excluded
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from the balance sheet. The following year they were excluded from the
profi t and loss account as well. It is probable that the status of
these two compani es were changed to improve the appearance of the
con so 1i dated accounts. The effect of thi s restructuri ng on the 1979
ba 1ance sheet was to reduce bank overdrafts by £37.4 mi11 ion (Dun lop
S.A., £23.2 million, Pire11i Ltd, £14.2 million), debentures and loans
by £25 million (Dunlop S.A., £24.1 million, Pirelli Ltd, £0.9 million),
and minority shareholders by £12.8 million (£5.3 million and £7.5
million respectively). If the profit and 'loss account had similarly
been adjusted sales would have been about 14% lower and operating
profits about £2 million lower. Consequently, sales would have fallen
by around 6.5% compared with 1978. By the same token, sales in 1980 at
£1,386 million would have been 2% higher than in 1979 (see Annual
Report, 1980, p.15).
The 1981 turnover figure excludes the sales of Angus Fire Armour
Ltd which was 'sold in November 1980. The company's sales figures in
that particular year amounted to £35 million. In December of the same
year, there was a further capital re-construction owing to losses at
Dunlop S.A., France. The French company made a rights issue to provide
additional equity capital, which was wholly taken up by Dunlop Holdings,
gi vi ng the Group a 96% share of the equity. Thi s was in 1i ne with
company policy of
" •••••• control1ing our European tyre activities as to enable
more rapid integration of manufacturing and marketing"
(Annual Report, 1981, p.3).
The French company' was included in the consolidated balance sheet
as a subsidiary at 31 December 1981, although it retained associated
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company status in the Group profit and loss account. The restructuring
also bought with it the following additions to the Group balance sheet:
bank overdrafts of £29.3 million; debentures and loans of £14.1 million;
and an increase in total shareholders' funds of £0.5 million. This was
fo 11owed by the rat iona 1isation of the Group's European manufacturi ng
operations, which resulted in employment falling from 75,000 to 59,000
between 1981 and 1982, with tyre manufacturing suffering the largest job
losses, down from 39,000 to 32,000.
Further, the Union between Dunlop and Pire11i was disso1ved in
1981, which entailed the transfer of the minority interests each company
held in the other, so that their respective minority holdings were
excluded (see Appendix 2 on Dun10p-Pire11i Union for details). In
addition, the Group's holding in Dunlop India, Ltd, was reduced from 51%
to 45% in December 1981. The company was therefore included in the
Group balance sheet as an associated company as from 31 December 1981.
Dunlop argued that this change was implemented to remove the competitive
disadvantage suffered by Indian companies with foreign majority control
(Annual Report, 1981, p.3). The effect on the balance sheet was to
reduce bank overdrafts by £8.2 mi 11ion, debentures and loans by £8.8
million and total shareholders' funds by £15.3 million.
In 1982, the appropriate changed status of Dunlop S.A., France and
Dun lop India Ltd were incorporated into the Group's profit and loss
account. If implemented the previous year, sales in 1981 would have
risen from £1,456 million to £1,499 million; the operating profit would
have fallen from £52 million to £45 million; and the share of associated
companies' profits and investment income (but excluding interest
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recei ved) waul d have regi stered a profi t of £4 mi 11ion rather than a
loss of £7 million. As a result, after deducting financing charges and
taxation, minority shareholders' interest would have fallen from £12
million to £10 million, resulting in a rise in attributable losses after
extraordinary items of £1 million.
In 1982, Dunlop Nigerian Industries ltd also lost subsidiary
status and became an associ ated company. The Group's interest was
reduced to 40% to comply with the Nigerian Government's regulations
pertaining to foreign majority control. This caused bank overdrafts and
debentures and loans to fall by £18 million and £4.1 million
respectively, and total shareholders' funds to fall by £6.8 million.
The impact on the 1983 profit and loss account was to exclude any losses
suffered by Dunlop Nigerian Industries ltd. which in 1982 amounted to
I
£4 mi 11ion.
Even after allowing for these vari ous adjustments and changes in
the status of subsi diaries and associ ated compani es, operati ng profits
slumped from a peak of £87 million in 1976 to £41 million in 1982, but
rationalisation and job cuts filtered through to produce a sharp
increase in profits to £63 million in 1983.
The overall poor performance is reflected by the continual squeeze
on profit margins after 1971, when the margin was 7.5% (table 5.5). It
remained at just under 7% for most of the period up to 1977 when it fell
to 5.5%. As competition in the tyre sector increased, so profit margins
continued to fall until they reached a low of 2.7% in 1982. However,
repeated "surgery" by Dunlop was responsible for the upturn in profit
220
margins to 3.9% in 1983.
Meanwhil e the share of profits from associated companies were
similarly affected by restructuring and changes made to company status,
though the main source of earnings from associated companies remained
the Pire11i companies. With the formation of the Union in 1971,
earnings started to increase, although the precise details were not
diselased unti1 1976, when they reached £14 mi11ion. Thereafter, they
started to fall as losses from Pirelli's tyre business offset income
from the more profitable cable side. Furthermore, profits from
Pire1li's very lucrative tyre and cable business in Brazil started to
decline, and were further eroded by the devaluation of the Brazilian
cruzeiro in 1979. In 1981, the Dun10p-Pire11i Union was dissolved, and
the income from the Pire11i companies were excluded from the accounts;
with that earnings from associates recorded a loss of £9 million. This
was principally due to the mounting losses at Dunlop S.A., France, which
left the Group's share of these losses at £11 million in 1981 (Phillips
and Drew, Equity Book Service, 27 September 1981).
Earnings (before interest and tax) in the first half of the 1970s
were far from satisfactory. Dunlop had earlier set itself a target
return on capital of 15% before interest and tax, later raised to 17~%
(Heller, 1969, p.60). However, Dunlop failed to meet this target even
in the high growth period of the 1960s (Newman, 1982, p.52). In 1970
(adjusted), the return on capital was 10.4%, rising to 13.9% in 1976"
since when it continued downwards to reach 7.2% in 1981, before
recovering to 9.6% in 1983 (see table 5.5). To compound Dun10p's
problems still further, there had been a steady climb in interest
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charges since 1970 to meet the company's very large borrowings. They
rose to a point where, at £54 million in 1981, interest charges actually
exceeded pre-tax profits, leaving Dunlop to declare a pre-tax loss of £3
million (after excluding exceptional items of £3 million). This was
repeated in 1982, when interest charges rose further still to £67
million, resulting in a pre-tax loss of £9 million.
The inability of Dunlop to meet its financial obligations is
further revealed by the erosion of the income cover. It fell from a
high of 4 in 1972 to 2.9 in 1973 and remained at this level until 1976,
when it recovered to 3.3. Thereafter, it cont inued to fall each year,
culminating in a negative cover in 1981 and 1982.
These were not the only financial commitments that Dunlop had to
satisfy. Additionally, Dunlop had to meet its financial obligations to
its shareholders and the Inland Revenue. For the shareholders, the most
important figure is attributab 1e profits. Throughout the durat ion of
the Dunlop-Pi re11i merger, attributab 1e profits were reduced to meet
payments to minority shareholders. The exact sums paid to Pirelli were
not dise1osed for the earlier years, but in 1977 it amounted to £8
mi11ion and in 1978 to £2 mi11ion. By 1979 and 1980, these had turned
into an attributable loss to Pirelli of £6 million and £17 million
respecti vely. With the break-up of the Union all profits and losses
were appropriated by Dunlop shareholders. This is important because it
forms the basis for calculating the company's earnings per share
(e.p.s.). With interest repayments rising and the return on capital
falling, the earnings per share deteriorated. It rose from 7.4p in 1970
(adjusted) to reach a peak in money terms of 16.7p in 1976, after which
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it dec1ined, recordi ng growing negative earnings in every year after
1979 (see table 5.5).
A further drain on resources were the sums set aside to cover the
costs of plant closures and the rationalisation programme, i.e.
extraordinary items. In 1978, these amounted to £18 million (composed
of £34 mi11ion 1ess minority shareholders' interests of £16 mi11ion),
which produced a drain on reserves of £20 mill ion. In 1980 and 1981,
£22.4 million and £22.5 million respectively were set aside for
"rationalisation costs, including redundancies, principally in the UK",
but no charge is shown in the profit and loss account for either year
because these sums were fully offset by profits from the sale of
subsidiary companies (£8.3 million in 1980 and £24.3 million in 1981),
and other sums and provisions released with the dismant 1ing of the
Union. By 1982, extraordinary items had risen to £28 million (of which
£29.4 million were rationalisation costs). This, together with steeply
growing attributable losses, caused retained earnings to register a loss
of £85 millions. Finally in 1983, Dunlop was able to implement the
long-awaited decision to extricate itself from the tyre business. The
company accordi ng1y set aside £135 mill ion to cover this withdrawal
which, with tax less minority interests, produced an attributable loss
of £138 million. The total retained losses that year amounted to £169
million. Not surprisingly, the Board recommended that no dividend
should be paid, which was not totally unexpected since the dividend had
been cut in the previous three years from 5.3p in 1977 to 4p in 1980 and
1981, and finally to 2p'in 1982.
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Liquidity
An analysis of the Group's Balance Sheet (table 5.6) shows that
after 1973 there was a marked deterioration in Dunlop's short-term
financial position, as revealed by the trend decline in both the current
ratio and the acid test ratio. By 1983, the former stood at 0.99 and
the 1atter 0.54 (t ,e. current 1iabilities exceeded current assets).
Turning to table 5.7, we can see some of the changes which have occurred
in the composition of working capital over the period in question. The
tab1e shows that after 1973, total current assets as a proport ion of
total assets, increased from 55% to 65.8% in 1983. This large increase
was achieved mainly at the expense of fixed assets and investments.
Analysed in more detail, the two most important elements comprising
current assets are stocks and debtors. The former maintained a fairly
constant share of total assets for most of the period, but experienced a
declining share of total current assets. Stocks' share fell from 53% in
1975 to average just under 50% from 1976 to 1982, before droppi ng to
45.2% in 1983. This pattern is also confirmed when stocks are measured
in terms of sales. In 1978, stocks accounted for 25.2% of sales, by
1983 the respective figure was 20.8%. The reasons for this were partly
due to Dunlop's policy of running down stocks to source it customers,
because of overcapacity and declining production in the tyre sector, and
partly attributable to stricter financial control and more efficient
management of production and supplies.
Debtors, meanwhile, maintained a fairly constant share of current
assets after 1973, at around 43.4%, though there was a perceptible
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improvement in the debtors/sales ratio after 1979. This, once more, is
further evidence of tighter financial regulation.
Cash, by contrast, accounted for a growing proportion of both total
current assets and total assets, especially during the mid-1970s. As
stocks' share of total current assets declined, so accordingly, did
cash's share increase. In 1982, it rose to 8.5%, and further still to
11.5% the fo11owing year. . Although, the £85 mi11ion worth of 1iquid
assets did include £14.4 million of funds in Zimbabwe, which Dunlop was
unable to repatriate.
Focusing on current liabilities, we can see that their share of the
funds invested in Dunlop rose from 29.3% in 1970 to 50.4% in 1981, and
finally to 66.8% in 1983. This is confirmed by the trend analysis
(table 5.8), which shows that current liabilities increased at a
comparable rate with current assets up to 1975. Thereafter, the former
increased at a much faster rate so that by 1983, current liabilities had
increased by 4.78 times since 1970, whilst the latter had risen just
2.57 times. The growth in current liabilities up to 1975 was also below
sales, but in the following years, apart from 1981 and 1982, this
pattern was reversed. In other words, the financial institutions were
taking control as Dunlop was forced to rely upon short-term loans from
banks and credit from suppliers to maintain operations. Thus, the
explanation for the steady decline in the current and acid test ratios.
The deteriorating financial position of Dunlop is further confirmed
by the upward trend in the creditor/sales ratio, and by the failure of
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the working capital (index) to keep abreast of turnover, particularly
after 1976 when the gap between the two started to widen. Moreover, in
1974, working capital amounted to 29% of sales, but it fell sharply to
21.8% in 1979, and to 19.2% by 1983. Yet further evidence of a company
intent on reducing its borrowing requirements.
Analysis of Funds Flow
The overall financial position of Dunlop is illustrated in table
5.9, which diseloses the sources and uses of funds duri ng the eight
years, 1976-83. Over this period, Dunlop experienced a financial
deficit in every year with the exception of 1983. The total outflow of
funds over these eight years amounted to £258 mi11ion. Most of this
deficit was covered by net borrowings, including a rights issue of £26
million in 1977. This indicates that net profits were inadequate to
finance all of the Group's expenditure, including investment and stock
replacement. Pre-tax profits had been declining every year since 1976,
culminating in an actual loss of £7 million in 1982, whilst the sums
set aside to cover plant closures and redundancies increased from £2
mi 11ion in 1978 to £26 mi 11ion in 1983. Expressed as a percentage of
total funds generated, funds from operations fell from a high of 71.8%
in 1976 to a low of 6.3% in 1982.
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For a company, however, the crucial consideration is whether the
interest repayable on borrowi ngs can be met from earnings. Table 5.9
reveals that there was an upward trend in the proportion of borrowings
to capital employed. Between 1976 and 1983, borrowings rose from 40.5%
to 58.2%. Over the same period, the Debt/Equity ratio, which is a more
sensitive measurement of gearing, increased from 74.3% to 173.4%. As
the high level of debt mounted, internally generated funds from
operations were insufficient by 1980 to meet either expenditure on fixed
assets, or the repayment of long-term debt. Dunlop was, therefore,
forced to contain its borrowing commitments by selling a number of its
subsidiary companies to raise finance. In 1980, divestments raised £19
million, increasing to £83 million in 1983; equivalent to 16% and 53.5%
of total funds respectively. Nevertheless, Dunlop still needed to raise
external borrowings to fund its diversification programme, and to
convert its operations from textile to steel radial production. For
much of the period under review, capital expenditure only just exceeded
depreciation (before allowing for inflation), which would indicate that
most of this investment was for replacement purposes.
Further evidence of the attempts by management to exert tighter
financial regulation over its deteriorating financial position are
revealed by the controls imposed on any expansion of working capital.
In 1978, working capital increased by £57 million, but it was
stringently cut back for three of the next four years, as stocks were
run-down and creditors were allowed to increase faster than debtors.
Dunlop's short-term liquidity position, meanwhile, worsened as the
company's reliance on its overdraft facility expanded faster than cash
reserves were bein9 accumu1 ated, so that in 1981 and 1982 short-term
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loans exceeded funds generated from operations.
Capital Structure
Referri ng back to table 5.7 we can see that the proportion of
equity capital to the total funds invested in Dunlop shrank from 46.5%
in 1970 to 31.4% in 1981, and finally to 22.5% in 1983. The long-term
debt portion of total funds invested in the enterprise similarly
exhibited a downward trend from a peak of 28.5% in 1972, ending up at
just 5.5% in 1983, owing to the company's policy of converting long-term
debt into short-term.
Table 5.8 shows the relative changes in the elements which make up
debt and equity. It is evident that debt increased much faster over
this period than equity, leaving equity in 1983 at a level comparable to
that prevailing in the early 1970s (i.e. a decline in real terms). Over
the same period, sales rose to 285, net profits declined to (74), whilst
interest charges rose sharply to 448. The direction of company policy
was to finance its needs by long and short-term debt. In 1978, Dunlop
repaid two 1arge loans tota 11ing DM 150 mi11ion (£40 mill ion) • These
were redeemed and replaced with ster1ing loans, so that the British
operations were entirely financed in sterling (Annual Report, 1978,
p.18).
An inspection of Dunlop is balance sheet (table 5.6) reveals the
impact that the European tyre operations had on the financial positio~
of the company. Net profits proved inadequate to finance investment and
stock replacement, 1eavi ng Dunlop with the option of increas ing its
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borrowings, running down its cash reserves, or adopting some combination
of the two. A company will consider it worthwhile borrowing money so
long as its return on capital exceeds the cost of capital, thus
borrowi ngs wi 11 increase attributab 1e profits. However, the problem
with relying on borrowings is that interest charges can seriously erode
pre-tax profits, particularly of a company which is highly geared.
Dunlop, therefore, found itself ina pasition where interest charges
were increasing sharply, return on capital was declining, and finally in
1981 interest charges outstripped pre-tax profits.
After 1978, reserves were gradually depleted as Dunlop divested.
The company responded to mounting attributable losses by regularly
reviewing and revaluing its fixed assets, to give both a more accurate
figure of the capital employed, and to increase ordinary shareholders'
funds (otherwise the Debt/Equity ratio would have been higher). In 1981
and 1982, these surpluses from asset revaluations amounted to £31
million and £50 million respectively, accompanied by exchange adjustment
gains of £33 million and £35 million respectively. A year later, Dunlop
agreed to sell its European tyre facil ities to Sumitomo, which led to
the complete run-down of reserves to cover the costs associated with the
divestment (revaluation of fixed assets amounted to £9 million and
retained losses totalled £169 million). Sir Maurice Hodgson, the new
Chairman, explained the reasons why:
II •••••• as shareholders were warned at the time of the EGM,
there were substantial extraordinary costs involved in the
SRI deal comprising asset write-offs and provisions for
redundancies and other charges. Together with similar costs
for other closures and further rationalisation and
restructuring of ~he diversified products group, the total
extraordinary items for 1983 amounted to an additional £138
million, of which £12 million was a provision for the
expected losses in Tyres Europe in 1984 until the businesses
are acquired by Sumitomo. Prudence dictated that these
234
expected tyre losses should be taken into the 1983 accounts"
(Annual Report 1983, p.4).
This 1eft ordinary shareholders' funds at the end of 1983, £141
million lower at £110 million compared with a total debt of £437
million, and even if minority interests and preference capital are
included with equity, the overall debt/equity ratio reached 173.4%. The
inflow of funds from Sumitomo reduced the 1eve1 of debt to equi ty,
though Dunlop was to be responsible for any debts or guarantees
outstanding of Dunlop S.A., France, which went into liquidation on 6
October 1983 and was deconso 1idated from the Group accounts at that
date. The fund of £138 million set aside for the divestment contained a
provision of £39 million for this purpose.
The effect of this decision by Dunlop to sell its European Tyre
interests left ordinary shareholders' funds equivalent to just 14.8% of
total capital employed, compared with 31.2% in 1982 and 35.6% in 1980
(aided by the revaluation of fixed assets). This really underlines the
extent of Dunlop's debt problems. In 1970 (adjusted), ordinary
shareholders' funds stood at 34.4% of total capital employed, but their
share began gradually to fall as debts began to mount, so that by 1974
their share had fallen to 27.5%.
Faced with mounting debts, Dun lop endeavoured to strengthen its
financial position. In 19~7, Dunlop raised some £26 million by way of a
one-far-three rights issue, to facilitate planned capital expenditure of
£246 million for the three year period 1977-79 (partly to re-equip for
steel radial productionf, of which 35% of the total was to be spent in
the UK (Annual Report, 1976, p.2). In the event, actual capital
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expenditure was considerably below this sum, at just £164 millions, with
the UK accounting for 41.5% of total investment (Appendix :3, table 12a).
The stated pol icy of moving from "select tve containment to selective
expansionll, had clearly suffered a set-back.
By 1978, Dunlop was ready to reveal to investors the Group's
decision to reduce its tyre-making capacity in Britain, as a first step
towards rationa 1ising its European tyre operat ions. An exp 1anat ion of
the reasoning behind company policy was proferred by Michael Whitaker,
an analyst at the stockbrokers, Simon & Coates:
liThebackground to the above measures is the appalling slump
in profits of the Group's European tyre operations over the
past eighteen months. Due to a combination of substantial
overcapacity, 'dumping' of cheap imports into the UK and the
sharp dec 1ine of the replacement market the European tyre
operations are estimated to have lost approximately £20m at
the operating level in 1978. In the second half of the year
the problem became so acute that Dunlop was forced to cut
its supply prices to its UK distribution network.
Dunlop has been forced to cut capacity at this relatively
early stage rather than sit out a prolonged poker game with
the other tyre manufacturers waiting to see who will be the
first to cut capacity largely because of the scale of its
losses. Losses at the rate of £20m p.a. are a potentially
cripp1ing burden on the Group's cash flow and loan
structure, which is beginning to look seriously unbalanced.
Estimated net borrowings at 31.12.78 of £330m compare with
ordinary shareholders' funds of £254m and minorities'
capital of £200m, and although this aggregate net gearing of
73% does not look an intolerable burden it conceals a severe
international imbalance of liquidity within the Group;
outside Europe, borrowings are relatively small, but £12m of
pre-tax profits consists of associates income and also it is
difficult or impossible to remit funds from several of the
non-European operati ons back into Europe. In consequence
European gearing is extremely high, and as it is the
European operations which are incurring the major losses the
Group may be begi nning to come up against 1endi ng
constraints within several of its European operationsll
(Simon & Coates, 26 January 1979, p.2).
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Dunlop's solution to its liquidity problem was to raise finance by
se11ing assets. On 29 September 1981, Dunlop announced that it was
going to sell its 51% stake in Dunlop Estates Berhad for £60 million to
Multi-Purpose Holdings, a Chinese/Malaysian company, which would give
Dunlop an extraordinary profit of £23 million over the book value of the
subsidiary.
The Dunlop estates were Malays ia's sixth 1argest p1antation group
with 55,097 acres, comprising 49.1% rubber, 42% oil palm and 8.9% cocoa
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 June 1980, p.52). They were also one
of the Group's few profitable ventures. In 1980 and 1981, the
respective pre-tax profits were £7.1 million and £4.6 million, of which
£1.9 million and £1.8 million were attributable to Dunlop shareholders.
But the Group planned to more than compensate for these lost earnings by
using the proceeds from the sale to reduce borrowings. By so do+nq,
Dunlop hoped to increase attributable profits by £5 million in a full
year (Annual Report, 1981, p.14), on the basis that the resulting
reduction in interest charges would exceed any lost profits.
The deal also offered certain other advantages to Dunlop. Firstly,
it helped to remove the threat of a Malays ian takeover of the Dunlop
Group itself (see following section). Secondly, the Malaysian
Government's "New Economic Policy" proposed to limit foreign
participation in companies operating in Malaysia to 30% by 1990. Dunlop
would, therefore, have been forced to sell 21% of its holdings to local
interests before that date. Additionally, during the previous 15 years,·
Dunlop had been concentrating on the more profitable oil palm at the
expense of rubber. Now, however, the oil palms required a large capital
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outlay to facilitate replanting; an investment which Dunlop was loathe
to make, in view of the declining commodity prices (Far Eastern Economic
Review, 9 October 1981, p.94). Moreover, the sale price gave Dunlop a
premium of almost a half on the quoted share price of Dunlop Estates.
It also amounted to roughly two-thi rds of the Group I s market
capitalisation (Financial Times, 30 September 1981).
In 1981, Dunlop announced that the funds generated by divestments
totalled £94 million (Annual Report, 1981, p.14), of which £60 million
came from the sale of Dunlop Estates and £20 million from the
dissolution of the Dun10p-Pire11i Union. On the other hand, the
consolidation of Dunlop S.A., France bought with it £43 million of debt.
The only movement in the opposite direction was the deconso1idation of
Dunlop India, which reduced debt by £17 million. The net effect of all
of these transactions was to increase total debt from £328 mi 11ion in
1980 to £363 million in 1981, causing the debt/equity ratio to rise from
78.8% to 106.5%, whilst interest charges exceeded operating profits.
With the European tyre operations sliding into losses and in need of
urgent attention, further divestments were clearly planned.
To finance this major programme of divestment and plant closures,
Dunlop called an Extraordinary General Meeting for 26 January 1984, to
seek shareholders' permission to raise the company's borrowing limit.
Existing borrowing limits had been set at 1i times book net worth, which
would have limited total indebtedness to £458 million. However, the
proposed programme of ~isposa1s and write-offs would certainly have
breached this limit during 1984. Rather than raise the existing
multiple, the Dunlop directors proposed a ceiling of £600 million, which
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was duly approved.
The banks, meanwhile, remained concerned as their loans to Dunlop
already stood at over ten times its market capitalisation (Financial
Times, 4 January 1984). At the beginning of May 1984, the 46 banks with
loans outstanding to Dunlop, moved to protect their interests by
convert ing some of their debt into equity. In return Dunlop was forced
to convert its long-term debt into short-term borrowi ngs, causi ng the
former to fall from £226 million to £61 million, and the latter to rise
from £195 mill ion to £356 mi11ion. Nevertheless, the 1arge difference
between shareholders' funds and borrowings remained, and it was
inevitable that Dunlop would be forced to divest itself of further
overseas subsidiaries to improve its financial position.
Takeover Threat
The losses sustai ned by the European tyre operations, and the
associated debt, had led to much speculation about the possiblity of a
takeover of Dunlop. There had been persistent rumours since the
beginning of 1980 that Malaysian interests, led by Mr Abdul Ghafar Baba,
were prepari ng to make a bid for the Group. Goodyi e1d P1aza and Pegi
Malaysia, companies owned by the aformentioned businessman, together
with a number of other Far Eastern business interests, had secretly been
building up a substantial shareho1ding in the company. By the middle of
1980, it was rumoured that the Malaysians held somewhere between 20-30%
of the Dunlop shares, possibly more (Far Eastern Economic Review, 27
June 1980, p.51). A concerned Dunlop, asked the Department of Trade to
investigate the extent of their shareholding, but the Department's
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investigators were unable to fulfil this task. Nevertheless, their
investigation did have the effect of hastening Goodyield's disclosure of
the full extent of its holding in Dunlop. This was revealed to be 17.5%
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 February 1981, p.90). In a later deal
Goodyield transferred its entire holding in Dunlop to its associate,
Pegi Malaysia.
One may wonder why the Malaysians should have wanted to acquire
Dunlop, given the company's precarious financial position. There are a
number of possible explanations. Firstly, it would have allowed the
Malaysians to move downstream into advanced rubber-based and industrial
technology. Alternatively, it was known that the Malaysians were
essentially interested in the two profitable Malaysia-based Dunlop
subsidiaries. However, the share price of Dunlop Holdings was so low,
that it would have cost about the same to buy the parent as it would the,
subsidiaries at market capitalisation, then valued at M$350 million (Far
Eastern Economic Review, 27 June, 1980, p.52). It, therefore, made a
great deal of sense to purchase the parent company, and to dispose of
any unwanted part of the Group. As one analyst explained:
"Dunlop's real vulnerability stems from a low share price.
It stands at a mere 25% of net asset value, to give a market
capitalisation under £100m. Dunlop will continue to be a
potent ia1 takeover candi date whi 1e it stands at a discount
to net asset value and whi 1e those assets have strategi c
va1ue to some bidders II (Far Eastern Economic Revi ew, 1 May
1981, p.48).
Dun lop's directors moved to avert the takeover threat by agreei ng
to a deal in September 1981, to sell its 51% stake in Dunlop Estates to
Multi-Purpose Holdings, a Chinese/Malaysian company. In return the
1atter company ageed to set up a new joi nt venture with Pegi, whi ch
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would compri se of Dunlop Estates plus Pegi's 17% stake in Dunlop. An
important part of the deal was an agreement by Pegi and Multi-Purpose,
that the new company would not increase its existing stake in Dunlop
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 October 1981, p.94). But why were Pegi
and Multi-Purpose satisfied to purchase a 51% stake, rather than pursue
a full takeover of Dunlop, with a market capitalisation of £89 million?
Since Pegi already had a holding in Dunlop valued at £14 million, they
would only have needed to find an additional £15 million, at Dunlop's
then market price of 60p. The ready answer is that a successful
takeover was less certain to succeed and that the offer price per share
would probably have been about £1, putting a bid beyond the means of the
two companies (Ibid, p.95). Further, given the very high interest rates
then prevailing, it is likely that they did not relish inheriting
Dunlop's large debt problem.
In December 1982, the joint company set up by Pegi and
Multi-Purpose was dissolved, leaving the former with its shareholding in
Dunlop and the latter with control of the Estates. Evidently, it was
just a marri age of conveni ence to appease the Malays ians Bumiputras
(indigenous "sons of the soil") policy of local ownership and control.
This left Pegi free to continue building up its shareholding in Dunlop.
By April 1983, this stake had risen to 26.1% (Financial Times, 12 April
1983). In the meantime, Pegi was still awaiting permission from the
Ma1ayasian Government to complete its £73 million bid for Dunlop
Malaysian Industries Berhad; later revised to a 25.5% stake, before
being finally abandoned., Once again, however, given that Dun10p's share
price stood at 49 pence, valuing the company at £70.5 million, as
against a net asset value of £650 million, Pegi could have bought
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contro 1 at a cost of around £25 mi11 ion (Economi st, 30 Apri 1 1983,
p.79). Under British law, Pegi would have had to make a full bid for
Dunlop if it had raised its holding beyond 29.9%. Dunlop, however,
believed that Pegi lacked the necessary industrial management expertise
to seek full control (Financial Times, 12 April 1983). Eventually, the
Malaysians were offered, and accepted, two non-executive posts on the
Dunlop Board. These were duly appointed on 23 June 1983.
Meanwhi1e, the prospect of a bi d for Dunlop encouraged Ameri can
investors to buy 10 million of the company's shares, as speculation
caused the price of the shares to increase by 50% in two days, valuing
Dunlop at £112 million (Investors Chronicle, 27 May 1983, p.35).
I nvestorswere interested in Dunlop because the sum of the i ndi vi dual
parts were worth more than the company's market value, and they believed
that any bid would reflect this fact. The Investors Chronicle put a
total realisable value on Dunlop's foreign quoted subsidiaries at £160
million, excluding quoted subsidiaries in India, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and
Zambia, which would have been very difficult to repatriate because of
local exchange controls. The value of unquoted subsidiaries was put at
about £140 million, giving a total value on paper of £300 million
(Ibid). Mr Bill Seward of stockbrokers, Phillips and Drew, put a value
of £170 million on realisable assets, excluding the European tyre
subsdidiaries. Mr Criss York, of Capel Cure-Myers, put the value a
little higher at £180 million. This compares to the then stock market
value for Dunlop of £75 million (Financial Times, 20 September 1983).
Clearly, the answer to Dunlop's problems was to somehow extricate
itself from the European tyre business, to allow the company to
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concentrate on its more profitable investments. However, simply closing
down the tyre operations was the one solution not available:
"Dunlop does not have the option of simply closing down its
European tyre operat ions. It still has about 4,000 people
mak ing tyres in the UK and 3,000 in France. The enormous
redundancy and closure costs and the political difficulty of
such a move makes it highly improbable. Even for a
potential bidder, some form of separate hive-off of tyre
activities in Europe would be difficult because, while much
of the group's £400m net debt relates to tyres, the
borrowings have generally been secured against all of
Dun10p's businesses" (Investors Chronicle, 27 May 1983,
p.35).
In these circumstances, the only alternative was to find an
outright purchaser for the tyre facilities.
Details of the Sumitomo Deal
On 19 September 1983, Dunlop confi rmed that it was sell ing its
European tyre interests to Sumitomo. Details of the deal were given in
a statement three days later. The Japanese company was to acquire:
(i) Dun10p's tyre factories at Washington, Co Durham and Witt1ich in
West Germany; and a truck tyre retread factory in the UK;
(ii) the tyre manufacturing facilities within the factory at Hanau in
West Germany;
(iii) the tyre techn ica1 and mou 1d engi neeri ng activities and the
truck and bus tyre manufacturing facility at Fort Dunlop,
Birmingham;
(tv) the tyre depots, selling and distribution facilities in the UK
and West Germany (but excluding the wholesale and retail tyre
distribution business in those countries);
(v) the Dunlop tyre selling companies in Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Greece, Holland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland
(Statement to Stock Exchange and Press, 22 September 1983).
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The amount agreed for the sale of these businesses plus Dunlop's
40% stake in Sumitomo Rubber was about £82 million; an interim payment
of £41 mi11ion (later increased to £43 mill ion because of the fall in
the value of the pound) was to be received at the end of 1983 and the
balance by 2 January 1985. Sumitomo also agreed to purchase the
inventories of these businesses, thereby releasing to Dunlop the
substantial sums tied up in working capital, estimated to be about £30
mi11ion; 1eaving Dunlop to collect any outstanding debts and 1ikewise
pay-off any creditors (Ibid).
The acquisition of the above four tyre plants gave Sumitomo tyre
production capacity of 4,500 tons (new rubber consumption) monthly,
which was equivalent to about 15% of Dunlop's capacity (TAB, November/
December, 1983, p.35). At that time Sumitomo was manufacturing about
10,000 tons of Dunlop tyres in Japan. Specifically excluded from the
deal were the car tyre manufacturing operations at Fort Dunlop,
Birmingham (though negotiations were in progress in April 1984 between
the two companies to arrive at a price for these facilities) and the
French operations.
The benefits to Dunlop of divesting itself of its loss~making tyre
factories and improving its cash flow position were obvious. The City
was equally "thrilled" by the decision. It
".•••..reacted with unreserved enthusiasm at the prospect of
Dunlop unloading most of its tyre operations, which stacked
up a £26 million loss last year.
Dunlop's share price rose lOp to 63p, increasing the stock
market value of the company by £14.4 million" (The Guardian,
20 September 1983).
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The trade unions, on the other hand, were not convi nced of the
benefits that the takeover offered to their members, especially since
Sumitomo stated that at least 1,000 jobs would be cut at Fort Dunlop in
Birmingham (Financial Times, 29 September 1983). Perhaps what angered
the unions the most was the fact that they were not informed that these
negotiations had been taking place. Indeed, talks between national
officials of the TGWU and GMBATU and senior management only months
earlier, had revealed no proposed changes in company policy. On hearing
news of the deal Mr John Miller, National Officer of the TGWU,
reportedly accused Dunlop of telling him "downright bloody lies", about
the company1s future, at a meeting in June (The Guardian, 20 September
1983). But should the trade unions have been that surpri sed at this
turn of events? The analysis in this and previous chapters suggests
not. Furthermore, there was some speculation to this end as early as
April 1983. In fact, it was reported that:
"Another possibility, not wholly discounted at Dunlop, is
that the Japanese are casting an eye on the group. Japanese
tyre makers are already moving into the space left as
western tyre firms shrink , Sumitomo Rubber is just one
obvious possible Japanese buyer" (Economist, 30 April 1983,
pp.79-80).
In an interview, Mr David Warbuton, the GMBATUls National Officer
for the rubber industry also stated that:
"•••••.there was an inkling through the IeEF that something
was happening with Sumitomo" (19 March 1984).
However, ne-one on the unions lsi de investigated the matter
further. If they had done so, they would have realised from the'
information available that a divestment, or at the very least a
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radica1 restructuri ng of the
possibility, perhaps inevitable.
tended to think so.
Group's activities was always a
Certainly, most other informed sources
Investors' Strategy for Dunlop
If the trade unions were largely unaware of the divestment strategy
being evolved at Dunlop, -investors were not. They were indirectly
responsible for the formulation of this policy. It was because Dunlop
had to satisfy the acquisitiveness of investors that it was forced to
adopt this strategy.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the changes in the share price of Dunlop,
compared with that of the Motors group and the Financi a1 Times - All
Share Index, measured in both nominal and real terms. The fluctuations
in the share prices in the former figure reflects how the Stock Market
reacted to news of the oil crisis, plant closures, redundancies,
divestments and other events. However, it is the inf1ation-adjusted
movement in share prices which most concerns investors, because it
measures changes in thei r abi1ity to buy goods and services. From thi s
latter figure, we can see that until about the middle of 1971, Dunlop
had been performing better than the motor industry group, but then the
positions completely reversed, apart from a brief period from early 1974
to the later half of 1976.
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The downward slide in the share price of Dunlop started in June
1972, with the motors group falling more slowly. It is also evident
that this decline set in before the outbreak of the Middle East war in
October 1973, as reveal ed by the much steeper fall in the All Share
Index. Investors were clearly already concerned about the future
performance of Dunlop before the onset of the first oil crisis, mainly
because Dunlop was lagging behind her major competitors in the
application of radial technology.
The 1ack of investment in the British tyre plants by most of the
major producers was reflected by a fall in the UK's share of world
trade in tyres from 11.5% in 1971 to 8.5% in 1972 (Appendix 1, table
30) . Moreover, doubts began to emerge about the prospects for the
Dunlop-Pire11i Union, as the early financial results highlighted major
weaknesses in the new Group, which were further underlined by the
subsequent large losses declared by Industrie Pirelli.
By the beginning of 1973, investors were aware of the industrial
sectors that would be badly affected by any rise in inflation. In March
1973, Cutler and Westwick published a study on the impact of inflation
on the earnings (e.p.s.) of companies from a wide range of manufacturing
and service industri es. These are reproduced in table 5.10. Thei r
findings made it abundantly clear that manufacturing industry, with the
motor industry amongst the worst affected, was very vulnerable to any
rise in inflation. The service industries, on the other hand, would be
the least affected, with certain sectors actually experiencing an
increase in earni ngs. Withi n the motor industry group, the compani es
which appeared to be particularly risky, on the evidence presented in
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Table 5.10 Average Percentage Change in CPP Earnings Compared with
Historical Earnings
Average decrease (increase) between
CPP and historical earnings (%)
Electricals
Shipping
Motors
Textiles
Heavy Engineering
General Engineering
Miscellaneous Capital
Hire Purchase
Household Goods
Packaging and Paper
Tobacco
Banks
Wines and Spirits
Oil
Chemicals
Contracting and Construction
Miscellaneous unclassified
Electronics and Radio
Building and Materials
Office Equipment
Newspaper and Publishing
Food Manufacturing
Food Retailing
Stores
Merchants Banks
Mining Finance
Breweries
Entertainment and Catering
Insurance Composite
Property
- 174
- 106
- 71
- 65
- 61
59
- 48
- 44
- 44
- 43
- 36
- 31
- 30
26
- 23
23
22
21
19
18
14
14
6
5
1
o
+ 20
+ 35
+ 78
+ 228
Source: Cutler and Westwick, 1973, p.21, table 4.
table 5.11, were British Leyland and Dunlop. Their major problem being,
along with a 1arge number of other manufacturi ng compani es, the very.
high depreciation and stock levels relative to earnings.
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Table 5.11 Estimated Effect of Inflation on Companies in the
Motor Industry
All
other
P&L Gain Gain
Account on on
Historical cpp Total Deprec. Stock items short long
e.p.s. e.p.s decrease (loss) (loss) gain money money
British
Leyland 2.9 - 1.2 -141 133 191 2 134 47
Lucas 21.4 11.8 - 45 29 27 6 -17 22
Assoc.
Eng; neeri ng 6. 1 3. 1 - 49 51 85 6 20 60
BBA 5.2 3.7 - 29 30 39 5 20 16
Dunlop 10.8 0.8 - 93 94 112 5 5 103
Average - 71 67 91 5 32 50
Source: Cutler and Westwick, 1973, p.18, table
In an updated and slightly modified paper to the earlier study,
Parker & Gibbs (1974, p.59, Figure 4) found on comparing the share price
performance of these i ndustri a1 sectors wi th that of the FT-ASI from 1
Jan 1968 to 19 July 1974, that the principal losers from inflation
(motors and distributors, electricals, household goods) "substantially"
underperformed the index. Similarly of the six sectors that benefited
most from i nfl at ion (property, entertai nment and cateri ng, contracting
and construction, breweri es, misce 11aneous (other groups) , food
retail i ng), all except entertai nment and cateri ng and food retai 1i nq
outperformed the index. ,Parker and Gibbs (1974) concluded that:
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" the stock market is not, and has not been, so naive as
to ignore the effects of i nfl at i on on company profits, and
it already appears to have been making allowances for these
effects in terms of the ratings attri buted to di fferent
industry sectors" (p.59).
The shortcomings of these estimates by external analysts was that
they were based on published historic cost information. What was needed
was more accurate inflation adjusted information published by the
companies themselves. The first oil crisis provided the stimulus for
the development of policy in this direction:
"When the first oil crisis occurred in 1973-74 the reaction
of the stock market was swi ft, and the requi red scale of
industrial "adjustment" was clear. Although the market
appeared to overact i nit i ally, generous tax hand-outs and
further considerationshave left the cut in investors' wealth
at around 30 per cent in real terms compared wi th 1962"
(Bryer et al 1984b, p.225).
By 1977, most major companies were producing current cost accounts
(Dunlop had introduced inflation-adjusted account in 1975), providing
investors with more accurate information on the value of their
investments and, more importantly, precisely which companies would be
embarking on large-scale plant closures in the event of a further steep
rise in inflation. With this uncertainty removed, the variability of
share prices which had risen sharply to 32.1% in 1974, and then up to
48.9% in 1975, fell back to 16.9%, not far from the historic 1925-77
average of 15.1% (Ibid). Investors were now aware that plant closures
were being planned across the range of manufacturing industry.
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Nevertheless, it would appear that the Stock Market's pessimism of
the prospects for the British motor and components industry persisted,
as evidenced towards the end of 1977 when the share price of Dunlop (in
the case of Motors, at the beginning of 1979) failed to match any
improvements in the All Share Index.
In 1979, the world suffered a second oil crisis. Yet figure 5.1
shows that there was no exaggerated reaction from the stock Market.
This is because
1I •••••• investors knew that closures were coming well before
that happened, and their impact had already been
incorporated in changed share prices. In stock market
jargon, they had already been 'discounted' II (Ibid, p.226).
Finally, in November 1983, the Dunlop shares were dropped from the
Financial Times 30 Share Index.
Whilst investors were expecting plant closures, the trade unions
were not. Yet the necessary informat ion requi red to keep the trade
unions as well-informed as investors was available in Dunlop's
published accounts. The problem was that the unions failed to
comprehend the imp1icat ions of the pub 1ished current cost accounts, or
to be more exact, they totally discarded them. For example, the
company's annual report in the possession of the GMBATU's research
department, had the current cost accounts crossed-through, as if to
denote their insignificance. This is hardly surprising in view of the
fact that the TUC failed to make any representation to the Committee of.
Inquiry (Sandi1ands Committee, 1975) investigating the impact of
inflation on corporate entities. Thus ensuring that it did not become a
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matter of concern in trade union circles. In a wider context, it is
symptomatic of the distrust that the trade unions have shown generally
towards published accounts, stemming in part from the lack of technical
competence from within the Labour Movement.
If the trade unions had examined this information and had been
aware of its significance and implications, they may well have been in a
better position to resist plant closures . .In Appendix 1 we show that
the incentive for companies to engage in capital expenditure may depend
on the prospective rate of return relative to the cost of capital. The
higher is the rate of return relative to the cost of capital, the more
worthwhil e investment wi11 become, and vice-versa. This inducement to
invest is represented by the valuation ratio IIqll,which is simply the
ratio of the post-tax real rate of return on capital to its cost or, in
other words, it expresses the relationship between the market value of
•
the firm and the replacement cost of its assets. Up to 1974 (Wilson
(Ccmnittee, 1900, p.l44, table 37);the valuation ratio had more or less remained
above unity. Thereafter, it fell substantially below unity, in the wake
of the oil crisis, making divestment rather than investment the key
concern. With the publication of current cost accounts, it became
possible to calculate the valuation ratio for individual major
companies.
Table 5.12 overleaf reproduces the valuation ratio for Dunlop from
1975 to 1983. Over the entire period in question Ilqllremained below 1.
In 1979, with the onset of plant closures, it fell to 0.33 owing to the
sharp fall in real post-tax profits in relation to the cost of capital.
That year, Dunlop suffered a real post~tax loss of £47 million, compared
with a declared post-tax historic cost profit of £1 million.
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Table 5.12 The Valuation Ratio "q_ for Dunlop, 1975-83 (£III).
Book va1ue1 Market va1~e Total
Rep1acement3cost "q,,4of net debt of equity of assets
1975 215 56.1 271 •1 718 0.38
1976 268 78.2 346.2 843 0.41
1977 273 128.1 401. 1 1,075 0.37
1978 337 104 441 1,163 0.38
1979 287 84.8 371.8 1,133 0.33
1980 288 92.6 380.6 1,001 0.38
1981 317 96.1 413. 1 879 0.47
1982 355 89.9 444.9 965 0.46
1983 352 76.8 428.8 864 0.50
gross debt - liquid assets
2 average share price x No. of shares (excludes preference capital)
3 includes investments
4 rate of return = forward 100kin9 real post-tax profits
replacement value of tradlng assets less deferred tax
cost of capital = forward lookin~ real post-tax profitsmarket value of equlty plus net debt
valuation ratio Iql = real rate of return
real cost Of capltaJ
or market value of equity plus debt
replacement value of tradlng assets
It is evident from tables 5.13 and 5.14 that the primary cause of
these 1arge current cost losses were the tyre operati ons based in
Britain and the European Convnunity. The 1arger losses experi enced by
the former are evidence of the lack of investment and hence the
predominance of much older plant in the UK. In fact, in 1981, an
operat ing profit of £2 mi11ion was earned by the tyre group, although
heavy losses were still occurring in the UK. This can undoubtedly be
attributed to the higher profits from the modern automated plants in the
rest of the world, especially in North America, and the closure of tbe
older, unprofitable tyre plants in Britain and Europe. With the
implementation of the closure plans after 1979, "q" rose to 0.38 in 1980
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and finally to 0.50 in 1983, as Dunlop announced, not unexpectedly, the
divestment of the company's European tyre operations.
Table 5.13 Analysis of O~eratins profits (Current Cost) by Resiona1
Location of Co.pany, 1977-81 (£III)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
UK (1) (8) (34) (43) (29)
Rest of EEC (6) (4) (3) (2)
Rest of Europe
North America 8 5 (1) (4) 9
Central & South America 1 1
Africa 5 6 10 15 12
Asia & Australasia 16 21 22 18 18
Total 23 20 (6) (14) 9
Source: Annual Reports
Table 5.14 Analysis of Operatins Profits (Current Cost) by Product
Grou~, 1977-81 (£III)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Tyres (8) (12) (24) (25) 2
Industrial 13 14 5 5 2
Consumer 4 7 2 1 (4)
Sports 3 2 (2)
Engineering 4 2 2 (1) 3Plantations 7 7 9 8 6
Total 23 20 (6) (14) 9
Source: Annual ReEorts
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Employment
The pursuit of this twin policy of product diversification and
rationalisation of unprofitable production facilities contributed to
large job losses. In 1970, Dunlop had a global workforce of 107,000
people, by 1983 this had fallen to 53,000 (Appendix 3, table 15a). The
bulk of these job losses occurred after 1979, with employment falling by
45.9% between 1979-83 compared with 8.4% from 1970-79. More
significantly, however, a very large majority of the jobs displaced were
in the UK. Here, employment fe11 by 60% from 55,500 employees in 1970
to 22,000 in 1983; and roughly 50% of these jobs were lost during the
period 1979-83, as opposed to 20.7% from 1970-79 (Ibid).
A key factor contributing to the reduction in employment in the UK,
was Dun1op1s policy of concentrating on overseas investment and
production. As a result, the British workforce as a proportion of total
employees fell from 51.9% in 1970 to 41.5% in 1983 (Appendix 3, table
15b). This did not, however, come as a totally unexpected surprise to
the trade unions. For a union report stated that:
"Given the allocation of investment plans during the
remainder of the 19701s, this percentage (of total worldwide
employees) seems very likely to continue falling" (GMWU,
1977, p.25).
Of the 23,000 jobs displaced from Dun1op1s tyre manufacturing
facilities worldwide between 1978 and 1982, 8,000 were in Britain;
equivalent to 34.8% of the total tyre jobs lost (calculated from.
Appendix 3, table 16a). 'As a result, the UK accounted for only 10.9% of
total employees engaged in tyre production in 1982, compared with 20.9%
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in 1978.
These job losses certainly had a significant impact on company
performance, as profit per employee from the tyre group, measured in
money terms, more than trebled between 1979 and 1983 (Appendix 3, table
18), whilst tyre sales per employee increased by 84% (Appendix 3, table
20) •
Conclusions
There clearly was a great deal of information in Dunlop vs Annual
Reports, industry statistics, stockbroker reports, newspaper articles,
and other sources which, if properly analysed, would have revealed to
the unions the direction of Dunlop·s policies.
The European tyre market had shifted from crossply tyres to fabric
radials and then to steel radials, leaving the tyre companies holding a
considerable amount of redundant tyre-making capacity. Dunlop·s
response was to reduce its dependency on tyre production and to
concentrate its investment overseas in non-tyre products. Thus, whilst
investors were expecting plant closures, the unions by contrast were
merely anticipating an unspecified number of job losses.
One reason why the unions were uninformed and unprepared was their
virtual disregard of financial information. But, as we shall see in the
next chapter, access to. information alone would not have helped the
unions to resist investors· strategies. They would still have needed to
use this information, and this required a plan. Thus we also need to
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explore why the unions failed to develop their own strategic conception
of the rubber industry.
·Accounting and Trade Unions : '!be Incutpltibles?
A Case Study of Closures at Dunlop
Thous Villi_ McGovern BSc.. Msc.. PhD.
University of Var.1ck
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CHAPTER 6 - TRADE UNIONS, INFORMATION AND STRATEGY: THE ROLES Of THE
TYRE SWP
On 5 November 1975, the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, launched
the Labour Government IS" Industri a1 Strategy" (NEDC 75/71), from which
evolved the Tyre Industry Sector Working Party. In this chapter we
sha11 show that the trade unions became dependent on this tripart He
body to put forward solutions to the problems faced by the British tyre
sector. We shall argue that this effectively precluded the unions from
developing their own information strategy for the tyre sector, so that
they became incorporated into viewing the problems and their solutions
from a "tripartite consensus", which in practice tended to reflect the
perspective of management. The result was that after 1979 the SWP was
unable to offer anything to their members beyond improving
"communications" as a means of reversing the decline of the tyre sector ••
As the job losses in the industry began to increase, the unions did
put forward a number of policies, though many were never formally
articulated.
below:
Amongst these were the fo11owing 1isted in table 6.1
Table 6.1 Trade Union Policies for Protecting Jobs in the British Tyre
Sector
l.
2.
3.
4.
Reversal of Monetarist policies;
Higher investment;
Import controls;
Import substitution and export development;
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5. Shorter working week;
6. Planning Agreements;
7. Industrial democracy;
8. More accountability on the part of Multinational companies;
9. Nationalisation or a larger public stake;
la. Government aid;
11. Training and manpower planning;
12. Application of new technology to improve efficiency.
Sources: GMWU, Rubber Industrial Review 1982/83.
GMWU, Rubber in Crisis (unpublished).
At first sight these policies look impressive, but in reality they
lacked content and were not supported by any detailed programmes. The
unions failed to devise any strategic conception of the industry. We
shall see that combined with the short-comings of union organisation at
Dunlop and their preoccupation with wages and sectional interests, this
effectively undermined their ability to fight plant closures. We
proceed ~n three stages: in Part (i) we analyse the constraints imposed
by tripartism. In Part (ii) we analyse how the trade unions were
outmanoeuvred into accepting the abolition of national bargaining. And
in Part (iii) we show that with the failure of the SWP and the removal
of national bargaining, the stage was set for unopposed plant closures.
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Part (i) The Constraints of Tripartis.
The NEDC (National Economic Development Council) was set up by the
Conservative Government of Harold Macmillan on 7 March 1962. Its
purpose was lito seek agreement upon ways of improving economic
performance, competitive power, and efficiency", (quoted from
Midd1emass, 1983, p.ix) • Under the umbre11a of the NEDC there were
about 50 tripartite committees, known as Economic Development Committees
or Sector Working Parties, covering roughly 60% of manufacturing
industry (Ibid).
The SWPs grew out of the "Industria1 Strategy II (NEDC 75/71) drawn
up by the Labour Government in 1975. It was intended that the SWPs
would implement this strategy in industries and individual companies.
On the political level these new bodies performed an additional
function, in that they enabled the Government to steer a course between
Tony Benn and his supporters who backed planning agreements, and the CBI
who were opposed to them. The setting up of the SWPs were
"••••••a means of appearing to institute planning agreements
without actually doing much about them or risking breaking
up the machinery of NEDC tripartism. The sectors were
chosen, not because they were areas of desperate need, or
ones characterised by great disparity of performance between
companies, but because they were predicted to grow quickly
in home as well as export markets" (Ibid, p.9S).
Some 30 industrial sectors, including the rubber processing sector,
were selected on this basis. A number of these SWPs were wholly new
while others grew out of existing EDCs. The former differed from the
latter in that they were tailored to specific industries. It was
envisaged that the SWPs would cover a broader range of issues, though
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probably in less depth, and report more frequently to Council.
Inevitably, the SWPs were set up in those sectors which had a powerful
trade association, or where there were strong links with the sponsoring
department in the Department of Industry (Ibid).
The Committees were "tripartite" in composition, with representa-
tives drawn from management, trade unions and the Department of
Industry. Management members were nominated by trade associations and
trade union members by the TUC. The Industry Division of NEDO provided
a representative and a Secretary for each Committee. The appointment of
the chairman and independent members was subject to a veto of each
partner. These Committees, though set up at the behest of NEDO,
government or individual sectors, were formed voluntarily and could be
disbanded if the partners so wished.
Objectives of the Rubber Processing SWP
In 1977, the Rubber Processing SWP set itself the task of
"arrest ing and revers ing the dec 1ine of the Brit ish tyre sector ". To
achieve this, the SWP identified two key policy considerations.
Firstly, to improve production efficiency in UK tyre plants and,
secondly, to increase the sales and marketing efforts of the British
producers. These policies evolved from the work of the Manpower Working
Party, which was set up to investigate production efficiency
improvements in the home industry. A guiding principle adopted by the
Working Party was that:
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n •••••• the key to improving performance in companies will be
security of employment for their employees and therefore ••..
1ncreases 1n product1vity should come through increased
output and a higher wor1d market share on the basis of
stable employment " (NEDO/RP/IS (77) 18 p.1, my emphasis).
In the context of what was happening to the industry, this
objective was clearly absurd. The tyre sector was suffering from
overcapacity, and companies were planning to reduce their staffing
1eve1s. Nevertheless, NEDO set about quant ifying the target 1eve1 of
output, based on market forecasts and productivity details provided in
confidence by individual companies. This information suggested that UK
product ivity (measured in terms of weight of throughput per man hour)
needed to be increased on average by 30% to match international
standards (Ibid). It was calculated that if this was achieved, an
additional 30% more capacity would be needed to absorb the surplus
workforce and guarantee security of employment (Ibid). It was also
estimated that an overall increase in production of a further 20% could
be obtained from existing capacity, with more intensive use of plant,
including increased shiftwork and reduced downtime. Therefore, in
total, to guarantee security of employment an increase in production of
around 50% might be required. The SWP appeared confident that UK tyre
production could be increased over the following five years, provided
that increases in efficiency were achieved.
The strategy envisaged increasing home production of car and
commercial vehicle tyres by 5-5i million units by 1981, equivalent to a
15-18% ;ncrease in product ion (see figure 6.1)• NEDO ;tse1f stated"
that:
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"Overa 11 market objectives call for a total increase in UK
tyre production of up to 18% by 1981 from the present level
of about 32m units •.•..•The reduction in unit costs and the
planned increase in production will be on the basis of more
intensive plant utilisation and selective plant investment.
The SWP has agreed on the need to increase relative
production efficiency in the UK by up to 30% compared with
with European competition •••••••• lf the continuation of
increased efficiency, and increased sales can be achieved
the SWP believe that security of employment for existing
employees can also be achieved" (1977, paras. 1.10~1.12).
The Tyre SWP identified increasing exports as one major means of
expanding production and sustaining jobs in the UK. An analysis of the
British tyre sector's competitive position in world markets, prepared
with the help of a data-base set up by the Rubber and Plastics Research
Association, showed that UK exports were concentrated in Conmonwea1th
and third world markets. By contrast, penetration of the important
European and North American markets was notably shallow. These markets
were therefore identified as the ones offering the best opportunities
for increased sales, with the EEC singled out as the prime target for a
number of reasons:
"First, it provides a major opportunity for export led growth
because it is a big market and there is scope for the UK to
increase its small market share in continental Europe from
the present 1eve1s• Second, it is a product ion intens ive
market with a high degree of international sourcing by
companies. The distribution channels for developing UK tyre
exports are therefore already in existence" (NEDO, 1977,para 2.16).
The basic premise of NEDO, that increased efficiency would enable
the UK producers to gain a larger share of the European market, was
based on the view that:
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"(t)he major determinant of market performance in the
European tyre industry is the unit cost of production"
(Ibid, para 2.26).
The SWP expected that of the extra output, 3.5 mi11ion car and
commercial vehicle tyres would be sold in the Community, with a further
one mi 11ion going to North Ameri ca and the Entrepreneura 1 markets. On
top of this, it was anticipated that a reduction in import penetration
1eve 1s could be achieved by the Government encouragi ng the Japanese
vehicle companies to set up assembly plants in the UK using a specified
proportion of British components, including home produced tyres
exclusively. This would have the dual effect of reducing imports of
Japanese cars and,hence tyres, while also increasing DE tyre production
for Japanese cars exported to Europe. It was estimated that by 1980,
new car registrations could reach 1.6 million, with the Japanese share
in excess of 10%. If all of these Japanese cars were produced in
Britain rather than imported, this would expand DE tyre production by
0.8 million units. If in addition, the UK was also used as an assembly
base for Japanese car exports to Europe, potential DE production would
increase to 2.6 million tyres (NEDO/RP/IS (77) 18, paras 6.276•3).
An alternative means of boosting tyre production was the imposition
of import controls on foreign tyres. NEDO calculated that a halving of
imports could increase home production of car tyres by one million units
within two years (para 6.4). The SWP' s strategy was to use
voluntary import ceilings to allow imports in.1981 to
fall to levels which persisted in 1975 thus encouraging the
substitution of up to one million imported tyres by home production
(paras 3.13 and 4.2t.
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The combi nation of this extra output with the 30% target for
improvements to productivity implied a contraction in the workforce
from 40,000 to about 34,000 in 1981. Assuming the high levels of labour
turnover in the industry would continue, NEDO estimated that this
reduction in employment could be achieved through "natural wastage",
while at the same time guaranteeing secure employment for the remaining
employees (paras 5.2 and 5.3).
Evaluation of the Strategy:
Production and Employment
It appears extraordinary that the SWP should construct a strategy
to expand output to such a level, in order to accommodate a guarantee of
secure employment along with a 30% increase in productivity, especially
when all the available evidence clearly showed that the two objectives
were incompatible. For example, graphs produced by NEDO for the SWP
revea 1ed that if a 20% increase in effiet ency was to be achieved by
1981, together with security of employment, import penetration of car
tyres would have to be reduced from the existing level of 25% to 2%
(NEDO/RR/IS (77) 3rd Meeting). This was neither feasible nor
achievable. NEDO must have realised this (and the union representatives
on the SWP may have done), but appeared to accept that this was the only
way of getting an agreement with the parties concerned. Management
wanted improvements in productivity; the unions wanted job security. It
should have been se1f~ev~dent that in a stagnating market, both of these
objectives could not be achieved, as indeed they were not.
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Table 6.2 shows that by 1981t total tyre production (cart truck,
bus t earthmover t dumper and tractor) had fallen to just 24.2 mi11ion
tyres t aeons iderab 1e way short of the target figure of 36.3 mi11ion
tyres (see Figure 6.1), whilst employment had shrunk to 27,700 people,
compared to the target of 34,000.
Table 6.2 E!ploy.ent and Output in the Tyre Sector, 1973-82
Productivity
Employment Tyre output Output/man Index
(mlIhons)
1973 47,000 31,480 669.8 1001974 42,800 28,621 668.7 991975 40,400 27,063 669.9 1001976 40,300 31,003 769.3 1151977 41,200 30,013 728.5 1091978 40,300 27,641 685.9 1021979 35,700 27,650 774.5 1161980 32,800 26,884 819.6 1221981 27,700E 24,247 875.3 1311982 25,500 24,798 972.5 145
Sources: Tyre sector employment, 1973-78· NEDO, 1979, p.7.. ,.. .. II 1979-81· RPPITB, 1980 to 1982.. ,.. II .. 1982 ; estimateTyre production, 1973~82; Rubber Statistical Bulletin
(various issues).
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Between 1975 and 1981, the net effect of the reduction in
enployment was to increase productivity, rreasured in tenns of output
per man, by 31%. However, the fall in the labour force was
insufficient to counteract the decline in output. Hence productivity,
as measured by the productivity index, failed to rreet the target of
159 (see Figure 6.2) considered by the SWPto be necessary to make
British produced tyres canpetitive at hare and overseas. For
production to be on course, output per man should have risen to
sanewhere in the region of 1,063 tyres by 1981, as canpared with an
actual figure of 875. By .iIrplication, employmentin 1981 should have
similarly been reduced to 22,810 people, as opposed to the 27,700
then atployed. Clearly, therefore, nore job losses were to be
expected. And this should have been obvious to the trade union
representatives on the SWP.
Exports
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 display the SWP'spolicy objectives for
expanding Britain's trade in car and camnercial vehicle tyres with
the EEC. Plotted alongside the SWPtarget balance of trade are the
actual balance of trade statistics. The SWPset a target for 1981 of
a positive balance of trade of 3,360,000 tyres in the fonner
category, and 480,000 tyres in the latter category. However, in
practice the UKfell considerably short of both policy objectives.
Between early 1977 and the end of 1979, Britain suffered a negative
trade balance in car tyres. The following year witnessed. a steep rise
in exports to the Ccmnunity, accanpanied by a fall-off in imports,
which produced a positive balance of 1.8 million tyres. But this
still fell considerably short of the policy objective. A year later,
in 1981, the UKrecorded a deficit of 319,000 car tyres with the
EEC.
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Trade in commercial vehicle tyres, by comparison, fared much
better, inasmuch that no deficit was recorded. In 1976, a favourable
balance of 325,000 tyres was recorded, but one year later the reported
fi gure was just 8,000 tyres. The fo 11owing years produced a steady
upward climb in the trade balance, culminating in a surplus of almost
274,000 in 1981. Nevertheless, it was still 42.9% below the SWPtarget.
The primary reason why exports were unable to meet the targets
established by the SWP, was clearly because its policy conflicted with
the strategies being pursued by the tyre companies. During the 1960s,
the tyre companies tended to treat the UK and the Continent as two
distinct markets (Hood and Young, 1982, p.137). However, with the
deve1opment of the EEC, and with Bri tai n I sentry in 1973, the tyre
companies began increasingly to view Europe as one market, and they
started to plan their production on that basis. This ultimately proved
detrimental to the UK, which by now was experiencing poorer economic
performance and lower economic growth than her European neighbours. As
the overall size of the domestic market started to shrink, owing to the
oil crisis and the effects of the growing use of the radial tyre, plus
the declining output of the British motor industry, the tyre companies
began to consider the UK less favourably as a production base (Ibid,
p.146). They responded by using the British production facilities to
source only the home and Commonwealthmarkets. A major feature of the
sales policies of the British-:-based manufacturers was to export tyres
allover the world, thus achieving only a shallow penetration in these
markets (NEDO/TI (82) 17). The other European nations, by ccntrest , .
concentrated their sales'within the European Community and by so doing,
established a stable base from which to exploit other markets (NEDO,
1977, paras 2.19.1 and 2.19.2).
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Imports
Towards the end of the 1970s, the SWP and the trade unions both
expressed their concern at the rising level of tyre imports into the UK.
According to the former:
"Increased imports and decreased exports have undermined the
who 1e basis of employment and efficiency in the UK tyre
industry" (NEOO, 1979, p.6).
The trade unions responded by demanding the imposition of import
controls to protect the domestic industry, whilst the manufacturers'
representatives on the SWP, argued strongly against any restraints on
trade. However, as import contro 1s, apart from being contrary to
Community membership, would clearly be in conflict with the
intra~company sourcing policies of the manufacturers, the tyre companies
would only agree to support the SWP in its anti~dumping action against
"disruptive" imports from Eastern Europe.
Faced with these two opposing viewpoints, the SWP chose to steer a
"middle course":
"The SWP did not consider it realistic to set an overall
import penetration objective for the home market because of
the difficulties of anticipating the development of the
trade balance with the EEC and the difficulties of
predicti ng "cheap" imports of tyres from Japan, S. Korea,
Spain and Eastern European countries ••••••the SWP will
consider the possibility of setting voluntary import
cei1ings, for tyres with a view to reduci ng overall import
penetration by 1981 towards the level which existed in 1975.
The frosfects for achieving this are good (sic!) because a
subs ant a I proporb on of ,mported tyres into the UK are
made by companies represented on the SWP as part of their
international sour~in9 arrangements" (NEOO, 1977, paras 3.11and 3.13, my emphasis).
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In reality, the SWP must have realised that there was little
prospect of the tyre companies voluntarily cutting-back imports of tyres
into Britain. Dunlop, for example, had adopted a strategy of reducing
its dependency on British production by concentrat ing a 1arger
proport ion of its investment overseas. Hence, Dunlop I s British plants
were short of steel radial capacity just at the time when the market was
shifting to steel radials. Naturally, the tyre companies used their
European facilities to meet the short~fall in domestic supply.
The SWP could do little other than call for "voluntary" import
cei 1ings, because it had no powers to compel the tyre compani es to
comply with targets; while at the same time it needed to placate the
unions which were now demanding import controls. The impotence of the
SWP is clearly revealed in table 6.3
Table 6.3 I!pOrt Penetration of the Net Replaca.ent Market, 1973-80 (S)
SWP
TARGET
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 FOR 1981
Car and van 25 30 27 31 38 44 41 42 27
Commercial
vehicle
Tractor
n.a. n.a. 20
46
17
36
35
57
33
53
33
75
39
79
20
46n.a. n.a.
Earthmoverl
Dumper n.a. n.a. 49 88 85 67 90 92 49
Sources: NEDO, 1978, p.2; NEDO, 1980, p.2, table 3; NEDO/TI (81) 9, table 7
Evidently, the tyre companies chose to ignore the NEDO policy·
objectives, as shown by the rapid increase in import penetration in all
segments. The targets set by the SWP were not attained in any of the
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market segments. In 1980, imports of car and van tyres exceeded the
1981 target by 55.6%, truck tyres by 95%, tractor tyres by 71.7% and
earthmover/dumper tyres by 87.8%. In the last two categories, the level
of imports actually exceeded the size of the replacement market, and so
were being used to source the origina1 equipment market as well (NEDO,
1980, p.2).
Inherent Weakness of Tripartism
An independent assessment of the prospects for the tyre sector,
free from the constraints of a tripartite committee, would almost
certainly have adopted an entirely different approch to policy. In fact
in 1980, when it was too late, SRI International did carry out an
independent assessment and analysis on behalf of the SWP. They
suggested, not surprisingly, that the strategy should have been based on
the British tyre sector's ability to win a larger share of the EEC and
other markets by taking into account: the rate of growth of these
markets; capaci ty constrai nts; the investment intentions of the tyre
companies and their sourcing policies; and the international
competitiveness of the British producers based on output, productivity,
production costs and exchange rate movements.
To implement this strategy would have required the support of both
management and unions, but this was not forthcomi ng. Management were
only prepared to support the 1imited consultancy carri ed out by SRI
International.
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This notwithstanding, as we have seen from the previous chapters, a
great deal of important information was publicly available. There was
no technical reason, therefore, for NEOOto have relied upon the
manufacturers to supply information that could have been readily
compi1ed and analysed by its own staff. The SMMTpub1i shes detailed
information on the production, imports, exports and sourcing policies of
the individual motor manufacturers. There are also a number of
speci ali st research companies, such as ORI Europe and the Economist
Intelligence Unit, that produce regular forecasts on the British and
Wor1d automot i ve i ndustri es. Li kewise, the Government, the EIU, the
BRMAand the IRSG publish a considerable amount of information on the
rubber industry, though it is not di saggregated to the 1eve1 of the
fi rm, as in the case of the motor industry. There was, nevertheless,
sufficient published information available for NEOOto draw up a broad
strategy for the British tyre sector. The SWPdid not consider this
approach. They were committed to working with company management, and
to conduct serious planning with them
"•••••• (would have) require(d) the SWPto find an acceptable
way into areas of product and investment pol icy, product
sourcing arrangements, industry competition and company
strengths and weaknesses. All of these considerations are
commercially sensitive. To a large extent, because of the
multinational nature of the industry, they are also
determined outside of the UK" (NEOO,1979, p.12).
This dependency on company management exposes the inherent weakness
of tripartism. NEOOis not a statutory planning organisation, and none
of the tyre companies were interested in a sector strategy, voluntary or
otherwise. The vehicle and components industries plan on a European and
global level, making a "British" sectoral strategy irrelevant. NEDO
was, therefore, left in the position where it could only put forward
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policies which were broadly acceptable to both management and unions,
because anything which was regarded as "controversial" by either side
would have been rejected outright. Policy was accordingly reduced to
the lowest common denominator which ensured that nothing was
implemented.
Throughout 1978, the SWP continued to concentrate on its
"expansionary" strategy, though it was clear that unlike employment
levels, production was falling significantly behind target. Homedemand
for tyres continued to contract, while imports, particularly tied
imports, continued to increase. Meanwhile the growth in exports was
insufficient to compensate for rising imports and falling domestic
demand (NEDO/RP/IS (78) 3rd Meeting, paras. 3.1.1-3.1.3).
The trade union representatives expressed their "concern" at the
ri sing 1eve1 of tied imports, but thi s was defended by the management
nominees on the grounds that the Bri t ish plants were unable to meet
market demands. Messrs Hinton and Nairn, of Michelin and Dunlop
respectively, argued that they were "forced" to increase their imports
from Europe in 1974 and 1977 because of production difficulties in the
UK (Ibid, para 3.3.2). This may well have been true, but after 1977
tied imports cpntinued to rise, and this could not be attributed solely
to production or supply problems in Britain.
The SWPremained concerned that production continued to fall behind
target. Consequently, they decided to "monitor" output quarterly using'
RPPITBdata. This was to be supplemented by plant level information,
which measured productivity improvements over time for individual
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factories and companies. The tyre companies were, however, unwilling to
disclose this information to NEDO, claiming that it was commercially
sensitive. Management were only prepared to disclose this information
to their own local workforce.
On the face of it, it is very difficult to reconcile this reasoning
with commercial logic. Certainly, commercially sensitive information
had been made available to NEDO previously, and so this bald explanation
can be discounted. A more plausible explanation was the negative
attitude of the employers to the SWP. Management may have feared that
this information would have given NEDO a powerful overview of the
industry, and perhaps have encouraged NEDO to try and expand the role of
the SWP. Furthermore, information on investment and productivity would
have allowed NEDO to identify which plants were likely to close.
The workforce, by contrast, would not have been able to come to a
similar conclusion through the possession of productivity information
relating to their own plant. Also, it is likely that company management
wanted to make compari sons with "best practi ce" to encourage higher
productivity in individual plants. However, for the trade unions to
have made stategi c use of this informat ion, they woul d have had to
collate and analyse it centrally. On the basis of interviews with trade
union research staff, there is no evidence to suggest that this in fact
happened (or could have). Nevertheless, management may have appreciated
this possibility, and attempted to discourage the passing~on of
information by emphasising its commercial sensitiveness.
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In 1978, the SWP decided to engage J. Walter Thompson to advise on
a "conmuni cati ons proqr anme" for the industry. Duri ng the course of
visits to the tyre plants, and after conducting interviews with nearly
100 key opinion formers in the industry, the feedback that the
consultants received from the shopfloor was that the major cause of the
industryls troubles were cheap tyre imports from Eastern Europe (NEDO,
1979, p.1S). The SWP decided to use this issue to raise its public
profi 1e with the rank-and-fi 1e employees, who were 1arge 1y unaware of
its existence. A "stronqly worded" letter was, therefore, sent by the
SWP to the Secretary of State for Trade, requesting anti-dumping action
and/or selective controls on imports from Eastern Europe. It was this
letter which paved the way for the first major tyre industry conference
held in Birmingham during November 1978. Two days after the conference
had finished, Dunlop announced the closure of its tyre plant at Speke,
fa 11owed short 1y after by the announcement that Firestone was pu11ing
out of the UK. This proved to be a key turni ng point in po11cy, with
any pretence that may have still 1ingered of revers ing the dec 1ine of
the British tyre sector now abandoned. As the SWP had to admit:
IIThere is no visible progress towards the market share
objectives which were agreed for the industry. Efforts by
the SWP to reinforce action at company level in this area of
production efficiency have not bought about the hoped for
improvement in performance which is a necessary factor in
arrest ing the dec 1ine of the industry. The SWP now finds
itself in need of a fundamental rethink of the prospects and
opportunities for the UK tyre industryll (NEDO, 1980, p.2).
If it was to retai nits acceptabi 1ity to management, the SWP was
now forced to openly pursue policies that were consistent with the
divestment strategies of.the tyre companies. A strong emphasis was now
placed on direct cOllll1unicationswith emp1oy.ees, in order litobring about
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an improvement in production efficiency at plant level" (p.3). By these
means the SWP may have hoped to persuade the shopfloor of the need to
accept changes, so that a further dec 1ine of the industry coul d be
avoided. Although the staff at NEDO may have been sincere in this
belief, the managers serving on the SWP were fully aware that the
British tyre sector was suffering from under-investment. They knew that
only large scale investment in new plant and machinery could have made
the British tyre plants as efficient as those on the continent.
Moreover, more job losses were already being planned as obsolete
crossply production facilities were to be phased out. This left the SWP
facing the dilemma of calling for more efficiency at a time when plant
closures and redundancies were being implemented. The SWP feared that
this could seriously undermine its credibility and impartiality.
Accordingly, the SWP sought to establish a much higher profile,
particularly on issues important to the rank-and-file. Hence action on
" '
dumping may have been seen as one way of strengthening the position of
the SWP (NEDO/RP/IS (79) 1st Meeting, para 4.4).
To press the case for higher productivity, members of the Working
Party decided to organise a series of international plant visits by a
small tripatite team to compare production practices in European tyre
factories. To ensure confidentiality of commerCially sensitive
information, it was agreed that management members would not be invited
to visit plants of thei r compet itors. The purpose of the visits were
twofold. Firstly, to observe differences in performance between plants
and,secondly, to help the trade union leaders sell the idea of improving'
productivity to their members (paras 6.7-6.9). This was to be
reinforced by the commissioning of a consultancy to establish best
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international practice in tyre plants globally. The aim of the SWP
policy was ostensibly to attract more investment by encouraging changes
in working practice that would lead to a reduction in the unit cost of
production. This was based on the premise that,
........though the SWP was un1ikely to be able to influence
investment decisions, it could influence the industrial
relations climate and this in turn would have an impact on
investment decisions" (Ibid, para 6.8).
But, as we have shown earlier, the tyre companies had no intention of
increasing the levels of investment in British tyre plants. On the
contrary, their intention was to close down factories and reduce
obsolete capacity. The tyre manufacturers certainly welcomed any
initiative from the SWP that led to a reduction in unit costs, because
it suited their plans. But when the SWP proposed policies that the
manufacturers opposed, they were simply disregarded. Hence, the
proposa 1 to draw up a product ivity index showing tyres produced per
employee, with an allowance made for differences in product mix, for the
UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Eire, Holland and Luxembourg, was abandoned
simply because the tyre companies would not disclose the relevant
information (NEDO/RP/IS (79) 4th Meeting, para 4.3).
To that time, the focus of policy had concentrated on the 1abour
contribution to efficiency. The SWP now turned its attention to the
capital contribution to efficiency. NEDO staff~ that consultants
should be employed to consider the prospects and opportunities for the
British tyre sector, which would include an analysis of investment in
the domestic industry. The management representatives at first
expressed reservations about co~operating with consultants, probably
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because it sounded too much like a sector strategy - an approach which
had previously been rejected by the compani es. Additionally, some
companies were probably concerned about what such a study might reveal.
In particular, those companies that were proposing to reduce their
workforce, or to close down factories, were presumably not keen on
announcing their future plans to the trade unions.
However, the employers eventually agreed to a consultancy, because
they were persuaded that it could offer other benefits, including
"educat tnq'' the shopfloor to understand the nature and cause of the
decline of the industry (NEDO/RP/IS (79) 3rd Meeting, para 4.9.4). In
other words, the study could be used to justify management I s proposed
changes in working practices, on the basis that if these changes were
not voluntarily forthcoming, further jobs would be lost.
However, for reasons outlined earlier, the rubber companies
provided only limited assistance to the consultants. This ensured that
the final report, which at the insistence of the SWP was to provide a
IIframework for discussionll and was not to include "policy
reconmendations", was of no practical use.
Nevertheless, the report did paint a gloomy picture of the future
prospects for the British tyre sector. It pOinted to the old production
facilities in the UK, and raised the question whether the tyre
mu1tinationa1s would be prepared to invest heavily in new plant and
equipment in Britain which would inevitably displace production in their·
European tyre factorie~. The answer was a resounding no! Not
surprisingly, some of the tyre manufacturers defended their position at
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a presentation of the interim report, by dec1aring that the deline of
the domestic industry
II••.•..had been brought about by inadequate profi ts to fund
productivity improvements via capital expenditure and/or
technical dsve lopment" (NEDO/TI (80) 2nd meeting, para
4.3.1).
The trade unions were not able to challenge the facts presented to
them. All that the unions could do was to look to the SWP to IIsuggestli
solutions for improving the prospects of the industry. For the most
part, this now rested with the communications programme which was
intended to confront those working in the industry with the "facts", so
as to convince them of the need to change working practices and raise
productivity.
With no prospects of obtaining a larger share of the static foreign
rep1acement market, the SWP attempted to arrest the dec1ine intyre
production by increasing home original equipment sales. In August 1979,
John Cousins, the Chairman of the Tyre Industry SWP, wrote to Lord
Trenchard, Minister of State at the Department of Industry, concerning
the decline in car production and its impact on tyre manufacturing. In
his letter, Mr Cousins recognised that there was excess capacity in the
European motor industry, but he stressed that since the Japanese were
contemplating establishing car assembly in Europe, it made sense for
Britain to compete for these plants. So long as the cars produced were
for eXisting Japanese markets' in Europe, displacing those currently
exported from Japan, then the switch in sourcing arrangements would not
exacerbate the overcapacjty in Europe. Efficiency had been initially
identified as the key factor undermining the British tyre sector. Now,
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rather belatedly, the decline in car output relative to our
international competitors was recognised as an additional major factor
contributing to the reduction in tyre production.
The SWP also petitioned the Government to introduce changes in the
tyre depth law to stimulate sales in the replacement market; a measure
advocated by the consultants, SRI. This would have produced a
substantial short-term increase in sales which, unless the home industry
had the capacity to meet this demand, would have accelerated the level
of imports, as happened when the 1aw was changed in 1969 (SRI, 1980,
p.70). Other policy measures which stemmed from the consultants' report
and were adopted by the SWP in their dealings with government included:
the lowering of interest rates to encourage investment; a higher
priority to the management of the exchange rate to encourage exports;
and the control of inflation to ease the pressure on costs to increase
I
competitiveness (NEDO/TI (80) 34, p.6). However, the first two policy
recommendat ions were contrary to government policy and therefore were
unlikely to be acted upon, whilst the third policy option was impossible
to achieve. This was because British industry was suffering from
under-:-investment, and so simply reducing the level of inflation would
not have been sufficient to increase competitiveness.
Thus restricting imports once again resurfaced as a possible policy
option as the home industry.adjusted to decline. In 1980, undertakings
were given by the Eastern European exporters to refrain from "dumping"
tyres in the British market. Nevertheless, low cost imports still"
remained a problem as the worldwide recession was helping to undermine
tyre prices. Japan, in particular, was identified as a major threat.
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The trade union representatives on the SWP therefore - for want of an
alternative strategy - came down strongly in favour of import controls
to protect the domestic industry. However, as we saw earlier, there was
never any prospect of implementing this policy because, firstly, it
would have been in contravention of GATT and the Treaty of Rome and,
secondly, it would have been strongly resisted by the rubber companies
because it would have seriously infringed their international sourcing
arrangements.
To counteract these restrictionist tendencies, NEDO produced
aggregate statistics showing the trend increase in imports, together
with details of changes in the trade balance. The aim of this paper was
to dissuade the trade union representatives from arguing for import
restrictions, by showing that the major area of trade imbalance was with
the EEC, and especially France, which was a high cost producer. In the
words of NEDO:
IIAny attempt to impose import quotas elsewhere would
therefore be difficult to justify if similar action were not
taken against France, which it should be noted is also our
fourth largest export market. Action against French imports
wou 1d, at the very 1east, be incompat ib1e with EEC
membership. Irrespective of the EEC, it would almost
certainly invite a reaction, and not necessarily limited to
the tyre sector. Quota action could also be damaging, even
without retaliation, on the operation of tyre companies in
the UK which also have French manufacturing facilties"
(NEDO/TI (80) 17).
Shortly afterwards further papers were prepared by NEDO to argue
against import controls from low cost producers, on the basis that 85%
of the tyres imported into the UK in 1979 came from the OECD countries,'
while only 4% came from Third World countries (NEDO/TI (80) 20).
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These papers appeared to serve their purpose by weaken ing the
arguments of the trade unions. The employers were able to escape more
or less completely unscathed by refusing to disclose their individual
sourcing policies to NEDO, though again they added the rider that they
were prepared to discuss these arrangements at plant 1eve1 (NEDO/TI (80)
1st Meeting, para 4.1). The defence offered by the tyre companies was
again that this information would prove invaluable to a competitor.
Perhaps more pertinently, they feared that it might stimulate a reaction
from the trade unions against those companies using a high level of
captive imports, culminating possibly in campaigns similar to those
conducted by the unions against the sourcing policies of Ford and
General Motors. Disclosure at plant level, on the other hand, would be
potentially less damaging to the companies, unless of course the trade
unions attempted to collect and analyse this information centrally.
Also, more importantly, redundancies would be implemented at
plant-level.
Policy Constraints
The SWP proved to be powerless to analyse, predict, or prevent the
run-down of the tyre sector for a number of reasons. Firstly, as a
tripartite body, the SWP could only advocate policies that had the
agreement of all parties, which effectively ensured that any conflicts
of interest between the unions and employers were not trans 1ated into
strategy. This gave the employers a veto. Secondly, any strategy for
the tyre sector had to be an integral part of an overall strategy for·
the motor industry. This is because the British tyre sector was
established to meet the needs of the vehicle industry:
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"Tyre plants were originally designed to match the scale of
Britain's vehicle industry and in many cases tyre plants are
adjacent to car plants" (NEDO,1980, p.S).
Britain's motor industry, however, unlike those of our major
compet i tors in Europe and Japan, was in dec 1i ne. The slump in car
production,accompanied by rising imports and falling exports, had
contributed to the reduction in tyre output.
Thi s was the crux of the problem for the SWP. No body that had
been set up to cover the motor industry was able to survi ve for very
long owing to the open host i 1i ty of the vehi cl e companies. The Motor
Industry EDC ceased to function in 1971; whilst the Department of
Industry's own tripartite cOlllTlittee, though not strictly analogous, set
up in 1977 with a membership inc 1udi ng Eri c Var1ey, Jack Jones, Hugh
Scanlon and Terence Beckett, met frequently but did not survive beyond
1979. Furthermore, the Motor Industry Tripartite Group (MITG) lay
outside the NEDOstructure, reporting directly to the Secretary of State
for Industry. The MITG had a similar remit to the SWPs, though it
behaved entirely different. It saw its role
" •••••• to put pressure on management and the uni ons at 1oca 1
1eve 1 to improve i ndustri a1 re 1at ions, rather than to make
recolllTlendati ons on the main determi nants of performance"
(Elliot, undated, p.9).
The di fferent approach to pol icy by the MITG, combined with the
fact that it was not part of NEDO, effectively ruled out any serious
discussion of a strategy for the vehicle and components industries. The.
motor manufacturers were' in competition with one another and, 1ike the
tyre companies, they operated an international production and sourcing
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po1icy. Thus, the car compani es were no more committed to a sector
strategy than were the tyre producers. The policies of these companies
were to operate in the interests of their investors, which often
conflicted with wider interests.
The sectionalism and weakness of the unions likewise effectively
prevented the formu 1ation of a coherent trade union strategy. Union
leaders for their part were aware of their own limitations and inability
to directly influence policy and events, particularly when power lay
with the shopfloor activists. As Elliot explained:
"The trade unions are well -orqant sed in terms of membershi p
but multi-unionism and differing power basis in different
companies; Transport & General Workers I Union in Fords, and
the AUEW in BL for instance, make the effective coordination
of a national trade union policy difficult if not
impossible. The TUC has no policy committee for this sector
and the CSEUls interest in national policy is limited.
Initiatives, therefore, tend to be hesitantly taken by
national union leaders conscious that union power is largely
located with convenors in the p1ants" (p.g).
According to Elliot, the interchange of information between the
MITG and the SWP was limited. Apparently, the MITG was only prepared to
disclose its forecasts of future car production, which he reported to be
"wi1d1y optimistic" and, anyway, the SWP preferred to rely on its own
forecasts derived from the New Cars Demand Model Steeri ng Group, a
technical committee of NEDO. This, accordingly, begs the question of
whether the lack of a strategy for the motor industry was crucial to the
tyre sector. According to Elliot:
liThe managers cou1dnlt see what general sectorial relations
would add to indiv4dua1 relations between companies. Trade
unionists thought institutional relationships were
irrelevant to the basic industrial dependence.
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Representati ves of the Department of Industry accepted the
situation and saw their role as picking up issues relating
to vehicles in the SWP and discussing them within the
Department with the appropriate officials. Within the
office itself the Section Head thought that industrial
po1icy shou 1d be approached by asking where key sectors,
such as vehicles, will be in ten to twenty years' time, and
then tell ing component industri es to take thei r cue from
them. This constrasted with the SWP Secretary's views that
the SWP didn't need a vehicle strategy to work with because
multinationals in both cars and tyres no longer plan their
production within national boundaries. Tyre companies
source for the European market rather than the British one
and hence the tyre industry is no longer 1ocat ionally tied
to the car plants" (p.10).
It is undoubtedly true that the motor and tyre companies plan on a
global basis, and that in the narrowest sense of the word a sector
strategy is largely irrelevant. However, this does not rule out a role
for government in influencing the strategy of the motor companies,
because of the importance of the industry to the British economy. It
had been estimated that the total job significance of motor
manufacturing, selling, repair and mainte~ance to the UK, before
applying a multiplier, was of the order of 1.3 million people, or about
5% of the total workforce (Expenditure Committee, 1975, p.16). In the
West Midlands, for example, between 1971 and 1973, the motor industry
accounted for 16% of total local employment, approximately 6% of total
manufacturing investment, and together with the components industry was
responsible for 10.6% of total industrial output (CPRS, 1975, p.9).
In these circumstances, it can be argued that it was of paramount
impbrtance for government to develop a strategy for the industry.
Working on the NEDO principle, an SWP could have been set up covering.
the entire motor and ~omponents industry; complemented by smaller
working parties covering individual components. This arrangement may
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a1so have encouraged greater co-operation across the industry by the
trade unions, who may have come to recogni se their common interests.
Alternatively, the Government could have established a body which was
"planning orientated", with an accepted direct input into the corporate
po1icies of the manufacturers. If this policy had been adopted by
successive Labour Governments in the postwar years, the Labour Movement
would have at least understood investors' strategies, and thus arguably
have been better-equipped to resist the run-down of British
manufacturing industry.
Constraints on the Range of Issues Discussed
Apart from the role it played in lobbying for anti~dumping action
against East European imports, and the pressure it continually put on
government for a new tyre-tread law, there are few other areas where the
•
SWP can be said to have had an impact. The major issues facing the SWP
were the slump in the production of British tyres, the rising level of
imports and job losses. Yet there was very little direct discussions of
the factors responsible for the decline in output. The papers that were
presented to Committee were focused on the issue of international
competitiveness. Hence, policy prescriptions were heavily biased
towards this aspect of efficiency: the need to raise productivity and
reduce costs. There was, however, little investigation or analysis of
the many other factors which contributed to the decline of the tyre
sector including: lack of investment; divestment; sourcing policies;
marketing and profits.
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Many of the papers prepared by NEDO for the Committee can fairly be
said to lack content and analysis. This is not a criticism of the
ability of the staff at NEDO, but of the constrai nts accepted by the
need to achieve consensus. A sample of these papers is listed below:
NEDO/TI (81) 5, International Comparisons of Productivity.
NEDO/TI (82) 7, UK Share of World Tyre Exports.
NEDO/TI (82) 15, UK Tyre Industry Employment.
NEDO/TI (82) 16, Output Trends in the UK Rubber Industry.
NEDO/TI (82) 17, Major Tyre Export Markets.
NEDO/TI (82) 19, Tyre Industry Investment.
NEDO/TI (82) 20, UK Tyre Industry Output and Costs.
NEDO/TI (82) 24, Import Penetration of the UK Tyre Market.
The major weakness of these papers was that they tackled issues at
a very general and abstract level, and not at the level of the
individual firm. This ensured that no concrete policy prescriptions
were drawn up for each company to comply with, say, as regards
production, tied imports, exports, investment, employment, etc. But
with so much published economic and financial information available, it
would have been possible for NEDO to do this without the co~operation of
management ~ though it is very likely that this would have provoked a
storm of protests from the employers. The tyre companies would not have
welcomed the intrusion of a third party in their affairs, but in an
"oligopolistic industry dominated by a small number of mu1tinationals~ it
is hard to believe that individual companies were not fully aware of
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what their compet itors were doing, and that much of the informat ion
withheld by the tyre companies could not be regarded as commercially
sensitive. Evidently, it would appear that the employers were more
concerned with preventing the unions from knowing what they were
planning.
The oligopolistic nature of the industry also prevented any
discussion of the rationalisation and restructuring of the tyre sector.
There were no direct discussions on any matters which applied to anyone
company (rules under which the SWPs operate), particularly when the
question of jobs and the future plans of any of the companies were
involved. If the government wanted to discuss these matters, it would
do so directly with the company concerned or else through the BRMA
(trade association). The companies, however, reiterated on many
occasions to Committee that they were prepared to talk with the unions
locally on these issues. Though there is little evidence that any
detailed discussions did take place with the trade unions, except to a
1imited extent as the work of the SWP began to increasi ngly focus on
communications and participation, which was largely used to smooth the
way for plant closures and job losses.
"Efficiency Dialogues"
In the previous sections we saw that the thrust of the SWP's policy
was to increase output and efficiency and simultaneously guarantee job
security. These objectives were to be achieved through the mechanism of·
"efficiency dialogues". To initiate this strategy, J Walter Thomson
were engaged to draw up a communications package for the industry. The
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objectives of this programme were:
litoextend the dialogue beyond the SWP;
to inform employees about the world outside the factory;
to reinforce the management and trade unions leadership in
companies" (NEDO (80) 60, p.S).
To achieve the first objective a conference was held in Birmingham
in November 1978, to introduce the Rubber Process ing SWP (1 ater to
become the Tyre Industry SWP), and to establish its credibility with the
major opinion formers in the industry. The conference was attended by
nearly 400 representatives from all seventeen tyre plants in the UK,
plus government and trade union officials. It was the first time that
management and unions had assembled together on a mul ti-plent basis
(NEDO, 1978a, p.1)• The conference was held ..amidst rumours of plant
closures and redundancies" (Ibid). The theme was the serious decline in
competitiveness and employment in the British rubber industry, and the
measures necessary to combat and reverse this position. The delegates
unanimously agreed that a plant level communications programme along the
lines of "efficiency dialogues" was needed to tackle this situation.
The SWP proposed a two~pronged attack to improve the performance of
the tyre sector:
"(1) by development and aggressive
competitively priced tyres;
(2) by more efficient use of all existing resources of both
plant and manpower" (NEDO, 1978b, p.17).
marketing of
The first lip1ank II of this strategy entai 1ed reduci ng unit costs in
the British plants, so that they were competitive vis-a-vis those in
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Europe. This in turn was dependent on persuading management and
workforce to make more efficient use of plant and labour. To encourage
the two sides to acknowledge the need for change, the SWP suggested that
two conditions would need to be met before the efficiency progranune
could be initiated in plants. These two conditions were explained in
the following terms:
II (l ) it is important that all those who work in the tyre
industry should feel and be involved in any attempt to
achieve higher efficiency;
(2) assurances on securi ty of employment must be given to
all those taking part in efficiency schemes II (Ibid,
p. 6).
However, as we showed earlier raising productivity in a stagnant
market was incompat ib1e with employment securi ty. Further, without
higher levels of investment in new equipment, the British plants could
never be as productive or as profitable as the modern European plants.
Moreover, the overcapacity in the industry was assurance enough that the
older type factories in the UK would close soon.
Plant Development Committees
The SWP suggested that "efficiency dia1ogues II shou 1d be conducted
at plant,,:,leve1 through existing consultative committees, or by
establishing new plant development committees. This was clearly spelt
ou~ by John Cousins, the Chairman of the Rubber Processing SWP:
"••••••the present depressed state of the UK tyre industry
wi 11 on1y be reversed by action at the plant 1eve 1• That
act ion is not a series of ad hoc changes but a carefully
constructed system of planning and working which is devised
by management and unions together and put into practice by
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them ••••.•most of the action has to be centred on individual
companies and individual plants" (NEDO, 1978b, p.lV).
The SWP envisaged that these committees would not simply become
glorified quality circles concerned with just increasing efficiency, but.
that they would also cover a wide range of issues beyond traditional
joint consultation. These would include: marketing strategy;
emp 1oyment trends; profi ts, etc, as they related to the plant (NEDO,
1978b, p.]).
The SWP also suggested that a similar type of body could be created
at the divisional and/or company level. These bodies would then be able
to discuss a much wider range of issues including the company's
financial performance, new legislation as it affects the company and its
employees, investment, manpower policies, market position, etc. It was
felt that the exchange of views and information on these would help to
"improve the quality of decisions and would complement the decision-
mak ing procedure II (p, 8) • The compos ition and procedural arrangements
for all these bodies from plant to company-level would have to be agreed
between management and unions. However, it was suggested in the
document that the membership of the plant development committees should
reflect the "technical nature" of the subject matter. To be effective,
and to question management on a broad range of issues, from profits and
investment to flexibility and manning levels, it would have been
necessary for the union representatives to make substantial demands on
their research departments. But this was not considered.
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Instead, Mr David Warburton, the National Officer for the rubber
and chemical industries at the GMWU,simply welcomed the document, and
stressed that greater disclosure of information was paramount to enable
the "exercise" to go ahead. He emphasised that the unions would want
detai 1s about ti ed imports, i nformati on which had been requested and
refused in the past. He di d not conunent on the use to which the
information would be put, even though he stated to the Conference that:
"If anybody was under any illusion that the whole dialogue
was going to be a rather sophisticated exercise in
indiscriminate (sic) demanning then that would have to be
disproved quickly" (NEDO,1978a, p.1S).
This would appear to suggest that, while David Warburton may have
rejected the notion that "efficiency dialogues" was to be used to pave
the way for plant closures, he was certainly aware that job losses were
coming and that the unions were seeking consultation on the
implementation of management policy.
Further, as described in detail in Appendix 1, the rundown of the
tyre sector was anything but "indiscriminate". Against this background,
the attempts by the SWPto reassure the uni ons that any increase in
efficiency would not be at the expense of jobs, appears very hollow.
"The SWP has agreed that all existing employees will be
guaranteed secure employment in so far as there is a firm
commitment that there will be no redundancies as a result of
an agreement between management and unions at plant level,
designed to increase efficiency" (NEDO,1978b, p.10).
How this was to work in practice is not clear, for the exact
details of these assurances on the security of employment had to be
agreed at lip1ant or shopfloor 1eve1" • How, and between whom, these
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agreements had to be reached is similarly opaque because the SWPmade it
very plain that these consultative or plant development committees,
" •..•.. must not usurp the role of the negotiating bodies and
changes which they propose might require discussions within
the established negotiating procedures before
implementation" (Ibid, p.9).
In these ci rcumstances, gi ven that the issues under di scussi on
included jobs and working practices, it is difficult to see how the
consultative process taking place in the plant development cOlllllittees,
could be realistically separated from the negotiations process in
collective bargaining. There was always the danger that these plant
development committees could have impinged on, or operated on a parallel
basis, to the existing bargaining system. This could have proved
divisive and led to the undermining of the unions' negotiating position,
because management would have dictated what issues were suitable for
negoti ati on, as opposed to those which were only matters for
consultation. Eventually the unions would have been forced to merge
these bodies into the collective bargaining system. Management may then
have responded by suspending all discussions/negotiations on matters
arising under "efficiency dialogues".
The Failure of the Birmingham Conference
A major weakness of the Birmingham conference was the absence of
the vehicle manufacturers, and the failure by delegates to consider the
impact of the motor industry on tyre production. In fact, the decline
of the Bri t ish motor' industry was not di scussed in Birmingham
(NEDO/RP/IS (79) 3rd Meeting, para 5.2). It was not until 1979 when,
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for the first time, the UK had become a net importer of cars, that the
relevance of the vehicle industry to tyre output was given. any serious
consideration by the SWP. For reasons explained earlier, there were
never any prospects of devising a strategy for the entire motor and
components i ndustri es. The tyre conference confi rmed how far the SWP
was operating in a policy vacuum.
Management and Union Views of "Efficiency Dialogues"
Perhaps at some logical limit "efficiency dialogues" offered the
unions a means of extending the scope of collective bargaining. Perhaps
many trade unionists supported this initiative because they thought
that, at the very least, it could have allowed them to have access to
more information. However, whether they planned to use this information is
questionable, since there was a great deal of financial and economic. ,
data available which they had chosen to ignore. The more "enlightened"
managers saw it as a means of moving from a "closed" to a more "open"
styl e of management. Many other managers and trade uni ani sts took a
less radical view of the policy. They took it at face value, as a
checklist of topics for discussion. However, in practice management
were very willing to discuss issues concerning work practices,
flexibility and manning levels, and certain other topiCS, but they were
not prepared to di scuss with the uni ons manpower p1anni ng, investment,
finance and profit levels (Elliot, undated, p.19); matters presumably of
extreme importance to those trade unionists intent on monitoring
management strategy and extending collective bargaining.
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There were some trade unianists who were scept ica1 of the SWP I S
approach. They real ised job losses were "coming", but they did not
appear to know that they were planned. For example, Mr Howlett,
Engineering Branch Secretary at Firestone, expressed his reservations to
the Birmingham conference. He said
"••••••the industry was being conned. It was all very well
to say work hard, put more effort in, but production would
not improve until plant was moderni sed and some investment
was made. Jobs were being lost and the industry was dying
because of lack of investment" (NEDO, 1978a, p.16).
This viewpoint became prevalent amongst many shop stewards when the
benefi ts of "efficiency dia1ogues II fai1ed to appear. The announcement
of the closure of the Speke factory shortly after the conference had
ended, convinced many of those who were present at Birmingham that they
had been deliberately misled by management, who in their opinion were
fully aware of the proposed closures. By the beginning on 1980, the SWP
was forced to admit that the initiative "had not been a great success II
(NEDO/TI (80) 2nd Meeting, para 4.3.9). In its view, a different
approach was now needed, one that forced management and the shopfloor to
confront the problems that the industry was facing.
Employee Involvement Programme
The SWP believed that it was necessary for it to become more
directly involved in the communications process in each company, even
though the question was raised as to the value of associating the SWP
with briefings, so long as the information was fed into existing
communications channels (NEDO/TI (80) 1st Meeting, para 3.7). One
solution put forward was to involve the trade unions more closely in the
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communi cat ions process, so that they cou 1d impress upon the workforce
the need for change. This would not have been entirely welcomed by shop
stewards, especially when factories were closing and jobs were being lost.
However, owing to the serious decline of the industry, senior management
in many compani es were already address ing managers and shop stewards
about plant and company performance. Foremen and supervisors were also
being more closely involved. These changes were happening outside the
traditional mainstream communications systems established in companies,
such as works councils and consultative committees.
non-traditional c~anne1s which
It was these
"••••••. seemed to offer the best opportunity for introducing
the new idea of a message from the impartial SWP with a
pass ionate concern for the we 11-bei ng of the tyre industry"
(NEDO/TI (80), 15 February 1980).
Most of the tyre companies appeared content to use the leaflets and
,
briefing material produced by the SWP in their communications programmes.
They were 1ess wi 11ing, however, to allow the SWP ,to
make its own presentation in their plants. Goodyear were, nevertheless,
persuaded to allow the SWP to address members of the workforce at their
Wo1verhampton plant in November 1980. This was video-recorded so that
it cou1 d be seen by all those working in the plant. Attendance was
restricted to exclude SWP representatives from other companies.
Circulation of the vida was also restricted to Goodyear.
Experience at Dunlop
Armed with the lessons from this exercise, the SWP continued on to
the third stage of the plan devi sed by J Walter Thompson. A paper
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presented to the Committee in May 1981 suggested that the next step was
to overcome the constraints that had been identified:
"Both management and trade union officials consider
efficiency dialogues as a useful exercise but of limited use
due to the lack of understanding and knowledge of the
participants" (NEDO/TI (81) 6).
NEDO, nevertheless, proposed that the way forward was through an
Emp1oyee Invo1vement Programme, whose object ive was to bring about a
change in attitude from managers, supervisors, and shop stewards through
partiCipation, which would they thought result in improvements to
performance. This was to be achieved through an education and training
programme designed to:
"...increase the employees I awareness of the total
environment in which the company operates;
- increase management wi 11ingness to accept more employee
involvement;
- encourage employees to participate in the decision-making
process" (Ibid).
Dunlop reluctantly agreed to participate in this experiment. The
company bel ieved that one-day conferences 1ike those held at Goodyear
were insufficient to establish a constructive dialogue. Instead, Dunlop
thought that progress was best achieved through joint meetings at plant
level, which considered the prospects of the tyre sector and the
implications that this had for company policy and strategy.
During discussions between Dunlop and NEDO, it was suggested that
these meeting could benefit from the participation of an independent
third party (TI (82) 1, p.2).
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At the next Committee meeting in July 1981, it was agreed that the
Office should hold informal meetings with management and unions to
implement this programme. The trade union representatives, however,
raised two matters of concern. Firstly, they were opposed to the
programme being funded by government and, secondly, they were hostile to
any notion that companies should be directly responsible for the
training of both shop stewards and managers. The trade union movement
has long insisted that it alone should be responsible for trade union
education, so as to avoid any danger of incorporation into management.
The first problem was tackled by NEDO funding the programme. The second
object ion was overcome by engagi ng Professor George Bain, a 1eading
Industrial Relations researcher at the University of Warwick, to
undertake a feasibility study at Dunlop.
Professor Bain was asked to carry out a study to look at how
communication/participation was working at Dunlop; the effect it had on
developing efficiency dialogues; to identify those issues which required
joint discussion and determination, and to evaluate and identify the
training needs of employees to further the development of the
participative process (Ibid, pp.2~3). Between December and January
1982, he held meetings with senior group and divisional management, and
shop stewards from a11 the unions represented in the plant
(rubberworkers, staff and craft). He was accompani ed at the initia1
me~ting by two representatives from NEDO and, at the 1ater meeti ng, by
two other acamedics from Warwick University, Roger Fawthrop, Professor
of Financial Management, and Ian Watson, a Lecturer in Marketing. The
initial meetings with the various groups were held separately, but
eventually joint meetings were held with the rubberworkers and staff
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and, finally, with them and senior management. After two initial
meetings, however, the shop stewards representing the craftsmen declined
to take any further part in the project, mainly because greater
flexibility in working practices had already been introduced into the
craft areas, and were not universally welcomed by this group of workers.
They did not believe that this communications programme had any benefits
to offer.
Professor Bain found that Dunlop had implemented many of the
general proposals outlined in "efficiency dialogues", including greater
labour flexibility, especially among craft workers, improved quality
contro 1, more efficient use of plant and machi nery, reduced manni ng
1eve1sand lower unit costs. To convi nce employees of the need for
change, the company had devised its own involvement policy together with
a more "open" style of management. The objectives of this involvement
policy were to achieve:
"••••••a higher degree of motivation •••••leading to greater
commitment to meet business objectives, (and thereby)
improve overall effectiveness to the mutual benefit of both
the employees and the company" (Ibid, Appendix A).
This was to be achieved through the use of Action Learning Groups,
Briefing Groups and Involvement Groups (Quality Circles). Despite these
efforts from Dunlop to present the unions with more information,
Professor Bain reported the that they were "dissatisfied with the
Icompany lsi nvo1vement policy" (p, 5) • This was because the policy
emphasised "communication rather than consultation", or to quote one
shop steward "management, decides and we listen" (Ibid).
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The trade unions saw communication as a one-sided monologue, with a
limited amount of useful information coming down from senior management,
but with very little going in the opposite direction. The shop stewards
believed that this state of affairs had developed
!I •••••• primarily because they are sometimes (sic) not given
adequate information and, even when they are, they have
generally not had an opportunity to acquire the specific
skills needed to assimilate, to analyse, and, if need be, to
challenge what is being said. Since they cannot really
satisfy themselves that what is being said is correct, they
have either to accept it on trust or to reject it. Given
the atmosphere which has been created by plant closures and
large scale redundancy, they often choose to do the latter
rather than the former!l (Ibid).
The stewards felt that it was particularly in the areas of finance
and marketing where they required more information. The information
they sought included: group and divisional profit levels; budget
detai 1s and the extent to which divisions were financi ally autonomous;
the level and determin~tion of transfer pricing; the contribution that
foreign licensing agreements made to profits; short and long~term
investment plans at home and abroad; and the viability of Fort Dunlop as
a production centre. In the marketing area, the stewards wanted
information on pricing strategy, sourcing policy and level of captive
imports, and the company strategy for selling the extra production
resulting from increased efficiency (Ibid, p.6). This once again
demonstrates how little attention the trade unions had paid to analysing
economic and financial information. For, if they had, they would have
known that a substantial amount of this information was contained in the
Company Report and other pub1ished documents. Thisal so confi rms that'
the trade unions had no real strategy for acquiring and using this
information, and there is therefore little evidence to show that they
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would have been able to use it constructively.
Professor Bain informed the SWP that these constrai nts could be
overcome through "strategic mediation". In short, the third party would
help to create a favourable climate which would allow the two sides to
interact and reach an accommodation. The signs were cons idered to be
very hopeful because management and trade unions, apart from the craft
workers, supported the idea of joint meetings to discuss proposed
changes. Strategic dialogues could begin at group level and, once
started, they could be established in the largest division, namely Truck
Tyre. The group and divisional meetings were to be chaired by Professor
Bain, assisted by, depending upon the issue under discussion, Professor
Fawthrop, Mr Watson and NEDO staff members. Following these meetings,
the information could then be disseminated to all employees through
trade union and company channels.
It was proposed that the experiment would run from March through to
December 1982, with assessments made in May/June and December. If it
proved successful, it could then be extended to other divisions in the
company. The programme suggested by Professor Bain was put to the SWP
in February 1982 for their approval. Whereupon, it was savaged by the
AUEW representative who declared that it was not the SWP's business lito
intrude on matters of job demarcation, plant maintenance, etc II
(S~cretary' s meet ing notes, quoted from E11iot, undated, p.23) • The
Chairman, John Cousins, felt that in the circumstances he had no
alternative but to resign. The SWP suspended its operations, while NEDO
.
sought to find a new Chairman and a new consensus around which to
re-establish the COlllllittee. In the meantime, the Employee Involvement
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Programme was dropped from the agenda.
The AUEW's position was determined by the opposition of the craft
workers at Dunlop to the Involvement Programme, mainly because their
jobs tended to be the most affected by the introduct ion of flexib1e
working practices. Furthermore, their members were still angry over the
imposition of new working practices at the company's Washington plant,
and concerned about the proposed changes to be introduced at Fort
Dunlop. Perhaps, if John Miller, the National Secretary of the TGWU and
Chairman of the Rubber Processing Manpower Working Party (the senior
union official in the SWP), and an advocate of "efficiency dialogues",
had been present at the meeting, he may have been able to persuade the
trade unions to maintain their support for the Involvement Programme.
Indeed, there were many trade unionists, managers and leading figures
on the SWP, the Chairman, John Cousins, an ex-official of the Transport
Union, and John Miller of the TGWU, who were strong supporters of
"efficiency dia1ogues" • The 1atter saw the exerci se as a way of
extending and strengthening the bargaining power of the trade unions.
The Secretary of the Tyre Committee and his support staff from the
manpower and industrial relations division in NEDO also supported
"effiet ency dia1ogues" because they believed it was a means of
establishing consensus at the plant level (Elliot, undated, p.25). It
would appear that these principal actors had pushed the idea of
partici pation much further than their fellow Committee members would
have wished. Moreover, the economi c and po1itica1 climate had changed
since the inception of "efficiency dialogues", with the new Conservative
Government having no commitment to its predecessor's Industrial Strategy
and, of course, the tyre sector was now clearly in decline.
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To sum up, without a change in policies on the part of management
and the trade unions, it is difficult to see how doubts about this
policy could have been overcome. If the Programme had proved successful
there would have been pressure to extend the experiment to other
companies. Some managers may have been concerned that this could have
led to the introduction of industrial democracy through the back door,
which many feared would undermine their traditional role and authority.
For their part, the trade unions were divided between those who felt
that the unions should not become involved in management, and others who
believed that members' interests could only be properly defended by the
trade unions becoming more involved in those areas, traditionally
regarded as the prerogative of management.
The lessons from this episode show that, whilst the goal of NEDO is
to achieve tripatite consensus, it is difficult to estab lish this at
plant and company level. Management supported "efficiency dialogues" to
the extent that it suited their ends by encouragi ng the workforce to
see the problems of the British tyre sector in terms of dec 1ining
international competitiveness, which could only be arrested by higher
productivity and greater flexibility in working practices. The
Involvement Programme, on the other hand, if successful, could have
strengthened the bargaining position of the trade unions by encouraging
them to participate in the decision-making process, at a time when
management was planning to cut its workforce and reduce its dependency
\
on tyres. However, the trade unions, for the most part, lacked detailed
knowledge of the strategy being pursued by Dunlop. The shop stewards
were prepared to participate in the Involvement Programme, in spite of
the traditional union hostility to the involvement of third parties in
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industrial affairs, in the hope that it would help to maintain and
protect jobs in the company. However, as management were not
forthcomi ng about future plans as they tried to impose new working
practices, the unions could see few tangible benefits arising from this
experiment and therefore withdrew their support.
Attitudes Towards the SWP:
If support for the role and importance of the SWP were measured in
terms of attendance at meetings, then it would certainly. rank as a low
priority amongst some companies and unions. The attendance record shows
that company representatives from Dun lop, Avon (also Pres; dent of the
BRMA), Pirelli and Michelin were present at most meetings. Whereas
representatives from Uniroyal and Goodyear attended about half, and from
Firestone a quarter (Elliot, undated, p.27).
I
The BRMA and the
Government (though there were three changes in represent atives) were
present at most meetings.
On the union side, representatives from the GMWU, TASS and APEX
attended nearly every meeting, the TGWU about two-thirds, ASTMS about a
half, and the AUEW a quarter (Ibid).
The SWPs produce reports not legislation, and their main aim is to
try and achieve a consensus between the parties. In the case of the Tyre
SWP conflict was reduced by non-:-agreeingmembers simply not attending.
Thus, issues which we~e contentious or likely to produce diverging
positions were avoided.
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Management View
The attitude of the employers to the SWPwas clear-cut. They
regarded it as a relatively unimportant body compared to the BRMA,which
was the industry's main vehicle for discussing problems with government.
Nevertheless, it did perform an important function on behalf of the
rubber companies. With the demise of the National Joint Industrial
Council for the rubber industry, it was the one remaining body where the
employers could meet with senior trade union officials and listen to
thei r vi ews. It was also a "neutra 1" forum where management (and
government) could get thei r vi ewpoint over to the uni ons. The rubber
companies were, therefore, content to use the SWPas a medium to get the
message across to the workforce that the problems facing the industry
stemmed from low productivity, and that only through more efficient and
flexible working practices could the position be reversed. The same
"propaganda" coming directly from management would have been treated
with scept i c ism and generally ignored. However, once NEDO stepped
outside the narrow constraints which the employers sought to impose upon
the SWP, the rubber companies were not slow to show their disapproval.
For instance, in 1980, NEDOprepared two papers on "The future of
the UKTyre industry" (NEDO/TI (81) 3) and "Forecasts of markets and
manpower requirements" (NEDO/TI (80) 38)). The rubber companies
,
responded through the BRMAto leave NEDOin no doubt that these policy
issues were not the province of the SWP, and that:
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"the manufacturers have some doubts about the value of
producing strategy papers of this kind, relating as they do
to a national tyre industry strategy as opposed to a company
strategy" (NEDO/TI (81) 4).
The BRMA then defined on behalf of the manufacturers what functions
they believed the SWP should perform. These were as follows:
"1. the maintenance of a forum for discussions between the
three participants;
2. to help build in Government a more receptive viewpoint
on the assistance the industry needs during the current
restructuring process;
3. to maintain a dialogue with the trade unions outside of
the normal negotiating channels in order to:
(a) reconcile more intensive use of plant with demands
for a shorter working week;
(b) obtai n the acceptance of new technology and their
effects on present working practices;
(c) develop a programme which would bring about a
change of attitude on the part of managers and
operatives.
4. to help in the 1obbyi ng of Government, EEC and other
bodies;
5. to be a resource which could be called upon to help with
communications and 'efficiency dialogues' within
companies" (NEDO/TI (81) 4).
Clearly, the rubber companies saw no strategic role for the SWP
beyond acting as a communications channel for the employers. There was
little that NEDO could do to extend the role of the SWP, because there
were no ob1igations on compani es to partiet pate in these tripart ite
meetings. The tyre companies could simply have refused to attend
meetings or have withdrawn from the SWP, without seriously damaging
relations with government. This is because it was the BRMA and not the
SWP which was the main vehicle for representing the industry's interests
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in discussions with government. Broadly speaking, the role of the trade
association was:
"..•..to act as the spokesman for the rubber industry, the
guardian of its interests, a forum for discussion and a
swtichboard for the exchange of views" (NEDO/TI (80) 39,
p, 2) •
Companies dealt directly with their sponsoring division in the
Department of Industry on matters such as financial assistance for new
investment. Further, the Ministry did not allocate funds to promote a
particular sector strategy, neither did it insist that companies should
participate in the SWP, though they may have felt "morally" obliged to
do so. In addition, the Department of Industry did not attempt to
encourage the development of a sector strategy by participating in the
SWP. The presence of their representative was to gather useful
information on the industry, in particular the views of the trade
unions, with which it had no direct contact. This then became another
input into the framework of government policy-making.
The Trade Union View
The trade unions sit on these Committees for a number of reasons:
"Access to information and management, the chance of
participating in decisions, matters greatly to trade union
leaders or shop stewards. Participating on the Committees
.is particularly prized by smaller trade unions, ••••••for
this may be their best access to major employers, and their
only chance to see an industry as a who1e" (Midd1emas, 1983,
p.180).
313
The trade uni on representati ves on the Tyre Industry SWPthought
that it was a useful vehicle for obtaining information; the
representatives of the BRMAand the Department of Industry were
described by one union representative as a particularly valuable source
of i nformat ion. Another trade uni on member confi rmed that the SWP
reports provided information in an accessible form which previously
wauld have been obtai ned from government stati stics. In other words,
NEDOprovided a research service which could have been carried out by
the trade unions, provided that they devoted sufficient resources to
this task. The only data that NEDOproduced which would not normally be
available to the unions, because they did not have close ties with the
employers association, was that collected by the BRMA;for example, on
aggregate sources of tied imports by country of origin. However,
careful scrutiny and analysis of government and other published sources
of information would have enabled the unions to produce close
approximates if necessary.
It seems that the unions were not clear what their role on the SWP
should be, so that at times it oscillated between treating the Committee
as part of the extended bargaining arena, and on other occasions as a
po1icy and strategi c development body. Each of these approaches has
different implications for the trade unions.
I
If the former approach is adopted then there is little potnt in
trying to achieve consensus, because management and unions are seeking
tacti ca 1 advantages which may 1ater strengthen thei r hand in
negot i at ions. Here, the trade uni ons and management are tryi ng to
eli ci t each others I vi ews on a range of issues, but nei ther side ; s
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prepared to divulge information or discuss matters which may give a
tactical advantage to the other side. We have seen that in the case of
the Tyre Industry SWP, management was not prepared to discuss
investment, sourcing policies or future plans.
If, on the other hand, the SWP is to be a consensus reaching body,
then this requires greater openness from management. To be effective,
however, the unions would, by necessity, need to take a more proactive
role in evaluating management strategy, and for developing policies that
explicitly benfited their members. Otherwise, the unions could find
themselves incorporated into management, helping to implement policies
that were against the interests of their members. In reality there was
no prospect of the SWP (or for that matter the unions) taking on this
role, and it would certainly not have been welcomed by the employers.
As one union officer painted out:
"It is clear that you cannot use the SWP to devise a strategy
for tyres when the companies are competing with each other.
They owe no allegiance to the UK because they are all
multinationals and operate as such" (Interview notes).
In essence thisis true. The SWP was not an appropri ate vehicle for
developing a sector strategy for tyre manufacturing, but this alone
should not have prevented the trade unions developing their own strategy
for the industry. Part of the reason for the failure of the SWP to
progress beyond communication and participation, must therefore be
attributed to the lack of policy input from the trade unions. This, in
turn, appears due to the failure of the trade union representatives on'
the SWP to clarify their role, and the absence of any direct reporting
lines to the membership. As Elliot explained:
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"The TUC's aim in trade union membership is to balance
National Officers, Regional Officers and lay officials. In
theory this should give a balanced, multi-layered trade
union view in contrast to management which is usually at the
highest level. In practice it leads to role confusion for
the trade unionists who give varied answers to the question
of who they represent. Answers vary from their union and
parts of their union, to TUC, trade unionism, no-one
(similar to the management view that they are there as
individual men of wisdom to act in the best interest of the
sector), and most combinations thereof. This role confusion
serves a useful purpose in faci 1itating represent atives to
act with greater latitude than their constituents would
often allow. This latitude is enhanced by the lack of
reporting back and this is justified by the confidential
marking on most papers which come before the cORlllittee"
(p, 26) •
On the Tyre Industry SWP there was no balance between union
officers and lay officials. With one exception, it contained all
officers, either area, regional or national. The union side was led by
John Miller, the National Secretary of the Transport and General
Workers' Union. The only lay official was the APEX representative, who
was the Branch Chairman at Fort Dunlop. The Manpower Working Party
contained two additional lay officials, an AUEW convenor from Dunlop and
a research officer from the GMWU. The management representatives on the
SWP tended to be Chairman or Managing Directors of their respective
companies or, at the very least, a director or senior executive of a
relevant division. A number of these managers were also represented on
the Manpower Working Party, together with two senior personnel
executives from Dunlop and Michelin.
The preponderance of union officials on the SWP was probably due to
the oligopolistic nature of the industry, with a relatively small number
of very large multinational companies. This made it very difficult to
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achieve a balance between union officers and lay officials, while at the
same time ensuring that all the major unions were represented, along
with shopfloor representatives from all the major companies. Trying to
achieve all of these objectives may have produced an unnecessarily large
and cumbersome committee that could not perform as a trade union
"management team". This was indeed what was lacking on the trade union
side of the SWP - a coherent union perspective. Unless all the
individual trade unions were prepared to co-operate, exchange
information, and develop a multi-union policy and strategy for the tyre
sector, there was little prospect of the workers' interests being
proper ly represented or protected. If the unions had co-operated in
this manner, then their respective research departments could have
shared the research, monitoring and servicing function between them.
The trade unions would then have been better informed, and forewarned,
about the strategi es being pursued by each of the tyre compani es.
However, the corollary to thisis that if the unions had organi sed
themselves in this way, then no consensus could ever have been reached
with the emp1oyers or the Government on the SWP, because the inherent
confl icts of interest would have been obvious. The employers would,
therefore, have eventually withdrawn from the Committee as it would no
longer have operated to their benefit.
The lack of any defined reporting structure to the membership also
ensured that the rank-and-file were not informed about what was
discussed in these meetings. In the GMBATU, for example, the Regional
Officer who sat on the SWP made reports to the Natiana1 Officer, who'
then reported to the General Secretary. There were, however, no direct
reporting lines back to the shopfloor. Instead, the Regional Officer
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and the Nationa 1 Officer for the industry made a verbal report to
delegates at the annual conference for the rubber industry, which only
met once a year and therefore was an inappropri ate meeting to discuss
a11 the policy issues raised at the SWP.
similar problems.
Other trade unions faced
One solution would have been to appoint convenors and shop stewards
to serve on the SWP. This idea was supported by two of the full-t ime
union officials interviewed, because they felt that those who worked in
the industry were more knowledgeable, and therefore better equipped to
serve the interests of the membership. This was not necessarily true,
however, because it precluded knowledge that could have been gained from
reading published financial, economic and industrial reports on the
industry, which were potentially available to anyone. Nevertheless, the
presence of lay officials with back-up research facilities could•
certainly have improved the flow of information to the shopfloor, but
this would have presented a new problem: How to relay information to
the National Officer and the General Secretary, and to those plants with
no represent ative on the SWP? One possible solution was for the
convenors to report back to the regions and then on to the Nationa 1
Officer. Meanwhile, new trade union organisations, such as multi-union
combines, could have been encouraged so that these could have also
played a part in receiving reports and disseminating information to the
membership.
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Summary
It appears that the Tyre SWP encouraged the trade unions to limit
their interest in the strategic issues facing the industry, a bias which
the trade unions did little to correct.
An explanation for the general failure of the unions to develop a
strategy for the tyre sector, and the apparent confusion in union
tactics, will be attempted in Part (ii). We shall see that the trade
unions were obsessively preoccupied with wages and narrow sectional
interests, which left them largely oblivious to the policies being pursued
by Dunlop, and that this rendered the workforce powerless to resist the
implementation of the planned plant closures.
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Part (ii) National Bargaining
The Abolition of National Negotiations
At the beginning of the century, the policy of the rubber unions
was to achi eve uniform rates of pay through nat i ona 1 negot i at ions to
prevent wage cutting. To this end, they were instrumental in
encouragi ng the Government to estab 1i sh a Joi nt Industri a1 Council for
the industry at the end of the First World War. However, the functions
of this body were
1I •••••• purely advisory or consultative and amongst suitable
matters for discussion were •••• we1fare and social subjects,
suggestions, working hours, regularity of employment,
output, improvements in methods and machi nery, di sci p1i ne,
gri evances, and di sputes II (Report on the Estab 1i shment and
Progress of Joint Industrial Councils, 1917-22, p.7S).
The employers refused to countenance national negotiations through
the Council on the grounds that:
II •••••• the wages and conditions in the Rubber Trade are totally
dissimilar and are dependent upon the wages paid in other
predominant industries in the various 10ca1itiesll (Ibid,
p, 161).
A number of employers feared that to concede to union demands would
strengthen the unions' bargaining position and raise costs.
Consequently, some of the larger employers refused to join the Council.
Evi deryt 1y, the trade uni ons 1acked the bagai ni ng strength and
organisation to compel them to do otherwise, and so the failure to
achi eve these objectives 1ed to the co 11apse of the Rubber Counci 1 in
1920. But,
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".•••••so 1itt1e store did the union set by it and so heavy
were the series of calamites and losses of that period that
its demise went unrecorded by the union at the time" (Clegg,
1954, p.239).
Since there were no regional councils, negotiations became confined to
the plant level.
The following years were to prove calamitous for the trade unions.
The aftermath of the 1921 slump led to a slide in union membership which
outweighed a simultaneous weakening of the Employers' Federation.
Price-cutt ing and reductions in wages became endemi c. Many employers
were very strongly anti-union, forcing many works committees to be
transformed into company unions (I bid, pp.239-40).
The depression years of the 1930s saw further price reductions and
cuts in wages. However, some of the more "progressive" employers
realised that continuous price-cutting was not in their interests
either, and they were aware that one way of eliminating price-cuts was
to re-establish the Council, and through it agree national minimum
rates. This would also guarantee that the more "progressive" employers
did not suffer a competitive disadvantage by agreeing wages and
conditions that were superior to those offered by their competitors, as
they would be forced to follow suit. The only means available of
compelling companies to do so, in the absence of strong trade unions or
\
a powerful employers' federation, was by settting up a Trade Board.
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Thus, in March 1939, the Rubber Manufacturing Trade Board was
established. Its function was to determine minimum wages and
conditions. The Board consisted of an equal number of representatives
from the employers and the trade unions, plus three independent members
appointed by the Minister of labour. If the employers and union
representatives were unable to agree on a joint recommendation, the
independent members would cast their vote to support one side or other.
When a decision was ratified by the Minister of Labour, it became
legally binding on all employers in the industry, with penalties imposed
on those failing to comply. The Board, however, had no mechanism for
the settling of disputes. As a result, a National Joint Industrial
Council for the Rubber Manufacturing Industry was formed in June 1940.
The NJIC differed from the Trade Board in that it was a voluntary
body, composed entirely of representatives from the employers and the
trade unions; there were no independent members. The unions represented
on the Council were the TGWU, NUGMW,USDAW, and the United Rubber
Workers of Great Bri tai n (1 ater to merge wi th the TGWU). The Counci 1
subsequently took over as the body which determined national minimum
wages and conditions. These voluntary agreements were then referred to
the Board (later to become a Wages Council under the Wages Council Act,
1945), comprising basically the same people who sat on the NJIC, plus
the independent members, whose task was to recornmend to the Mini ster
that the voluntary agreements be made obligatory on all employers in the
industry.
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The success of the NJIC can be judged by the fact that membership
increased from 37 firms in 1940 to just under 100 in 1950 (Ibid, p.244).
There was little reason for the employers to remain outside. The legal
compu 1sion of the Wages Counc il, together with improved union
organisation, and the growing authority of the Employers' Federation,
provided the necessary incentive to join. In 1958, the Wages Council
ceased to operate, leaving the NJIC to set minimum wages and conditions
for process workers.
During this period the trade union strategy in the rubber industry
was to build up membership and organisation by "securing good relations
with the employers" (Ibid, p.246). The employers, in the main,
reci procated by encouragi ng union membershi p because of the mutual
benefi ts it offered to both part ies. The emp 1oyers were seeking high
output in a period of prospertity and rising demand, which they did not,
want to see interrupted by industrial diputes, especially on issues of
bargaining rights and union recogni tion. The unions in turn wi shed to
secure their position within the industry.
As a consequence, the level of unionisation amongst manual workers,
particularly in the larger companies, was high. Process workers were
represented by the Transport and General Workers • Union (TGWU) , the
General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trade Union (GMBATU) and the
Union of Shop, Distri but ive.and A11ied Workers (USDAW). Craftsmen were
represented by the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), the
Electrical, Electronic, Teleconununication and Plumbing Union (EETPU);
the National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths and Heating and
Domestic Engineers (NUSMW), the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and
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Techni ci ans (UCATT) and other craft uni ons. A number of compani es
operated union membership agreements and de facto closed shops. Union
membership amongst white collar workers, on the other hand, tended to be
lower. Here the major trade unions were the AUEW's, Technical
Administration and Supervisory Section (TASS), the Association of
Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS), the Association of
Profess i ana 1, Execut i ve and Computer Staff (APEX), the TGWU's
Association of Clerical, Technical and Supervisory Staffs (ACTS) and the
GMBATU'sAdministrative, Technical and Supervisory Section (MATSA).
However, the trade uni ons became i ncreasi ngly di ssati sfi ed by the
wage levels set by the NJIC. Agreements reached by the Council were
regarded by the process workers as mini mum earni ngs 1eve 1s (MEL), on
which to build local agreements, except for items such as working hours,
the 1ength of annual ho1idays, and payments for annual and statutory
holidays which remained unchanged,
In April 1971, Dunlop withdrew from the NJIC for the Rubber
Industry because it no longer regarded the Counci 1 as "appropri ate"
because
" •••••• its growing involvement in plant bargaining had
reduced the importance to the company of industry-wide
negotiations". (IRR, No. 25, February 1972, p.1S).
Tyre building had previously been carried out largely by human effort,
with operatives rewarded on a piece rate system. But with the
conversi on to radi a1 technology, Dunlop developed new machi nery which
.
entailed "taking the trade way from the operative and putting it into
the hands of the machine" (Heller, 1969, p.64). This allowed the
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product ion of truck tyres, for example, to increase from 22 per hour
using conventional methods to 46 tyres an hour (Ibid).
A management informant from Dunlop stated that the rapidly
developing technology, from tube to tubeless tyres, and from crossply to
textile radials and then to steel radials, as well as significant
changes in tread depth, diameter sizes and the quality of rubber in a
tyre, had left the payments system outdated and inadequate.
In addition, our informant claimed that the NJIC system was
"inflexible" because similar rates were paid across the industry which
took no account of the fact that Dunlop was competing with Goodyear, BL,
Lucas, and other 1arge compani es in the Midlands for 1abour, and that•
the poachi ng of skilled workers was common place. The only way to
compete was by paying higher wages. There may be some truth in this but
it would hardly justify Dunlop's withdrawal from the NJIC. If it was
purely a question of attracting and retaining skilled labour other
solutions could have been found. More realistically, it would appear
that the shift from national to company-wide negotiations by Dunlop and
other 1arge compani es during this period was part of a strategy by
these companies to exert greater control over their workforces.
Accardi ng to Beynon and Wainwright {1979} , this type of corporate
bargaining
"••••••represents a systematic attempt to control and
regulate the relationship with their labour force" {p.167}.
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As part of th is pol icy, in February 1972, Dunlop conc 1uded an
i nteri m procedure agreement with the GMWU,TGWUand URWGBlito estab 1i sh
company-wide guidelines which leave sufficient room for effective plant
bargaining" (IRR, No. 25, February 1972, p.15).
The agreement reached with the unions replaced the Rubber
Industry·s national negotiating machinery with company~wide negotiations
conducted through a National Joint Committee and a smaller Negotiating
Committee. The main functions of the NJC were mostly consultative,
covering issues such as eduction and training, health and safety, and
promoting efficiency.
The company si de of the NJC consi sted of the Group Industri a1
Re1at ions Advi ser, the Seni or I ndustri a1 Re1at ions Offi cer, the
Industrial Relations Officer (Process Workers) and up to 7 additional
management representatives. The union side comprised 4 representatives
from the GMWU,4 from the TGWUand 2 from the URWGB. Of these, one
representative from each of the unions had to be the appropriate
Nat i ona 1 Offi cer; the rest were 1ay representatives nominated by each
union.
The Negot i at i ng Comi ttee compri sed, for the company, the Group
Industri al Rel ations Advi ser, the Senior Industri al Relations Officer
and the Industrial Relations Officer (Process Workers) plus 3 management
members selected from the NJC. Whilst the union side consisted of the
National Officer for each of the 3 unions, plus 3 lay delegates
nominated from the 7 lay delegates on the NJC.
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As far as pay rates were concerned, the new company agreement
fo 11owed the pract i ce of the Rubber Industry Nat i ona 1 Agreement in
specifying only minimum earnings levels. The interim agreement laid
down identical rates and allowances for those which were at the time
operat i ng throughout the industry. Wage rates above the company-wi de
minima were to be determined at local level.
Nevertheless, the trade unions soon became dissatisfied with the
new bargaining arrangements, mainly because it did not produce the pay
improvements that they expected, and so within six years the unions
terminated the agreement. However, it is debateable how far this was an
i niti ati ve of the uni ons, or whether they were manoeuvred into thi s
position by Dunlop.
Management may have taken the view that whilst negotiations
operated through the NJC, they would find it more difficult to secure
changes in working practices and reductions in the workforce. Perhaps
management were concerned that the "mi1i tant II shop stewards from Speke
were able to use the Dunlop-Pirelli shop stewards' committee to
i nfl uence the unions' negot i at i ng pos it ion. Through thei r 1inks wi th
other stewards in Dunlop~Pirelli's plants throughout Europe, the Speke
shop stewards had been able to establish an extensive organisation (see
part (ii 1) for detai 1s) • It may therefore have been in Dunlop's
interest to ensure that the NJC ceased to function.
This has to be vi ewed in the context of the growi ng fi nanc i a1.
crisis that began to beset Dunlop. Campbell Fraser, the Chairman of
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Dunlop, had been visiting the plants during 1976, briefing managers
about the problems that the company was faci ng. Though some managers
were apparently already familar with the issues.
Our informant, for example, had been talking with the unions during
1975 about the need to introduce a new payments system. Confi dent i a 1
company documents stated that:
"At the time of the 1975 Annual Rubber. Workers Contract the
Management and Trade Union concerned mutually agreed that
the Rubber Workers Wage Structure was outdated, unfai rand
required replacing".
A joi nt Management/Trade Uni on Committee was therefore set up to
"research, develop and recommend a new Wage Payment Structure". Seni or
management suggested that the introduction of a "Plant-Wide Productivity
Bonus Scheme" might be the remedy for "the general decline in Fort
Dun10p's manufacturing efficiency".
Two wage payment structures were investigated: Scheme A which
would have given an increase of pay to approximately 99.25% of all
Rubber workers and provided a 1abour~saving to Dunlop of £392,143 over a
3 year period, and Scheme B which would have given an increase of pay to
approximately 95.4% of all Rubber Workers and provided a labour-saving
to the company of £5,437,994 over a 3 year peri od. Both schemes
envisaged that the number of operatives at Fort Dunlop would fall from
2,950;n 1977 to 2,524 by 1980. The importance of implementing one of
\
these schemes immediately was also stressed. It was estimated that a 12
month delay would turn a profit from Scheme A into a 'loss of £158,501
over the same 3 years period, whilst the saving from Scheme B would be
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reduced from £5,437,994 to £3,511,524.
In 1976, the trade unions agreed to the introduction of the new
wage payment structure. However, the report never reached the main
Board of Dunlop, because it was not supported by many senior managers at
Fort Dunlop. The authors of the report recognised that what they were
proposi ng would have had a "profound effect II on other service
departments. A key problem, according to our informant, was that
control was centralised in London. As there was no Managing Director at
Fort Dunlop to co-ordinate operations, each department worked
"eutonoaous ly", jealously guarding their areas of control. The
Technical department was especially concerned that its functions would
become 1ess important, whi 1st the Product ion department would become
more important. Consequently, it was not until 1980 that the new system
was introduced, following the implementation of the company's new policy
of divisiona1isation. In the meantime, the Speke factory had been
closed, and there had been large job losses at Fort Dunlop.
Not surprisingly, by the late 1970s, the manual unions had become
totally dissatisfied with the national-level negotiating machinery for
the rubber industry. Agreements reached by the NJIC had come to be
viewed as minimum on which to build local agreements, apart from, as
stated earlier, hours of work, length of annual holidays, and payments
for annual and statutory holidays, which remained the same. The unions,
however, found that these arrangements were doing very little to
ameliorate the problem of low pay in the rubber industry, because a·
large number of employers were paying little more than the NJIC minimum
earnings levels. Plant-level bargaining appeared in many cases to have
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had little impact in supplementing national agreements. A number of
senior trade unionists appeared to concl ude, therefore, that the only
way of tackling low pay in the industry was to shift the entire emphasis
towards local bargaining.
In many respects this appears to be an extraordinary conclusion as
it is difficult to comprehend how reliance on plant-Jeve l bargaining
only could possibly resolve the problem of low pay - particularly when
it is highly probable that it is those employees in the poorly organised
sites who experience the lowest earnings. Hence, the logical outcome of
this policy is to produce a widening of different ia1s between those
workers in the most highly unionised compani es, normally the 1arge
multinationals, and those employed by the small rubber companies.
Notwithstanding this, in 1977, the unions withdrew from the NJIC,
leaving collective bargaining to be conducted solely at the subsidiary
company or plant level. Shortly afterwards, on 22 February 1978,
following the collapse of the NJC pay negotiations in December 1977, the
Dunlop National Lay Delegates Conference decided to terminate the Dunlop
National Agreement with effect from 11 March 1978. All that the trade
unions had to say was that it was:
........an important step towards more involvement locally on
pay and conditions" (Bulletin in Dunlop Ltd, February 1978,
No.13, p.2) •
However, with the demise of these two bodies, the trade unions
recognised the need to establish new broadly-based institutions.
Delegates, therefore, unanimously agreed to set up a National Dunlop
Trade Union Committee, known as the Dunlop Rubber Workers Joint Union
Committee, comprising of those who were then serving on the Dunlop NJC.
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However, the unions failed to recognise the potential strategic role
that this body could fulfil: for instance, monitoring and reporting
back on the financial performance of each plant (e.g. sales, overhead
costs, investment), and on vari ous aspects of, i ncl udi ng changes in,
management policy. Instead, the Committee was given a limited brief and
purpose, which was to provide a "platform for united initiatives", in
face of the centralised personnel policy operated by Dunlop (Ibid).
This included discussions on strategies and objectives to be pursued in
future local negotiations, most prominently the possibility of
establishing a common date for all Dunlop workers' agreements.
At another meeting held in London on 18 July 1978, attended by
representatives from the TGWU,GMWUand USDAW, the unions agreed to
establish a Rubber Unions Joint Committee (RUJC). Membership was
restricted to five representatives from both the TGWUand GMWU,and two
from USDAW. In addition, each constituent union had the right to co-opt
individuals onto the Convnittee "whose assistance would be valuable on
specific matters of concern to the Committee" (Rubber Unions Joint
Committee, notes of meeting held on 18 July 1978).
The aims and objectives of the RUJCwere:
"1. To co-ordinate joint initiatives on behalf of UK rubber
workers.
2. To consider the development of industrial relations
within the Rubber Industry.
3. To evaluate the affects of collective bargaining of
workers in th~ Rubber Industry.
4. To outline specific objectives in the areas of
collective bargaining.
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5. To receive reports on the activities of outside bodies
which relate to the Rubber Industry.
6. To consider possible initiatives in the field of
industrial training and re-training" (Ibid).
The key objective overlooked by the unions, however, was the need
to understand the industry's and the rubber companies' strategies.
The Effectiveness of Local Bargaining
Following their withdrawal from national negotiations for the
rubber industry and company~wide bargaining at Dunlop, the unions were
1eft to pursue the interests of their members through 1oca1
negotiations. David Warburton had made the case for local bargaining by
arguing that the NJIC and the NJC had stifled effective wage bargaining,
by encouraging some companies merely to abide by the minimum NJIC rate.
In an interview given on 19 March 1984, David Warburton pOinted out
that the abolition of these bodies had enabled "progress" to be made in
pushing up wage 1eve1s for manual workers. The staff shop stewards at
Fort Dunlop confirmed that the switch from company level to local wage
bargaining had produced a large increase in wage rates. The convenors
now negotiated the wage rates for the division, while the shop stewards
negotiated the gradings for their respective sections. In these
circumstances, the stewards could see company level negotiations
offering few benefits to a "well,,:,organisedplantll•
The main drawback of this parochialism for the trade unions is that
the strong plants gain at the expense of the weak. More importantly, it
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does 1itt1e to foster harmony and unity, and it allows the company to
play one plant off against another: IIIf Speke does not close then Fort
Dunlop wi 1111 • Furthermore, it may also 1ead to the reduct ion in trade
union militancy within individual plants. As one steward said:
IIPeople are afraid to stand out in case management uses it as
an excuse to close their plant or to get rid of them. Six
or seven years ago there was unity, today the unions have to
grab what they can. It might be ten years plus before the
unions are able to establish a more powerful position".
The powerlessness and isolation felt by many of the weaker plants
in the rubber industry was made very clear by the reso 1utions put to
the GMWU I S annual Nationa1 Rubber Industry Conference in 1982. The
Southern region put forward the following resolution:
"That Conference discusses the poss ibi1ity that due to the
nature and structure of the rubber industry, a conmittee
comprising of shop stewards from each Branch in the
Region(s) representing members employed in the industry be
established, and to meet on a regular basis" (Rubber
Industry Conference, July 1982, Resolution No.11).
However, this resolution was later withdrawn.
The Northern region was also concerned at the weaknesses inherent
in the new Dunlop negotiating structure. This region put forward the
following two resolutions:
"Re-f ntr-oductton of a JIC to cover Dunlop Workers II
(Resolution No.12).
and
IIIntroduct ion of a nationa 1 Dunlop workers lone-day
Conference II (Resol~tion No.13).
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Both of these resolutions were remitted for consideration at
national level. But this did nothing to quell the anxiety felt at the
grass roots of the weaker and more vulnerable plants and companies, as
witnessed by the resolutions put forward the following year from
Liverpool, North Wales and Northern Ireland:
"That this conference asks the National Officer for the
facility of national negotiations on wages and conditions as
previ ous ly enjoyed wi thi n the rubber industry" (September
1983, Resolution No.3).
Notwithstanding the resolution from the Southern region, which
appeared to recogni se the need for a strategi c body, a1bei t at shop
steward level, the major resolutions revealed the inability of the union
leaders to see beyond the immediate issues of wages and conditions, even
though the rubber industry had suffered a loss of over 10,000 jobs
between 1979 and 1982 (RPPITB, 1982).
However, a number of delegates argued that the di sparity in wage
rates was no longer acceptable. They saw national negotiations as one
means of protecting and improvi ng the earni ngs of the weaker .p1ants.
Davi d Warburton, nevertheless, remi nded conference of the problems in
the past caused by 1ack of f1 exi bil ity at nat i ana 1 1eve 1• He poi nted
out that the bi ggest movement in bas i c rates had come since nat i ana 1
bargaining had ended. Furthermore, the National Industrial Officer,
informed conference that there was 1itt 1e prospect of the employers
wanting( to return to nati~nal negotiations, particularly when other
NJIe I s were comi ng under pressure from compani es to di sband. Thi s.
appeared to do little to' dispel the sense of unease felt by delegates,
who cast their votes narrowly in its favour by 18 to 11:
334
"This National Conference urges a positive consideration of
re-establishing closer working arrangements within the trade
union structure in this industry and in furtherence of this
end, we request the re-fermi ng of the Nationa 1 Negot iating
Body II (Resolution No.4).
Another put up by Yorkshire and N. Derby region was carried by 18
votes to 13:
"This conference asks for the establishment of a main
negotiating body at national level for the rubber industry,
including Dunlop Ltd" (Resolution No.5).
The consternation felt by these workers was understandable since
few had benefited financially from the abolition of national
negotiations, but had instead suffered disporportionally from greater
insecuri ty of employment. The 1984-85 survey of wages in the rubber
industry, carried out by the GMBATU, revealed that the spread of the
lowest basic rate for standard hours, covering 46 agreements, was from
£47.97 to £114.40, with the average being £86.57 (the comparable spread
for the highest grades, or skilled rate, was from £76.02 to £200, with
an average of £107.44), compared to national settlements for the
Pharmaceutical & Fine Chemical NJIC of £86.70 for 38 hours, and for the
Chemical & Allied Industries NJIC of £85.12 for 38 hours. On this
evidence progress in increasing basic rates had been relatively slow.
Or in the words of the GMBATU:
"Just under half of the agreements recorded in this survey
~ad lowest basic rates above that achieved in the
Pharmaceutical & Fine Chemical NJIC. However, by contrast
this meant that over half did not achieve what in another
process industry is cons idered a minimum bas ic rate" (UK
Rubber Industrial Review, 1984-1985, pp.25-:-6).
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These relatively low basic rates in the rubber industry were
inevitably manifested in low average earnings, especially for those
workers who did not enjoy supplements for shiftwork or premia for
overtime, and they tended to be mainly women who were generally more
dependent on the basic rate for the bu1k of their earni ngs. This was
confirmed by a survey carried out by the Department of Employment for
October 1983, which showed that both men and women working in the rubber
industry earned below average earnings for manual workers in
manufacturing industry as a whole (Ibid, pp.26-7). Women in particular
earned what the TUC described as poverty wages, £90 for a 38 hour week.
Thus, it is not clear how withdrawing from national bargaining
helped the trade unions. National or company level negotiations offered
them twin benefits. Firstly, it guaranteed the weaker plants a minimum
pay award, which they could use as a "fall -back position". Secondly, it
fostered unity. The abolition of the Dunlop National Agreement, on the
other hand, undermined the influence of the comparatively well,:,organised
Speke stewards, and placed the emphasis firmly on sectional interests.
It would seem, therefore, that the union leaders were prepared to
sacrifice job security in return for higher pay increases for the
relatively few better paid workers.
The main beneficiaries of the unions' strategy would appear to have
been m~nagement. It could obviously have been in management' s interest
to encourage divi sions between different groups of workers at
"competing" tyre plants, and so the unions' withdrawal from company
bargaining arguably assisted Dunlop with its plans.
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White call ar trade uni ani sts at Fort Dunlop were convi nced that
Dunlop had manufactured the development of local agreements to
facilitate job losses. These trade unionists said that Dunlop had been
tryi ng to get the staff to pull out of company 1eve1 negot i at ions for
severa 1 years (staff and engi neeri ng workers were not covered by the
NJIC). However, it was not until 1980 that the staff finally did so,
the simple choice available was the prospect of large pay rises with
local agreements, or very little otherwise. In the event, the staff at
Fort Dunlop were asked to consider an offer at plant level equivalent to
about 7i%, or nothing at the company level. Initially, the staff unions
believed that this was in line with the company's policy of
divisiona1isation, because the Tyre group was not profitable. But, with
hi ndsi ght, they recogni sed that events proved otherwi se, and that the
planning of divisionalisation was the prelude to rationalisation. At
the time this possibility was not seriously considered by the unions.
Further, unknown to the unions, the Dunlop Board had in 1978 set up
a team to evaluate capacity and manpower requirements for volume tyre
production. The team reported that all of Dunlop's output could be
produced in a relatively tiny part of Fort Dunlop by a small workforce
using fully automated machinery.
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Part (iii) Plant Closures
The scene had now been set for management to push ahead with plant
closures. Our management informant stated that for management Speke was
out-dated and should have been shut in the 1960s, whil st Inchinnan
should have closed in the 1970s. He speculated that this had not
happened because both plants were located in areas of high unemployment.
Senior management had established close ties with successive
governments, which were of mutual benefi t. The former were able to
secure important contracts, especially from the military, whilst the
latter gained politically by maintaining jobs in the depressed regions.
Our informant also stated that:
"Speke would not have been closed unless it had first been
sanctioned by government".
He said that Dunlop had originally been offered £7 million to assist
with new investment in Speke, but it had been rejected by the company.
Hence, at a stroke Dunlop was able to rid itself of both the best
organi sed and most "mi1itant" workforce, as well as the most obsolete
and least productive plant.
The closure of Speke signalled the virtual disappearance of the
Dun10p~Pire11i Shop Stewards' Committee, which had been formed in 1970
in response to the proposed union between the two companies. Originally
a British~Ita1ian organisation, it extended its influence to include
other countries, especi~lly France, and other companies, including
Michelin and Goodyear. The mainstay of the organisation were reputed to
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be Charles Parker and Stan Pemberton (who was also the national
President of the TGWU and a member of the TUC General Counc i1) from
Speke, with John Miller of the TGWU, the key union official involved.
The Committee held regular quarterly meetings, each meeting hosted
by a different convenor, with expenses shared to cover travelling costs.
There was always a prepared agenda, progress reports and minutes. The
meetings proved a useful medium for exchanging information on wages and
conditions, output manufacturing methods and new developments, which
were the type of issues normally found on the agendas of Combi ne
Committees (Lerner and Bescoby, 1966).
A key reason for forming a combine is to improve the wage
bargaining position of the union in companies which bargain on a plant
basis (Terry, 1985). During the 1970s a key objective of the unions was
to push for inter~plant wage parity. However, Terry reported that wage
parity was not regarded by combines as the same thing as company
bargaining, since many stewards tried to preserve plant bargaining in
order to prevent national negotiations being taken over by the national
union officials.
The Dunlop-Pirelli combine was not recognised for bargaining
purposes. It was, nevertheless, able to influence the unions'
negotiating position, because any resolution relating to wages and
conditions passed by the combine was put forward by delegates as a
resolution at branch meetings. This gave the combine a potentially·
powerful influence over the unions' bargaining stance when the NJIC and
the Dunlop NJC were functioning. Paradoxically, the unions' bargaining
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strategy probably assisted Dunlop to implement its policy of
divisiona1isation. Their withdrawal from the NJC effectively left the
unions in a "straight-:-jacket" where they were unable to influence
policies and events beyond the immediate division.
The staff and engi neers 1ikewise estab 1ished their own separate
combines, organised across Dunlop. The staff combine existed for about
15 years, concentrating mainly on wages and conditions, so that with the
demise of company level bargaining, it ceased to have any relevance.
The combine eventually broke up in 1982 due partly to the opposition of
certain MATSA officials, who were strongly opposed to unofficial union
bodies.
Perhaps the major weakness of most of the union bodies and
organisations that were established was that they concentrated mainly
on wages and conditions. What was needed was a central body similar to
that proposed, though too 1ate, by the DRWJUC and RUJC, that cou 1d
negotiate with Dunlop on strategic issues, and which would have been a
far more effective mechanism than an NJIC. This would have allowed the
unions to present a unified face, and would have inhibited management
from using its policy of divisionalisation to isolate individual plants.
Not surprisingly, Dunlop was not prepared to sanction negotiations on
these issues.
,
Another key weakness facilitating closures was the role and
funct ion of the regi ana1 officia1s. One ex-:-regiana1 officer of the
GMBATU said that collective bargaining should be left to the shop
stewards, because they were in afar better position to negotiate wages
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and conditions. He saw his role as just "inspecting" the agreement
before it was signed. Logistics dictated that he could not do
otherwi se. As a regiona1 officer he was responsib1e for rubber, plus
every other industry in the Birmingham area, excluding engineering. The
only assistance that he had was that provided by five district officers,
each responsible for their own area, These resources were clearly
inadequate to provide the comprehensive service, support and
co-ordination role needed to deal effectively with management.
The white collar unions faced similar problems. The 350 MATSA
members at Fort Dunlop were organised on a branch rather than a regional
basis. The branch had its own secretary and was "autonomous", which
allowed it to make its own policy decisions within union rules. When
the new regional officer took over in August 1983, he found (unlike his
manual counterpart) that these arrangements made it very difficult for
him to establish a "rapport" with the shop stewards. This was because
the full-time convenor had direct access to management, and local
management preferred to settle matters domestically, rather than involve
the regiona1 officer. The outcome was that the regiona1 officer was
only called in when there were grading disputes, or when a failure to
agree was registered by a shop steward with a company, and the matter
could not be resolved by the district officer.
Once again there was a need to exchange information and to
Co-ordinate policy, so that the regional officer was aware of what the
company was planning. However, the logistical problems were formidable.
The regional officer dealt with 106 private companies plus all public
services including the National Health Service (staff side only). These
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problems were compounded by the fact that the union had lost seven
experi enced officers in the previous three years through death and
retirement, so that where there used to be three MATSA officers handling
union business, there were now only two. Also there were increased
demands made on the regiona1 officer's time because of the severe
economic problems in the region. In expanding industries managers are
keen to assist in resolving problems, whereas in declining industries
there is 1ess urgency to resolve disputes, and they tend to be more
time-consuming.
One obvious solution to the apparent lack of resources would have
been an amalgamation between the TGWU and GMBATU, accompanied by an
increase in the number of district officers. However, to 1ink the
regional officer closely into the shop stewards' committees to develop
an effective organisation, which could offer a comprehensive service to
the membership, would have entailed tackling the sectional interests of
the stewards - who often jealously guard their direct contact with
management and the shopfloor. There may well have been a precedent for
doing this, since sectional interests had not prevented the unions at
Fort Dunlop and other factories from forming Joint Shop Stewards'
Committees to protect members' interests. Likewise, if the regions were
able to offer a research and monitoring service to the stewards through
the district and regional officers, this could be one way of improving
overall union effectiveness. The regional officer would then be able to,
hold regular meetings with stewards to share information, and to brief
them about possible developments in the firm or industry, which may·
assist the stewards in their dealings with management. This would still
leave the convenors and shop stewards free to lead all negotiations with
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the employers, but they would be encouraged to liaise closely with
regional office for back-up information and advice; thus integrating the
entire regional union apparatus into the negotiating structure.
Trade union organisation could also have been made more effective
by extending it beyond the narrow confines of the rubber industry. This
research has shown that all manufacturing industry is inter~dependent,
with the rubber and tyre industries inextricably tied. to the motor
industry. Yet no evidence has emerged of the rubber unions establishing
contacts wi th stewards in the motor industry or other segments of the
components industry, even though trade unionists recognised that a forum
for the motor and components industry ~ whether composed entirely of
shop stewards or a combination of union officers and lay officials -
would have substantially increased the bargaining strength of the
unions.
Clearly. most trade unionists recognised the shortcomings of
sect i ona 1i srn, but were unable or unwi 11i ng to overcome it. Thi s was
also manifested at the international level where the unions had extended
their organisation, but found themselves divided on ideological and
political grounds.
There were two major international trade union organisations in the
rubber industry: The I nternat i ona 1 Federat i on of Chemica 1, Energy and
General Workers' Union (ICEF), and the Trade Unions International of
Chemica 1, Oi1 and All i ed . Workers (I CPS) • The former was affil i ated to
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the
latter to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Most of the
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affi 1i ates to the ICPS were uni ons based in the Sovi et Union, Eastern
Europe, the developing nations, and France and Italy where the two
largest federations, the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) and the
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) were communist
contra 11ed. Although the CGIL had resigned from the WFTU, its
affiliates still participated in meetings of the ICPS.
rCEF Activity
The decline in the European rubber industry, soon after the
Dunl op-Ptr-al l t merger in January 1971, led to redundancies and
shcrt-t tae working both in Britain and in Italy. The unions blamed
these job losses on the rationalisation policies being pursued by the
two companies. Shortly afterwards, in June 1972, Charles Levinson,
Secretary General of the ICEF, demanded that they meet with an
international delegation of trade unionists who had formed a "Permanent
Dun10p-Pire11i World Counci111, representing the two companies' workers
in twenty countries. The companies were informed that the delegation
wished to discuss:
II •••••• the short and medi um-term (though not . long-term! )
international investment strategies of the companies,
particularly in respect of possible repercussions on jobs
and working timell (Business Week, 4 November 1972, p.38, my
insert).
The World Council included many unions with wham the two companies
had no dealings, including a number from countries where neither Dunlop
nor Pire11i had manufact~ring facilities. Also the Council excluded the
large communist unions from its French and Italian factories. Thus,
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Dunlop-Pf relli refused to recognise or to meet formally with
representatives from this body. In addition, Dunlop management were not
convinced that:
1I •••••• an international forum could possibly contribute to
the solution of employee concerns or adequately substitute
for solutions to local prob1emsll (Northrup and Rowan, 1974,
p. 120) •
Nevertheless, an informal meeting was held between Charles Levinson
and the personnel director of Dunlop, and it was agreed that another
meeting would be held involving, Levinson, the co~chairman of the World
Council, Bob Edwards of the TGWU and Egidio Quaglia of the Italian
union, Organizzazione Sindacale Fra i Lavoratori Chimici ed Affini
(Federchimic:i), an affiliate of the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati
Lavoratori (CISL), plus the personnel directors of Dunlop and Pirelli.
The meeting was arranged for March 1973, but did not take place. It was
originally cancelled because of the illness of the Dunlop personnel
director, then in July 1973, Federchimici ended its affiliation to the
ICEF. This was because the chemical affi 1iates of the three Italian
federat ions merged into a co-ordt nated organi sation, domi nated by the
CGIL, which had no relations with the ICEF. After that the
Dunlop-Pirelli World Council IIceased to exist except on paper II(Northrup
and Rowan, 1979, p.268).
Dunlop's decision not to'formally recognise that World Council, but
to hold informal talks with Charles Levinson, appears to have been the
result of a number of factors. The TGWU and GMWU, the two main unions
in the British rubber industry, were both ICEF affiliates. Further, Bob
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Edwards was, besides being co~chairman of the World Council, a national
officer of the TGWU and a Member of Parliament. Dunlop and Pirelli
recognised that diplomacy was called for, particularly since they had
received bad publicity arising from job losses and industrial unrest.
Management may a1so have viewed the ICEF and the World Counci 1 as a
possible bulwark against the growing International Shop Stewards'
Committee, organised by stewards in Britain and in Italy (Northrup and
Rowan, 1974, p.120).
Evidently, management feared the potential "disruption" and
activities of the international stewards' committee more than that of
the ICEF, and probably calculated that, if necessary, the company might
be able to reap some benefits from their mutual hostility.
International Shop Stewards' Committee
The Dunlop-Pire11i Shop Stewards' Committee was set up in 1970, in
response to the announced proposed merger between Dunlop and Pire11i.
The COl1lllitteecentred around the shop stewards' movement in Britain and
Italy, but it later expanded its coverage to other European countries,
especially France, and other companies including Michelin and Goodyear.
The shop stewards' organisation set up an International Shop
Stewards' Steering Committee to co-ordtnate their activities. In
Britain, they enjoyed the support of John Miller, National Officer of
the TGWU (and an ex~Dunlop tyre worker and shop steward), which'
effectively gave the union a foot in both camps, since Bob Edwards was
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the co-chairman of the ICEF sponsored World Council. In Italy, the
Steering Committee received assistance from the CGIL, and presumably had
close ties with the WFTU(Ibid).
The object i ves of the Committee were to protect the jobs and
interests of the rubber workers by building a stewards' organisation to
match the organisation of the new Dunlop-Pirelli Union, and by doing so,
increase shopfloor power on an international basis. The Steeri ng
Committee be1i eved that the best way to win concessi ons from
Dunlop-Pf re l l t was through industrial strength and direct action.
Unlike the World Council, the COnJllittee was opposed to multinational
collective bargaining because of the economic, political and social
differences between countries. The stewards were also keen to avoid
........ any moves in the di rect i on of creating i nternat i ana 1
•company uni ons " with the workers seen as no more than
members of some vast international corporation, in which
their only hope of improvement comes from what they can win
from the company" (quoted from Northrup and Rowan, 1974,
p.121).
On 9 June 1972, the International Shop Stewards' Committee
organised a "Day of Shame" or "Eurostrike" in Dunlop and Pirelli plants
located in Britai n and Italy, to protest about redundanci es. Pl ants in
other European countries were, however, not affected. In Britain, the
strike was organised by the shop stewards, with no official backing from
any of the trade unions. Indeed, the GMWUinstructed its members not to
participate in this action. The strike was therefore only partially
successful, with about 7,500 of the total Dunlop-Pirell i workforce of.
54,000 obeying their stewards' instructions. One small belting plant
was completely shut down, and only ten of the fifty factories in Britain
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suffered any loss of production. In Italy, the industrial action was
more successful, with about 80% of the Pire11i workforce around Mi 1an
taking part in a two-hour demonstration (Ibid).
The next attempt at transnational industrial action by the
International Shop Stewards' Steering Committee came in 1975. This was
in response to the redundancies and short-time working which ensued in
the European rubber industry in the wake of the oil crisis. Initially a
shop stewards' conference was held in Turin, Italy in May 1975, attended
by delegates from five countries. This was followed by a conference in
Liverpoo 1 on 11 September 1975, attended by eighty-one delegates, of
whom fifty-seven came from the UK, eleven from Italy, nine from Germany,
and four from France. Of these delegates, forty came from Dunlop
plants, sixteen from Michelin, eight from Pirelli, six from Goodyear,
four from British Leyland, and one each from Firestone, Continental
(Germany), and Innocent-Leyland (Italy), plus one CGIL union official,
an academic and two delegates from an unknown Germany company (Northrup
and Rowan, 1979, p.275). All the major unions operating in the rubber
industry in these countries were represented, including delegates from
the GMWU and I.G. Chemie, who were opposed to these meetings. Delegates
passed a reso 1ution calli ng for a. complete one-day stoppage on 22
October 1975, as a protest against job losses in the industry.
The ICEF was opposed to this strike in line with its opposition to
the International Shop Stewards' Committee. Charles Levinson's apparent
aim was to extend the influence of the ICEF, by setting up World
Councils for all the major companies in the rubber industry, as a
prelude to establishing international collective bargaining. Although
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the evidence would suggest that since the Dunlop-Pirelli World Council
inc1uded unions not invo1ved in negot iations with either company, and
excluded the main communist unions in France and Italy. there was little
prospect of this occurring. Consequently, Levinson found himself in
conflict with the International Shop Stewards' Committee, which carried
more "authority" amongst the rank-and-file than his "official" union
organisation.
To protect the interests of his International Secretariat, Charles
Levinson wrote to those unions affi 1iated to the rCEF, stating his
opposition to the strike and requesting them not to support it:
II I have been directed to inform you that no ICF affi 1iate is
participating either directly or indirectly.
Please be informed that none of the national federations or
plant representatives of IeF affiliates, which represent the
vast majority working in these companies, are in any way
involved. This manifestly political maneuver is designed to
further the penetration within our jurisdiction of WFTU
strategies and political trade union forces who represent
few workers in multinational companies. We ask affiliates
to inform their shop-level representatives of this action in
order to point up that it is not a spontaneous shop-steward
activity but rather a maneuver Of the Communls£ party
aG)aratusll (ICf C,rcular letter No. 169/15, 17 September,1 5).
The national trade unions were similarly keen to assert their
authority over the shop stewards' movement, and they duly instructed
their members not to support .the strike. Mr Biggin, the National
Industrial Officer of the GMWU at that time, wrote to his regional
officers reminding them of union policy:
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"News of the threatened stoppage has also appeared in the
national Press, and at a meeting of the Executive Committee
of the NJIC on the 24th September the Employers raised the
issue, expressing the hope that such "unofficial" action
would not be condoned by the Unions.
The position in our Union is quite clear in that such
proposed action will not be supported and you are requested
to inform your membership accordingly" (GMWU, 30 September
1975 ).
The response to the strike call varied considerably across Europe.
In Britain, Dunlop estimated that 4,524, or 10.2% of its workforce
heeded their stewards' instructions. In total, four plants were closed,
including Speke, the only plant to shut down in 1972. But,
"•••••.because these plants were working on short time, the
actual impact on production was negligible" (Northrup and
Rowan, 1979, p.276).
The other tyre companies in Britain were unaffected. Only the Goodyear
plant in Glasgow experienced a one hour stoppage on each of its three
shifts.
No industrial action was reported in Germany, where the unions were
opposed to any involvement, nor in Spain or the Benelux countries. In
France, only two Michelin plants suffered any strike action. About 17%
of the 27,000 workforce at Clermont~Ferrand struck for four hours, as
did about 10% of the workers at Bourges (Ibid).
In Italy, the strike was more widely supported, but as it coincided
with a major union demonstration, where 50% of Fiat employees and a·
similar percentage of members of the Industrial Union of the Province of
Turin went on strike to protest about job security, it is difficult to
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separate out the reasons for the strike. About 80% of the workers in
the Pirelli plants at Bicocca and Milan struck for four hours. In other
Pirelli plants in northern Italy there was a 40% response rate, while
the factories in southern Italy were unaffected. Michelin factories
a1so experi enced stoppages, but the American owned plants were 1eft
unscathed. The motivation for the strike by Italian rubberworkers is
therefore open to interpretation.
The next attempt to organise a European wide strike occurred on 7
March 1979, to protest about the announced closure of the Speke plant.
About 50% of Dunlop's labour force in Britain came out on strike, but
there were no simi lar strikes in Europe, only messages of support and
solidarity. Further strikes planned for 11 Apri 1 and 14 May were
cancelled, mainly because most of the workforce had accepted redundancy
and very little could now be achieved.
In their detailed study of the effectiveness of international trade
union action in the rubber industry, Northrup and Rowan (1979) concluded
that:
"lhe record indicates that, despite claims to the contrary,
neither the ICEF nor the Communist group has been able to
develop effective multinational action in the rubber tire
industry ••••••most claims of multinational union actions are
more imagi ned than real and that purported support of one
union for another over national boundaries almost invariably
has amounted to little more than leaflet action or letters
or telegrams of support to the unions and idle threats to
the companies ••••••The demonstrations of the Communist-
supported shop stewards organization, while sensational in a
different form, also appear to lack the continuity and
stability to build viable international union cooperation.
Such disruptions c_an apparently be maintained over a long
period in Italy, for short periods in France, and here and
there in Britain. But the Communists have no support in
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Germany or the United States, and disruption, with its
resultant loss of work and pay, does not gain long-term
adherents. The strength of the Communi sts in Italy and
France is in itself a major barrier to multinational union
cooperat ion in the Western world, for it exacerbates the
divisions in the labour movement ..•••.international union
cooperation, despite claims to the contrary, has not been a
serious factor in labor disputes in the rubber tire
industry •••••• It seems reasonable also to conclude that the
prospects for more effective multinational union cooperation
are not bright. Union divisions, divergence of nationa 1
union interests, employee disinterest in losing work and pay
because of problems elsewhere, the demonstrated ability of
compani es to hand1 e along stoppage and to avert product
shortages, the increase in the number of nonunion plants in
the United States and Canada, and the over-emphasis of the
internat iona 1 union movement in this industry on pub1icity
and sensation instead of a basic program and organization to
support it are some of the obvious reasons for this
conclusion. It therefore follows that the prospects for
multinational rubber industry labour-management information
meetings and/or bargaining sessions are poor for the
foreseeable future" (pp.309~lO).
Conclusions
There appear to be five main reasons why the trade unions failed to
mount a serious challenge to plant closures in the tyre sector:
Firstly, the unions were divided. This was manifest at all levels
of the unions concerned. Bargaining arrangements over pay and
ccndi tions were used to divide workers in one plant from those in
another. Similarly, rubber workers were unable to recognise their
common interests with employees in the motor industry, or workers
emp 1oyed in other sectors of manufacturi ng industry. Even at the
international level division persisted, as unions were segregated on
political and ideological grounds into rival bodies.
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Thus, no attempt was made to develop a strategy for the tyre sector
as part of an overall policy for the entire motor and components
industry. The resu lt was that the unions fa i1ed to fu11y comprehend
what factors were responsible for the run-down of the British tyre
sector, and they were therefore misled into supporting policies that ran
counter to their members' interests.
Secondly, the SWP was an inappropriate vehicle for developing a
sector strategy. The tyre companies were implementing a planned
rationalisation and closure programme, and were not prepared to discuss
their plans with the unions through the SWP. As a result the Committee
became almost exclusively concerned with "communications" and
"participation". There was, therefore, very little direct input from
government, because the major issues and concerns faci ng the industry
were dealt with through the BRMA, or directly with the respective
company, so that the SWP operated more or 1ess as a bi-part ite as
opposed to a tri-partite body.
A key policy advocated by the trade unions to protect the domestic
industry was a restriction on all tyre imports into the UK, and not just
those from Eastern Europe. But there was never any prospect of this
policy being adopted by the Government or the SWP. Paradoxically, the
possibility of developing other alternative policies were hampered by
the lack of any clear reporting lines between the union representatives
on the SWP and the shopfloor. Thus, the combination of role confusion
with the emphasi s on consensus, mi 1itated against the trade unions
putting forward anything that might have been deemed contentious. In
these circumstances, the only strategy that the unions could have
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conceivably supported was that laid down in "efficiency dialogues".
However, if we ana lyse the actual strategy adopted by the SWP, it
is clear that in a stagnant market it was not possible to increase
productivity and at the same time guarantee job security. If the
Bri t ish and European markets had been growi ng at rates comparable to
that in the 1960s, this could have been contemplated. But this was not
the case. Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that the British
tyre sector could have been revived through lower unit costs accompanied
by dynamic marketing. Indeed it is unlikely that a sufficient cost
advantage, aided or otherwise by the vagaries of the exchange rate,
could have been sustained long enough to boost home output to a level
where it could have guaranteed job security. Furthermore, there is
little reason to believe that the tyre companies would have been
prepared to make greater use of capacity in the UK, at the expense of
that in Europe, particularly when one takes into account the higher
proport i on of obsolescent plant in the UK compared to the cont i nent.
All of the tyre companies in Britain, with the exception of Michelin,
were still producing crossply tyres and fabric radials. These companies
did not have sufficient steel radial capacity in Britain to both source
the domestic market and to substantially increase sales to Europe.
Additionally, the solution to the industry's problems did not rest
with isolated improvements in operations at plant level. The rubber
companies had established an integrated production and marketing system
in Europe, and each plant was part of that network. They were not
autonomous entities. Decisions to increase production or investment in
one plant as opposed to another were not the prerogat i ves of plant
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management. These were made by senior management who based their
decisions on a host of factors including: growth and size of market;
level of investment required; profitability; costs and exchange rates.
Within the context of corporate planning, "efficiency dialogues" were
irrelevant. The tyre companies had been planning since 1974 to close
down factories and cut-back on capacity, which would inevitably lead to
thousands of job losses. It was not surprising, therefore, that David
Warburton, when interviewed in March 1984, said ruefully that
"efficiency dialogues" was nothing but a means of "raising productivity
on the cheap".
In short, tri parti srn paved the way for redundanci es after the
abolition of national bargaining, and the failure of the unions was
manifest in their acceptance of this policy and their inability to
recognise the full implications of its implementation.,
Thirdly, the unions were either under-resourced or their resources
were not well -menaqed. No effect i ve research faci 1it i es and support
services existed for full-time officials which could have assisted them
to understand management policies, or to develop an alternative strategy
for the tyre sector. The research faci 1it i es that were avai 1ab1e were
mainly orientated towards servicing the immediate needs of the
membership, i.e. wages and conditions.
Fourthly, the trade union movement is not radical. Unions see
thei r role to pursue thet r sect i ona1 interests through i ndustri a1
methods, as opposed to using strikes and industrial action to achieve
common political objectives. Thus since the Labour Movement was not
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prepared to directly confront the power of investors, there was little
prospect of the rubber unions being able to persuade Dunlop to reverse
its closure policy through conventional industrial and political
methods.
Fifthly, the trade unions are uneducated in business, and generally
are unable to monitor and analyse company strategy. This was apparent
among both shop stewards and 1ay officia1sin the rubber industry. An
abundance of information was regularly published on the motor and rubber
industries, which was acquired and analysed by economists and business
analysts working for the tyre companies, and used to keep management
fully informed of developments within the industry. The same
information was available to NEDO and the trade unions. However, as no
attempt was made by the unions to make use of this information, it was
not surprising that they were unaware that management were planning to
close down factories, or that they were unable to develop their own
strategies to counter management's.
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CHAPTER 7 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In his review of trade union responses to closures, Moore (1984)
identifies "established patterns of trade union organisation and
strategy ••••••as a major source of constraints" (p.209) upon union
effectiveness in fighting closures. As he says, the constraints are
"many and varied", ranging from the "coherence of policy objectives to
the quality of the organisation and its use of resources" (p.210).
As we described in chapter 2, the evolution of the trade unions
along craft, occupational and industrial lines has clearly served to
promote sectional interests at the expense of broader collective
interests. The unions have unquestioningly embraced collective
bargaining as the main method for achieving their objectives, which
has endorsed their sectional interests, while also acting as an
institutional means of controlling their industrial militancy. In
short, the trade unions are orientated towards furthering the sectional
interests of their members within the framework of capita1isrn, rather
than the interests of the working class through its abolition.
These structural and organisational constraints are mirrored in the
narrow objectives and strategies of trade unionism, so that they pursue
goals which are acceptable to the employers. Further, the unions have
accepted limitations on their use of industrial methods - as well as the
separation of industrial from political purposes ~ which has effectively'
restricted their ability to achieve their political objectives. The
consequence of this, as Moore concluded, is that:
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1I •••••• there has been no direct, coherent political dimension
of trade unionism in Britainll (p.2ll).
The pursuit of sectional economistic interests has reduced the
class nature of the conflict, and by so doing has inhibited the unions
from translating their industrial objectives into general political
demands. Further, the unions have been content to 1eave politica1
matters to the Labour Party. However, the dilemma for the Labour
Movement is that the abi1ity of the unions and the Labour Party to
engage in industrial or political action to achieve their objectives is
limited by the capitalist system itself and its values. The Labour
Movement appears to have gained marginal improvements for workers within
capitalism, but they have not been able to transform the system.
This was clearly demonstrated during the closure of Speke. Once
the closure had been announced the unions real ised that industri a1
action alone would not persuade the company to reverse its decision.
Only political pressure could do that, but by this stage it was too
late. The Government was not prepared to intervene directly to thwart
investors' strategies, as industrial output had already been cut back,
and plant closures were occurri ng, or had taken place, across
manufacturing industry. It was evidently not possible for the
Government or the unions to move decisively in the opposite direction to
that required by investors.
Thus, the central failure of the Labour Movement appears to be its
unwi 11ingness and inabi 1ity to put forward coherent a1tern ative
industrial strategies and a supporting political programme to challenge
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the everyday workings of capitalism. Without these, workers have had
little choice but to accept closures as inevitable, or even as rational~
As Moore (1984) put it:
" •••••• (1)n closure fi ghts workers appear to be forced to
realise it may be the workings of capitalism itself, through
the dec is ions of emp1oyers, governments and i nternat i ona1
agencies, which are making them redundant. But instead of
inspiring and assisting them to seek alternatives, the
conventional trade union role appears to be to pull them
back to look for a compromise, or even to countenance a
sell-out. If the picture sometimes appears to be the
reverse, with members cl amouri ng for redundancy payments
rather than job retention against the advice of their trade
union officials, it may amount to no more than reaping what
has already been sown" (p.212).
To overcome these constraints, Moore suggests that:
IIIf trade unions want to fight closures more effectively and
thereby resist their own membership loss, they need to move
on from 1abouri srn. Thi s means a re re] va1uat i on of trade
union aims, of their methods and levels of pursuing these,
and of the kind of education and servicing in political
economy which thei r members deserve and which thei r
circumstances require" (p.214).
In other words, Moore has himself now come to recognise the need
for IIstrategic trade unionism": the establishment of strategic
object i ves and the development of appropri ate uni on organi sat i on and
machinery to achieve these goals. As a first step, as Moore and others
have pointed out, the unions would need to organise at every level of
the enterprise and the economic system to pursue their objectives.
Thus, the uni ons at Dunlop cou1d presumably have enhanced thei r
ability to resist plant closures by organising strategically across the
entire motor and components industry - this appears not to have occurred
to shop stewards or uni on offi ci a1s, who treated plants in the rubber
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industry as distinct entities in a distinct industry. However, it is
obvious that the demand for tyres for original equipment is ultimately
determi ned by the number of cars produced in Britain, and that the
domestic output of vehicles is controlled by the production and sourcing
arrangements of the motor manufacturers. Yet the unions in the rubber
and vehicle industries apparently failed to recognise their common
interests.
Instead, the only preoccupation of the general unions in the rubber
industry was the low level of. pay of their members. Ironically,
however, the failure by the unions to adopt a strategic approach towards
pay allowed them to be out-manoeuvred by management on strategic issues,
which culminated in the withdrawal of the unions from national
negot iations for the rubber industry (and company 1eve1 at Dunlop).
This effectively left individual plants isolated and vulnerable and
appeared to make it much easier for management to close them.
Further, the unions at Dunlop found that they were unable to raise
issues with management beyond the immedi ate plant or division, as no
trade union platform existed which could discuss strategic matters with
senior management. Thus the unions were effectively excluded from any
discussions on the company's future plans, and were merely informed -
usually through the press - once they had been announced.
The only formal contact that the unions had with senior management
was through the Tyre Sector Working Party. However, it was not part of
the remit of the SWP to discuss issues that were specific to individual
companies. Indeed, the COfll1litteewas neither part of the bargaining
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arena, nor was it a strategic planning body. Instead it largely served
the interests of the employers by concentrating on merely conveying the
message to Labour that the British tyre sector was suffering from "low
productivity" and "inadequate communications".
If the trade uni ons had been organi sed on the basis of strategi c
unionism, there would have been little reason for them to attend the
SWP. For then it would have been obvious to both management and unions
that there were i rreconc i1ab1e conf1 i cts of interests. The onus wou1d
then have been clearly on the trade unions to extend their range of
research and specialist skills, specifically in the areas of financial
analysis and management techniques, to enable them to monitor and
understand management's plans.
However, a survey by the Trade Union Research Unit, at Ruskin
College, Oxford (1978), into the structure of union research departments
clearly revealed their limitations. They found that the large
multi-industry unions anployed an average of 5.6 research workers covering
a wide-range of subject matters, but tended to concentrate thei r
resources on wages, cost of living, employment legislation and
government 1egi slat ion. Although the majori ty of respondents saw "the
formu1at i on of alternat i ve pol icy as an important deve 1opment in the
role of research departments" (p.10), there was little evidence to
suggest that they recognised the need to take on the role of
"shadow-planning" (Bryer et a1, 1984b), or what was earlier termed
"parallel management" (Lane, 1981).
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It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that unless the unions
are prepared to moni tor what is happeni ng in various sectors of the
economy, they will remain oblivious to the strategies being pursued by
management. Further, they will be unable to develop their own plans and
strategies.
At Dunlop, it was evident that although many trade unionists were
aware that the tyre sector was experi enci ng "prob1ems II, few had any
precise information. Not many rubberworkers were expecting plant
closures. However, we have seen that by the beginning of the 1970s it
was clear to investors that the British tyre sector was suffering from a
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis her European competitors, owing to
the lack of investment in modern automated plant and an over-dependency
on outmoded crossply production. Dunlop in particular was in a very
vulnerable position, having invested in fabric radial production
equipment, in what was to prove an intermediate technology stage to the
steel radial. These problems were further compounded by the oil crisis
in 1973-4 as the steel radial was making its impact felt on the market.
The decline in vehicle production and the greater mileage offered by the
steel radial contributed to massive over-capacity in the European tyre
industry. Britain's problems were further aggravated by the strategy of
the vehicle and tyre manufacturers to integrate their European
manufacturing facilities, leading to a large increase in captive imports
of both cars and tyres. Inevitably, the tyre manufacturers sought to
reduce thei r capaci ty by closing down plants, and since the UK had a
large preponderance of obsolete production facilities, its plants were·
amongst the first to close, resulting in Britain suffering a far greater
loss of productive capacity and jobs than her European competitors.
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By 1972, investors were very concerned about the performance of the
tyre sector, as evidenced by the 1arge s1ide in the share price of
Dunlop, the leading British rubber company. The following year a study
by Cutler and Westwick (1973) revealed that the earnings of the motor
industry group, in particular Dunlop and British Leyland, would be
amongst the worst affected by any rise in inflation. The oil crisis at
the end of the year was to realise that fear. In 1977, Dunlop produced
its first set of full current cost accounts, which we saw confirmed that
the divestment of tyre operations was in the best interests of
investors.
Although the unions were aware that Dunlop was experiencing
"dt fficu1ties", it was not unti1 1978 at the start of pay negot iations,
that they were officially informed by management that the company had
"problems". A year later Dunlop formally announced the closure of its
tyre factory at Speke, followed by the shut-down of other production
facilities, as it set about reducing its manufacturing capacity in the
UK. This turn of events took the unions completely by surprise, though
previously published financial information clearly revealed that this
was part of management I s strategy, and cauld have been anticipated by
the trade unions.
The failure of the unions to monitor management strategy was again
underlined in 1983, when Dunlop announced that it was selling its
European tyre operations to Sumitomo of Japan. Thisal so came as a
"shock" to the unions, though a careful analysis of company policy would
have revealed this as a likely outcome.
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Much of the evidence from the Dunlop experience is consistent withthe
conclusion that the failure of the trade unions to monitor and
scrutinise the tyre sector prevented them from developing a coherent
policy and strategy. One contributory factor was that the GMBATU's
research de~artment lacked the resources and, for the most part, the
expertise to monitor policy decisions by the manufacturers. Most of its
resources were devoted to issues relating to wages and conditions. The
union's research department published a yearly review of wages and
conditions in the rubber industry, accompanied by an analysis of
developments occurring within the industry. However, it did not monitor
the rubber companies or the industry on a regular basis. Instead,
information was collected and analysed on a yearly basis to service
delegates at the annual Industrial Conference for the Rubber Industry,
and to assist them to formulate policy and to draw up their wage claim.
Inevitably these policy documents only presented a brief review of
the state of the industry, and the financial and economic analysis
tended to take a short-term rather than long-term assessment of the
prospects for the tyre sector. Not surprisingly the research department
did not anticipate or forewarn delegates to expect plant closures.
Delegates were merely warned at the 1977 Conference that "investment
rates ha(d) more than halved between 1965 and 1975", and that there was
a need to "restore and step-up investment 1eve1s, so as to safeguard
emp1oyment in the industry" (p.7).
The absence of a grasp of management's strategy appeared to also
allow management to undermine union organisation at Dunlop, by
manoeuvring them into withdrawing from the company-wide bargaining
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arrangements. This effectively left each plant isolated and hence vulnerable.
It may be argued that the trade unions were unable to develop the necessary
strategies and policies to combat plant closures because job losses on this scale
were beyond their experiences. The unions had came to accept the maintenance of
full employment as an integral part of the economic policies of both Labour and
Conservative Governments over the postwar period. Thus, when confronted with
plant closures, the unions were unable to offer a critique or to pose "viable"
alternatives to what, on the face of it, appeared to be "rational" decisions by
management to close-down old, obsolete and unprofitable factories.
What lessons have the trade unions learnt fram the factory closures of the
late 1970s and early 1980s? The evidence would suggest that little progress has
been made in the direction of "strategic trade unionism".
The prospects of the unions encouraging the establishment of "shadcw"
planning teams at all levels of the enterprise are not good. perhaps one reason
is that the unions still view corporate planning as the prerogative of management,
and see little prospect of extending collective bargaining into this area in the
foreseeable future. A further reason is that the re-election of the Conservative
Government in 1983, confronted the unions with a political and industrial
environment which was hostile to trade unionism. 'The mainstay of the union
ItOvement, the manufacturing workforce, had been reduced to 5 million people, and
the adoption and use of new technology had becane widespread. Meanwhile, the
employers have tried to capitalise on this more "favourable" environment to
re-assert their prerogatives, and many have taken a determined stand in attempting
to de-unionise the workplace. On top of t.hrs, the Government has used legal
measures to curtail the industrial objectives of the unions and ,furthermore, it
has challenged the derrocratic nature of decison-rnaking within unions and
questioned heM' far they represent the views of their members.
In response to this hostile industrial and political environment the unions,
rather than confront it, have retreated and same have begun to re-evaluate their
economic, political and social objectives. Fram this has emerged two distinct
strategies. The first has been dubbed "new realism", and is being pursued mainly
by the craft unions - the EETPU and the AEU. The second strategy is a respon~e to
the for.mer by the other major trade unions.
New realism has also became known as "market unionism". John Lloyd described
it as a shift fram "class based to market based unionism" (Financial Times, 31
January 1986, p. 27) . Here the membership are
365
recognised as "consumers not merely producers", and the employers are no
longer regarded as the "enemy". On the contrary:
"The common interest of both workers and management is
recognised as growth, profits, and increased market share"
(Ibid) •
From this has evolved what has been termed "employer-based"
collective bargaining, where the emphasis is placed on strike-free or
single-union deals. In return for recognition, the union is prepared to
de1iver a "responsible" workforce.
A final feature of "new realism" is the stress placed on
individual ballot~based democracy, in which members are given a private
choice to cast their vote, free from the "coercion" of the mass meeting.
Critics would contend that the intention is to discourage the
involvement of the activist and to undermine representative democracy.
It is clear that the proponents of "new realism" reject the
socialist and radical objectives of the Labour Movement - they advocate
coming to terms with capitalism not challenging it. Indeed it would
appear that their primary aim is to satisfy the immediate pecuniary
interests of their members.
The apparently competing strategy propagated by the other major
unions, notably, John Edmonds, General Secretary of the GMBATU
(Financial Times, 22 March and 3 June 1986), and Tom Sawyer, Deputy
Genera 1 Secretary of NUPE (Guardian, 29 January 1987), is critica1 of
"market unianism" because they believe that it is app1icab 1e to only a
small part of the workforce - essentially those with an already high
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level of pay and security.
A key policy of the general unions is to reject the narrow
individualism of "new realism", and to instead recognise the needs and
interests of the wider community especially on broader social issues -
equal opportunities, health and safety, maternity rights, unfair
dismissal, and legal advice. Further, the general unions have tried to
extend union membership and protection to par t.-t tme workers - mainly
women and workers in low paid and service industries.
Neverthe 1ess, these unions have also adopted many of the
"acceptabl e" features of "market unionism". For example, they have
extended their services to cater for the needs of their members as
holiday-makers, as parents, and as motorists. Like the "new realists"
they have tried to become more service and consumer orientated, though,
they would argue that this has not been at the expense of their
socialist objectives.
Thus, on the basis of either of these two strands of "modern" trade
unionism, it is difficult to envisage the union movement adopting a
common programme to challenge the power of investors by the systematic
use of financial information.
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Appendix 1 A Statistical Analysis of the British Tyre Sector
This appendix examines the decline of the British tyre sector over
the postwar peri od. In 1960, the UK was the 1argest tyre producer in
Europe and the third largest in the world behind the United States and
Japan. However, by 1980, the UK had also been surpassed by France,
Italy and West Germany.
Thi s was brought about by the fai 1ure of the rubber compani es to
invest in modern automated plant and machi nery in thei r British tyre
factori es. Thus 1eavi ng the UK heavi 1y dependent on crossp 1y
production, at a time when the European market was switching to steel
radial tyres. Further, the reduction in domestic vehicle production
also contributed to a substantial decline in original equipment demand.
The result was that more capacity was shut down in the UK than in
any other European country. Moreover, between 1973 and 1981, employment
'in the rubber industry fell from 135,000 to 96,000, with 16,000 of these
job losses occurring after 1979 (RPPITB, 1982). More importantly, half
of all the jobs lost were in the tyre sector (Ibid).
Early History
The foundationsof the modern rubber industry were laid during the
early part of the nineteenth century, due largely to the pioneering work
of Thomas Hancock in Britain and Charles Goodyear in the United States •.
In 1820, Hancock started to develop machinery and processes specifically
for app 1icat ion to rubber. The industry recei ved its second fi 11ipin
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1839 through Goodyear's discovery of vulcanisation, which enabled rubber
to be moulded for widescale industrial and commercial uses.
In 1845, Robert Thomson, a Scotsman, invented the pneumatic tyre,
but it was never commercially exploited and, after his death in 1873, it
was largely forgotten. More than forty years 1ater, in 1888, the
pneumatic tyre was "reinvented" by John Boyd Dunlop, another Scotsman.
The following year the Dunlop Rubber Company Limited was established to
manufacture the new tyre for use on bicycles. Two years 1ater the
Thomson patent was discovered which invalidated Dunlop's patent, leaving
the market wide open for a number of new companies to enter and exploit.
The early technological lead established by Britain and the United
States allowed them to dominate world trade in rubber goods. In 1850,
UK net imports of rubber stood at 209 tons, by 1900 consumpt ion had
I
increased beyond 10,000 tons and had doubled again by 1910. By
comparison, it is estimated that the United States was already consuming
rubber at the rate of 1,000 tons a year during the middle of the
nineteenth century. In 1900, this figure had increased to 20,000 tons
and by 1910 had similarly doubled (Wallace, 1952, pp.333-:-4). Measured
in terms of tons of rubber consumed, the American rubber industry was
now twice the size of the British industry. By 1920, American
consumpt ion of rubber had increased to 206,000 tons, more than eight
times the amount used by the British rubber industry. This phenomenal
growth in the size of the Ameri can industry was bought about by the
development of the motor industry, and the concomitant demand for rubber
tyres. As a resu1 t, in 1922, the United States accounted for about
three-:-quartersof the world consumption of rubber (Ibid, p.332).
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The United States has continued to maintain her lead as the world's
main consumer of rubber (that is natural and synthetic rubber
combined). In 1965, the United States accounted for 39% of world rubber
consumption, whilst Britain, now the third major consumer behind Japan,
consumed just under 7% of the total (calculated from Smit, 1982, p.183,
table 6.1). In 1980, the United States was still the major consumer
with nearly 2.6 million tonnes or 20.7% of total consumption, Japan was
in second place with just over 1.3 mi 11ion tonnes or 10.6% of total
consumption, but Britain had now fallen to fifth place in the table of
major western rubber consumers, with 379,000 tonnes or 3.1% of the
world's total consumption (Ibid)~
Performance of the British Rubber Industry
The British rubber industry produces a wide range of industrial
,
components and consumer goods, details of the main processing activities
can be seen in table 1. In 1981, the gross output of the industry (as
defined by MLH 481) amounted to nearly £2 billion which was about 1.2%
of total manufacturing output. The rubber industry cannot, however, be
considered homogeneous, but it can broadly speaking be classified into
two distinct sectors: tyre manufacturing and general rubber goods
(GRG). The former is the single largest product group acounting for in
1981, 29.7% of the industry's sales and nearly 29% of total employment.
The GRG covers a diverse range of industri al and consumer products
including: conveyor belting j hose j motor components; footwear and
medi ca1 products. The main customer is also the motor end
transportation industries' which take roughly 40% of total output (NEDC,
1970, p.3). In total, about 70% of all rubber consumption is absorbed
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by the motor industry (Ibid, p.14).
Table 1 Ma;n Process;ng Act;v;t;es ;n the Rubber Industry ;n 1981
Main Processing Number of Number of Employees
Activity Establishments Em~loyees as % of total
Moulding GRG 111 16,055 16.7
Extrusion - Belting & Hose 20 3,589 3.7
Tyre Distribution 633 16,435 17.1
Tyre Manufacturing 16 27,699 28.8
Tyre Repair and Remoulding 32 1,826 1.9
Tank Lining 4 525 0.5
Latex Dipping 11 2,757 2.9
Proofing and Spreading 6 811 0.8
Footwear 9 2,623 2.7
Foam 12 1,260 1.3
Adhesives 21 3,196 3.3
Other (Rubber) 139 19,372 20. 1
TOTAL 1,014 96,148 100.0
Source: RPPITB, 1982, p.31
To the extent that the products of the rubber industry are
components for other manufacturers' end products, in particular the
motor industry, means that the financi a1 performance of the rubber
compani es depends upon thei r success in sell ing to the end-user. In
this respect the decline of Britain's motor industry has had a direct
bearing on the investment, production and employment policies of the
rubber manufacturers.
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World Tyre Production
Table 2 denotes the share of the European, United States and World
markets taken by the rubber companies. Tyre production worldwide is
controlled by about ten large multinationals, with Goodyear and Michelin
the two major manufacturers. The former domi nates the North Ameri can
market with a 32% share of original equipment sales and 14.5% share of
rep1acement sales, whi 1st the 1atter is the 1argest manufacturer in
Europe with a 37% share of total sales (OE and replacement combined).
Table 3 shows the turnover of the ten largest rubber companies in
1982, ranked in order of sales. All of the tyre producers experienced a
decline in sales as a consequence of the recession and the contraction
in the rubber industry. Even Michelin, the pioneer of the radial tyre,
suffered a 10.6% decline in sales in 1982.
In addition to industry concentration, production is also
geographically concentrated in the hands of a small number of countries.
A1though sixty countri es now produce tyres, seven countri es in 1980,
accounted for 69% of total car and truck tyre production. These same
seven countries also produced over 80% of the total world production of
cars and commercial vehicles (calculated from SMMT data). This dual
concentration is not surprising since tyre plants have traditionally
been situated close to vehicle production facilities to meet original
equipment requirements.
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Table 3 Turnover of Major Rubber Manufacturers, 1982
Sales ($m)
Goodyear
Michelin
Pirelli
Firestone
B.F. Goodrich
Bridgestone
Dunlop Holdings
General
Uniroyal
Continental
8,689
5,567
4,210
3,869
3,005
2,860
2,668
2,062
1,967
1,338
% change 1981~82
- 5. 1
':'10.6
.:.5.4
-11.3
.:.5.6
':'13.2
.:.9.6
':'18.3
-13.0
.:.6.7
Source: Financial Times, 20 September 1983, p.18.
Tab1es 4a and band 5a and b present disaggregated car and truck
tyre output statistics for the major producer countries, from 1960~82.
The static nature of output in these countri es confi rms the impact of
the two oil crises, recession and increased radia1isation.
Nevertheless, the United States still remained the world's largest
producer of car tyres, though its share had been more than halved since
1960, when it produced nearly 60% of world output. In the truck tyre
sector, the United States has been displaced by Japan, which trebled its
share of world production in two decades. The UK by contrast has
cont inued to loose ground in both segments, and. is now ranked as the
seventh largest tyre producer in the world (the Soviet Union is larger),
and the fourth largest in Western Europe.
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Table 4a Car Tyre Production in Major Countries, 1960-82 (millions)
1960 1965 1970 1973 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982
Canada 7.60 12.05 17.72 16.57 13.58 18.85 18.14 18.68 20.09
France 13.65 20. 12 34.95 41.33 34.43 44.10 44.23 38.10 36.67
W Germany 12.85 23.16 33.93 37.81 28.38 34.35 33.80 31.66 32.84
Italy 5.70 13.31 19.99 21.89 18.68 23.65 23.83 21.92 19.95
Japan 2.11 8.58 32.42 46.26 45.89 61.81 65.10 62.59 63.68
U.K. 12.85 19.94 26.64 26.57 22.22 23.61 22.90 20.83 21.96
USA 105.34 147.35 164.72 189.16 158.09 168.03 130.86 149.79 149.48
Others 15.70 29. 19 50.23 89.61 105.83 115.60 121.14 n.a. n.a.
World 175.80 273.70 380.60 469.20 427.10 490.0 460.0 n.a. n.a.
Sources: International Rubber Study Group, 1980, p.56, table 6.
Smit, 1982, p.161.
Rubber Statistical Bulletin, February 1984.
Table 4b Share of World Car Tyre Production held by Major Countries,
1960-80 (S)
1960 1965 1970 1973 1975 1979 1980
Canada 4.3 4.4 4.7 3.5 3.2 3.8 3.9
France 7.8 7.4 9.2 8.8 8.1 9.0 9.6
W Germany 7.3 8.5 8.9 8.1 6.6 7.0 7.3
Italy 3.2 4.9 5.3 4.7 4.4 4.8 5.2
Japan 1.2 3.1 8.5 9.9 10.7 12.6 14.2U.K. 7.3 7.3 7.0 5.7 5.2 4.8 5.0USA 59.9 53.8 43.3 40.3 37.0 34.3 28.4Others 8.9 10.7 13.2 19.1 24.8 23.6 26.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: calculated from table 4a
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Table 5a Commercial Vehicle Tyre Production in Major Countries, 1960-82
(millions)
1960 1965 1970 1973 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982
Canada 0.85 1.49 2.09 2.86 2.53 3.36 3.33 2.90 2.87
France 2.87 3.25 4.47 4.41 4.94 6.37 6.18 5.36 4.05
W Germany 1.90 2.40 3.62 3.53 3.47 4.24 4.22 3.98 3.56
Italy 1.20 1.97 2.36 2.44 2.89 2.89 2.79 2.57 2.34
Japan 3.45 11.95 22.18 28.47 25.78 38.87 45.70 44.19 41.79
U.K. 3.05 3.45 4.08 3.72 3.79 3.28 3.45 2.90 2.42
USA 14.48 20.48 25.68 34.26 28.61 38.66 28.40 31.97 29.02
Others 5.40 28.81 42.02 50.81 50.69 74.33 73.93 n.a. n.a.
World 33.20 73.80 106.50 130.50 122.70 172.00 168.00 n.a. n.a.
Sources: International Rubber Study Group, 1980, p.56, table 6.
Smit, 1982, p.161.
Rubber Statistical Bulletin, February 1984.
Table 5b Share of World Commercial Vehicle Tyre Production held by
Major Countries, 1960-80 (S)
1960 1965 1970 1973 1975 1979 1980
Canada 2.6 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0France 8.6 4.4 4.2 3.4 4.0 3.7 3.7
W Germany 5.7 3.3 3.4 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.5Italy 3.6 2.7 2.2 1.9 2.4 1.7 1.7Japan 10.4 16.2 20.8 21.8 21.0 22.6 27.2U.K. 9.2 4.7 3.8 2.9 3.1 1.9 2.1USA 43.6 27.8 24.1 26.3 23.3 22.5 16.9Others 16.3 39.0 39.5 38.9 41.3 43.2 44.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: calculated from 'table 5a.
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Overcapacity
-During the 1960s, tyre demand in Europe and the United States was
growing at an annual rate of 9% and 10% respectively (Harkleroad, 1980c,
p.8), encouraged by the postwar boom in the vehicles market which
continued into the early 1970s. In response, the tyre manufacturers in
Europe laid down enough capacity in the late 1960s to accommodate this
increas ing 1eve 1 of demand. Unfortunately, thetr calculations were
upset, firstly, by the oil crisis of 1973-74, which led to a slump in
car product ion, and thus a reduction in origina1 equipment tyre sales
and; secondly, by the spread of the longer lasting radial tyre, which
caused a dramatic shrinkage in the size of the replacement market. As a
consequence, by the end of the 1970s, excess capacity in the European
tyre sector was estimated to be in the order of 20% (Financial Times, 21
December 1982).
Table 6 Percentage Capacity Utilisation in European Tyre Plants, 1975
Car tyres Truck tyres
Belg/Lux
France
West Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
UK
81.3
79.1
63.6
75.0
80.0
64.0
73.7
80.0
82.5
72.7
80.0
93.3
87.5
82.2
Source: SRI, 1980, p.34, table 21.
Table 6 confirms that the full effects of overcapacity began to be
felt in 1975, and the initial response from the rubber companies was a
price war that continued for the next two years (Norbye, 1982, p.185).
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This, however, only delayed the inevitable rationalisation programmes
which were to follow. At first, a number of small operations were shut
down in Europe. In 1975, Tre11eborg stopped producing car and truck
tyres in Sweden; at the beginning of 1977, BF Goodrich closed its plant
at Kob1enz, West Germany; and the following year, Firestone closed its
factory in Pratte1n, Switzerland.
In Spring 1979, the major phase of rationalisation and plant
closures began. Uniroyal, America's number three tyre producer,
withdrew from Europe and sold its ent ire European tyre operat ions to
Germany's Cont inenta 1 Gunvni-Werke for $55 mi 11ion (Business Week, 27
October 1980, p.68). Two other American companies, BF Goodrich and
General Tyre, also pulled out of Europe. By the end of 1980, Firestone
had ceased operations in Britain, and Phoenix and Metze1er, West
Germany's second and third 1argest tyre compani es respectively, had
I
withdrawn from the tyre market. Goodyear also shut its factory in
Glasgow; Pire11i closed its plant at Carlisle; and Dunlop closed two
plants at Speke in Liverpool and Inchinnan in Scotland and, in 1983,
Dunlop sold its entire European tyre operations to Sumitomo of Japan.
Details of these plant closures can be seen in table 7.
Between 1977 and 1981, European tyre productive capacity was
reduced by 97,000 tyres per day, equi va1ent to 11% of total capacity
(Financial Times, 21 December 1982). However, plant closures continued,
so that by 1983, 19 factori es had been closed, accounti ng for 20% of
European tyre productive capacity (TAB, November/December 1983, p.25).
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Table 7 Tyre Production Capacity Reductions in Europe 1977-81,
1,000 tyres a day
Ceat (Italy)
Dunlop (GB)
Firestone (GB, Sweden, Switzerland)
Goodrich (W Germany)
Goodyear (GB, Sweden)
Metze1er (W Germany)
Phoenix (W Germany)
Tre11eborg (Sweden)
Total
5
19
27.6
5
13.4
11
10
6
97
Source: Financial Times, 21 December 1982, p.4.
Capacity in the UK
Table 8 shows that at the beginning of 1983 there were six rubber
companies producing tyres in eleven factories in the UK. Six tyre
plants had been closed, and Michelin had announced that its factory at,
Mallusk in Northern Ireland, was to shut at the end of 1983. In
addition, three associated brand companies had also been closed:
Bergougnan (Michelin), Dayton (Firestone) and Henley's (Avon).
Table 9 details the estimated tyre production capacity of the
individual companies for the three years, 1964, 1969 and 1981. Between
1964 and 1969, tyre capacity in the UK grew by almost 45% from 105,000
units per day to 152,000 units daily. The largest expansion in capacity
was made by Michelin (200%), Pire11i (100%) and Goodyear (61%). Dunlop,
by contrast, increased its capacity by just 7.5%, 1eavi ng the company
over-dependent on the output of crossply tyres. This ultimately
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Table 9 Estimated Tyre Production Capacityl in the UK by Individual
lyre Companles, 1964, 1969 and 19B1 (dally unlts 'OOOs)
1964 1969
Dunlop 53 57
Michelin 10 30
Goodyear 18 29
Pire11 i 3 6
Uniroyal/Continental 4 4
Firestone 12 18
Avon 5 8
Total 105 152
1 car and truck
1981
482
40
39
13
9
11
160
2 excluding the closure of Inchinnan and John Bull (Leicester) which
would reduced daily capacity by a further 3,800 tyres.
Sources: 1964 and 1969, Harkleroad, 1980b, p.18, Exhibit 7.
1981, Charles Zub Associates, 1981, pp.354-7 and my estimates.
contri buted to the serious problems that Dunlop was to face over the
following decade. Indeed, with the excep~ion of Firestone, Dunlop
reduced its tyre production capacity between 1977 and 1981, by a larger
amount than any other company (see table 7).
Equally disturbing was the fact that Britain suffered a greater
loss of tyre-making capacity through plant closures than any other
country. Table 10 shows that between 1979 and 1980, tyre capacity in
the UK was reduced by nearly 44,000 units per day (the two later plant
closures raises the figure to over 50,000 tyres per day, or a quarter of
product ive output). West Germany, by compari son, reduced its capaci ty
by 26,000 tyres per day, whilst Sweden cut capacity by 19,500 tyres per
day. Put another way, plant closures in the UK accounted for over half
the total reduction in European tyre product ion capacity duri ng this
period.
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Table 10 Tyre Plant Closures in Europe by Country and Manufacturer
Dai 1y
Country Manufacturer Location Year Capacity
W Germany B F Goodrich Kob1enz 1977 5,000
Metze1er Munich 1978-79) - 11,000Bruberg 1978-79)
Phoenix Hamburg 1977-78 10,000
UK Firestone Brentford 1980 7,400
" Wrexham 1980 6,000
Goodyear Glasgow 1979 5,400
Dunlop Speke 1979 15,000
Sweden Firestone Boras 1980 4,000
Viskafor 1980 1,500
Goodyear Norkoping 1980 8,000
Trel1eborg Tre 11eborq 1977-78 6,000
Switzerland Firestone Pratte1n 1978 8,700
Italy CEAT Turin 1979 5,000
Source: Charles Zub Associates, 1981, p.362.
But why did Britain bear the brunt of these closures? The primary
reason was that the tyre plants in the UK were older and, hence 1ess
profitab 1e, than those in Europe. The British plants were a1so more,
heavily dependent on the now obsolete crossp1y tyre, and this capacity
was considered surplus to requirements. According to SRI (1980):
"Overcapacity in Europe is at a level roughly equivalent to
the UK's entire production. If Britain were to cease making
tyres, this would just take up the slack in the European
tyre production system" (p.40).
On the basis of this estimate, analysts were probably expecting
product ive capacity in Western Europe to be cut by a further 160,000
tyres a day. Particularly since in 1981, British car tyre plants were
operating at 77.5% of capacity, whilst in the commercial vehicle tyre
sector, the respective figures were 92% in the LHS (light-heavy) segment
and 66% in the HS (heavy') (TAB, September/October 1981, p.80).
383
In Europe, West German car tyre plants were operating at 82% of
capacity, and for all tyres the estimate was 80% (Rubber Trends, No. 94,
June 1982, p.28). The French tyre plants were similarly operating at
70-75% of capacity utilisation in 1982 (Rubber Trends, No. 98, June
1983, p.21).
The UKTyre Sector
There are a number of di fferent markets for tyres, rangi ng from
cars, commercial vehicles, Earthmover, Land/Road, agricultural, motor
cycle, aeroplane, and many more. The two major segments are car and
commercial vehicles tyres, which together are responsible for 93-95% of
total tyre production (calculated from Rubber Statistical Bulletin). On
a volume bas is, the market for car tyres is the 1argest segment, but
commercial vehicle tyres are about four times the size and value, so,
that the two segments are of comparable size in terms of value.
Table 11 shows that the total production of car and commercial
vehicle tyres increased over the postwar period to reach a peak of just
over 28 million units in 1971. From 1960 up to 1971, car tyre
production increased by 118% to meet the rapidly growing demand from the
motor industry. Thereafter, the production of car tyres fell by 22.5%
between then and 1983, while commercial vehicle tyres fell by 46%. The
major decline in both segments were crossply tyres, which contracted
steadily over the period. Consequently, between 1973 and 1983, radials
increased their share of total car tyre production from 16.1% to 96.4%,·
and of truck tyres from 64.9% (in 1974) to 87%. The bu1k of thi s
production was steel radials, as the textile radial's share of total
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Table 11 New Tyre production in the UK, 1960-83 (1000 units)
Car/Van Commercial Vehicles
Crossp1y Radial Tota11 Crossp1y Radial Tota11
1960 12,854 3,049
1965 19,940 3,452
1970 26,462 4,083
1971 28,039 4,162
1972 26,694 3,642
1973 10,093 16,472 26,565 3,722
1974 7,313 16,560 23,873 1,274 2,352 3,626
1975 5,919 16,298 22,217 1,155 2,635 3,790
1976 4,902 21,144 26,046 1,161 2,663 3,825
1977 4,190 21,055 25,246 1,045 2,620 3,665
1978 3,193 19,973 23,166 947 2,552 3,499
1979 2,824 20,785 23,609 694 2,591 3,289
1980 1,596 21,303 22,872 571 2,876 3,447
1981 1,510 19,320 20,829 456 2,439 2,895
1982 1,105 20,853 21,958 345 2,073 2,418
1983 773 20,954 21,727 292 1,957 2,249
1 may not add up to total due to rounding.
Source: Rubber Statistical Bulletin (various issues)
radial car tyre production declined from around 40% to about 13% (Rubber
Trends, No. 99, September 1983, p.28). Eventually, both crossp1y and
text ile radi a1 product ion wi 11 be phased out completely. In the truck
tyre sector, however, steel radi a1s wi 11 take much longer to fully
penetrate the market because price considerations outweigh high
performance demands.
Market Segments
The tyre sector can be' divided into two distinct market segments:
original equipment (DE) and replacement sales. The former accounts for
about 25% of total sa1~s by the British manufacturers (taking into
consideration exports and sales to Government), and is characterised by
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direct, 1arge volume transactions between the tyre compani es and the
vehicle producers. The latter is roughly twice the size of the original
equipment market and involves sales to vehicle owners to replace
worn-out tyres. The market is 'served through a variety of channels,
inc1uding sales through outlets contro 11ed by the tyre manufacturers,
independent dealers and garages.
One of the characteri stics of the demand for tyres is that the
replacement market is far larger than the OE market (Figure 1). This is
always true except when the vehicle parc is growing extremely rapidly,
as it was up to the mid-1960s. Figure 1 shows the production and sales
of car tyres by the British-based tyre companies, all of whom are
members of the British Rubber Manufacturers Association (BRMA). It is
noteworthy that up to the beginning of the 1970s, sales usually just
exceeded production. Thereafter, however, the tyre producers began to
•
rely more heavily upon sourcing the British market from their plants in
Europe. This was because their failure to invest in steel radial
technology and, hence the over-reliance of the British plants on
out-dated crossp1y production equipment, ensured that as the demand for
steel radials expanded, there was insufficient capacity to meet it.
Consequently, steel radials were imported from their European plants to
satisfy consumer demands.
Original Equipment Demand
The industry demand for original equipment tyres is price
inelastic, and is determined by the number of vehicles produced. As
tyres constitute an extremely small cost in the overall price of a car,
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changes in OE tyre prices have virtua 11y no effect upon car demand.
Clearly, however, the demand facing the individual tyre company is more
e1astic; the car manufacturers are able to buy from the tyre company
offeri ng the lowest prices. Tyre prices are negotiated for each model
range, but historically the vehicle manufacturers have been able to
squeeze the lowest possible prices, so that prices for standard high
volume tyres vary by less than 1% between suppliers (Fishwick, 1977,
p.39), and profit margi ns are very low. As a consequence, OE tyre
prices in Britain were reputed to be 20-30% lower than those prevailing
in Europe (Rubber Trends, No. 99, September 1983, p.36).
The relationship between the tyre companies and the vehicle
manufacturers is one of bilateral oligopoly. In such a situation,
prices are determined by the relative bargaining strengths of the two
parties, and in this particular case the market power clearly rests with
I
the motor manufacturers, who have the option of buying from any of the
tyre companies. Their negotiating power was further strengthened by the
overcapacity in the tyre sector, which helped to force down prices, as
well as by the decline in the British motor industry, which led to
increased compet ition for fewer orders. In practice, however, the
vehicle producers do not constantly switch from one supplier to another,
instead close links have been established between individual companies,
e.g. Leyland with Dunlop, ford with the American tyre companies
(Fishwick, 1977, p.ix). In fact, until the long str-tke at Dunlop in
1970, the company was virtually the sole supplier to Austin-Morris. Now
all vehicle producers r~ly upon a system of multi-sourcing to overcome
supply problems.
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Table 12 gives an estimated breakdown of the OE tyre market between
manufacturers in 1979. Duri ng the 1970s, Miche 1in I s techni ca 1
superiority in steel radial technology over the other tyre
manufacturers enabled the company to increase its share of the OE
Table 12 Estimated Share of the UK Original Equipment Tyre Market,
1979 (S of volume sales)
Cars Ford BL Vauxhall Talbot
Michelin 30-32 30-32 28-30 30-34
Dunlop 20-22 32-36 15-20 20-25
Goodyear 15-18 14-16 15-20 20-25
Firestone 13-15 9-11 12-15 10-14
Uniroyal 5-6 9-13 0-2
Pire11 i 15-20 7-11 8-10
Avon 0- 2
Imports
Commercial Vehicles Ford BL Bedford Dodge
Michelin 40-45 45-50 35-40 40-45
Dunlop 18-24 20-25 16-20 18-20
Goodyear 12-16 12-15 16-20 12-16
Firestone 8-10 6-8 10-24 8-12
Pirelli 12-14 0-8 4-8 8-10
Uniroyal 0-8 6-10 0-6
Avon 0-1 0-1 0-2
Note: Tyres are also fitted as OE to a number of other small passenger
car and commercial vehicle company marques.
Source: Rubber Trends, No.86, June 1980, p.25, table 7
market at their expense. In 1979, Michelin was the market leader in the
OE segment, ahead of Dunlop in second place, with the former
particularly dominant in the commercial vehicle segment. But now that
the technological gap has been closed, any further gains or losses in
market share are unlikely to be solely due to technical considerations.
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The nature of the sourci ng system does, however, impose certai n
cost penalties on the tyre manufacturers. Tyre deliveries are made each
day, but the motor compani es hold no more than three days I product ion
requirements. Instead, schedules are issued to the suppliers a few
months ahead and are then subject to regular revision, so that there are
no firm orders. As a result, the tyre manufacturers bear all the costs
directly associated with interruptions to vehicle production, whether
due to demand factors or supply problems (Fishwick, 1977, p.38).
This system compares very unfavourably (for the tyre companies) to
that practiced by Toyota and its supplier Sumitomo. Here, the factories
are next to each other and 1orries loaded with tyres 1eave the plant
every fifteen minutes, as Toyota keeps just five hour stock. Under this
system an indication of supply requirements are given one month ahead,
with actual orders placed on an hour-to-hour basis. Production is then,
geared up to meet demand. The benefit to Sumitomo is that it only needs
to hold two days supply of raw materials, which has assisted the company
to scale down its stock of finished tyres since 1975, from 428,000 to
140,000. Thus enabling Sumitomo to reduce its working capital by a
third (British Business, October, 1981, p.27).
In spite of these low prices and small profit margins, the tyre
companies nevertheless still consider it extremely important to secure
DE contacts; firstly, because it guarantees a long production run and;
second ly, because it creates demand in the more 1ucrat ive replacement
market. This is based on the assumption that there is a link between DE
fitment and brand loyalty in replacement sales. Though there is a great
deal of debate about the extent of this relationship, particularly in
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view of the increasing tyre life.
Replacement Market
The replacement market is the 1argest and most profitable segment
of the tyre sector. In terms of volume, the replacement demand for car
tyres is about 2i times as great as that for original equipment sales.
The key determinant of replacement demand is the number of vehicles in
use (lithe car pare"}, but several other factors, some of which are
intangible, also have a considerable impact. These include: vehicle
use; tyre quality; accelerating and braking habits; and climatic
conditions.
Table 13 shows that the car parc increased on average by
approximately 3.3% per annum throughout the 1970s, compared to an annual
average of 8.5% during the 1960s. The car parc has continued to grow,
albeit at a slower rate, in spite of periods of recession and the slump
in economic production caused by the two oil crises. This is because
when necessity dictates, people will postpone the purchase of a new car
and keep their old car in service for a longer period of time. The slow
down in the growth of the vehicle parc is due to the increasing maturity
of the UK market, in common with similar developments in other European
countri es and the United States. From 1960 to 1964, replacement car
demand in the UK accounted for about 28% of total annual demand, but
between 1970 and 1974, new demand became less important and replacement
demand constituted two-thirds of total demand (Bhaskar, 1979, pp.105-6).
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Table 13 Passenger Cars in use in the UK, 1970-82 ('000 units)
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
11,082
12,358
13,023
13,815
13,948
14,061
14,373
nla
14,417
14,927
15,438
15,633
16,075
Source: SMMT, 1983
Details of car density in Britain compared with the United States
and various other European countries can be seen in table 14. Note that
Table 14 Car Density in the US, Japan and Selected European
Countries, 1960-80
Total stockCars per 1000 population (mi11ions)
1960 1970 1978 1980
Belgium 82 213 303 3.0
France 119 254 333 17.7
W Germany 84 220 357 21.6
Italy 40 190 303 17.0
Japan 5 85 185 21.3Netherlands 45 200 286 4.0Portugal 18 57 91 0.9Spain 9 70 175 6.5Sweden 160 285 345 2.9UK 106 210 256 14.4USA 344 434 526 117.1
Source: Jones, 1981, p.91, table 4.
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maturity in Europe has been reached at a much lower level of car density
than in the United States, mainly because of the greater population
density, more extensive public transport provisions and the much higher
cost of buying and maintaining a car (Jones, 1981, p.8). Given that a
high proportion of the projected increase in demand during the 1980s is
expected to occur in the countries of Southern Europe: Spain, Portugal
and Greece, it is not surprising that the motor vehicle and tyre
manufacturers have both established plant in these countries in recent
years.
Although the car parc has cant inued to grow, it has not had the
effect of stimulating replacement tyre sales. This is because a number
of other factors have combined to retard any prospective growth. For
Table 15 Passenger Car and Van Mileage in Great Britain, 1970-82
Annual average distance 1
Total kilometres Total kilometrestravelled by cars and vans(thousand kilometres) cars (billions) vans (billions)
1970 n.a. 162.92 19.10
1971 n.a. 175.62 19.93
1972 14.6 186.07 20.64
1973 14.5 196.49 21.59
1974 13.9 190.83 21.35
1975 14.0 196.40 21.20
1976 14.22 202.49 21.6421977 14.4 205. 19 21.6321978 15.0 215.22 21.8921979 14.8 215.86 21.74
1980 14.9 224.42 22.11
1981 14.4 222.69 22.131982 15.2 239.82 23.65
1 vans taxed for private use only.
2 revised.
Sources: 1970-71, Tra~sport Statistics Great Britain, 1970-80, p.38, table 2.1
1972-82, " " "", 1972-82, p.42, table 2.1
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examp 1e, higher petrol prices have helped to reduce average annual
mi 1eage (see table 15), thereby reduci ng the wear and tear on tyres.
Even before the first oil shock, average annual mileage had remai ned
static, which is partly a reflection of the lower average distances
travelled by households where there are two or more vehicles. Table 16
shows that between 1970 and 1982, the number of two car households
doubled from 8% to 16%.
Table 16 Availability of Cars to Households in Great Britain,
1970-82 CS)
One or more One car Two Households
No car cars only or more in GB (mi11ion)
1970 48 52 44 8 18.2
1971 48 52 44 8 18.4
1972 47 53 44 9 18.6
1973 46 54 45 9 18.8
1974 45 55 45 10 19.0
1975 44 56 46 10 19.1
1976 44 56 45 11 19.3
1977 43 57 46 11 19.6
1978 43 57 45 12 19.7
1979 4·2 58 44 13 19.7
1980 41 59 44 15 19.9
1981 39 61 45 15 20.1
1982 39 61 45 16 20.3
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain, 1972-82, p.63, table 2.22
An additiona 1, and indeed the most important inf1uence on tyre
wear, has been the radial tyre. Its impact on replacement sales has
been determined by the pace at which radials have displaced crossply
tyres in both OE and replacement segments of the market. At a resu1t,
by the late 1970s, the increasing level of radia1isation had more than
compensated for the recovery in annual vehicle mileage. Thus providing
no stimulus to replacement demand.
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Size of the Replacement Market
The replacement market is served by radial and crossply tyres, and
to a lesser extent by remoulded tyres. Table 17 below shows the net
replacement market for car tyres, excluding remoulds.
Table 17 UK Net Re~lacement New Car Tyre Salesl, 1971-82 (000'5)
Net
BRMA2 Competiti~e Distribut~r
Replacement
Imports _ Exports _ Market
1971 12,563 ),727 597 13,693
1972 14,944 2,019 838 16,125
1973 13,943 1,987 897 15,033
1974 13,069 2,136 599 14,606
1975 14,007 2,287 1,366 14,928
1976 14,933 2,836 1,955 15,814
1977 13,817 2,932 1,828 14,921
1978 14,212 3,536 2,432 15,316
1979 13,156 4,150 2,005 15,301
1980 11,651 3,491 1,440 13,702
1981 11,735 3,791 1,083 14,443
1982 11,618 4,100 1,152 14,566
1 Approximate only, stock movements and other unidentified factors not
taken into account; excludes replacement tyre sales to the government.
2 Including sales to distributors which are subsequently exported.
3 Including some tyres imported to be fitted as OE, and also including
parallel imports (i.e. BRMA brand tyres imported by independent
distributors).
4 Including some tyres imported from abroad which are then exported.
Sources: BRMA data, Rubber Statistical Bulletin (various issues).
Competitive imports, 1971-75, Fishwick, 1977, p.24, table 11.9
Competitive imports, 1976-78, Rubber Trends, No.86, June 1980,
p.26, table 14.
Competitive imports, 1979-83, my calculations based on data in
Tyres &.Accessories, April 1983, p.85.
Distributor exports, calculated from Rubber Statistical
Bulletin (various issues) and Business Monitor, PQ491.
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The net replacement market had been stagnating since the beginning
of the 1970s. On the one hand, growth in replacement sales had been
stimulated by the rising vehicle parc, while on the other, it had been
retarded by the greater preference for radial tyres. Additionally, the
two oil crises had an adverse impact on vehicle mileage, with the cost
of crude oil increasing by 1,473% between 1971 and 1981 (Bryer et a1,
1984a, p.2l). Latterly oil prices have fallen in real terms owing to
the oil glut, and average and total annual mileage are now increasing.
The net replacement market reached a peak of 16.1 million tyres in
1972, mainly because of the high level of BRMA sales, brought about by a
large amount of forward-buying by dealers in anticipation of price
increases (Tyres & Accessories, May 1976, p.41). Consequently the 1973
figures were artificially deflated. Around this time fabric belted
radials became the main fitment for passenger vehicles, which coincided•
with a peri od of peak car sales. As a result, the net replacement
market increased by nearly 6% in 1976 (based on the assumption that the
replacement cycle for a fabric radial is 3~ years compared with 2~ years
for a crossp ly tyre). However, after 1976 the net replacement market
declined owing to the spread of the fabric radial, which increased from
50.3% of OE demand in 1972 to 86.6% in 1974, together with the slowdown
in the growth of the vehicle parc after 1972, accompanied by a reduction
in veh ic1e mi 1eage. The one factor work ing in the oppos ite direct ion
was that people were keeping their old cars for longer periods. This is
indicated by the decline in new registrations share of the car parc in
the mid-1970s. In 1972, new registrations share of the car parc reached
a peak of 13.1% before falling to a trough of 8.6% in 1975, but by 1979
new regi strat ions reached a new peak of 1.73 mi 11ion cars or 11.6% of
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the car parc (calculated from SMMT data).
In 1980, the net replacement market fell by 10.5% to 13.7 million
tyres due to the switch away from fabric to steel radials in 1975 (based
on the assumption that the life of a steel radial is 4! to 5 years).
Once the replacement market has been fully saturated with steel radials,
demand will adjust to a lower level for the rest of the decade. Since
1975, steel radials have gradually displaced crossp1y and fabric
radi a1s, enab 1ing the former to increase its share of the replacement
market from 26% in 1975 to 78% in 1982, as shown in table 18.
Table 18 Breakdown of UK New Car Tyre Replacement Marketl, 1975
and 1978-82 (mi1110n5)
Radial
Steel radials as %
Cross~ly Textile Steel Total of total market
1975 4.7 5.4 3.6 13.7 261978 2.9 7.0 6.3 15.2 411979 2.1 5.6 7.5 15.2 49
1980 1.6 3.7 8. 1 13.4 601981 1.1 3. 1 8.9 13.1 68
1982 0.7 2.2 10.2 13.1 78
1 The source and hence the size of the replacement market are different
from that used for table 5.1.
Source: Rubber Trends No. 99, September 1983, p.41, table 41.
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Car Replacement Ratio
One measure of the impact of the radial tyre on the replacement
market is the car replacement ratio. It is calculated by dividing the
number of rep 1acement tyres sold by the number of vehi c 1es in use.
Unfortunately, the compilation of government statistics does not allow
us to calculate an exact measure, because vans may be classified as
either passenger cars or commercial vehicles depending on their
registered use. The tyre production statistics, on the other hand,
combine car and van tyres under one headi ng. After making allowances
for these statistical handicaps, it can be seen from table 19 that there
was a trend decline in the replacement ratio, from 1.80 in 1972 to 1.12
in 1982. The growth in the size of the car parc proved insufficient to
compensate for the increased sales of radial tyres. Unless tyre safety
standards are made more rigid or present legislation is enforced more
l
comprehensively, then the trend decline in the ratio will continue until
it matches the levels prevailing on the continent (see tables 20 and
21).
The public, generally speaking, tend to be very lax and ambivalent
towards the tyres on their cars. Surveys conducted by the National Tyre
Distributors Association (N.T.D.A.) show that there has been a
progressive increase in the number of ill ega 1 tyreson the roads. In
1979, 48.4% of all tyres. taken off vehicles in a specific week were
found to be illegal; in 1982 the corresponding figure was 59.9%. It
would seem that a 1arg~ number of people are willing to put their lives
at ri sk rather than buy a new tyre. A secondary cons i derat ion is that
this dangerous practice also deprives the tyre producers of replacement
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sales. Research by Firestone has shown that failure to enforce the tyre
laws (then lmm across three-quarters of the tread) deprives the
manufacturers of at least 20% additional replacement sales, whilst a
change in the tyre laws, so that the minimum tread depth applied across
the whole width of the tyre, would generate a further 30% on top of that
(Tyres and Accessories, February 1979, pp.27-8).
Size of Replacement Market by Value
If we now consider tables 22 and 23, we can see that the total
value of the car and truck tyre markets, including distributor exports
and retreads, in 1982 was £457.7 million. If retreads are excluded, the
value of the new tyre replacement market to the manufacturers was £387.8
million (excluding distributor exports, the net replacement market was
worth £357.8 million). Significantly, BRMA sales remained static in
l
money terms over this period, however, in real terms car tyre sales fell
by 37.9% and truck by 25.2%. Meanwhile, non-BRMA or competitive imports
were able to increase their share of the net car replacement market, in
value terms, from 20.4% in 1978 to 28.1% in 1982. Similarly, in the net
truck replacement market, their respective share increased from 24.4% to
43.4%.
Turning to the value of the market in retail prices; the total car
and truck replacement markets increased from £455 mi 11ion in 1978 to
£566 million in 1982. Table 24 shows the average value of a car tyre in
the net replacement mar~et at both manufacturers' and retail prices.
These figures are very crude estimates and shou1d be treated with
caution. Nevertheless, they do show that there was a trend increase in
400
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Table 24 Average Value of Car Tyres in the Net Replacement Market
at Manufacturers· and Retail prices, 1978-82
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Retail prices 16.1 18.5 18.9 18.3 20. 1
Manufacturers' Prices 12.9 14.6 14.9 14.1 15.0
3.2 3.9 4.9 4.2 5. 1
Sources: calculated from tables 17 and 22
the average mark-up on each tyre, excluding any allowance for inflation.
This would seem to indicate that the retailers benefited from the
increase in competitive imports. With the landed prices of radial tyres
from Eastern Europe costing £7.51, and cheap imports from Portugal
Spain and South Korea costing £7.09, £10.84 and £9.98 respectively
I
(Customs and Excise), the profits earned on these tyres was substantial.
Market Shares
Tables 25 and 26 show that in 1971 Dunlop was the market leader in
the car and truck replacement markets. At this time, Michelin was
1aggi ng in third place in both markets, behi nd Dunlop and Goodyear.
Today, these positions have been reversed, and Michelin is now firmly
established as the dominant company in both segments of the market. The
main cause of this change around was the increasing radialisation of the
British tyre sector. As, the inventor of the radial tyre, Michelin's
name became synonomous with steel radials, so that as the market for
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Table 25 Estimated Market Shares of the UK Car Tyre Net Replacement
Market, 1971, 1979 and 1982 (I of total market)
1971 1979 1982
Michelin 11-13 21 23
Dunlop 33-35 16 17
Goodyear 19-20 12 14
Pire11i 3-5 6 8
Uniroyal 2-4 5 61Firestone 12-14 8 4
Avon 3-5 2 1
Imports (competitive) 9-11 30 261
1 In 1982 Firestone sales counted as competitive imports, hence for
competitive import true total Firestone's share should be added.
Sources: 1971, Rubber Trends No.86, June 1980, p.30, table 12.
1979 and 1982, Rubber Trends No.99, September 1983, p.45,
table 21.
Table 26 Estimated Market Shares of the UK Commercial Vehicle Tyre Net
Re~lacement Market, 1971, 1979 and 1982 (I of total market)
1971 1979 1982
Michelin 16-18 34 35
Dunlop 29-31 21 16
Goodyear 17-19 10 12
Pire11i 7 7
Uniroyal 18-20 2 2
Avon 2 21Firestone 13-15 7
Imports (competitive) 1-3 16 271
1 In 1982 Firestone sales counted as competitive imports, hence for
competitive import true total Firestone's share should be added.
Sources: 1971, Rubber Trends No.86, June 1980, p.30, table 12.
1979 and 1982, Rubber Trends No.99, September 1983, p.45,
tab1e 21.
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radials grew, so too did the demand for Michelin tyres. This allowed
the company to take market share from all of its competitors, with the
exception of Pire11i and Uniroyal (now owned by Continental) in the car
tyre market segment. Meanwhile, Dunlop's slow response in adopting
radial technology can be acknowledged as the prime reason why it lost
market share in both the car and truck tyre segments.
Although the other tyre companies have now closed the technological
gap, they have not been able to undermine Michelin's market dominance.
Indeed, between 1979 and 1982, Michelin managed to increase its market
share from 21% to 23% in the car tyre segment, and from 34% to 35% in
the truck tyre segment.
Since 1971, competitive imports have made substantial inroads into
both segments of the replacement market. In 'that particular year, the
importers he1d 1-3% and 9-11% of the truck and car tyre replacement
markets respectively. By 1982, they had managed to push up their share
of the former segment to 29%, and the latter to 30%. But substituting
imports for UK manufacturing facilities did not prove beneficial to
Firestone, which saw its share of the car tyre market fall from 12-14%
in 1971 to 4% in 1982, whilst the company's market share of the truck
tyre segment declined from 13-15% to 2% over the same period.
Captive Imports
Imports can be broadly classified into two categories: captive
(BRMA) and competitive imports. Table 27 revea1s.that between 1971 and
1981 there was a large increase in both BRMA and competitive imports.
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Table 27 UK Car Tyre Imports by Source, 1971-81 (OOO's)
COMPETITIVE
Distri East TOTAL
BRMA -butor Europe Others Total IMPORTS % BRMA
1971 728 495 150 1,082 1,727 2,455 29.7
1972 1,482 595 198 1,226 2,019 3,501 42.3
1973 1,766 650 208 1,129 1,987 3,753 47. 1
1974 2,129 805 240 1,091 2,136 4,265 49.9
1975 1,577 958 355 974 2,287 3,864 40.8
1976 1,895 1,507 563 766 2,836 4,731 40. 1
1977 2,795 1,579 685 1,353 2,932 5,727 48.8
1978 2,994 1,491 958 1,087 3,536 6,530 45.8
1979 2,824 1,775 843 1,532 ·4,150 6,974 40.5
1980 2,150 1,539 652 1,300 3,491 5,641 38. 1
1981 2,910 2,086 406 1,299 3,791 6,701 43.4
Sources: BRMA, based on sources used for table 17.
Competitive imports, Customs and Excise.
Distributor imports, calculated from Customs and Excise (Total
EEC imports - BRMA imports).
In that year captive imports were responsible for just 29.7% of total
imports. The following year this figure rose sharply to 42.3%. At the
same time, Britain's share of world trade in tyres fell fom 11.5% to
8.5% (see table 35). Car and commercial vehicle tyre output also fell
from 32.3 million tyres to 30.3 million units (Rubber Statistical
Bulletin, February 1973). Even before the onset of the first oil
crisis, and certainly long before the radial tyre was able to make its
impact felt on the market, there was sufficient evidence available to
suggest that the British tyre sector was beginning to experience
difficulties.
Captive imports remained at very high levels throughout the 1970s·
and the beginning of the 1980s, ranging from 40% to nearly 50% of total
imports. The large and sustained high levels of BRMA imports can be
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attri buted to the highly developed system of internati ona 1 sourci ng
operated by the tyre companies. According to NEDO (1978b):
"UK tyre plants are part of the European scene. The demand
for tyres in Europe is increasingly being served by an
integrated production and marketing system. The tyre
compani es, with one or two exceptions, are multi nat iona 1
with plants and factories allover Europe. Because of this
there is a high degree of international sourcing between EEC
countries.
Within this system, the UK tyre industry has not been
holding its own. More and more of the UK market for tyres
is being satisfied by imports; less and· less of world trade
exports in tyres is being secured by the UK. And because of
this, employment is declining" (p.2).
As part of company policy, individual plants may be used to
specialise in the production of a particular type or size of tyre to
supply the needs of the European market. When necessary, however,
companies will seek to switch production, albeit on a temporary basis,
from one country to another to take advantage of lower costs, or to
tackle shortages of supply brought about, for example, by increased
demand, bott 1enecks or industri a1 disputes. Compan ies also seek to
capitalise on exchange rate and price variations, and sourcing
arrangements may be determined by the competitive advantages these
bestow on one country relative to another.
Table 28 shows just how important international sourcing is to the
British-based tyre companies. The integration of their European
operations led to an inexorable rise in captive imports after 1971.
Spokesmen for Dunlop and Michelin claimed that production difficulties
at home in 1974 (presumably the "four day week") and 1977 made it
necessary for them to import tyres from their European plants
(NEDO/RP/IS (78) 3rd Meeting, 17 April 1978, p.l). Significantly, in
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both these years there was a substantial increase in the level of
Table 28 Captive Imports Share of BRMA Net Rep1acement1 Sales, 1971-82
BRMA Net Replacementl BRMA Imports
(000 in %
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
11,984
14,106
13,046
12,470
12,641
12,978
11,989
11,780
11,151
10,211
10,652
10,466
6. 1
10.5
13.5
17.1
12.5
14.6
23.3
25.4
25.3
21.1
27.3
25.9
1 BRMA Net Replacement = BRMA Replacement Sales - distributor exports
Sources: calculated from tables 17 and 27
captive imports. However, in the first instance, captive imports soon
fell back to their previous level, but after 1977, they plateaued at a
much higher level. More importantly, captive imports were increasing
while BRMA net replacement sales were shrinking, confirming that captive
exports were being used to displace domestic production.
Competitive Imports
Competitive imports have similarly displayed an upward trend since
1971, topping 4 million tyres in 1979, before falling back to 3.5
million in 1980 and recovering to 3.8 million in 1981. If we examine
the make-up of these imports, we can see that the single most important
source was distributor or parallel imports. These are tyres shipped in
407
by independent dealers, taking advantage of the 1arge . discounts
prevailing in Europe in concert with favourable relative changes in the
exchange rate. Their impact on the net replacement market can be seen
from table 29, which shows that parallel imports increased their share
from 4.3% in 1973 to 14.4% in 1981.
Table 29 Im~ort Penetration of the New Car Tyre Re~lacement Market by
Source, 1971-81 (S)
COMPETITIVE
Distri East TOTAL
BRMA -butor Europe Others Total IMPORTS
1971 5.3 3.6 1.1 7.9 12.6 17.9
1972 9.2 3.7 1.2 7.6 12.5 21.71973 11.7 4.3 1.4 7..5 13.2 25.01974 14.6 5.5 1.6 7.5 14.6 29.2
1975 10.6 6.4 2.4 6.5 15.3 25.91976 12.0 9.5 3.6 4.8 17.9 29.91977 18.7 10.6 4.6 9.1 19.7 38.41978 19.5 9.7 6.3 7.1 23. 1 42.61979 18.5 11.6 5.5 10.0 27.1 45.61980 15.7 11.2 4.8 9.5 25.5 41.21981 20. 1 14.4 2.8 9.0 26.2 46.3
Source: calculated from tables 17 and 27.
The next major source of imports were the countri es of Eastern
Europe. By "dumping" tyres on the British market, the East Europeans
managed to increase their share of the replacement market from a
negligible amount at the start of the 1970s, to reach a peak of 6.3% in
1978. This source of supply subsequently tailed off, dropping
particularly sharply from 4.8% in 1980 to 2.8% in 1981, following an
undertaking by the Eastern European producers to refrain from "dumping"
tyres in the British market. Though their share of the replacement was
quite small, the volume of tyres from this source .together with their
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low prices, proved sufficient to depress prices ina market already
suffering from overcapacity.
In total, competitive imports captured an increasing share of the
rep1acement market, up from 12.6% in 1971 to reach a peak of 27. 1% in
1979. Compet itive imports also exceeded capt ive imports in every year
after 1971, though in some years only just so. Overall, competitive and
captive imports combined were supplying nearly half the car tyre
replacement market by the end of the 1970s.
Share of World Trade
Another yardstick by which to measure the performance of the
British tyre sector is the home industry's share of world exports. In
1961, the UK accounted for 22% of the world trade in tyre exports (NEDO,
1
1979, p.6). However, Britain's failure to exploit the major markets and
those of the developing nations is mirrored by her declining share of
world trade. Table 30 measures Britain's share of world exports since
1970. This is based on DECO data which excludes non-DECO countries,
principally the East Europeans, and therefore slightly overstates
individual country's share of world trade.
In 1980, the total value of world exports amounted to just over $7
billion, with car and commercial vehicle tyres accounting for 35% and
38% respectively of total exports (NEDO, TI(82)7, 8 February 1982, p.2).
The major exporting nations in 1980, ranked according to their share of
world trade, were: France; Japan; West Germany; UK; Italy and the
United States.
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Table 30 Share of World Trade Exports for Tyresl held by the UK and
Other Selected Countries, 1970-80 (I)
Total OECD
Exports ($m) UK FR GER IT J US Other-
1970 1,063 11.8 21.5 11.3 10.0 15.3 7.4 22.8
1971 1,291 11.5 20.2 11.2 11.3 16.3 6.8 22.8
1972 1,552 8.5 21.1 13.9 11.4 15.4 6.0 23.8
1973 2,065 8.1 21.0 16.4 9.9 12.6 6.5 25.5
1974 2,838 7.1 19.0 17.3 7.4 14.5 10.7 24.0
1975 3,400 8.5 20.8 14.2 8.1 16.0 8.6 23.7
1976 3,679 9.3 19.5 14.4 8.8 16.3 6.0 25.8
1977 4,139 8.0 20.1 15.1 8.3 16.6 6.9 24.9
1978 4,736 7.9 20.5 15.5 8.8 15.7 5.9 25.7
1979 5,829 7.3 21.4 14.5 8.9 15.4 6.1 26.4
1980 7,164 8.7 20.0 12.7 7.3 19.3 7.1 24.9
1 includes total tyres and tubes for vehicles and aircraft.
Source: NEDO, Tl(82)7, 8 February 1982, p.l
Significantly, Britain's share of world exports fell sharply from
11.5% in 1971 to 8.5% in 1972. The evidence available would suggest
that Britain's slow start in adopting radial technology contributed,
initially, to her loss of world trade, especially exports to the major
markets in Europe.
France, by contrast, as the home-base of Michelin, was able to
maintain her position as the world's leading exporter of tyres. Closely
followed by Japan, who alone of the major exporters increased her share
of world trade over the period.
Like Britain, West Germany also lagged behind in radial technology
during the early 1970s, but she managed to maintain her export base
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owing to the quality of her labour force (Hood and Young, 1982, p.140).
Her position as a major exporter was, however, undermined in the latter
part of the seventies by the rise in the value of the DM (Ibid), so that
tyres produced in West Germany became amongst the most expensive in the
world because of the high value of her currency and manufacturing costs
(Rubber Trends, No. 94, June 1982, p.33). Nevertheless, West Germany
was still able to retain a significantly higher share of world trade
than Britain.
Summary
The failure of the British tyre manufacturers to invest in- steel
radial technology left the domestic industry dependent on crossply
production at a time when the market was switching to steel. The
increased life of these tyres effectively contributed to a halving of,
market demand. To make matters worse, the radialisation of the British
market coincided with the first oil crisis, which further depressed
domestic sales.
The response of the tyre companies was to close down their obsolete
production facilities in Britain and Europe. As Britain was more
heavily dependent on crossply production, she suffered a greater loss of
productive capacity and jobs. In the meantime, the tyre companies
imported steel radial tyres. from their European factories to meet the
increase in domestic demand. Hence, imports started to rise, whilst
Britain's share of world trade fell, as the domestic manufacturers were
unable to respond to the changes in market demand in the major
economies.
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Additionally, Britain's dependency on outdated technology also made
the home market vu1nerab 1e to cheap imports, and they were able to
increase their share of the domestic market.
In the following sections we shall examine the policies pursued by
the motor manufacturers to assess their impact on the British tyre
sector.
Sales
Original equipment sales broadly parallel vehicle production
patterns. From 1964 until 1972, the pattern for both of them in the UK,
was one of stagnation followed by absolute decline. As a result, DE car
tyre sales declined from a peak of 9.6 million units in 1972 to 4.6
mi11ion in 1981, before recoveri ng to just under 6 mi11ion tyres in
\
1983. Details of car and truck original equipment sales are shown in
table 31.
Table 31 Orisinal Egui~ment Tyre Sales 1n the UK, 1973-83 (1000 units)
Car/Van Commercial Vehicle
Cross~ly Radial Tota11 Crossp1y Radial Tota11
1973 1,962 6,742 8,703 ) 1,0951974 987 6,355 7,342 319 641 9601975 567 5,411 5,978 326 604 9291976 605 6,223 6,828 285 712 9971977 395 6,985 7,380 291 763 1,0541978 296 6,991 7,288 270 739 1,0091979 254 6,824 7,079 221 815 1,0371980 136 5,309 5,445 214 634 8481981 123 4,509 4,633 113 391 5041982 93 4,860 4,952 116 525 6411983 54 5,867 5,921 86 541 627
1 may not add up to total due to rounding.
Source: Rubber Statistical Bulletin (various issues)
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The prime cause of this slump was the decline in British car
production and the growth in imports. Table 32 shows that during the
two decades since 1960, the British car industry lost its position as
the second largest producer outside North America (behind West Germany)
Table 32 Share of World Car Production by Major Producing Countries
1960-81 (%)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981
France 9.0 7.1 10.0 10.1 10.0 10.3
West Germany 14.2 14.2 15.6 11.5 12.1 12.4
Italy 4.4 5.7 7.6 5.4 4.9 5.1
Japan 1.3 3.6 14.1 18.1 24.1 24.8
UK 10.6 8.9 7.0 5.0 3.3 3.3
USA 52.4 48.6 29.0 26.6 21.8 22.4
Rest of World 8.1 11.9 16.7 23.3 23.8 21.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: McArdle and Jones, 1982
to become the fifth largest ~ having been overtaken by France, Italy and
Japan. Further, in 1980, the UK also produced less cars than Spain
(SMMT, 1981).
Table 33 illustrates the effect of the decline in UK car production
levels on original equipment demand. The statistics are admittedly
crude, with no allowance made for unassemb1ed vehicles which are not
norma lly fitted with tyres .but. nevertheless, it does illustrate the
impact that declining car output has had on the British tyre
manufacturers. Over the same period France was able to increase its .
tyre output by 6 million tyres, West Germany by 4.5 million and Japan by
31.5 mi 11ion.
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Table 33 International Car Production Levels and OE Tyre Demand
(millions)
Car output
1965 1981 Change
France 1.4 2.6 + 1.2m cars or 6.0m tyres
W Germany 2.7 3.6 + 0.9m cars or 4.5m tyres
Italy 1.1 1.3 + 0.2m cars or 1.0m tyres
Japan 0.7 7.0 + 6.3m cars or 31.5m tyres
UK 1.7 1.0 - 0.7m cars or 3.5m tyres
Source: SMMT, 1966 and 1982
Figure 2 illustrates the growth in home car production and new
registration since 1945. During the 1950s and 1960s, there was a rapid
increase in demand for cars, reachi ng a peak of 1.2 mi11ion in 1964,
before falling back and stabilising at just around 1 million cars.
Meanwhile, production kept on rising as government put an emphasis on
the export market. Then in July 1971, hire-purchase restrictions were
removed, which stimulated a sharp increase in demand, as new
registrations reached a peak of 1.7 million in 1972; production
similarly peaked at 1.9 million cars. Following the first oil shock,
demand and production fell in unison, but as demand picked up production
continued to decline, so that by 1977 new registrations had actually
outstripped production. In 1979, demand reached a new peak of 1.73
million, whilst production was falling back to levels pertaining in the
mid-1950s. This was because the motor manufacturers were not prepared
to invest in new plant and machi nery to meet expected increases is
demand. According to Rhys (1980):
.. :~'=:.'. '=~:~:-:~ ,~.~::~.: ~~~~i~~~~~;~~~~.__h .• _ ::=-:~f ~~~-....~:::: ~~.:~!~::.: ~:~~_~J~r~~~': ~i~~~ f~·:~
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"The short-run elasticity of supply depends upon both the
degree of capacity utilisation and the efficiency with which
particular manufacturers can change output levels. The boom
in demand in 1972-3 found the industry wanting and various
production difficulties lost some one-fifth of achievable
output. In the longer term the industry has traditionally
responded to the growing vehicle market by new net
investment. This was so in 1946-7, 1955-7 and 1962-5.
However, the strong demand in the early 1970s did not
produce increases in capacity. Indeed because of the
financial difficulties of companies and the commitment of
multinationals to export in kit form from the UK, final
assembly capacity fell from 2.5 million units in 1973 to 2.3
million in 1978" (p.182).
The policy of the four volume car producers since 1970, has been to
reduce their output of British produced cars. In 1972, BL was producing
over 900,000 cars, but by 1981, it was producing just over 400,000 cars
(SMMT, 1982). Similarly, over the same period, Ford reduced its output
of cars from around 550,000 to just under 350,000 (Ibid). As a
consequence imports were able to increase their share of the domestic
market from 5% in 1965 to 55.7% in 1981 (Ibid}.
Historically, the British manufacturers have regarded the home
market as largely captive, based on protectionism and the consumers wish
to buy British cars. However, the Di11on Round, 1962-68, lowered the
import duty on vehicles from 33% to 22%, and the Kennedy Round, 1968-72,
reduced the duty still further to 11%. In 1973, Britain joined the EEC
and by July 1977, duty on community imports had been removed, allowing
the European producers to exploit the British market. But, the lowering
or elimination of tariff barriers were not the sole cause of the
increase in import penetration:
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"The surge in imports in 1972 was a reflection of the
inabi 1ity of the UK car industry to supply enough of the
right type. The 1ack of investment in the 1960s had 1eft
the industry with uncompetitive facilities and an ageing
mode 1 range. The UK consumer was now presented with a
greater range of vehicles, especially in the small to medium
range in the mass market than he had enjoyed since the early
1930s, when some fifteen firms had offered their wares. By
1980 some eighteen domest ic, West and Eastern European, US
and Japanese firms were competing in the bargain basement of
the car market" (Rhys, 1980, p.186).
Up to 1973, the trend had been to 1arger-:-engined cars. The oi1
crisis reversed this trend, so that by 1974 cars with an engine capacity
of less than 1200cc accounted for 25% of total sales (Bhaskar, 1979,
p.119). The foreign manufacturers were able to meet this demand,
whereas the British producers were unable to respond. Consequently, the
importers were able to increase thei r share of thi s segment of the
market from 19% in 1971 to over 50% in 1978 (Ibid). Only the Mini and
the Hillman Imp, and later with the introduction of the Vauxhall
•
Chevette, the Ford Escort and Fiesta and the Chrysler Sunbeam, were the
home producers able to compete effectively with the importers.
The rise in imports can also be attributed to the steep increase in
tied imports, especially since the mid-1970s, brought about by the
integration of production facilities by the motor companies. Ford began
to integrate its European operat ions with the estab 1ishment of Ford
Europe in 1967, followed by the production of common models in Britain
and West Germany: the Capr.i in 1969 and the Cortina in 1970. In the
late 1970s, the Fiesta was produced in Dagenham, Saarlouis, and
Valencia; and the Escort in Halewood and Saarlouis. General Motors, ori
the other hand, only fully integrated its Belgium and West German plants
in the 1ate 1970s, 1eavi ng Vauxhall to operate as a separate ent ity.
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The company's strategy was based on a concept of national differences in
demand between individual European markets, which provided the home
plants with sufficient economies of scale to meet this demand (Bhaskar,
1979). However, by the early-1980s the success of Ford's European-wide
models prompted GM to adopt a similar strategy.
Economics of Integration
The integration of production facilities was largely determined by
economic considerations. In the 1950s, fixed costs accounted for about
15% of the total costs of car production (Maxcy and Silbertson, 1959),
but by the 1970s safety legislation and emissions regulations had
increased fixed costs to just over 30% of total costs (CPRS, 1975).
Manufacturers now faced the choice of relying on high volume in order to
reduce unit costs and maintain profit per unit or, alternatively, they
•
sought economies of scale through innovations in the production process
by making greater use of microprocessors and robotics in engine, body,
assembly and design to increase productivity and quality and lower unit
costs. Thus reduci ng the capita1 costs of model changes and allow; ng
these costs to be spread over a number of models or several generations
of models (Altshuler et al, 1984).
Table 34 shows the minimum efficient scale in the various car
manufacturing operations, and the respective output at which a company
can expect to achieve economies of scale. These estimates pre-date the
impact of robotics in body assembly. Nevertheless, it ;s clear that the
different manufacturing processes all have a varying range of minimum
efficient scale. A car manufacturer may not be able to balance all of
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Table 34 Minimum Efficient Scale in Car Manufacturing Operations
Casting of engine blocks
Casting of other parts
Powertrain machinery and assembly
Axle machinery and assembly
Pressing of various panels
Painting (undercoats, etc)
Final assembly
1 mi 11ion
100,000-750,000
600,000
500,000
1 to 2 mi 11ion
250,000
250,000
Source: Rhys, 1980, p.183
these processes to perfectly meet his desired output level.
Consequently, some of these operations will have to work either side of
optimum capacity. But with final assembly and power train manufacture
accounting for about 70% of an efficient car producers' total internal
costs, it is essential that they at least operate at optimum levels
(Rhys, 1977, p.316).
The CPRS (1975) found that three-quarters of the eighteen
continental assembly plants it analysed met this minimum criterion
(based on 200,000 units), compared with less than one-third of British
plants. On this basis, it was estimated that if all the British plants
could reach this level, then the home manufacturers could produce 2
mi 11ion cars a year with just ten assembly plants, as opposed to the
thirteen then in operation. Since then two assembly plants have closed,
one by BL at Speke in Liverpool in 1978, the other by Ta1bot at Linwood
in Scotland in 1981.
Working from the figures presented in table 34, it can be seen that.
the production of one million cars is the minimum output at which a
419
company can expect to achieve economies of scale, whilst maximum
efficiency is obtained at two million units. Ideally, individual models
should be produced at an output level exceeding 200,000 per year
(Bhaskar, 1979, p.25). The corresponding figure in the executive and
luxury market segments are 100,000-200,000 and 30,000-50,000
respectively. To ensure that full use is made of economies of scale,
motor manufacturers must use common engi nes and body parts in as many
mode1s as pass i b1e. By i ncreas i ng output from 250,000 to two mi11ion
cars per year produces unit cost savings of 15-20%, whilst increasing
output from one to two mill i on reduces uni t costs by about 6% (Rhys,
1980, pp.183-4). The effect of these cost reductions on profitability
is substantial because profits seldon exceed 10% of turnover and often
fall to half this level (Rhys, 1977, p.315).
In tot a1, there are just si x manufacturers produci ng more than a
million cars a year in Western Europe:
group; Renault; Volkswagen; and Fiat.
Ford; General Motors; Peugeot
BL (before Jaguar was separated
and privatised), was the only other full range car manufacturer, and it
was producing less than half this number. Combined, these seven
companies and their associates (t .e , Renault-Volvo link) control about
90% of European car production (Jones, 1981, p.3). World production is
similarly highly concentrated, the eight largest producers: General
Motors; Toyota; Nissan ; Ford ; Volkswagen-Audi; Renault; Peugeot group
and Fi at are based in fi ve countri es: the United States; Japan; West
Germany; France and Italy, and between them they account for 70% of
world output (Financial Times, 19 October 1982).
Some believe that we are now witnessing a global integration of the
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major markets with a convergence in the patterns of demand, leading to
restructuring and rationalisation at a global level (Jones, 1981). This
has been brought about by the two oil crises in the 1970s, resulting in
US Government legislation to promote more fuel efficient cars. The US
car manufacturers responded by downsi zing thei r Ameri can model ranges,
wh ich 1ed to an influx of more compet itive imports from Europe and
Japan. The Japanese were thus able to increase thei r share of the
United States market from 3% in 1970 to 20% by 1980 (Hogg, 1982, p.42).
This led the American manufacturers to develop the concept of the
"world car", which would be suitable for all three major markets. Their
strategy was to achieve major economies of scale in production and
development by producing variants of the same basic model for the three
markets. Thus, allowing Ford and General Motors to assemble the Escort
and Cavalier (IJI-car) respectively, from parts produced at the least
•
cost from any factory in the world. However, UK content regulations and
pressure to produce in the home market, rather than source from Europe
and Japan, has prevented the complete integration of the three markets,
but it has not discouraged the global integration of operations by Ford
and General Motors (Jones, 1981).
Small volume manufacturers like BL have, nevertheless, managed to
survive in spite of their heavy reliance on their domestic market. This
has been achieved, as we saw earlier, through the application of
robot ics and new techno 1ogies in the product ion process. Furthermore,
BL was able to reap the,advantages of economies of scale by "buying-in"
major components, as for example, gearboses from Honda and Volkswagen,
and by entering into a joint venture with Honda, to design and produce
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cars for sale world-wide.
These policies have, however, had a major impact on the UK's
trading performance and, ultimately, on job prospects. Panic and Joyce
(1980) observed that:
II •••••• duri ng a peri od in which the trade performance of UK
industry was generally declining, exports increased more
slowly relative to imports, in good produced by the sectors
where foreign participation was higher than average for
manufacturing industry. Consequently. these sectors have
experi enced the bi ggest deteri orat ion in thei r trade
ba1ances •••••• Vehic1es and textiles provide clear examples
of such deterioration in trade performance II (p.48).
Fi gure 3 shows that i ntegrat i on encouraged Ford, GM and 1ater
Talbot to accelerate their policy of sourcing from abroad. In 1981,
44.3% of all new Ford cars and 46.3% of all new GMmodels registered in
the UKwere imports compared with 0.2% and 11.3% respectively in 1975
(calculated from SMMT1976 and 1982). Additionally, in 1973 tied or
captive imports accounted for less than 2% of home demand, by 1981
284,000 new registrations were captive imports, representing 34.4% of
all imports or 19.1% of the total market (calculated from SMMTdata).
In terms of "l ost " tyre sales this was equivalent to 1.4 million
passenger units. Not surprisingly the Central Policy Review Staff
(1975) reported that it was:
II ••••• unrea 1i st i c, •••••• to expect that the import share of
the British car market can consistently be cut back below
28%•••••• On the other hand, import penetrat ion into the
United Kingdom could reach 45% if the competitive weaknesses
are not corrected. Imports already account for 45% of new
cars registered by private buyers and the import share could
well reach 45% of the total market, if the multinationals
implement what tile CPRS understands to be their present
plans for supplying the British market from their
continental p1antsll (p.106).
4LL
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These fears were fully realised by 1977, when imports just exceeded
45% of the total market, and increased to nearly 56% in 1981 (SMMT,
1982). This was because the importers were able to gain 60-80% of the
private car market (Bhaskar, 1979, p.1l5). The Japanese in particular
increased their share of the British market from 0.4% in 1970 to nearly
10% by 1980 (SMMT, 1971 and 1981).
The greater part of this increased share of the market taken by the
importers was at the expense of British Leyland, whose market share fell
from 40% at the beginning of the 1970s to just under 20% by 1979 (SMMT,
1980), and Talbot whose market share fell from 11% in 1970 to less than
5% in 1981 (SMMT, 1971and 1982).
In 1977, Ford took over from BL as market 1eader, after having
previously lost market share between 1972 and 1975. But, although Ford
•
captured some of the market share lost by BL and Talbot, it was the
foreign importers who were able to take most advantage of the
contract ion in sales of these two compani es. Evident ly, the 1ack of
investment by Ford in modern plant in the 1960s and early 1970s, left it
vulnerable to the stylish imports of small and medium range cars,
especially those produced by Datsun, Honda and Toyota.
Table 35 however, reveals that the largest section of the market is
the business segment. During the 1970s, it ranged from 55-65% of the
total car market, possibly reaching as high as 70% (Bhaskar, 1973,
pp.8-9). At the present time the business sector is dominated by Ford, .
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Table 35 The Business Segment of the UK Car Market
1975176 1978179 1980/81 1982
Company registered cars
as % of the market 38 45 40 41
Company owned but
privately registered as
% of market 12 10 10
Company assisted purchase
as % of the market 18 7 10 10
Total 56 64 60 61
Source: Bhaskar, 1983, ~.8
though there is evidence that the importers are now making inroads even
here. If this trend continues the importers (excluding tied imports)
could capture almost half of the total car market. But for this to
happen the Government would have to rescind the 11% market share
I
agreement negotiated with the Japanese. Indeed, only import controls
and restrictions have prevented the Japanese from gaining a larger share
of the European market. It has been estimated that these protectionist
measures have so far reduced Japan I s car imports to Western Europe by
500,000 a year. Otherwise it is assumed that the Japanese would have
captured 10% of the market in Italy, Spain and France, and 20% in the
UK; the equivalent of 120,000 cars in Italy, 70,000 in Spain, and
150,000 in both France and the UK (Jones, 1981, p.71).
Any increase in the level of vehicle import penetration will have a
major impact on domestic tyre production, because each imported car
carries five imported tyres. Captive imports, however, present less of
a problem, given the international sourcing policies of the tyre
42~
companies, as these vehicles carry identical tyre sizes to similar cars
produced in Britain and, therefore, their replacement needs can be
readily met. Competitive imports, on the other hand, may require
different replacement tyre sizes, providing a "magnet" to further tyre
imports. Alternat ively, some of these new tyre replacement sizes can,
and are being met, by the British-based companies, but this ultimately
depends on the length of the production run and the costs involved.
Any increase in import penetration, whether captive or competitive
does, nevertheless, have an adverse affect on the DE tyre sector,
primarily because practically every car imported is in a completed form.
The level of imports during the early 1980s represent a production
"loss" of about 4.5 million car tyres per annum. By comparison, table
36 shows that the majority of cars exported are in an unassemb1ed form.
Tyres fitted to these vehicles are usually supplied from sources in or
close to the country of assembly (Fishwick, 1977).
Table 36 UK Trade in Motor Cars, 1970-80
1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980-------
Exports (000 IS) 1
Assembled 375 250 238 226 266 243 232 193 164
Unassemb1ed 315 349 327 291 230 232 234 217 195Total 690 599 565 516 496 475 466 410 359% Unassemb1ed 45.7 58.3 57.9 56.3 46.4 48.9 50.2 52.9 54.2
Im~orts (000 IS) 1
Assembled 158 505 375 449 523 678 801 1061 863Unassembled 12 21Total 158 505 375 449 534 699 801 1061 863
1 may not add up to totals due to rounding
Source: SMMT, The Motor Industry of Great Britain (various issues)
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The trends portrayed in the above table reveal that exports of both
assembled and unassembled vehicles fell considerably between 1970 and
1980. In the case of assembled vehicles, the reduction was greater than
50%, which was equivalent to a production "loss" in 1980 of over a
million tyres compared to 1970. Additionally, since 1978 exports of
assembled vehicles have fallen faster than those of unassembled
vehicles.
In summary, the key problem was that the high levels of imports, in
particular tied imports, were not compensated for by a similar increase
in the 1eve 1s of exports. The reasons for thi s were exp1ai ned by Rhys
(1980) :
liThe UK's poor trade performance was partly due to its
exc 1us i on from the EEC duri ng a peri ad of rapi d economic
growth and trade creation within the Six. During this
peri ad the mu1t i nat i ana 1s used thei r smaller home market
base in the UKto service their non-EEC w.arkets. This often
meant the sale of cars in kit (ckd) form for overseas
assembly. Consequently the incentive to renew, let alone
expand, UK assembly capacity was blunted. Thi s i ncenti ve
was further reduced by BLMC's preoccupation with almost
continual reorganisations and short-term labour
di ffi cult i es. Both factors interrupted the flow of
product i on and new model programmes and ali enated forei gn
dealer chains, harmed company finance, morale and product
development. All these elements militated against any
concerted export drive" (p.187).
The export pol icies of the Briti sh-based subsidi aries are
determined by the corporate strategies of their respective parent
companies. The Expenditure Committee (1975) noted that only BL was able
to export worldwide without any restrictions placed on markets or model
design. All of the other major manufacturers in the UK: Ford, Vauxhall'
and Talbot, had progressed to the stage where thei r ckd exports were
more important than their built-up exports. The Expenditure Committee
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spelt out the dangers associated with this strategy:
"If the multinationals use the UK as a centre for the
production of vehicles in C.K.D. form, British capacity for
making built-up cars will be limited. At times of strong
demand, this may lead to increased import penetration. It
wi11 also reduce British abi 1ity to meet demand in
high-income developed countries. There is the additional
danger that deve 1opi ng countri es may increase thei r
manufacturing (as opposed to assembly) capability" (p.112).
Statistical evidence from the SMMTconfirms that the multinationals
use thei r UK operations essent i ally to source the home market. After
the mid-1970s, Ford, GMand Talbot stopped exporting British produced
cars to the North American market , Previously, the British subsidiary
was the sole source of captive imports by Ford-US. From 1956 to 1960,
over 120,000 British produced Fords were sold in the United States, and
over 80,000 between 1966 and 1970 (Maxcy, 1981, p.222). Since then
Ford-US has imported Capris from West Germany and Fiestas from Spain.
Whilst General Motors sources the American market with small cars from
its Japanese associate, Isuzu. The American multinationals have used
their subsidiaries to supply small cars to the American market, but lack
of investment in the Bri t ish plants to expand capaci ty, ensured that
these factories would not be retained as the main source of supply.
The multinationals operate similar policies in Europe to prevent
their subsidiaries competing with each other in these markets. In 1981,
Ford exported 28,000 cars or 31% of its total exports to the EEC,
compared with 53,000 in 1977 (SMMT, 1978 and 1982). Over the same
period, Vauxhall exported 6,000 cars, all to the EEC, compared with
12,000 in 1977 (Ibid), which was equivalent to 55% of its total exports.
The export performance of Talbot was also relatively poor. In 1975, the
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company exported 170,000 cars, of which 136,000 were ckd kits destined
for Iran, as part of a long~term contract originally negotiated by
Rootes. By 1981, Talbot exported 72,000 cars, of which 66,000 or nearly
89% of total exports went to Iran (SMMT, 1982).
Of the domestic manufacturers, only BL can be considered a major
exporter, and in most years its exports were greater than the combined
total of the other three companies. However, the lack of investment in
suitable models also seriously affected BL's export; performance. In
1976, BL exported 309,000 cars worldwide, of which 151,000 went to the
European Community, but by 1981 these figures had fallen to 122,000 and
92,000 respectively (SMMT, 1977 and 1982).
The lack of investment in the British motor industry over the
postwar period, together with the concomitant export strategies of the
l
motor manufacturers, contributed to a decline in the UK's share of world
car exports, ,which fell from 35% in 1955 to 6% in 1978 (Rhys, 1980,
p , 187).
Table 37 confirms the effect of these export strategies on
Britain's share of Community imports, which fell from 5.4% ;n 1970 to
2.4% by 1980.
Table 37 Britain's Percentase Share of EEC (8) Car I!!!orts (by Value),
1970-80
1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980-- --Share 5.4 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.8 2.3 2.4
Source: OECD
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Investment and Productivity
Some students of the motor industry (CPRS, 1975; Jones and Prais,
1978; Dunnett, 1980) have attributed the poor performance and low
productivity of the British motor industry to factors other than
under-investment.
Dunnett (1980) asserted that the "stop-ga" economic policies
pursued by successive governments during the 1960s and early 1970s, to
damp down consumer demand to improve the balance of payments position,
had an adverse affect on the British motor industry because the purchase
of a motor car is largely determined by the level of personal disposable
income (i.e. it is income elastic).
A study by the SMMT concluded that from 1960 to 1974, there were 24
I
changes in government policy affecting the motor industry, 10 were
cons idered favourable and 14 unfavourable (Bhaskar, 1979), whereas the
West German motor industry by comparison was less affected by regulatory
policy changes; over the same period there were just three such changes
(Dunnett, 1980). The CPRS (1975) simil arly concluded that government
regulatory policy had made forward planning in the motor industry
extremely difficult.
Other writers have disputed that the poor performance of the
Briti sh motor industry can be attributed to "instabil ity of demand II ,
induced by government p~licy. Indeed Jones and Prais (1978) pointed out
that:
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........the German and American car industries have shown much
the same re1ative vari abil ity about a trend as has the
British car industry over the past twenty years. There is
no doubt that car production is much more variable than is
industrial production as a whole (in Britain it is about
five times as variable). But that appears to be an
inescapable characteristic of this industry, and is a result
of the product's being relatively durable, and its purchases
postponable, much as other capital goods. There is no
factua 1 support for the view that in the British 'demand-
managed' economy the car industry has been more vari ab1e
than in other countries" (pp.146-7).
More recently other researchers have also questi oned the possi b1e
impact of government policy on the industry:
"We would not deny that there were switchback fluctuations in
the demand for new cars. The rapid increase in new
registrations periodically faltered. After the Suez fiasco
in 1956, new registrations declined by some 20 per cent, as
they did during the oil crisis around 1974 ••••• 1n three
lesser fluctuations in the 1960s, smaller declines of 7 to
12 per cent in new registrations were recorded; the peak to
trough dec1 ine was 7.5 per cent in 1961 versus 1960, 10.3
per cent in 1966 versus 1964 and 11.5 per cent in 1969
versus 1968 .••.•.Furthermore, although the situation was
more complicated in 1956 and 1974, government policy changes
on purchase tax levels and hire-purchase repayments clearly
did precipitate all three downturns in the car market of the
1960s. Nevertheless, we would argue that authors like
Dunnet (1980) have placed too much emphasis on the damaging
effects of such policy-led fluctuations" (Williams et a1,
1983, p.230).
There have also been similar disagreements about the causes of low
productivity in the industry, in spite of three major government reports
and numerous academic publications on the subject. A key difficulty is
that even tryi ng to make productivity compari sons between compani es
operating in the same country presents a number of methodological
problems, when these are extended to make international comparisons
between companies, these. problems become even more acute. For example,
individual companies make different types of cars, as well as having a
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different product mix (i.e. the labour content of a commercial vehicle
is higher than that of a mass-produced car) from that of their
competitors at home and overseas. There are also different raw material
imputs, "bought-out" components as a proportion of raw materi a1s used
vary between companies. At Vauxhall, for example, 85% of its components
are "bought-out" (Expenditure Committee, 1975, p.41). An assembly
orientated company of this kind cannot be directly compared to one that
;s relatively integrated like British Leyland.
Accardi ng to the CPRS (1975), the mai n cause of low product ivity
was low labour productivity:
"On average, the man hours requi red in Britai n to assemble
the same, or a similar, car are about double those required
on the continent. The implications for the British car
industry are extremely serious. Either twice as many men
are needed to produce the same number of cars; or equally
manned lines are half as productive, which again raises unit
costs substantially above those of the competition" (p.81).
The CPRS compared the number of vehicles produced per employee per
year in several countri es for 1955, 1965 and 1973 as shown in tab 1e 38
below. From this they estimated that productivity in the British motor
industry was about 30% lower than in France, Italy and Germany, whereas
twenty years before it had been the most productive in Europe (Ibt d,
p. 79) • However, these statistics were criticised by Friedman and
Bhaskar (1976) who argued that:
".•••..the figures are more likely to indicate differences in
investment and size of operati ons than 1abour ffort. For
examp 1e, the figures also show that in 1973 the British
produced 58 per cent fewer cars per employee than the
Japanese. Did the. Japanese suddenly begin to work that much
harder over the 8 year period? The difference was due to
the growth in the size of the Japanese motor industry and
greater capital investment by the Japanese" (pp.315-6).
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Table 38 Vehicles Produced/Employee/Year
1955 1965 1973
UK 4.2 5.8 5.1
US 11.1 13.9 14.9
Germany 3.9 7.1 7.3
France 3.6 6.1 6.8
Italy 3.0 7.4 6.8
Japan 1.2 4.4 12.2
Source: CPRS, 1975, p.80
Friedman and Bhaskar also had grave misgivings about the lack of
"scientific rigour", and the' short-comings of the "controlled
experiments" carried out by the CPRS. They considered that the
experiments were invalidated because "industrial relations, components
shortages, plant layout were not held constant, as they should have been
in a controlled scientific experimentll (p.313). The only variable which
should have varied was labour effort. Further,' these experiments should
also have considered the so-called "production rhythm" of the individual
plants in question. This is because
"Car plants consist of complicated tnter-r-e lated production
processes. Most operations require parts from a previous
operation. It is quite wrong to make comparisons using a
single line without looking at the remainder of the
equipment which supplies the line. The speed at which a
line can operate will depend on the whole production
process. Such a complex process as car manufacture, relying
on thousands of different components, achieves a
production-rhythm. To replace anyone machine or line in a
plant will not appreciably alter this rhythm. Significant
changes in the rhythm. wi 11 often requi re more substantial
investment" (p.3l3).
Other reservations and criticisms expressed in their evidence to
the Expenditure Committee have been summed up by Bhaskar (1979):
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"Continental and UK plants are not directly comparable; the
UK plants are older, less spacious and not as well planned
as thei r European counterparts, and thi s, in turn, is a
direct result of the failure to invest capital in new plant
and equi pment throughout the UK motor industry ••••••• The
capi ta 1 investment withi n the UK motor industry has been
abysma lly low •••••• 01der plant is frequent ly i ncapab 1e of
producing work of acceptable quality, which in turn means
that rectification work must be carried out. Breakdowns are
more frequent, leading to stoppages during and between
shifts (which, due to the cramped lay-out of British plants,
can bring the entire plant to a standstill while repairs are
carri ed out). More mai ntenance staff are requi red to keep
the equi pment operating (up to 78 per cent more, accordi ng
to the CPRS Report). 01der machi nes are usually i ncapab 1e
of working as fast as newer ones, and often require more men
to operate them, leading to higher manning levels and slower
working. And, finally, plant lay-out itself can affect
productivity, through 1atk of space or costly misuse of
existing space. All of which affects the entire production
process and, indeed, the morale of men who are ob 1i ged to
work in far from perfect conditions" (pp.61-6).
The House of Commons Expendi ture Committee and the Ryder Report
(1975) on British Leyland also reached a different conclusion to the
"think-tank". They 1i kewi se put the blame' for low product i vi ty on
under-investment:
"We bel i eve that inadequate investment and the lower
productivity of old plant have been the greatest
contri butors to the poor profi tabil i ty of the
mass-production car side of the industry" (Expenditure
Committee, 1975, p.39).
and
"This record of under-investment is the main reason for the
low productivity of Bl's workforce compared with, say, Fiat
or Volkswagen" (Ryder, 1975, p.29).
The Expenditure Committee carried out a statistical analysis of the
value added per man and the fixed assets per man, as shown in table 39.
The Committee found that a close relationship existed between the two
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variables, i.e. about 66% of the difference in value added per man could
be explained statistically by different levels of fixed assets per man.
Table 39 Relationship Between Value Added Per Man and Fixed Assets
Per Man (1974)
Value added Gross output Fixed assets
per man ~er man per man
GMC (US) £ 8,600 £17,495 £ 4,346
Ford (US) £ 7,966 £19,905 £ 5,602
Opel £ 5,875 £14,747 £ 3,612
Daimler-Benz £ 5,207 £12,672 £ 2,694
Volvo £ 4,886 £14,790 £ 4,662
Ford Germany £ 4,883 £14,186 £ 3,608
Volkswagen £ 4,767 £11 ,087 £ 3,632
Saab £ 4,637 £19,972 £ 3,141
Renault £ 4,133 £12,928 £ 2,396
Ford (UK) £ 3,901 £11 ,397 £ 2,657
Chrysler (UK) £ 2,765 £ 9,968 £ 1,456
Vauxhall £ 2,560 £ 7,975 £ 1,356
Fiat £ 2,259 £ 8, 142 £ 3,160
B.l.M.C. £ 2,129 £ 6,539 £ 920
Source: Expenditure Committee, 1975, p.36, table 14
The Committee concluded that:
"This means that until investment substantially increases the
capita 1 stock, productivity in the Brit ish motor industry
will not be able to equal productivity abroad. These
figures demonstrate that, given roughly equivalent
environments, the inefficient use of resources as a result
of poor management, marketing, capacity utilisation or
industrial disputes accounts for a very much lower
proportion of productivity differences than might be
imagined ••••••we observed that much of the British
disadvantage in terms of value added per man was a result of
insuffi cient investment. A 1arge proportion of the
remainder is attributable to the age of the capital stock"
(pp.36-7) .
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Employment
Employment in the British motor and components industry, including
the tyre sector, was dependent on the investment and sourcing policies
of both the veh icle and rubber compan ies. Following on from the
integration of their European operations, Ford and General Motors (as
well as the rubber companies) were seeking to reap the rewards from the
greater efficiency and lower unit costs of their continental plants. In
the absence of higher levels of capital expenditure, the productivity of
the British motor and tyre plants were unable to match those in Europe,
where higher wage levels were more than compensated for by higher
efficiency.
As a resul t there was a rapi d increase in imports into the UK.
British Leyland estimated that the level of captive car imports was,
equivalent to just over 40,000 lost jobs in the UK (Financial Times, 2
November 1982). Further, many more job losses were attri buted to the
high 1eve 1 of imports from countri es where British-produced cars were
exc 1uded by tari ff or non-tari ff barri ers. These countri es inc1uded:
Spain, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Czechoslovakia, South Africa,
Australia and Romania.
Ray Horrocks, then the Chairman and Chief Executive of BL, moved a
resolution on behalf of the SMMT at the CBI Conference in 1981, which
stated that if an extra 25,000 cars were exported to these countries, at
1east an extra 25,000 jobs would be created in the domest ic motor
industry.
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However, so far no Bri t ish Government has been prepared to take
action to restrict captive imports, or any other imports apart from
Japanese cars. As signatories to the Treaty of Rome, the Government is
not in a position to take action against Community imports which, even
if it attempted to do so, would be strongly resisted by Ford, GMand the
other multinationals because of the effect that any policy of this
nature would have on their international sourcing policies; whilst
discriminatory action against imports from outside the Community would
be in breach of G.A.T.T. (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
In effect, therefore, the Government is relatively powerless to
directly influence and control the policies of the multinationals. At
best, government can only put pressure on the British-based
manufacturers to source more of the home market from British production
facilities, or encourage other manufacturers (e.g. Nissan) to set up,
operations in the UK. In the main, many of these companies have been
sensitive to government concern about rising imports and their impact on
the balance of payments, and have responded by buyi ng Bri t ish
components, partly as a defensive measure and partly because they are
compet it i ve. As a resu It, by the end of the 1970s the components
industry was larger in terms of employment, capital, sales and exports
than the car industry (Dunnett, 1980).
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Conclusions
Tyre manufacturing is an integral part of both the rubber and motor
components industri es and, as such, tyre output is determi ned by the
corporate policies of the vehicle and tyre companies, as well as by
market changes within the two industries.
The stagnation and decline in tyre output since the beginning of
the 1970s can therefore be attri buted to a number of inter-related
factors:
1. The spread of the radial tyre coincided with the first oil crisis
which together contri buted to mass ive overcapaci ty in the Brit ish
and European industry, much of it redundant capacity. The lack of
investment by the British tyre compani es ensured that the UK was
•
holding a far larger amount of obsolete capacity than her European
competitors, and consequently Britain suffered a far larger
reduction in capacity and,hence jobs, than her continental rivals.
2. Dunlop was slow in responding to Michelin's technological
breakthrough, and the company was left holding a surfeit of
obsolete crossply and textile radial capacity when the market
shifted to steel radials. Thus, Dunlop's failure to invest in
modern auomated plant resulted in the company, with the exception
of Firestone, cutting more capacity and shedding more jobs than
her competitors.
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3. Over the postwar period British manufacturing industry suffered
from under-investment, leaving British industry less competitive
and profitable than the Japanese and Europeans. Thus, the domestic
output of cars slumped as the British manufacturers lost market
share abroad and the home market became vulnerab 1e to styl ish
imports from Japan and Europe.
Further, as the vehicle companies began to integrate their European
operations during the early 1970s, the home market suffered an
influx of "captive" imports from the more modern continental
plants.
The net result was that the demand for tyres for original equipment
fitment declined.
4. Meanwhile, the tyre companies similarly began to integrate their
European operations, which also resulted in a large increase in
"captive" imports from the continent. In addition, there was also
a large increase in "competitive" tyre imports to meet the
replacement needs of the foreign vehicle imports.
Thus, the replacement market was depressed by the large influx of
"competitive" and "captive" imports, as well as by the increased
radialisation of the market.
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Appendix 2
The Dunlop-Pirelli Union
The two compan ies agreed to merge in the Autumn of 1969, but the
impending merger was not officially announced until Spring 1970. The
passage of time was taken up tackling the fiscal, legal, administrative
and profi tissues thrown up by the merger plan. Dunlop was advi sed on
how to structure the Union by Lazards. It was important, certainly as
far as their respective share prices were concerned, that it was seen as
an agreement between equal partners and not a disguised takeover. This
principle led to certain operating activities being excluded from the
Union, but they were not sufficiently large to affect the basis of the
Union. The exclusion of these subsidiaries left each company
contributing some £170 million worth of net assets (Thomas,1971, p.65).
I
Next the two compani es had to adopt common accounting princip1es
because of differences between British and Italian accounting practice.
Price Waterhouse were engaged to resolve this matter. The parameters of
these accounting principles were set by national laws and stock exchange
rules. One major difference was that British companies had been legally
obliged since 1948 to publish consolidated accounts, whereas no similar
stipulation existed in Italy. Thus the more stringent demands of the
London Stock Exchange caused the common accounting principles to more or
less reflect standard British practice. This left Pirelli having to run
two accounting systems, one for Ita1ian 1ega 1 requi rements, the other
for the purposes of the Union.
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The four principle areas of reconciliation were the basis of
depreciation charges, stock valuation, the employees severance fund and
deferred tax provisions (Ibid). If we take the example of stock
valuation, the Italians operated a system of LIFO (last in, first out),
whi ch was condemned in the UK by SSAP9 and was not recogn i sed by the
In 1and Revenue for tax purposes. Instead the Bri ti sh operated FIFO
(fi rst in, fi rst out), which was consequently adopted as the common
basis by the Union.
Taxation also presented a number of problems. In order to retain
thei r separate 1ega 1 and nat i ana 1 i dent it i es, both Dunlop and Pi re 11i
had to create new compani es to Own thei r operating assets. Thi s,
however, would have left the parent companies, under the laws operating
in the two countries, liable for capital gains tax on the paper profit
made by the transfer of assets. In Britain, the matter was dealt with,
in the 1970 Budget, which waived Dunlop rs liability to capital gains
tax, providing that the purpose of the sale was to facilitate a genuine
merger. Similarly, Dunlop incurred no tax liability for reducing its
holding in subsidiaries to below 75%, as the company had to do under the
terms of the agreement with Pi re 11i • The Italian company similarly
benefited from legal arrangements made in Italy to exempt it from
capital gains tax.
Details of the Union
The Union was a complex arrangement as shown by the corporate
structure in Fi gure 1. The Union compri sed three main compani es:
Dunlop Holdings, the new parent company; Pirelli SpA, the Italian
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holding company; and Societe Internationa1e Pire11i SA, the Swiss
holding company.
The Swiss company (SIP) was set up in 1920 to overcome the
international trading constraints imposed in Mussolini's Italy. SIP
held a 12% stake in Pirelli SpA and owned all the Pirelli companies
operating outside the EEC. To achieve a trading balance, because
Italian law prohibited equal partnerships, the two partners exchanged a
49% equity stake in each of their European subsidiaries and a 40%
holding in each non-European subsidiary for a corresponding stake in the
partner's subsidiaries. Pirelli SpA and SIP acquired a joint 40% stake
in the newly formed Dunlop International Ltd, which owned all
subsidiaries outside the UK, except New Zealand and Canada, plus another
40% holding in the Dunlop subsidiaries operating in these latter two
countries. Pirelli SpA took a 49% stake in the newly established Dunlop
\
Ltd, which held all the subsidiaries in Britain, Holland, France,
Ireland and West Germany. Pirelli Ltd, the UK operating company, proved
the exception to the rule. In this particular case Dunlop had to take
the controlling interest in order to comply with legislation set down
in the Restrictive Trade Practices Act (1956).
Initially, some companies were excluded from the Union; Dunlop
omitted its International Sports company and Dunlop Rhodesf a, while
Pirelli held back some Italian subsidiaries and an American selling
company. A11 of these compani es were 1ater, either absorbed into the
Union or sold.
Figure 1 Proposed Corporate Structure
DUNLOP
HOLDINGS t---t
LTD
60%-1 DUNLOP INTERNATIONAL LTD ~40%--- -,
I
I
I
51%4L-_.....:D_:..;UN..:..::L..:..:.OP~LT.,.:_D_ __,~49%
I~40%--- -,
I
DUNLOP (NEW ZEALAND)
60%~ HOLDINGS LTD
DUNLOP CANADA LTD
49% -~fINDUSTRIE PIRELLI SpA f- 51%
PIRELLI SpA
49%~ SUBSIDIARIES IN BELGIUM 4r51%
FRANCE AND GERMANY ,
,
40% -1OTHER PIRELLI COMPANIES ~60% - - ---:
I,,
51%-1.....__ P_IR_E_L_LI_L_TD __,r.-49%-- - - -,
Source: Dunlop, December 1970~ p.8
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443
The basic principle of the Union was that each parent company
should retain control of its original subsidiaries. This 1eft both
compani es holding the balance of power in areas which had been thei r
traditional preserve - which was perhaps an early indicator that a rapid
rationalisation programme was being planned (Economist, 12 December
1970) •
Management Control
To control the Union, an effective system to enhance co-operation
and communication had to be established. Details of the management
structure of the Union are shown in figure 2. The apex of the structure
was the Central Committee which contained both chairman, who chaired the
Committee in alternative years, and three executive directors from each
company. This Committee met every month to decide and co-ordi nate•
policy and strategy for the Union. However, for fiscal reasons the
Central Committee only acted as an advisory body, making recommendations
to the Boards of the parent companies on operations and plans for the
Union. Executive control and authority rested with the parent
companies, whilst responsibility for each company within the Union lay
with the partner with the highest percentage holding. Under the terms
of the Union, each partner had the right to be represented on the Board
of each jointly owned company.
Below the Central Committee were a number of product or funct ion
orientated committees, staffed by a representative from each partner.
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The Functional Committees were limited to the two senior managers from
each side of the Union. Beneath these lay a number of other committees,
for example, the Tyre Co-ordinating Committee, which had subsidiary
marketing and technical groups, while the Consumer and Industrial
Products Co-ordinating Committee had subsidiary committees for each
product. The purpose of all of these committees was to avoid
duplication of effort.
It was envisaged that this management structure would allow the
Union to operate on a single management control basis, enabling both
compani es to follow the same product p1anni ng programme. Dunlop and
Pire11i were also able to deri ve mutual benefit from exami ning each
other's work methods, visiting one another's factories and through
discussions on how to improve quality and performance. Close
co-operation was also established between the two puchasing departments,
\
allowing them to significantly reduce their costs through joint buying
of raw rubber and polymers. It was estimated that joint purchasing
a11owed the Union to make savi ngs of more than £1 mi 11ion per year
(Economist, 3 February 1973, p.55).
Integrating research and development proved more difficult to
achieve, in spite of the fact that it was one of the prime motives
behind the merger. The major problem here was that Dunlop's
laboratories were centralised, while Pirelli's were de-centralised
(Crawford, 1972, p.232). Pirelli was reknowned for its engineering and
technical expertise, whic~ Dunlop badly needed access to, whilst Dunlop
was better known for its specialist research into polymers. By
combining these attributes, it was hoped that the Union would be able to
develop a broad range of new products. In fact Dunlop admitted that it
would not have been possible to develop the Denovo (total mobility) tyre
so quickly without Pirelli's help (Economist, 3 February 1973, p.55).
There was, however, little progress in the area of joint marketing,
mainly because the two companies believed that it was strategically
important to maintain separate brand names. Having two distinct tyre
ranges allowed the Union two chances of winning the same original
equipment contract, which was tactically extremely important, especially
when the negotiating power lay with the vehicle manufacturers rather
than the tyre producers. An add;tiona 1 reason was that an ;ntegrat ion
of brands would have led to rapid rationalisation and job losses; a move
which would have been strongly resisted by the trade unions.
An Assessment of the Union
The Dun lop-Pi re 11 i Union was percei ved in many quarters as the
possible shape of things to come for, if successful, it could have
served as a model for other trans-European mergers. In the event this
proved not to be the case, and in this section we shall consider the
strengths and weaknesses of the merger, and question whether the Union
was ill-conceived from the very beginning.
The evidence available shows that the Union was plagued by a number
of problems from the outset. It cost Dunlop and Pirel1i some £3 million
between them to form the Union (Stanbrook, 1970, p.975); equivalent to .
nearly one-fi fth of the combi ned net attri butab 1e earni ngs of the two
companies in 1969. This was mainly spent on reconciling tax and
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accounting differences, and developing a common accounting basis.
If we consider the five year financial statements for Dunlop and
Pirelli, prepared in accordance with the common accounting principles,
we can see from tables 2 and 3 that both companies were in a weak and
deteriorating financial position.
The Dunlop statements show that from 1965-69, profit margins
averaged 6.8%, peaking at 7.3% in 1968. In the same year operating
profits reached a peak of £31.8million, producing attributable profits
of £11.2 million. The following year the slowdown in sales growth,
accompanied by rising costs, produced a slight fall in operating
profits. However, when higher interest payments were taken into account
net attributable profits fell to £9.3 million.
The performance of the Pirelli companies going into the Union had
also been extremely poor. Turnover at Pirelli did increase more rapidly
than at Dunlop, but it slowed appreciably after 1967. A comparison of
the profi tabi 1ity of the two compani es over thi s five year peri ad
reveals that the results of Pirelli were more volatile. This was
because the profi t margi ns of Pire11i were squeezed as sales growth
slowed down, falling from a peak of 12.9% in 1966 to 6.3% in 1969. As a
result, Pirelli reached its peak of profitability in 1966, with
operating profits of almost £35.7 million and net attributable profits
of £14.8 million. By 1969, operating profits had slumped to £24.8
million and net attributable profits fell to 6.2 million.
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Table 2 Dunlop - Combined Profit and Loss Account of those Companies
and Divisions included in the Union (Years ended 31st December)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Sales 330,053 338,648 378,335 435,762 479,364
------- ------- ------- ------- -------------- ------- ------- ------- -------
Operating Profit 22,070 22,299 25,299 31,835 31,453
Investment Income 67 44 82 108 187Associates 593 357 427 638 971
Profit before Interest & Tax 22,730 22,700 25,808 32,581 32,611Less: Interest 4,775 5,590 5,274 5,925 8,248
Profit before tax 17,955 17,110 20,534 26,656 24,363Taxation 7,491 7,178 8,847 12,846 11,454
Profit after tax 10,464 9,932 11,687 13,810 12,909Less: Minorities 1,785 1,844 2,167 2,607 3,603
Attributable Profit 8,679 8,088 9,520 11,203 9,306
======= ======::= ------- ------- -------------- ------- -------
Source: Dunlop, 3 December 1970, p.13
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Table 3 Pirelli - Combined Profit and Loss Account of those companies and
Divisions included in the Union (Years Ended 31 December)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Sales 239,940 275,362 316,210 351,429 392,896
------- ------- ------- ------- -------------- -------
Operating Profit 25,242 35,652 31,669 31,771 24,806
Interest Income 57 21 56 56 102
Associates 710 850 990 1,210 1,370
Profit before Interest & tax 26,009 36,523 32,715 33,037 26,278
Less: Interest 5,533 6,785 7,082 7,823 10,339
Profit before tax 20,476 29,738 25,633 25,214 15,939
Taxation 8,075 11,859 11,094 8,336 4,187
Profit after tax 12,401 17,879 14,539 16,878 11,752
Less: Minorities 2,853 3,067 1,736 4,945 5,533
Attributable Profit 9,548 14,812 12,803 11,933 6,219======= ------- ------- ------- --------------
Source: Dunlop, 3 December 1970, p.16
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The poor trading performance of Pirelli and its impact on Dunlop is
shown in Table 4. An analysis of the pro-forma Union profit and loss
account shows that the rate of growth of sales was already starting to
slow down after 1967. In that year turnover increased by 13.2%, but by
1970 the rate of growth had fallen to 10%, while profit margins narrowed
to 6%. In fact, the results for the two years prior to the formation of
the Union, 1969 and 1970 were pretty dismal. Operating profits in both
years at £56.3 million and £57.2 million respectively were significantly
down on the 1968 figure of £63.6 mi 11ion. Further, the subst.antf al
increase in interest charges in 1969 and 1970, led to a sharp fall in
attributable profits, from £23.1 million in 1968 to £10 million in 1970.
Thus:
"Judged by figures alone, Europe's newest giant appears to
have been born, not from aggress ive strength, but from a
defensive posture (Thomas, 1971, p.69).
,
Worse was to follow when the symmetry of the Union was shattered in
the first year of trading, when Pirelli's Italian subsidiary suffered an
unprecedented trading slump; declaring losses of £18.6 million under the
common account ing princip1es. The root cause of the problem was the
large increase in inflation, particularly wage inflation in Italy, which
coincided with stagnation in the Italian tyre market (Economist, 3
February 1973, p.54).
Pire11i had already lost its monopoly of supply contracts with
Fiat, and was now beginning to suffer from the growing competition with
Michelin. In response Pirelli advanced its $300 million programme of
re-equi pping its f ector-ies with radi a1 technology. This planned
expansion, however, coincided with recession in Italy in 1971, leaving
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these plants operating at no more than 70% of capacity (Crawford, 1972,
p.228) . Furthermore, strong opposition from the Italian unions
prevented the company from cutting costs by shedding labour.
Evidence of this mistimed expansion in Italy is provided by the
substantial increase in interest charges, up from £18.6 million in 1969
to £27.5 million in 1970, rising to £30.5 million in 1971. As a result
of these losses at Industrie Pire11i, Union attributable profits,
instead of more than doubling from the £10 million declared in 1970 as
the partners had hoped, slumped to a disastrous £1.3 million.
It is not entirely clear when Dunlop became aware of these pending
losses at Industri e Pire11i. However, to protect the interests of
Dunlop shareholders and to insulate them from these Italian losses, the
parent companies agreed that Dun10p's 49% holding of ordinary shares in•
Industrie Pire11i should be converted into Preferred shares, so that the
cumulative losses of the Italian subsidiary would fall first on the
ordinary shares held by Pirelli SpA. By this arrangement all losses
attributable to Dunlop were to be carried forward in Pirel1i's accounts.
However, these losses had to be fully covered by profits in subsequent
years before Dunlop could participate in the profits of Industrie
Pire11i. In effect, Dunlop had to forfeit 49% of its European earnings
in return for nothing from its own stake in Industrie Pire11i - a major
blow to Dunlop because the Italian subsidiary was initially viewed as a
very profitable part of Pire11i. Reciprocal arrangements were similarly
made in the capital structure of Dunlop Ltd, allowing the holding by
Pire11i SpA to be converted into Preferred shares. The respect ive
voting rights of Dunlop Holdings Ltd and Pire11i SpA in the two
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subsidiaries nevetheless remained unchanged.
In 1972, there was no improvement in the Italian economy and the
country continued to be plagued by industrial unrest, resulting in a
further loss of £21.1 million by Industrie Pirelli. It was now apparent
that these losses would continue into 1973 and that, unless appropriate
action was taken, they would completely wipe out Pirelli SpA's holding
in Industrie Pirelli, valued at the time at around £46 million. Any
losses above this amount would have had to be borne by Dunlop. This
would have been a particularly heavy burden to bear because Dunlop's
attributable profits in 1971 were just £11.6 million and, in 1972, they
amounted to just £13.4 million. Furthermore, Dunlop would not have been
able to use any of these losses on its holding in Industrie Pirelli as
an offset against taxation.
Continuing losses would have proved disastrous for Pirelli as
well, since under Italian law a capital recontruction is required once
accumulated losses total one-third of a company's total capital. In
1971, Indus trie Pirelli had, under Italian accounting principles, lost
around £ 10 mi 11ion with a further £15 mi 11ion expected in 1972 and
continuing losses expected thereafter (Investors Chronicle, 3 November
1972, p.50]). With the total capital of Industrie Pirelli standing at
around £90 million, it would not have been too long before accumulated
losses reached £30 million •.
On 25 January 1973., the Board of Dunlop Ho1dings announced that
Pirelli SpA would assume full financial responsibility for Industrie
Pirelli, and that Pirelli had secured the necessary short and long-term
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loans from its bankers. Dunlop Holdings would make no further
investments in the Italian subsidiary until it returned to
profitability. Instead Dunlop's investment went into its own plants in
France, Germany and Sweden. Dunlop also had to write off its £41.5
million investment in Industrie Pirelli against reserves, wiping 40p per
share off the value of its asset backing (Investors Chronicle, 26
January 1973, p.367). As a result, Dunlop's surplus on reserves
declined from £47.6 million to a meagre £5.89 million.
The results for 1973, howtver, proved to be more encouraging and
Industrie Pirelli was able to cut its losses to £5 million from £21
mi 11ion the previ ous year. This was due to the pick-up in the Ita1ian
economy and the efforts of Pirelli to reduce costs and increase
efficiency. Profit margins improved from 6.2% to 8% and in spite of
higher interest charges, brought about by r:ising interest rates and
increased borrowings, attributable profits increased from £3.7 million
in 1972 to £17.3 million in 1973. Outside Italy, higher financing
charges resulting from Dunlop's continued investment in radial
technology caused attributable profits to fall to £22.4 million.
In 1974, the effect of copper price movements and steeper interest
charges led Industrie Pire11i to declare a loss of £11.6 million.
Margins became squeezed as the first oil crisis made its impact felt on
manufacturing industry and the world headed for recession. The Union
balance sheet meanwhile remained top heavy because of the large
borrowings of Industrie Pire11i, as reflected by the debt/equity ratio,
which increased from 88.2% in 1970 to 107.2% in 1974. Outside Italy,
the level of borrowings was more manageable, with the level of debt to
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equity standing at 70.7%.
The problems at Industrie Pire11i continued into 1975, culminating
in the company increasing its share capital by £20 million (Lire 30
billion) to strengthen its financial position. This share increase was
wholly subscribed for by Pire11i SpA, causing Dunlop Holdings' share of
the equity to be reduced to 30%. After 1975, less information about the
Union was disclosed in Dunlop's Annual Report. No balance sheet for the
Union was disclosed from that date, whilst the combined profit and loss
account including the Pire11i Group, also ceased to be made available.
In 1977, Dunlop produced its last Union profit and loss account,
excluding Industrie Pirelli. Thereafter, no financial statements
relating to the Union were disclosed, signifying that the merger with
Pire11i was becomi ng 1ess important to Dunlop, and that the company's
l
main focus of attention was its own troubled European tyre operations.
A major reason why Dun lop formed the Union with Pire11i was to
reduce its dependency on tyres and to participate in the lavish returns
being earned from Pire11i's cable interests. Consequently tyres, which
accounted for 55% of Union sales in 1967, had fallen to 49.5% by 1974
(see table 5b). Over the same period of time the cables and engineering
products group increased their share of sales from 22% to 24.4%, and the
Industrial products group from 9% to 12.1%. In terms of profits, the
change around was even more pronounced. In 1967, tyres produced
operating profits of £3?2 million (table 6a), equivalent to 56.5% of
total operating profits (table 6b). By 1969, however, operating profits
from tyres had slumped to £22.4 mi11ion or 1ess than 40% of total
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operating profit, mainly because profit margins were squeezed from 8.4%
to 5% over this period. Once again this was early evidence that tyres
were going to be a major drain on the financial resources of the Union.
Margins recovered in 1970, but this was short-lived, as margins
continued to narrow throughout the 1970s, falling to 4.5% in 1974.
In 1972, cables replaced tyres as the Union's main source of
operating profits. The margins earned on cables were particularly
attractive, reaching a peak of 16.3% in 1973. Only the margins earned
by the Supply group were higher, averaging nearly 20% between 1967 and
1974. Not surprisingly, Pire11i began to devote a larger proportion of
its resources to the cable busi ness, so that by 1980 cables accounted
for 43% of the company's tota1 sales compared with 41% for tyres
(Marfe1s, 1983, p.220).
In the same year, Dunlop's participation in Industrie Pire11i fell
still lower. A consortium of Pire11i's creditor banks, led by
Mediobanca of Milan, invested some $50 million in Industrie Pire11i via
a consolidation of debt and a capital increase,' which more than doubled
the capital stock of the company. This gave the banking consortium a
23% stake in Industri e Pire11i, whi 1e the parent company's stake was
reduced from just under 70% to 58%, and Dunlop's share fell to 19%.
Dunlop did not participate in this reconstruction because it was facing
problems of its own. More significantly, Pire11i separated the loss
making tyre operations from the profitable cable operations by setting
up a respective subsidiary company. This reconstruction effectively
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signalled the end of the Union, with the recovering Pirelli unwilling to
help the now ailing Dunlop finance the modernisation of its tyre
operations.
In the three years up to the beginning of 1981, Dunlop had spent
over £50 million modernising its European tyre facilities (Dunlop, 7 May
1981, p.2), but further capital expenditure was still needed to improve
their competitive position. 8y early 1981, the heavy losses from the
tyre operat ions had wiped out the share of capital and reserves of
Dunlop Ltd. Pire11i was, however, unwilling to subscribe any new
capi ta 1 to the reconstruction of the company, thus 1eavi ng Dunlop to
bear all future losses. This would have left Dunlop in the impossible
pas it i on of all ocat i ng a substant i a1 share of the profi ts from its
overseas operations to Pirel1i, which amounted to £9.1 million in 1979
and £7.7 million in 1980 (see table 7), while receiving nothing in
return from the troubled Pi re 11i operations. Furthermore, Dunlop had,
for many years been sufferi ng adverse cash flow from the Union (see
section on cash flow). In these circumstances maintaining the Union in
its present form appeared to offer little benefit to either party.
Beth companies accepted that the original aim of the Union, to
create a single business entity, was becoming increasingly difficult to
rea 1i se. In recent years ne; ther company had been prepared to di rect
funds towards common investment projects. Instead both compani es had
concentrated thei r resources on rat i ana 1is i ng thei r own bus inesses in
Europe and by investing in the expanding non-European markets. Since
1978, Dunlop and Ptre l l i, had been engaged in discussions to seek ways to
rearrange the structure of the Union to take account of the changi ng
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circumstances, including the possibility of fuller integration. As
their holdings in each other's European operating companies gradually
became diluted, so the justification for maintaining the Union in its
original form slowly weakened. In the end, Dunlop and Pirelli decided
that it was in thei r best interests to end the partnershi p, but they
agreed to continue to co-operate in areas where it was of mutual
advantage, including purchasing, marketing and distribution.
Perhaps if Italy had not turned sour so early on things may have
been different. If these problems had not occurred, then it is likely
that the operations of Dunlop and Pirelli would have become more
integrated, making it extremely difficult to dissolve the partnership.
Early integration may also have made the Union strong enough to
withstand the impact of the oil crisis, the recession in Europe, and the
stagnation of the European tyre market, which were later to compound the
existing problems and further undermine the Union.,
Dissolution of the Union
On 23 April 1981, Sir Campbell Fraser, the Chairman of Dunlop,
announced to The Stock Exchange and the press that the Union between
Dun lop and Pire11i was to be termi nated. It was agreed that the
partnership should be dissolved in two stages, the first with effect
from 1 July 1981, invo 1ving the return of the minori ty interests that
Pire11i SpA and Dunlop Holdings held in each others' European operating
companies, with the exception of Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd. The
second stage involving the transfer of the remaining minority interests
he1din each others' compani es took effect from 31 December 1981. In
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addition, ajustments were made for any imbalances of cash flows, in
respect of additional investments and dividends, which had arisen since
the inception of the Union.
We can now see how each partner benefited from the Union, firstly,
in terms of any net gain or loss of the share of attributable profits,
and,second1y, as a result of cash flow movements between the partners.
Table 7 The Effects of the Dissolution of the Union on the Profit and
Loss Accounts of Dunlop and Pire11i (before extraordinary
items), 1976-80 (Em)
Attributable Profits £m 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Total attributable to
Dunlop from Pire11i 10.7 8.7 5.2 (0.6) (0.3)
====
Attributable Profits from
Dunlop to P1rel 11 £m
Dunlop Ltd 7.4
3.9
3.0
5.6
(4.9)
6.7
( 12. 7) (25. 1)
9.1 7.7Overseas Operations
Total attributable to
Pire11i from Dunlop 11.3 8.6 1.8 3.6 (17.4)====
Net Benefit (Detriment)
to Dunlop (0.6) 0.1 3.4 3.0 17. 1====
Source: Dunlop, 7 May 1981, p.10
Table 7 shows that Dunlop's share of profits from Pirelli had
turned into small losses' in 1979 and 1980, due mainly to losses incurred
in Spain and Argentina. Meanwhile, Dunlop Ltd, the UK operating
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company, similarly started to suffer heavy losses between 1978 and 1980;
in total £42.7 million, 49% of which was attributable to Pirelli. This
does not mean that Pirell i had to pay any money to Dunlop to cover its
share of the losses. Instead, Pire11i's share of Dunlop Ltd's share
capi ta 1 and reserves was reduced by the appropri ate amount. Further
attributable losses to Pirelli in 1981 however, completely eliminated
its shareho1ding in Dunlop Ltd. With Pire11i unwilling to subscribe to
any new capi ta 1 injection into the company, all further losses wou1d
have been borne by Dunlop regard1 ess of whether or not the Union was
di sso 1ved. Had the Union not been in operat i on between 1976 and 1980
all of these profits and losses, before extraordinary items, would have
been attributed to Dunlop.
Pire11i, on the other hand, had also been able to secure
increasing profits from Dunlop's relatively profitable overseas
•
operations. Nevethe1ess, the earnings from these operations were not
sufficient to offset the growing losses at Dunlop Ltd. As a result,
Pire11i suffered heavy losses amounting to £20.1 million from its share
of the Union in 1979 and 1980.
If we consider the five year period from 1976 to 1980, we can see
that in 1976, Dunlop's share of profits from Pirelli was £0.6 million
less than those which were attributable to Pire11i from Dunlop. In all
other years the reverse had been the case, enabling Dunlop's profit and
loss account to benefit to the extent of £23.6 million between 1977 and
1980.
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Cash Flow
Tab 1e 8 shows the effect of the Union on Dun lop I s net cash flow
over the period 1976 to 1980. It is evident that Dunlop suffered a cash
outflow in each of these years, due to a number of reasons. Over the
five year period, the dividends paid to, and the investments by, Dunlop
in Pirelli amounted to £24.2 million. This was significantly larger
than those received by Dunlop which totalled £14.9 millions; producing
Table 8 The Effect of the Un1onon Dunlo~'sCash Flow, 1976-80 (£m)
1976 1977 .1978 1979 1980
Dividends from Dunlop to
Pire11i (3.0) (3.6) (3.3) (1.5) (2.3)
Dividends to Dunlop from
Pire11 i 1.8 3.0 2.6 2.1 2.1
Investments by Dunlop in
Pirell i (7.0) (2.2) (0.3) (1.0)
Investments in Dunlop by
Pirelli 3.3
Financing charges incurred (0.8) (1.4) (1.7) (2.5) (3.2)
ACT and corporation tax (0.7) (1.0 ) (1.5)
Cash inflow (outflow) (9.7) (5.2) (0.9) (2.9) (3.4)
----- ===== ----- ----- =====
Source: Dunlo~ 7 May 1981, ~.11
a net outflow from Dunlop of £9.3 million. Added to this was'
compensati on for the loss of use of this cash. In other words, the
financing charges were calculated on the basis that, if the cash
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compensation to be paid to Dunlop had been available to the company at
the beginning of each relevant year, it would have reduced the Group's
UK borrowings by that amount. Over the five years this added up to £9.6
mi11ion. The only other additions were: unrecovered ACT suffered on
dividends paid to Pirelli plus corporation tax paid, which would have
been reduced by Group relief had the Union not existed. This totalled
£3.7 million. Under the terms agreed for the dissolution of the Union,
Dunlop was paid £22.1 million to compensate it for the adverse cash flow
suffered since the inception of the Union.
465
Appendix 3 Financial Statements
The Product Group
Tables la and 2a provide information on the composition of sales
and operating profits by product group for the period 1970-83. The two
accompanyi ng tab 1es, 1band 2b, analyse these resu 1ts as a percentage
breakdown of total sales and profits by product group. An inspection of
these tables shows that the tyre product group had been making a
declining contribution to both total sales and total operating profits.
In 1970, tyre sales, at £353.5 million, accounted for almost 63% of
turnover. By 1975, this share had fallen to 60.6%, and even in 1979, a
record year for tyre sales in money terms, the tyre group only accounted
for 57.2% of turnover.
Turni ng to operating profi ts, it can be seen that profi ts from
tyres increased from around £30 million in the early 1970s, to a record
£45 million in 1976, before tailing off and falling to a record low of
just 13 million in 1980. After that profits recovered, and in 1983 tyre
profits increased sharply to £41 million, due mainly to the performance
of the North American subsidiary (see table 4a). Measured in terms of
the share of aggregate operating profits, table 2b shows just how poor
the performance of the tyre operations had been. From a peak of almost
70% of total operating prof.its in 1971, the tyre group's share fell
sharply to 25% by 1978, and in the same year its contribution to total
profits was surpassed by the industrial products group. The tyre
group's share then recovered, but this owed as much to the declining
performance of the industrial products group after 1979, as well as to
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increased tyre sales in North America.
Overall the performance of the other product groups had also been
poor, mainly because a number of those divisions which make-up the
individual product groups were highly dependent on the motor industry
and, were therefore, subject to any oscillations in vehicle demand. For
example, the Fluid Seal, Polymer Engineering, and General Rubber Goods
which were important divisions within the industrial products group, had
been adversely affected by the decline in vehicle output and, more
recent ly, by the growi ng trend by the British car manufacturers to
source engi nes, gearboxes and other components from overseas supp 1iers
(Annual Report, 1982, p.12). Meanwhile the Oil and Marine division,
which was part of the same group remained the world's leading producer
of offshore floating oil hose.
The Engineering products group experienced similar problems. The
Automotive Engineering division had similarly experienced a reduction in
the demand for wheels, concomitant with the fall in vehicle production.
The most successful divisions were those producing Dun10pipe, used for
conveying abrasive and corrosive fluids and, most importantly of all,
the Aviation division, which was one of the world's major suppliers of
tyres and components to the aircraft industry. It managed to increase
its sales and profits in eight consecutive years to reach record profits
in 1981 (Annual Report, 1981, p.ll). No details were disclosed of the
size of the profits earned by the Aviation division, though it was
reported to have accounted for almost half the Engi neeri ng group's
profits in 1976 (Annual Report, 1976, p.9).
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The Consumer and Sports product groups also suffered from
declining profitability, though in the former case profits did increase
from a low of £2 million in 1981 to £9 million in 1982 and finally to
£11 million in 1983. The Chemical products division, specialising in
DIY adhesives had been particularly profitable in the early 1980s,
whilst the Dunlopi1lo division was already affected by the recession in
the furniture industry. The Sports group had simi 1ar1y been earni ng
very low profi ts, due main1y to growi ng compet ition from Far Eastern
producers (Annual Report, 1977, p.12), and in 1982 the group recorded a
loss of £1 million.
Profit Margins
From table 3 it can be seen that the profit margins on tyres were
being squeezed, causing them to fall from 8.4% in 1971 to 1.9% in 1978 •
•
There was a slight recovery in 1979 but then margins fell to an all time
low of 1.7% in 1980. However, even the substant iali mprovement in
margins brought about by plant closures and job losses since then failed
to convince Dunlop to continue producing tyres in Europe. Sir Campbell
Fraser, Chairman of Dunlop and President of the Confederation of British
Industry, addressing the 84th annual shareholders' meeting explained
why:
"The question that can properly be put (he told the meeting)
is whether tyres in. Europe will ever be a reasonable
business earning a reasonable rate of return on investment"
(Financial Times, 20 September 1983, p.18).
The answer to this question was clearly no and the deal with Sumitomo
(discussed in a following section) provided Dunlop with the opportunity
to rid itself of this loss-making operation.
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Compari ng the profits earned on tyres with those of the other
product groups, we can see that Dunlop had consistently earned a higher
margin on Industrial Products and Engineering since 1973 and 1974
respectively. Whilst fierce competition in the market for sports goods
had eroded profits. Indeed the only very profitable group was
Plantat ions. However, faced with mounting debt and the need to raise
finance, together with political pressure from the Malaysian Government,
keen to see vital assets locally controlled, Dunlop was forced to
sell-off its plantations. It was probably this divestment that
ultimately confirmed Dunlop's plans to sell-off its tyre manufacturing
facilities in Europe.
Sales by Product Group and Regional location of Company
Dun10p's strategy had, since the beginning of the 1970s, been to,
reduce its dependency on tyre manufacturing and to concentrate on
deve 1oping other areas of its business interests. This policy was
elaborated by John Dent, Managing Director, Dunlop ltd, of Diversified
"
Products:
"One of Dun10p's objectives is to increase the share of its
resources devoted to the profitable production and sale of
Industrial, Consumer and Engineering products, and to
increase their range. This we aim to achieve by energetic
support for the growth of current sales; by regenerating
and expanding the range of products of existing Divisions
in the Company; by developing fresh products; and entering
entirely new markets, sometimes by acquisition" (Annual
Report, 1978, p.8).
.472
Table 4a provides information on the extent of the divestment by
geographical regions. In money terms there had been a trend decline in
sales by the UK tyre division since 1978, when sales reached a peak of
£265 million before falling to £190 million in 1983. In terms of total
UK sales, tyres share fell from 47.9% in 1977 to 37.7% in 1983. In the
rest of the EEC, rationalisation of the tyre operations was instigated
1I •••••• as part of the overall strategy to bring the European
tyre group back to profitability" (Annual Report, 1979,
p.10).
At the same time, the cost cutti ng programme implemented by Dunlop,
together with the reduction in the workforce, contributed to large
improvements in productivity in the tyre operations of a magnitude,
15-20% (Annual Report, 1980, p.3).
If we look at the other regions, tyre sales by and large were
•
depressed, and there was a general tendency by Dunlop to reduce its
dependency on tyres, with North Ameri ca as the main except ion to the
rule. Here, tyre sales increased to £278 million in 1983; equivalent to
82.5% of total sales by the American subsidiary company, making it
Dun10p·s major producer of tyres (by turnover) worldwide and the market
leader in sales of motorcycle tyres in North America. This was brought
about by:
IIProductivity increases in both manufacturing facilities ••••
combined with reinvestment in modern equipment, (which)
enabled considerable cost savings to be made (Annual
Report, 1984, p.12).
The importance of the North American market to Dunlop can be seen
from table 4b. The American subsidiary was able to increase its share
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of tyre sales to the point where it accounted for 29.2% of the Group's
sales in 1983. The UK tyre division by contrast saw its share of total
tyre sales fall to less than 20% in the same year.
Any reduction in the share of total sales lost by tyres resulted
in an increased share for diversified products (that is all other
product groups excluding tyres). The bulk of sales by Dunlop ltd, the
UK operating company, was of non-tyre products, but after 1979, sales of
diversified products fell from £354 million to £314 million in 1983. In
other words, although Dunlop ltd became less dependent upon tyre
manufacturing than the Dunlop subsidiaries, this was not compensated for
by any substantial increase in sales of diversified products. Indeed,
table 4c shows that Dunlop ltd's share of total sales of non....tyre
products fell from a peak of 56% in 1980 to 48.3% in 1983. The UK
operat ing company remained Dunlop's major source of sales, though the,
European Community and North America became increasingly more important.
The divestment away from tyres in the UK and the concentration of
resources in other product areas did not by itse1f guarantee that
non-tyre activities were safe from closure. Although Dunlop had
extended the product range of a number of these groups; for example,
Dunlop Irrigation Services was formed in 1977 as another division of the
Industri a1 products group, and new compani es were also acqui red to
complement or to add to the existing product range (including Soil-Less
Cultivation Systems ltd, a company specialising in hydroponic and
nutrient cultivation), other companies were sold off across the product·
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range as part of Dunlop's policy of rationalisation and retrenchment
(these included Redditch Mouldings and Energy Engineering Divisions), or
simply closed (like the rackets and frames factory at Waltham Abbey).
Dunlop 'also tri ed to reduce its dependency on the motor industry,
especially as a number of divisions were major suppliers to British
Leyland, and were therefore vulnerable to any reduction in Leyland's
vehicle output. Dunlop found it difficult to alleviate the problem by
gaining orders elsewhere, because many of the foreign motor companies
operating in Britain tended to design in~house or had cultivated their
own suppliers. The net effect of this strategy was that the vehicle
industry only accounted for 15% of the total sales of the i ndustri a1
division, compared with roughly 25% in 1978, which in turn led to a 60%
reduction in employment within the division (Newman, 1982, pp.57 and
129) .
Sales Policy
Although the UK had become a re 1at i ve1y 1ess important base for
both the manufacture of tyres and diversified products, it still
remai ned Dunlop's 1argest market. Tab1e 5a shows that measured in
nominal terms, the domestic market produced peak sales of £618 million
in 1979. Thereafter, sales declined before recovering slightly to £504
million in 1983.
A similar pattern occurred in the EEC, where sales peaked at £420
mi11ion in 1979 and stood at £394 mill ion in 1983. The operat ions in
North America by comparison achieved an initial 'peak of £172 million in
477
1976, before falling back to £147 million in 1980, from where sales rose
sharply to £337 million in 1983.
Taking an overall perspective of sales, the UK operations saw
their share of total sales fall from 43.1% in 1971 to 31.4% in 1983.
This decline can be directly attributed to Dunlop's postwar strategy of
reducing its dependency on the UK. According to Heller (1969):
"Dunlop is moving up from a remarkable 60-40 split in favour
of overseas to 70~30 - which helps to explain £90 million
of overseas investment in the past decade". (p.60).
A1an Lord, then Managi ng Director, of Dunlop Internat iana 1 Ltd,
explained how this policy objective had been pursued:
"Looking to the future we have three objectives overseas.
First, we shall continue our policy of exporting from
Britain wherever that is possible. Second, we shall
broaden the base of our overseas compani es when we judge
that to be the best way to serve the local market, and by
local diversification from existing lines. Last, we shall
be on the lookout for opportunities to extend the Group's
geographical range" (Annual Report, 1978, pp.8~9).
To assist with the implementation of this strategy, in 1978,
Dunlop International Ltd, the parent company for the majority of non-EEC
subsidiaries, became a Swiss-:-registered company by transferring from
England to Switzerland, to facilitate investment in non-tyre activities
outside Europe. As the company explained:
"The main advantage .of the move will be that Dunlop
International can become more responsive to overseas
opportunities" (Ibid, p.18).
The GMWU, on the other hand, saw it as an attempt "to bypass UK exchange
and industrial policy constraints" (GMWU, 1978, p.12).
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Against this policy background it can be readily understood why
Dunlop was not prepared to invest heavily in its domestic tyre
operat ions. By contrast, higher 1eve1s of capita1 expenditure in the
North American tyre operations were responsible for the American
company increasing its share of total sales to 21% in 1983. Meanwhile
the recovery in sales of tyres and diversified products, after the large
falls in 1980 and 1981, allowed the EEC companies to raise their share
back to pre-recessionary levels.
Profits by Region
Although the UK companies were Dunlop's major source of turnover,
they were also the 1east profi tab 1e - though this was not always the
case. Table 6a shows that between 1972 and 1977 the British-based
compani es earned 1arger profi ts than compani es in other parts of the,
world, culminating in a peak of £31 million in 1976, or 35.6% of total
profi ts (table 6b). Thereafter, profi ts fell sharply and an operat ing
loss of £15 million was declared by the British~based companies in 1980.
Plant closures and job losses slowly reduced these losses, allowing the
British subsidiaries to break-even in 1983.
The thrust of Dunlop's policies to extend the geographical spread
of its activities was certainly beneficial to investors. In 1971, 50.6%
of total profits were earned by the UK and European companies.
Gradua 11y, however, the non-European operati ons started to account for
the larger proportion of profits, particularly as losses in the European
tyre facilities outweighed profits from the non~tyre operations.
Eventually in 1983 all of Dunlop's profits were earned outside Europe.
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Table 7 confirms that the highest profit margins were being earned
in Central & South America, Africa and Asia/Australasia. This was in
spite of the fact that a far 1arger proportion of their sales, as
compared to the UK (see table 4a), were dependent on tyres.
Undoubtedly, their margins were not squeezed to the extent that they had
been in Europe. In addition, their non-tyre operations were evidently
less dependent upon the motor industry as well.
The North American facilities were similarly reliant upon tyre
production for a high proportion of their sales, yet profit margins were
a1so rising. This was unquest ionab ly due to heavy capital expenditure
in modern manufacturing plant.
Size of Market
As the British compani es became an increas ingly 1ess important
source of turnover and profi t, the UK in turn also became a 1ess
important market. From accounting for one-third of worldwide sales, the
UK's share had fallen to a quarter. by 1983 (table 8). This was in line
with stated company policy of extending its global geographical spread.
An additional factor was the decline in manufacturing industry in
Britain, and the slow growth of the British economy during that period
compared with other industrialised countries.
Sales in the home market reached a peak of £506 million in 1979,
before falling by 12.6% in 1980 and 8.6% in 1981, followed by a slight
recovery ingrowth of 1% in 1982 and 1.2% in 1983. Exports suffered a
similar fate, with sales down 3.9% in 1980 and 13.4% in 1981.
482
Table 9 reveals that the position had been reached by 1982,
whereby sales in the EECwere on a par with those in the UK; indeed in
that year they were actually higher. If we look at the position of the
who1e of the European market in g1oba1 terms, we can est i mate that in
1979 total European sales accounted for 63.9% of Dunlop's world sales.
By 1981, sales in the European market had fallen below 50%, before
recovering to 57.4% in 1982. Meanwhile, North America emerged during
the 1980s as Dunlop' s fastest growi ng market ~ and second in terms of
importance to Europe. In 1979, North America accounted for 10.5% of
Dunlop's worldwide sales, by 1983 this figure had doubled to 21.3%.
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Exports
The Group's exports from the UK increased broadly in line with the
turnover of the UK operations, averaging approximately a quarter of
sa1es. After a periad of almost cant inuous growth, exports reached a
peak of £155 million in 1979 (table lOa). In 1980, they dropped
slightly to £149 million, equivalent to 27% of UK sales; further
evidence that Government policies had hindered manufacturi ng industry
long before the recession was felt in Europe.
The product groups most affected were tyres and consumer goods.
Tyre exports, which had been increasing up to 1978, declined sharply
between 1979 and 1982 .As a resu1 t, thei r share of tota1 exports,
presented in table lOb, declined from a high of 29.5% in 1973 to a low
of 17.4% in 1980. But in 1983 tyre exports increased sharply to £35
million, or 26.9% of the total, mainly due to the large increase in the
export of radia1 truck tyres and other tyres to the United States.
Export earnings from consumer goods had in the meantime slumped to £6
million in 1983.
Industrial products still remained the prime source of overseas
earnings, though even they were affected by the recession and the
development of foreign manufacturing facilities. Exports of Industrial
goods more than quadrupled between 1972 and 1980 to reach £70 million.
This sharp increase in sales is reflected by the fact that their share
of total exports jumped from 33.3% to 47% over this 9 year period. .
Their share then proceeded to decline, but unlike tyres they experienced
no upturn in 1983. The Engineering group, and to a lesser extent the
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Sports group, were the 1east affected, with the former experi enci ng a
slight increase in earnings over this period. This enabled its share of
exports to rise substantially after 1980, mainly because of the relative
decline in earnings of the other product groups.
Exports by Country of Destination
The European Community emerged in 1975 as the major export market
for Dunlop's UK operations. Tables lla and llb reveal that exports to
the EEC quadrupled between 1973 and 1980 to reach £49 mi11ion, some
32.9% of the total. Unfortunate ly, Dunlop' s accounts do not
disaggregate this data by individua 1 product groups, so one can only
assume that the decline in earnings from the EEC was primarily due to a
reduction in tyre exports. Significantly, the rest of Europe remained a
major export market, mainly because Dunlop had few manufacturing
facilities there, and therefore needed to source this market with
exports.
Africa and Asia/Australasia were important markets, though they
too suffered a down-turn in trade due to the recession in the early
1980s, whilst North America became a more important market owing to the
high value of the dollar. However, any significant change in the dollar
relative to sterling could reverse this trend, as happened after 1976
with the large rise in value of the petro-pound. In addition, the sale
of Dunlop's European tyre interests, a major supp 1ier of tyres to the
American market, will also severely depress earnings from this source.
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Investment
Summarising the preceding sections, we can see that Dun10p's
strategy of spreading its geographical and product base ensured that
Britain would become both a less important manufacturing base as well as
market for the company. The expansion into overseas markets left fewer
funds available to invest in British production facilities.
Table 12a details capital expenditure by region between 1968 and
1983. The statistics for 1971 to 1974, which was the main investment
period, are not direct1y comparab1 e to earl ier or 1ater years because
they include those Pire11i companies which formed part of the Dun lop-
Pire11i Union. Over this period Dunlop-Pf rellt invested £310 million,
of which £170.6 million was spent on expanding capacity (55% of total
expenditure) and £139.4 was spent on replacement and modernisation (45%
of total expenditure).
,
If we break this down further from the
information available, we can calculate that from 1972 to 1974, 19.1% of
total investment was expended in the UK compared to 55.1% in Europe.
However, given that the British manufacturing facilities were older than
those in Europe, the level of investment was insufficient to make them
competitive with the more modern continental plants. This is because
from 1958 to 1967, Dun10p's capital expenditure worldwide amounted to
£163 million, of which £73 million was invested in Britain; and compares
to a g1oba 1 investment programme over the previ ous decade of just £77
million (Heller, 1969, p.70). However, as we saw earlier most of this
investment in the UK went on replacement and modernisation, as opposed.
to expendi ture on the 1etest plant and machi nery, The bu1k of the
investment in installing new capacity was therefore established outside
of the UK.
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Dunlop's long-term strategy of reducing the level of investment in
British production facilities is also confirmed by table 12b, which
shows that in 1983 only 33.3% total capital expenditure was spent in the
UK. Given that Britain was still the company's main tyre production
base, and even after allowing for any cyclical patterns of investment,
this was a compartively small amount. Bearing in mind that in real
terms (adjusted for inflation), total investment was at a level which
was roughly half that pertaining in 1968.
Alternatively, investment can be measured nominally in terms of
numbers employed. Only since 1976 has it been possible to calculate
detailed disaggregated statistics for all of the regions. One of the
main disadvantages of this measure is that the UK was at that time still
the main centre of operations, and therefore retained a significant head
count of head office personnel. However, even allowing for this fact,
it is unlikely that this alone could explain why investment per,
employee was consistently lower, indeed in some cases considerably
lower, than that prevailing in most of the other regions. Furthermore,
the recent narrowi ng of the gap between investment per employee in
Britain and that in the other regions had more to do with the reduction
of the British workforce than to any increase in capital expenditure.
By contrast investment in the United States was increasing, whilst the
size of the workforce remained unchanged.
Investment by Product Group
Tab 1es 13a and b analyses capi ta 1 expendi ture by product group
between 1976 and 1983; no information was disclosed for earlier years.
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Further, this information was not disaggregated by region which would
allow an analyst to see precisely how much was being invested, for
examp 1e, in the British tyre factori es compared with the European and
North American facilities.
The bulk of investment was concentrated in tyre manufacturing, with
most of the expenditure, particularly in the UK, used to convert
product ion to steel radi a1 technology. However, in 1ine with company
policy of concentrating investment in diversified products, the share of
investment allocated to tyres fell from 72.1% in 1976 to 59.1% in 1983.
The main beneficiaries were the Industrial and Engineering product
groups, who saw their shares' of total capital expenditure rise to 18.2%
and 12.1% respectively.
Research and Development
A major determinant of future potential sales is ultimately the
amount of resources devoted to research and development. Table 14 shows
that the amount of money spend on R&D, in nomina1 terms, more than
doubled from £15 million in 1976 to £36 million in 1982. If expressed
in terms of sales we can see that there was an increase from 1.2-1.3%
between 1976-79, to 1.9% in 1980 and then to 2.4% in 1982. However,
this can be attributed more to the slow down in sales than to any real
increase in R&D expenditure. In fact, if allowance is made for
inflation, R&D in 1982 war at a level roughly equivalent to what it
was in 1976. Similarly, the increasing proportion of gross value added
spent on R&D was more a reflect ion of the reduction in gross value
added, especially after 1980.
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Table 14 Expenditure on Research and Development, 1976-82
£m R & D% R&D (ratio)
£m 1976 Prices Sales Gross Value Added
1976 lSE lS 1.2 0.03
1977 16E 13.8 1.2 0.03
1978 17 13.S 1.2 0.03
1979 20 14.1 1.3 0.03
1980 26 lS.S 1.9 O.OS
1981 29 lS.4 2.0 0.06
1982 36 17.7 2.4 0.06
E - Estimates
Sources: Dunlop Annual Reports
Few details were disclosed of how R & D was spent, though .we do
know that in 1981, nearly half was spent on diversified products, the
rest on tyres (Annual Report, 1981, p.16). It was not revealed how this
breakdown compared with previous years, thoqgh it is highly probable
that after 1976 more emphasis was placed on the non-tyre product areas,
and that this was reinforced by the formation of the Dunlop Technology
Division in 1980, which incorporated the R&D facilities. However, the
philosophy of the new Division was not to be totally pre-occupied
developing new products. Instead emphasis was placed on developing new
processes for direct application to existing operations, and for
reducing costs. The fact that R&D spending had not increased in real
terms was indicative of the fact that Dunlop was not planning on
developing many new markets.
Employment
Between 1970 and 1983, Dunlop+s workforce worldwide fell by just
over SO%, from 107,000 to,63,000. The bulk of these job losses occurred
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after 1979, with employment falling by 45.9% between 1979 and 1983
compared with 8.4% from 1970 to 1979. Table 15a shows that the majority
of jobs lost over this period were in the UK. Here, employment fell
from 55,500 to 22,000; a reduct ion of 60%. Once again most jobs were
lost, roughly 50%, in the years from 1979-83, whilst 20.7% were lost
from 1970-79.
The decline in employment in the UK can be attributed not only to
government policies and the recession after 1979, but also to Dun10p1s
policy of concentrating its resources on 'overseas production and
investment. The consequences of this policy was that the British
workforce as a proportion of total employees declined from 51.9% in
1970 to 41.5% in 1983 (table 15b).
Emp1oyment in the European Conununity, by contrast, held up much
better (after allowing for the consolidation and re-consolidation of
Dunlop S.A., France), so that numbers employed in 1983 were only 4,000
below the 1977 level. This allowed the EEC countries (excluding
Britain), owing to the greater loss of jobs outside the mainland
community, to increase their share of the total 1abour-f'orce from 17.6%
in 1977 to 26.4% in 1983.
The trade unions were clearly aware that Dunlop was pursuing a
policy of investing more heavily outside Britain, but they were unable
to do little about it. Accor~ing to the Birmingham Trade Union Resource
Centre (1983) , the conference held in Liverpoo 1 in 1975, attended by
shop stewards from Britain, Germany, Italy, France and Spain did discuss
"Dunlop vs strategy of transferring investment to the poor world to
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exploit cheap labourn (p.9). However, as we can see from tables 12a and
b any increases in capital expenditure outsi de of the UK duri ng this
period was going to the industrialised countries of Europe rather than
to the Third World. This much was recognised by the GMWU, which
reported to delegates at the National Conference for the rubber industry
that the UK:
n•••••.has grown least quickly of all
impression gained from recent years is
overhauled by the European market in the
next decade" GMWU, 1977, p.18}.
markets, and the
that it will be
early part of the
Moreover,
n.•.•.•between 1974 and 1976, UK employees as a percentage of
total worldwide employees fell from 49.S% to 47% ••••••Given
the allocation of investment plans during the remainder of
the 1970's, this percentage seems very 1ike1y to cont inuefallingn (Ibid, p.2S).
As it turned out, Europe did not overtake Britain as Dunlop's major
market, though North America did emerge as an increasingly more
important market. The problem for the trade unions, however, is that
they are re1atively powerless to determi ne the sales and investment
policy of an employer. If successful this would ultimately be at the
expense of jobs in other parts of Europe and the world. To counteract
the inherent power of the employers, the unions would need to organise
across international boundaries, but as we saw in chapter 6 any attempts
to mobilise action at this level have proved short-lived.
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Employment by Product Group
Tables l6a and b reveal that the largest proportion of job losses
occurred in tyre manufacturing, with employment falling from 57,000 in
1976 to 30,000 in 1983; a fall of 47.4%. As we saw earlier, most of
these jobs were lost in the "shake-out" after 1979, with tyres and the
industri a1 products group sufferi ng a 42.3% and 50% reduct ion
respectively.
largest group
employment.
Nevertheless,
employer in
tyre manufacturing still remained the
1983, account ing for 56.6% of tota1
We noted earlier that since 1979 Britain had experienced a greater
loss of tyre manufacturing capacity through plant closures than any
other European country. On top of this, with the exception of
Firestone, Dunlop closed down more capacity in Europe that any other
company, the greater part of which was located in the UK. In 1978,
Dun1op's British workforce engaged in tyre manufacturing stood at
11,500, but with the closure of Speke and Inchinnan, followed by job
cuts at Fort Dunlop and Washington, employment had slumped to 3,500 by
1982; a cut of 69.6%. Of the 23,000 jobs displaced from Dun1op's tyre
manufacturing operations worldwide, between 1978 and 1982, 8,000 were in
Britain; that is equivalent to 34.8% of the total tyre jobs lost. As a
result, the UK accounted for only 10.9% of total employees working in
tyre manufacturing in 1982, compared with 20.9% in 1978.
This reduction in numbers employed contributed to substantial·
improvements in company performance, as measured in terms of profit per
employee (tables 17 and 18) and sales per employee (tables 19 and 20).
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Even before adjusting for inflation, and allowing for the fact that
there had been a s1owing-down in the rate of growth of sales, it is
clear that Dunlop was able to achieve a significant increase in
productivity. The major improvement coming from the tyre group, where
profit per employee, measured in money terms, more than trebled between
1979 and 1983.
Table 16a Average Number of Employees by Product Group, 1976-83 (OOOs)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Tyres 57 57 55 52 40 39 32 30Industrial 15 16 16 16 15 12 10 8Consumer 11 10 10 11 9 8 7 7Sports 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 4Engineering 6 6 6 6 5 4 5 4Plantations 7 7 7 7 7 7Total 102 102 100 98 81 75 59 53
Source: Dunlop Annual Reports
Table 16b Percentase Breakdown of Averase Number of Employees by Product
Group, 1916-83
Tyres 55.9 55.9 55 53.1 49.4 52.0 54.2 56.6Industrial 14.7 15.7 16 16.3 18.5 .16.0 16.9 15.1Consumer 10.8 9.8 10 11.2 11.1 10.7 11.9 13.2Sports 5.9 5.9 6 6.1 6.2 6.7 8.5 7.5Engineering 5.9 5.9 6 6.1 6.2 5.3 8.5 7.5Plantations 6.9 6.9 7 7.1 8.6 9.3Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Calculated from table 16a
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